THE TOURIST AS A METAPHOR OF THE SOCIAL WORLD
The Tourist as a Metaphor of the Social World

Edited by

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The Tourist as a Metaphor of the Social World

Graham M.S. Dann

Introduction

John Urry, in his recent Sociology Beyond Societies, claims that ‘much of our understanding of society and social life is based upon, and reflected through, various metaphors’ (Urry, 2000: 21). Warming to his theme, and later on the same page, he becomes more emboldened when he categorically asserts that ‘sociological thinking, like any other form of thought, cannot be achieved non-metaphorically.’ In order to reinforce his position, he approvingly cites Sontag (1991: 91) as declaring that ‘one cannot think without metaphors’, and Hawkes (1972: 60), who states that ‘all language is fundamentally metaphorical, as is the way that it is communicated to others.’

Much, much earlier, Aristotle (384–321 BC), in his study of figurative signs, had asked the question: ‘is literal meaning possible?’ (Aristotle, 1960, 1984). Part of his response came from the etymology of the word metaphor (the carrying from one place to another – from the literal to the figurative (both related by similarity of implicit comparison)). Since the literal is not entirely deleted in the process, but ‘remains as a semantic background in conflict with the literal, Aristotle’s comparison theory of metaphor may be described as dualistic’ (Nöth, 1990: 129). According to the Greek philosopher, such carrying over is achieved via analogy that includes similarity (as in a riddle) (Nöth, 1990: 132). Because the iconicity of metaphor depends on cultural codes, and cultures themselves vary, there can be no universal metaphors. More importantly, however, Aristotle (and
the Scholastic tradition that followed him) believed that there was nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses. Thus judgements are formed via a process of abstracting out the essences of phenomena. These mental statements are articulated subsequently by referring back through speech to particular instances of these a posteriori universals. In other words, the possibility of literal (non-metaphorical) truth formed the other part of Aristotle's answer.

There are thus two principal opinions on the matter – (communicated) knowledge is composed either entirely or partially of metaphors.

It is not the intention here to enter this complex debate. Nor is such an exercise considered necessary as long as some place is found for metaphor in the human communication process. More germane to the task at hand is to gain an understanding of:

1. The nature of metaphor;
2. The ways that metaphors operate;
3. The relationship of metaphors to a changing social world; and
4. The tourist as a metaphor of the changing social world.

These four issues constitute the infrastructure of this brief essay. They act as an introductory framework for the other contributions to this volume.

The Nature of Metaphor

If Aristotle is correct in assuming that human knowledge is sense-based, and hence materialistic, it would seem to follow that enunciated truth is correspondingly relative. Thus, most, if not all, disciplines taught at university are based on relative truth. Even so-called ‘hard sciences’ depend on arbitrary constructs (such as the square root of minus one, transfinite numbers, a temperature of absolute zero, perfect elasticity), and ‘softer’ social sciences are replete with ideal types that by definition cannot be reified (e.g. perfect competition, the Protestant ethic). Much of sociology’s early theorizing, too, was clearly based on metaphor (e.g. Organicism (and later Functionalism) likening society to the human body, as well as exchange theory and conflict theory (cf. Urry, 2000: 23–24)). Given the ubiquity of this relative truth, only intuited or revealed truth, it would seem, has the possibility of being absolute. It is this first situation that requires metaphor in order to supply an understanding that goes beyond the literal.

The second scenario, at first sight, does not automatically need metaphor as a condition for understanding. However, on closer inspection, humans, being formed with bodies, do require metaphor for insights into the absolute realms of theology and metaphysics, i.e. those branches of knowledge concerned with truth in the spiritual domain. The story of
St Patrick instructing the Irish in the mystery of the Trinity by making use of a three-leafed clover is particularly illustrative in the current context. Even Christianity itself has been described by one of its bishops as metaphor (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001), just as the Italian thinker, Vico (1984), believed that metaphor pertained to a divine or heroic age. Several religions, too, employ a metaphor of ‘paradise’ because the idea is so difficult to envisage.

What then is metaphor? According to Nöth (1990: 128), metaphor can be considered in a narrow or broad sense. The former is a particular trope among such related figures of speech as metonymy, synecdoche and hyperbole, whereas the latter can apply to all such figures of speech, all uncustomary uses of vocabulary, all departures from conventional language.

Taking the first sense of the word, metaphor has the properties of transfer (replacement, substitution, translation) and similarity (likeness, comparison, analogy). Metaphor thus is often referred to as ‘motivated’, in contrast to the literal which is said to be ‘arbitrary’ (i.e. accepted conventionally (Nöth, 1990: 130)). Metaphor is also considered to comprise ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ (Richards, 1936). While tenor encompasses the concept to be understood, vehicle speaks to the imagery needed to convey at least one of its meanings. Thus, in the Shakespearian metaphor of ‘the sun as the eye of heaven’, the sun (which in certain respects is like an eye) is the tenor, and the eye is the vehicle for representing or carrying the sun (Nöth, 1990: 129).

Some metaphors are ‘unique’ (as, for example, the original and idiosyncratic creations of poets that depart from historically determined convention of the language norm). Others are ‘recurring’ – even to the point where their employment warrants their inclusion in everyday speech (e.g. ‘bottleneck’ in relation to a traffic jam), that is to say, they have become ‘lexicalized’, or even ‘clichéd’, in the case of overuse. Still others are ‘opaque’ (where the original literal meaning has vanished, e.g. ‘radical’ having lost its meaning of ‘from the root’), ‘dead’ (e.g. ‘news magazine’, where ‘magazine’ originally meant ‘storehouse’) or ‘resurrected’ (a reversal of the metaphorization process) (Nöth, 1990: 131).

The Ways that Metaphors Operate

Since metaphor compares two ‘different things on the basis of the characteristics they share’, it takes the form ‘x is y’ (e.g. ‘time is money’ (Elgin, 1993: 146)). Here, the focus is on points of similarity that have been carefully selected and communicated. Provided that both speaker and addressee understand the comparison, metaphor can become ‘the most powerful device available to us for changing people’s attitudes, quickly, effectively and lastingy’ (Elgin, 1993: 146).
On the other hand, metaphor can, paradoxically, display signs of linguistic poverty, since the use of the same word in different situations (e.g. the word ‘head’ to apply to the head of a bed, the head of a nation, the head of a pimple, the head of a man) reveals a limitation in the choice of words. Moreover, the ruling out of a literal interpretation, through the use of metaphor, is to restrict the otherwise boundless power of speech to descriptions that are basically untrue (e.g. ‘the hammer of his diction’ cannot refer to a real hammer (Burke, 1966: 462)).

Despite the foregoing strength and weakness of metaphor, one common usage, and indeed merit, is its ability to reduce the strangeness and unfamiliarity of a concept or its referent. In tourism publicity, this technique frequently is employed in relation to the targeting of destinations in the developing world to those residing in developed countries (Dann, 1996: 172–174). Thus, Puerto Vallarta becomes the Mexican St Tropez, Kandy is said to be the Lourdes of Sri Lanka (Cazes, 1976), Otavalo is likened to Banff (Atkinson, 1991) and Blumenau in Brazil to Kitchener, Ontario (McIntyre, 1991), Mopti is referred to as the Venice of Mali, and the potential threat of national or tribal differences is minimized through the metaphor of a mosaic (Tresse, 1990).

Not only are places and their peoples presented in a familiar fashion, but so too is the surrounding environment of mountains, rivers and lakes, as well as the cultural artefacts and heritage, via the use of life cycle language of an organic metaphor (Lowenthal, 1993).

Metaphor can also appear in travel promotions through visual cliché: the overuse of pictorial icons to convey and reinforce certain well-worn ideas. The notion of an island paradise can be quickly transmitted by injecting images of palm trees, vast empty beaches, crystal clear waters, and so on (Krippendorf, 1987), just as the friendliness of natives is evoked by the omnipresent smile. Of all these icons, perhaps the most frequently and uncritically employed is that of sunshine (Laurent, 1967), along with its connotations of freedom, healthy living, happiness and escape.

Williamson (1983) maintains that metaphor operates within a system of ‘indexical transference’, whereby the properties of one item are carried over to another. In advertising, where such a technique is often utilized, the idea of a better existence than that currently experienced is conveyed via the qualities of the promoted product or service which have been assimilated from its surrounds. Thus, luxury cigarettes, when placed alongside a copy of The Times and a vintage bottle of brandy, can assume the connoted characteristics of good taste, breeding, upper-class behaviour, etc. Similarly, an 18–30 female holidaymaker, clutching a bottle of wine in a hotel swimming pool, appropriates the signification of wine as emblematic of la dolce vita. That is why she is shown as laughing. She may, of course, also be indicating her sexual availability to an audience of approving young men cheering her on (Uzzell, 1984). Such is the associated problem with multivocal signs, including those contained in polysemic metaphors.
The Relationship of Metaphors to a Changing Social World

Under the condition of modernity, the world was very much an ordered universe of rational decision taking, of equivalence and literal truth. The straight railway line as the shortest distance between two points epitomized such logocentrism, as indeed did the coterminous emergence of capitalism and the industrial processes it spawned. In architecture and town planning, too, whole cities were bulldozed to eliminate the premodern labyrinth of winding streets and alleyways in order to make way for grand boulevards leading to the buildings and other sites deemed crucial to the orderly functioning of society. Amid such an ambience, there was little room for metaphor – realism ruled the day.

However, with the advent of postmodernity, and the de-differentiation of social relationships, such hard and fast divisions began to dissolve (Lash, 1990). Earlier distinctions based on class, race, age and gender started to fade, the institutional cultural demarcations of education, the family, religion, health, politics and so on no longer operated as they once so clearly did under an orderly set of rules, regulations, statuses and roles. Parallel transformations occurred in the way that sociologists sought to understand society. Formerly steadfast theories of Organicism and Function-alism with their treatment of society as a Parsonian system of interdependent parts operating within a centralized value system became passé, and had to yield to more flexible models that questioned the scientific and positivistic assumptions of the past. These new forms of theorizing were instead much looser, more relative and less deterministic in nature. They were based on blurred boundaries and fuzzy sets, and took as their relativist opening line the Symbolic Interactionist axiom: ‘if people define situations as real they are real in their effects.’

Although some metaphors did exist under the earlier modernist regime, their quantum and scope were as limited as the static and systemic ideas they sought to incorporate and reinforce. However, under a postmodern ethos, there was rapid expansion in the amount and type of metaphor, as people tried to come to terms with a fast, flickering and fleeting world over which they appeared to have little control.

Bauman (1993), for example, taking the pilgrim as emblematic of modernity (with steps along the way leading to an ultimate prescribed goal), soon saw the need to replace this trope with the metaphors of the ‘stroller’, ‘vagabond’ and ‘player’ as singers in a postmodern chorus. These personae constituted a joint metaphor of a fragmented and discontinuous social life that militated against rational networks of mutual duties and obligations. Jokinen and Veijola (1997) later replaced these images with the respective metaphors of ‘paparazzi’, ‘homeless drunk’ and ‘womanizer’ – all incidentally male. To emphasize the powerlessness of women, they added the metaphors of ‘prostitute’, ‘babysitter’ and ‘au pair’. Hybrid metaphors, such
as those of ‘photographer’, ‘map-maker’, ‘viewer of landscapes’, ‘car driver’ and ‘television gazer’ were subsequently offered by Urry (2000: 78) in order to understand better an equally disjointed world.

The Tourist as a Metaphor of a Changing Social World

However, of all the metaphors used to capture the postmodern condition, none has perhaps been employed more frequently than that of ‘the tourist’. Just as modernity had its metaphor of ‘the traveller’, seeking the rational goal of educational improvement, the moral path of spiritual renewal, the scientific and imperialistic exploration of unknown territories, so too did post modernity seize upon the tourist as connotative of a dilettante life of fun in the sun and hedonism ad libitum in placeless destinations where the ‘other’ was cheerfully ignored in favour of the unbridled pursuit of individualism sans frontières.

From MacCannell (1989) and Urry (1990), the tourist became a centre of attention, not simply because s(he) represented a constituent element of the largest industry in the world, but rather because s(he) provided a sociological understanding of that world. In other words, the tourist, potentially at least, could reveal more about conditions in the generating society than ever s(he) did about the way of life in the receiving society – more about home than away. This extremely important point is easily forgotten, even by such illustrious authors as themselves, as they started to overlook their original mission and began to place their focus instead on the authenticity of attractions and the tourist gaze on the people and places of alterity – of the centre-out-there, rather than the centre-in-here.

The other equally significant consideration was that when such commentators wrote their treatises on the tourist, the world itself was a far different place from what it is today. Then, there was no e-mail and no Internet, no revolutionary forms of cyber-technology – a realization that raises the question of whether the tourist continues to act as a metaphor of a rapidly changing world5. It may also help rebut the view that ‘the tourist as a metaphor of the social world’ is a topic that has already been exhausted. Indeed, it is the belief of this writer that quite the reverse is the situation – the tourist as a metaphor of the social world is a theme still ripe for further investigation. The faster the change, the more germane the topic.

Take the case of the UK, for instance. Back in the 1970s, in the aftermath of Beatlemania, free love reigned and there was virtually no AIDS. Today, however, presents quite a different scenario. Not only do people live in terror of contracting such diseases, but also anthrax and other biological warfare spread by the terrorist cells in their midst. Britain is also a highly invigilated society – estimated by one source (Independent Television, 2001) to be the most closely monitored in the so-called ‘free world’. With closed-circuit television (CCTV) everywhere and much of its population...
treated like quasi-criminals, the conditions for escape through tourism have never been riper.

Such a state of psychological oppression, which is replicated in many other countries of the West, raises the seemingly paradoxical issue of whether now is the time for searching for ever newer metaphors to explain the tensions between freedom and constraint, or whether indeed older perennial metaphors should be employed in their stead (Bentham’s panopticon being a good example).

The answer probably resides in both options, since neither alternative mutually excludes the other. In other words, the presence of a postmodern ethos does not automatically exclude the use of perennial comparisons, which, by very definition, transcend the past, present and future. Simmel’s forms of socialization are as applicable today as when they were first articulated.

Metaphors related to the tourist in a moving social world thus need to be drawn from both tradition and change. Indeed, such is the message of the challenging essay in this volume by Tony Seaton. It has also been echoed recently by Nelson Graburn (2001) when he raises the possibility that metaphors (including that of the tourist) can be reversible.

Additionally it is worth noting at this stage that much of tourism theory to date has been based on metaphor and, if not metaphor, then simile. The tourist has been considered as a sightseer (Urry, 1990), as a stranger (Cohen, 1979), as a pilgrim in search of the sacred (Graburn, 1989; MacCannell, 1989), as a performer (Bruner, 1994), and as a child (Dann, 1989, 1996). The institution of tourism itself, too, has been thought of in such analogical terms. The phenomenon has been described as an international social fact (Lanfant, 1980), as play (Lett, 1983), as a form of imperialism (Nash, 1989) and as language (Dann, 1996). Indeed, the cynic might be tempted to argue that so many analyses have tried to say what tourism is like that it is becoming increasingly difficult to say what it actually is (Dann et al., 1988).

The cynic, of course, is wrong. The comprehension of any phenomenon, especially one as huge and complex as tourism, can never be complete. It is an ongoing project. It requires the piecing together of many parts of a jigsaw assembled from a variety of disciplines in order to obtain even a partial picture.

Matters are complicated further with the realization that one cannot simply speak about tourists and tourism as if there were just one variant of each. There are many different types and forms of both. Yet an appreciation of one (however deficient) can lead to an increased understanding of another, and it is precisely in such a cumulative fashion that knowledge is assembled.

Take, for example, the metaphor of an island. Tourists have always been attracted to islands for a variety of motives. Baum (1997: 21-22) identifies some of these features of fascination: the feeling of separation, of being cut off, smallness, difference, slower pace of life, escape, etc., and, in
the case of tropical islands, of sun-drenched, white-sanded, blue-watered coastlines.

However, and as Eriksen (1993) points out, an island can also itself be a metaphor for isolation and uniqueness. Indeed, many anthropologists have in the past found it useful for their Functionalist analyses of self-sustaining societies. Yet the current situation is somewhat more complex. The study of structure and regularity has, as a result of change (whether evolutionary (Darwinian) or diffusionist (Newtonian) global interdependency), given way to studies of process and unpredictability. Systems theory has yielded to chaos theory.

Insularity has also become a relative term. Whereas the inhabitants of Trinidad and Tobago may look to New York and Miami as escape routes, those living in St Vincent and Grenada may still regard Trinidad and Tobago as their Mecca. In contrast, mainland societies, though not entirely surrounded by sea, may nevertheless display psychological insularity whenever they disallow cultural minorities the same rights as natives or whenever they close their borders to immigrants.

Another metaphor of contemporary tourism (although clearly not just restricted to that domain) is the ubiquitous T-shirt. According to Cullum-Swan and Manning (2001), the humble T-shirt (itself an iconic metaphoric name derived from its shape) is a prime emblem of postmodern life (p. 2). It playfully oscillates between the announcement of a significant tourist experience (a picture of a visited waterfall in Oregon (p. 5)) and the false status claim for an experience (‘Oxford Eights, Spring, 1991’; ‘Property of Alcatraz’ (p. 5)). It can be a form of self-mortification (‘Old Fart’, ‘Old Fart’s Wife’ (p. 6)), a reference to a putative self (‘Kissing Instructor’ (p. 6)), or membership of a fictitious institution (‘Drunken State University’ (p. 6)). It can be a walking visual pun (‘Veni, Vidi, Visa’ (p. 5)), a mini-billboard advertising status-enhancing products (Gucci sunglasses (p. 6)), or a poetic code in which the message of the text refers to self-feelings (‘Happy Baby’ (p. 7)). In brief, the postmodern T-shirt is an item that ‘crosses social classes, gender identities and social situations’ (p. 9), just like its wearer – the tourist.

Yet, to the best of one’s knowledge, there has only been one analysis of the T-shirt by a tourism academic (Schlüter, 1998).

Separate Glimpses of the Tourist as a Metaphor of the Social World

The chapters that follow represent a selection of the many excellent presentations that were delivered at the XVth World Congress of the International Sociological Association. More specifically, they were prepared for that organization’s research committee on international tourism (RC 50), which took as its overall theme ‘the tourist as a metaphor of the social world’. The only instructions given to authors were that their
contributions had to be consigned a year in advance, that their papers should be more theoretical than empirical in nature, and generalizable. Most of the participants responded eagerly to the challenge and seemed to be quite clear in their minds about the nature of the topic. In one or two instances, however, potential contributors claimed that they either did not fully comprehend the theme or that they were unwilling to frame their studies in such a manner. Interestingly, no one argued that the subject had been exhausted previously – an opinion shared by this writer. Indeed, and as will soon become apparent, some were ready to prepare extensive critiques of those earlier works that had purported to tackle it.

As for ordering the material, in one sense such a task was quite arbitrary and open to a series of editorial alternatives. In another, however, the collection began to assume an internal logic of its own, and it is this emerging self-classification that is adopted here. What follows, then, is a piece by piece summary that provides a number of cumulative insights that derive from the past and point to the future. Nowhere is it suggested that the volume is comprehensive. Indeed, such significant omissions as may, and must, be detected, should encourage others to fill the void as part of an ongoing research agenda.

The collection begins, appropriately enough, with two contributions that raise serious fundamental questions about how academics should research (and hence theorize) about tourists. The first, by Graburn, tackles the issue from an anthropological perspective by stressing that today’s travellers, since they may be considered as analogous to other mobile subjects (such as migrants, the military, refugees and businessmen) can be studied ethnographically in similar ways. However, such a project presents a number of parallel problems – the temporary nature of tourist experiences, the difficulty of articulating true feelings when engaging in ritual activity, the need to supply linkages to other life experiences, and so on. Basing himself on the touristic metaphor of a life’s journey, with all its possibilities of regression, satisfaction of ongoing needs and transitions through rites of passage, Graburn suggests that if researchers are themselves like tourists exploring this odyssey to and from the city of social life, they must come to terms with both the inner and outer worlds of its participants.

Moore advocates a similar engagement with the subject, although his emphasis is more on the verbal practices and accounting procedures employed by the tourist. By focusing on the differential language of motivation and experience, word-of-mouth conversational contexts of both host and guest, instead of imposing the ideology and top-down categories of the researcher, one necessarily comes face to face with metaphor as socially constructed. Like Graburn, Moore agrees that life is like a journey. He adds, however, that because it is largely uncharted and unfamiliar, it must be negotiated discursively.

The next two contributions provide a critique of conventional tourism wisdom, particularly as articulated by MacCannell in his thesis of
authenticity, with its underpinning metaphorical assumption of a thwarted quest for meaning. McCabe asks why MacCannell never completed his ethnomethodological project, why he is so caught up with the touristic search for difference elsewhere that he neglects the home society from which it perforce originates. By placing the accent firmly on identity, the body and domestic space, McCabe argues that the tourist experience becomes more than simply a metaphor of the social world, since it exactly mirrors and replicates that everyday world, along with the social concerns of its members.

Jamal and Hill also focus on the home environment and the experiences of daily life, work and leisure. They argue for a clarification of the concept of authenticity, particularly in its personal dimension, and provide a typology that situates it philosophically and socially. By reconsidering the concepts of alienation, time, space and post-colonialism from a performative/phenomenological approach, they offer an alternative understanding of the social world in which the tourist is inserted. According to them, ‘tourism becomes a metaphor for a changing, bio-political world in which post-modernity, capitalism and globalization furnish complex meanings to authenticity and to the authentic in everyday life.’

Chapters 6 and 7, by Kuhn and Picard, respectively, seek to incorporate alterity into their analyses. Kuhn maintains that one cannot simply speak of the tourist as an unconnected individual without any relationship to the other, or, more importantly, to the system of trust or distrust that (dis)unites these human correlates. Using complexity theory metaphor, she claims that tourism is an intricate and evolving social network with varying degrees of trust that are based on the correlative processes of self-presentation and interpretation.

Picard, by adopting a neo-Durkheimian approach, conceptualizes the tourist and the social world within a paradigm of social facts so that the former becomes a sign of the latter. From this situation, two contested social worlds emerge – that of the tourist and that of the local – each with its own system of narratives, and with the tourist seeking to capture both. In Picard’s words, ‘as the linking agent of the local and the global, [the tourist] becomes a metaphor of locals’ participating and being in the world.’

Chapters 8 and 9, which in some ways are the most challenging, are linked through their common association with the past. For Seaton, the tourist is never entirely alone on an uncharted journey, because there are always those who have undertaken it before. Hence there is a metempsychotic walking in the footsteps of a significant other (or, in the case of several personae, an operation of metensomatosis). His thesis draws its metaphorical inspiration from Benjamin’s *flâneur*, Barthes’ dethroning of the author in the literary text and Althusser’s interpellation.

Hennig, on the other hand, bases his analysis on myth. By asking the recurring question as to whether or not tourists experience reality, he looks for new answers in the complementary realms of imagination, fantasy,
dreams and the worlds of literature, film and fine arts. By initially adopting a Schutzian perspective, Hennig argues that both systems can operate simultaneously in the same individual – one at the pragmatic level, the other at the level of myth. Myth, however, is not understood in Barthian terms, but rather as a vehicle of ultimate redemptive values whose moral claims infuse social discourse and can be actualized through the pursuits of non-heroic, ordinary persons. Among these myths that have a special significance for tourism are those of Nature, the Noble Savage, art, individual freedom and self-realization, equality and paradise. While they all have their roots in the past, they also operate in renewed forms today.

Chapters 10 and 11 are far more sensate in orientation. Lengkeek provides a striking analogy between tourism and love in all its many phases. Beginning with flirtation and advancing through the stages of contact, dating, being in love and having a steady relationship, varying intentions are revealed towards the ‘other’, mindsets that are paralleled in the tourist leaving the home environment in order to discover difference elsewhere. The media of tourism promotion seduce the tourist into savouring the sublime, into entering a relationship with nature that encompasses the qualities of out-there-ness, discontinuity and even death. His wide-ranging analysis is reminiscent of Cassou’s (1967: 27) observation that:

Le phénomène du voyage se confond avec un phénomène d’amour, impliquant tous les épisodes possibles de l’amour, ses approches, ses jeux, ses cristallisations, ou bien ses coups de foudre, jusqu’à la désorientation et au dépaysement, au changement du destin, à l’acceptation d’un destin nouveau, totalement différent, incarné dans une femme fortuitement rencontrée et par qui s’accomplit le Grand Œuvre.

(Travel is like love, involving all its possible phases – its approaches, its games, its crystallisations, or its claps of thunder, even to the point of temporal disorientation or spatial displacement, from a change of place to the embrace of a new and totally different destination, as if in the bodily form of a woman met by chance, through whose union a masterpiece is accomplished (own translation)).

Lengkeek’s contribution also calls to mind what some commentators have recently been saying about tourism as a binary phenomenon where alterity is regarded in feminine terms (Swain, 1995: 250) and where landscape is a gendered construction of the world (Kinnaird et al., 1994: 22–23).

Just as Lengkeek stresses that tourism, like love, is multisensory, so too do Dann and Jacobsen emphasize that it is necessary to go beyond traditional analyses that focus solely on ‘the tourist gaze’. By promoting the olfactory, and how its otherwise hard to articulate descriptions are treated in travel accounts, they argue that places and their peoples are portrayed for tourists according to an aromatic moral hierarchy that ranges from pleasant, via neutral, to offensive. The tourist, they maintain, is led by the nose not only through space, but also through time, the latter consideration evoking
one of the most powerful motivational factors in tourism today – the capturing of and journeying to the past through memory and bitter-sweet nostalgia.

The next two essays highlight the fact that not all tourists are identical and hence, by implication, that the tourist as a metaphor of the social world must be understood as a multiple persona figurative of complex reality. Wearing, by drawing attention to the interesting case of ‘volunteer tourism’, believes that one can only understand this non-traditional and altruistic variant by linking the many selves that capture it to those of the disadvantaged inhabitants of visited host communities. Into this interactional amalgam of meaning construction and the power of self-presentation, the tourist experience of identity becomes an ongoing negotiated process that extends beyond the boundaries of time and space. It also takes the analysis of tourists and tourism much further than the conventional categories of escape and sightseeing.

Diganace and Cusack adopt a different approach by looking at a given destination and exploring the many definitions imposed by tourists on the same situation. For them, Glastonbury in the southwest of England is a contested site offering multiple choice for pilgrim tourists ranging from traditional Christians to New Agers, not to speak of those who travel there for the annual Festival, sightseeing, shopping or any other motive. Their point is that this town for all seasons is not unique in being open to polysemic interpretation. Since there are many other such places visited by tourists, it may be necessary to rethink the metaphor in conflictual terms.

Finally, there are three contributions that are decidedly postmodern and futuristic in outlook. Wang’s account of the tourist as peak consumer argues that it is no longer possible simply to refer to consumers in Functionalist language as undifferentiated counterparts to producers, or even to talk about segmented consumers. Instead, it is necessary to explore differing consumer roles of the same people through time and space, dimensions that are bounded to greater or lesser degrees by ordinary and extraordinary constraints. The ‘peak consumer’ transcends the limits of daily and weekend consumption as s(he) moves into an oneiric universe where the dream comes true, and where the major principle governing the budget is moral hedonism – the consumption of luxury space and luxury time – the utopian, deroutinized consumption of paradise and ever new experiences. It is in this ultimate sense that the tourist is a metaphor of the social world.

For their part, Morkham and Staiff explore the intersection between the cinematic and tourist experience. Drawing on the work of the cognitive psychologist, Daniel Stern, they show that both the film viewer and the tourist (through the processes of spectatorship and meaning making) exist in a dynamic relationship with otherness, which is a critical component of the ongoing enunciation of contemporary subjectivity. The latter, in turn, develops through four distinct senses of the Self, which react to the
surrounding social world in a series of encounters. Thus, both the tourist and
the watcher of film are metaphors of the social world from which they derive
meaning.

Prideaux, appropriately enough, goes several stages further than most
other contributors by taking a far-reaching look into the proximate and
remote future. By placing the accent on travel, he argues that it is possible
to trace an evolutionary process that encompasses pre-contemporary,
contemporary and post-contemporary phases, thereby providing a metaphor
for all times. Naturally, it is the final stage that attracts the greatest attention,
since here the cybertourist is revealed as the product of the latest and forth-
coming technology, including that derived from artificial intelligence,
nanobot-enhanced, tele-immersive, computer–human brain interfacing.
While such a vision holds out promising prospects for advocates of
sustainability, there is, however, the danger that with such development
there is an increased probability of uninvited intrusions into individual
liberty.

Conclusion

It has been the purpose of this introductory chapter to argue, along with
many of the contributors who follow, that, far from abandoning the tourist
as a metaphor of the social world, more and more novel and associated
metaphors are required which link the changing nature of the tourist to an
ever mutable environment.

The world of leisure travel has to be rethought because the world of
work (with which it frequently is contrasted) is now spoken of in far different
terms from when it was first articulated by tourism academics. Indeed, many
of these scholars are introducing updated metaphors into their vocabularies.
MacCannell (1992: 58), for instance, alludes to the cannibalistic qualities of
the workplace when he points to CEOs ‘surviving’ in the ‘corporate jungle’,
to ‘cut-throat competition’, of ‘picking each other’s brains’, of ‘headhunt-
ing’, and so on. From that scenario, it is but a short step to the cannibalistic
nature of tourism itself with its ‘cannibalization of the primitive’ and
‘language of repressed violence’ (p. 46), even to the point where the
primitive becomes ‘ex-primitive’ (p. 45)10.

Urry (2000: 27), too, clearly wants to go beyond the metaphors of
‘nomad’, ‘pilgrim’ and ‘motel’ (de Certeau, 1984; Braidotti, 1994; Clifford,
1997) when he agrees with Bauman (1993) that the ‘vagabond’ and ‘tourist’
are ‘more plausible metaphors for postmodern times, since they do not
involve such regularised mobility’ (p. 29). Yet Urry goes further by drawing
on Mol and Law’s (1994) analysis of blood circulation and anaemia, and
claiming that tourism today is much more fluid-like than ever before, as it
flows ‘in and out of different regions, across different boundaries, using
diverse networks’ and changing ‘as it goes’ (p. 31).
Faced with such fluidity and mobility, and the concomitant forces of globalization and rapidly expanding technology, one thus arrives at the same conclusion reached by Prideaux as he looks to the future: ‘the coming cyber age points to the need for a new metaphor that seeks to understand the tourist in a changing social world – a world that has evolved and will continue to evolve.’

Notes

1Some of the ideas contained in this chapter emerged from a staff seminar held for members of the tourism department at the Høgskolen i Finnmark, 6 September 2001. The contribution of participants is gratefully acknowledged.

2Metonymy is the substitution of ‘y’ for ‘x’, where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are existentially or habitually connected, e.g. ‘crown’ for ‘king’. As the linguist, Jakobson, notes, it is a name change, a substitute from contiguity (rather than from similarity, as in metaphor (Nöth, 1990: 341)). Synecdoche is the standing of one thing for another (e.g. while dreaming of a person wearing a garment of a certain colour, the colour comes to stand for that person (cf. Burke (1966: 358), whereby the part stands for the whole (Cullum-Swan and Manning, 2001). Hyperbole is an exaggeration not meant to be taken literally.

3Where comparison is generally quantitative and similitude (as in metaphor) is usually qualitative (Nöth, 1990: 132).

4One can endlessly debate whether this metaphor is cross-cultural or universal, as, of course, whether all thoughts about the sun are metaphorical. The question of which sun is being talked about is also interesting.

5There have also been parallel changes on the linguistic front. As Jacobs (2001) notes, the spatial props of the office (desktop, files, folders, mailbox, trash) have been incorporated into the computer vocabulary of ‘monitor’, ‘drop’, ‘drag’, ‘cut’, ‘paste’, ‘delete’. The highway of travel, with its crashes, ramps, detours, traffic hold-ups and transmission lines has similarly been appropriated by the information superhighway. So too has the touristic imagery of the ocean, with its surfing, navigation, pirates and hits, been taken over by the Internet. Indeed, and as Jacobs (2001: 6) tellingly observes, ‘it is difficult to imagine a cyberspace language with entirely new and unique vocabulary, devoid of metaphors.’

6Not only are tourism’s major theoretical paradigms metaphorical in nature, but so too are its principal focuses of analysis. The study of motivation, for example, has been considered in terms of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors (Dann, 1981), tourist experiences as predicated on cultural centres (Cohen, 1979), tourism impacts likened to forms of adaptation (Do an, 1989) and tourism development spoken of as following the rise and fall trajectory of a life cycle (Butler, 1980). The issue thus becomes not so much whether metaphor should underpin a theory or a theme, but whether a given metaphor is good or bad, useful or beyond its expiry date (cf. Urry, 2000: 22).

7The same can be, and indeed was, said of theological mysteries, which, by definition, can never be grasped by the human mind, and which are open only to analogical understanding.
Length requirements of the volume meant that some otherwise extremely worthwhile papers had to be excluded from publication. In a few cases, there was duplication of the ground covered. Others were not entirely germane to the theme. In all these instances, authors were given the opportunity to seek alternative outlets for their work.

The papers contained here were submitted by scholars residing in Australia (the host country), China, France, Germany, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the UK and the USA. Additional oral presentations included those by academics from Israel, Italy and Malta. Their overall international flavour was thus quite consonant with the aims of the ISA. Yet not all chapters are by sociologists and, interestingly, an openness to other disciplines is also a characteristic of the ISA. The present collection, for instance, also includes contributions by anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and students of religion.

However, such cultural devouring should not imply that the tourist is never victim. Indeed, as the events of 11 September 2001 make abundantly clear, the high-jacking of innocent plane passengers by terrorists may mean that the tourist has to be redefined as an easily consumable pawn in the ideological warfare between the developed and developing worlds.

References


The Ethnographic Tourist

Nelson H.H. Graburn

Introduction

This chapter focuses on certain problems in the contemporary practice of ethnography. It tackles the crucial question: how is it possible to know about today's mobile subjects? It then discusses the effectiveness of various ethnographic strategies to carry out such research (see Table 2.1). In his landmark book, *The Tourist: a New Theory of the Leisure Class* (1976), MacCannell has suggested that 'The tourist is one of the best models available for modern-man-in-general.' Taking a cue from him, it can be expected that an ethnography of tourists might be a good guide to confronting the problems of the ethnography of modern society itself. The need for guidance is urgent, for never before has there been such an outburst of questions and statements about research, expressed not only in many articles and books (e.g. Bohannon and van der Elst, 1998; Davies, 1999; Schensul and LeCompte, 1999 (7 volumes!)), but in the appearance of several new journals, two of them – *Ethnography* and *Field Methods* – coming from one publisher (Sage) alone!

This general interest in ethnography stems from the present writer's own research and his students' studies of tourism in the past two decades. Many of the participants in his graduate seminar at Berkeley, 'Tourism, Art and Modernity', are preparing to undertake their doctoral dissertation fieldwork. Though they may experience stimulating discussions of the globalized, diasporic nature of the world's populations (e.g. Appadurai, 1991), they find very little guidance about how to conduct their research on mobile non-communities. For instance, these ethnographic questions have been of...
particular concern to South African museum researcher and advanced Berkeley graduate student, Kathryn Mathers, who has carried out research on the impact of tourists’ experiences on their perception of South Africa for American and other short-term visitors (e.g. semester abroad students) to that country. How and where does one contact such populations? How well does one have to get to know them? Should one attempt to interview them in their home settings before and after their visits to South Africa?

Problems of Short- and Long-term Ethnographic Research

Research on today’s tourists presents the same kinds of challenges that investigations of other kinds of ephemeral statuses and events have posed. Comparable are studies of museum visitors, sports events, pilgrims, the military and temporary migrants, in fact research on participants in any kind of ritual. Among the problems are the following.

1. The limited duration of the events and the fleeting presence of the participants, which permit even the most assiduous of ethnographers only the briefest opportunity to carry out in-depth fieldwork. Given these temporal constraints, the only way for the ethnographer to amass a suitably large amount of data would be to multiply repeat observations and questions with hundreds of tourists, but this strategy, of course, leads to massive quantitative data of no great depth. Indeed, this situation is exactly what some anthropologists point out as the inevitable weakness of survey methods.

2. The special state of mind of the participants may include intense concentration, meditation, distraction, seriousness or altered states of consciousness. All of these conditions are likely to predispose them against taking time out to be interviewed, to fill in questionnaires, or even to be observed and photographed.

3. Relatedly, tourists during ‘ritual’ events may be unable to state their true feelings, or their feelings may be so labile or confusing that any answer given on that occasion could be misleading or multivalent. This writer’s own experience on Mount Moses (Graburn, 1999) might well have been of that nature. Indeed, it took another ethnographer, his interlocutor, Nancy Frey, to grasp the situation more clearly than himself (see below).

4. Ideally, no ethnographer would study persons taking part in a ritual or other short-term event and expect to be able to interpret them meaningfully without putting them into the whole context of their continuing lives, especially the meaning and mark that such events might (or might not) leave on their ordinary non-ritual lives. That is why anthropologists have long derided the typical clipboard research carried out on, for instance, museum visitors, either of the ‘before and after’ type or of the ‘observe them in front of
the vitrine’ variety. This realization led Berkeley researcher, Linda Draper, in her 2-year study of visitor learning at the Exploratorium Science Museum in San Francisco (1984), not only to interview visitors before, during and after their visits, but to carry out more in-depth, open-ended interviews with a select subsample of visitors and, eventually, to question a small number of these visitors (often repeat visitors) in their homes some months later to try to elucidate the place and meaning of the museum experience on their total life experiences. This kind of extended labour-intensive research is quite rare, and has only be carried out systematically on pilgrims by Gold (1988) in Rajathsan and on pilgrim-tourists by Frey (1998) in Europe.

If indeed anthropologists can learn something from an examination of the ethnography of tourists, either by intensive uses of short-term research or by being able to contextualize it within the longer-term life ways of the participants, a service will have been done for social science research in general.

The Tradition of Ethnographic Fieldwork

The now classical anthropological ethnographies at the beginning of the 20th century formed the model for two or three successive generations of social scientists. These studies usually were based on field-research sojourns that lasted 2 or more years. The researcher lived with, or very close to, the people being studied, and participated in aspects of their lives, although not too wholeheartedly, for fear of being accused of ‘going bush’ or ‘going native’. This latter situation might, for the anthropologist as well as the missionary, lead to a lack of objectivity or, even worse, of motivation to conduct the research. Early ethnographic investigations are well exemplified by the German geographer Franz Boas’s 2-year sojourn (1880–1882) among the Eskimos (Inuit) of Central Baffin Island (Boas, 1888), British social anthropologist A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s 2 years (1906–1908) in the Andaman Islands of the Indian Ocean (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922) and, most prototype, the Pole Bronislaw Malinowski’s 4 years (1914–1918) in the Trobriand Islands of Eastern Melanesia (Malinowski, 1922, 1935), where, as an enemy alien, he was exiled from Australia during the Great War.

In all of these prototypical situations, the anthropologists could track the same subjects through their annual cycle, witnessing them before, during and after annual rituals of increase. They were also able to see people of all ages undergoing their more important rites of passage, changing from one life status to another, such as in birth, initiation, marriage and death. But of course it was unlikely that any anthropologists were able to monitor the same person through more than one or two of these life stages. Even activities involving travel, somewhat comparable to this writer’s own studies of tourism, were no barrier to the observations of intrepid anthropologists.
such as Malinowski (1922), who followed the Trobriand Islanders on part of their Kula Ring trading cycle or, for that matter, Boas (1888) and other anthropologists in the Arctic (Graburn, 1969), who joined the Inuit on their sled and boat journeys in search of game and sociality. Following these pioneers, generations of anthropologists have attempted to observe their own peoples through their annual ritual cycles, through their regular travels and through their life cycle rituals. Indeed, such studies have been a hallmark of good anthropological research and, until recently, have been carried out without many problems. Nevertheless, even in the first half of the 20th century, certain ritual and travel activities went unobserved. Malinowski did not follow the Trobriand Islanders where they went to work ‘blackbirding’ as cheap labour for copra traders. Most anthropologists in Africa preferred to study their peoples in traditional settings, until the pioneer works of Nadel (1942) on the multi-ethnic Nupe city of Bida in Nigeria, Mitchell’s work (1956) on the African migrant labourers of the Copper Belt, and Colson’s study of the displacement of the Gwembe Tonga by the creation of the Kariba Dam (1971). Until the 1935 publication of Linton et al.’s Memorandum of Acculturation, most anthropologists were not officially interested in the dynamics of power and change, and often they pretended that, for instance, Reservation Indians in the USA were living traditional lives, or they focused on the idealized lives remembered by their older informants. It was only after the Second World War that the presence of modernity loomed large or became the dominant factor in the lives of anthropological subjects.

Ethnographic Strategies of the Temporally and Spatially Displaced

Major changes in anthropological research came about in the past 50 years because the subjects of research were on the move – displaced by war (the Aleut (Kohloff, 1988)) or military tests (Bikini Atoll (Kiste, 1968)), or else migrating in search of labour (southern Africa) or new homes (Egypt (Fakhouri, 1972)), where they typically were drawn to marginal, unstable areas of rapidly growing urban conglomerations of the developing world (Mexico City (Lomnitz, 1989); Lima, Peru (Mangin, 1963)). In addition, the subject matter of anthropology itself expanded to overlap with that of sociologists by including studies of towns, cities and the powerful, e.g. Hollywood (Powdermaker, 1950), the Mexican upper class (Lomnitz, 1993), as well as ordinary people in the home cities of, for instance, London (Bott, 1957; Firth et al., 1969) or Chicago (Schneider, 1968).

Anthropologists in Japan, and particularly in China, had different historical experiences. Although Japanese anthropologists studied both the peoples at home as well as those who fell under their imperialist rule (Graburn, 2001), Fei Xiaotong, who was a founder of Chinese anthropology,
chose to see Malinowski’s theory of culture as resting upon the real needs of the Chinese, and to translate his ‘functionalism’ as ‘pragmatism’. Thus, according to Fei, ‘culture should be viewed as a tool . . . [thereby] implicitly arguing that anthropology must have a function in the transformation of society. Further, anthropologists should bear social responsibility for the society they study’ (Liu, 1997: 7–8). More generally, and in Schein’s (2000: 105–106) words, ‘This fusing of [social science] research with development projects was an approach throughout both the Republican and Socialist periods. Social knowledge was always to be linked to applied programs.’ It has long been noted that China’s social scientists are required to play significant political and economic roles in their home society.

As members of many non-Western societies came to practise anthropology, the relative status of ‘we and they’ became reversible (Sasaki, 1960; Ogbu, 1974). Ethnography was not a simple community study, as it had been, and anthropologists became aware of the limitations of their research. In large cities and areas of labour migration, the population would be constantly shifting, and the researcher might be unable to see anyone through their whole yearly round, or they might ‘go home’ elsewhere for important life rituals. Access to city dwellers was not so easy, since the power relationship between the middle-class intellectuals and the individuals being studied might not be downward but steeply upward (Nader, 1971), and access to such busy and powerful persons could be very difficult (see, for example, Hamabata (1988) on élite Japanese business families, and Marcus (1992) on wealthy Texan families). Only a few anthropologists might be able to get ‘inside’ such social milieux, and even then many aspects of life would be hidden. Ironically, studying marginalized peoples also became difficult, for the poorer classes might come to resent the wealthy researchers for fear of negative evaluations (Campbell (1988) on Oakland bus drivers) or, realistically, they might be involved in economic activities that the middle classes considered criminal (Stack (1974) on poor blacks in Illinois; Bourgois (1995) on Harlem crack dealers). For stimulating discussions on some of the recent changes in general anthropological fieldwork practices, see Clifford’s chapter ‘Spatial Practices’ (1997: 52–91) and Amit’s ‘Introduction: Constructing the Field’ (2000).

Owing to these factors and the general climate of anti-colonialism (Deloria, 1969), anthropologists are now obliged to become much more circumspect in their researches and less confident in the authority of their accounts. The whole ethnographic project has been challenged on both ethical and scientific grounds (Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Marcus and Fisher, 1986), a moment labelled ‘the crisis of representation’. Anthropologists have to obtain many permissions before entering a community or asking questions. In the USA, for example, all government-supported research has to be prepared by Committees for the Protection of Human Subjects. Certain kinds of data may be withheld or else only supplied on condition that they are not published. Publications are more open to scrutiny and legal action;
anonymity is usually forced on the subjects about whom ethnographers write, even if they do not actually want it!

In addition, the physical difficulties of present research circumstances impose limitations and demand new strategies. Middle-class city households may not form part of compact residential communities, and real social links may be spread across cities or entire countries. Thus anthropologists may study random households within a city to focus on a certain class (Schneider, 1968) or they may have to select a few available households in order to obtain a desired sample (Bott, 1957). They may indeed only be able to interview members of a few select families or groups with whom they have personal links (Lebra, 1993; Lomnitz, 1993) and they are very unlikely to be able to follow these people during the course of a whole year, through all aspects of their lives or into each of their social gatherings. Thus, instead of whole people and entire communities, anthropologists may have to write more composite descriptions of fragments of many people, or they may have to rely on the few special occasions in which they are able to participate as typical of those from which they are barred.

One common response to these difficulties was to study people linked into networks rather than communities; indeed, for a while, networks loomed large both as research procedures and as metaphors for modern society (Boissevain and Mitchell, 1973; Castells, 1996). However, there are also some advantages to such a relatively familiar field of research. Rarely are the language and the main outlines of life unknown. Informants can often fill in for those occasions where the researcher is absent, and many of these informants, if middle class, are educated or sympathetic about social science research. Above all, there are many supplementary kinds of accounts available, in literature, magazines, novels, photography, movies and other media, all of which are accessible to researchers.

The Ethnography of Tourists: the First 30 Years

Tourists are not the only travellers in today’s world. The ethnography of tourists shares some characteristics with other contemporary ethnographies. Tourists are one form of ‘migrant’: short-term like pilgrims and many businessmen, as opposed to longer-term labour and education migrants, or even permanent immigrants. These phenomena currently are part of that transnationalism, which, along with movements of capital, technology, cultural and political values, makes up what is often called ‘globalization’ (Appadurai, 1991).

As has often been pointed out (Boissevain, 1977; Dann et al., 1988: 2), ethnographies of tourism were most often the by-products of ethnographic research on other ‘more traditional’ phenomena. Many anthropologists were upset (or ashamed) that the places they thought they ‘had to themselves’, in the sense that when they returned home they would be the experts on such
exotica, had to be shared with 'mere' tourists (Kottak, 1983), and because sometimes the native peoples placed anthropological researchers and tourists into the same category of 'annoying to-be-exploited foreigners' (Errington and Gewertz, 1989). No small wonder that many of these early accounts expressed anger at tourists (Greenwood, 1977), or that they focused on the contact mechanisms rather than on the tourists (McKean, 1977; Smith, 1977) or more on the native, local peoples (Crystal, 1977; Swain, 1977). Picard, the leading anthropologist of contemporary Bali, has produced a wonderful ethnography of tourism on that island (1992), but, as one who married into the local society, his focus has stayed with the Balinese and the broad and creative contact zone. Occasionally, the results are surprising. Korean ethnographer Moon (1989), for example, went to a remote mountain valley in Japan in order to study an undisturbed, traditional agricultural area. Yet, when she arrived, she found a ski resort had been built there employing many of the farmers’ family members, and that part of the community was ‘healthier’ and practised a great deal more of the traditional socio-ritual life than the poorer agricultural half!

The ethnography of ‘early tourism’, i.e. analyses of types of tourism that existed long before anthropology came on the scene, is a little more interesting. These accounts may well be historical ethnographies, using the usual kinds of historian’s sources (Towner and Wall, 1991). They may be based on early travellers’ self-ethnographies (Adler, 1989) or on a more general historical literature (Adler, 1994). Forms of the latter actually may provide more insights into the nature and experiences of tourists than the ‘early ethnographies’ because there is no avoidance of the tourists as persons.

Participant Observation

The hallmark of good ethnography is participant observation and grasping ‘the native’s point of view’ (Malinowski, 1922). Here, the tourist becomes the ‘native’. One common kind of participant observation is for observers to become tourists among tourists. Thus they can supply a detailed and fairly reliable account of what it is actually like to be a tourist in particular situations, and what generally happens in such events. Most ethnographers of tourism partake in some form of auto-ethnography (Selänniemi, 1996, 1999; Frey, 1998) though others are definitely just observers (Crick, 1994). Until the 1980s, auto-ethnography, i.e. the observation of the self as well as the other, was frowned upon in anthropology, and such recordings were often kept as separate documents, for instance Malinowski’s famous diary (Malinowski, 1967). However, since anthropologists began to examine their own writing (Clifford and Marcus, 1986) and predilections, it has become more acceptable to include oneself in the account and even to use one’s own experience as ethnography (Okely, 1995).
In assessing the state of qualitative tourism research, a recent article by Riley and Love (2000) has drawn upon Denzin and Lincoln’s methodological treatise (1994) and placed these forms of ethnographic research in a five-part temporal sequence of ‘moments’, starting from: (i) ‘traditional’, i.e. positivist research; (ii) ‘modernist’ rigorous post-positivist methods; (iii) ‘blurred genres’ which embrace multiple approaches, such as feminism, semiotics, deconstruction, and so on; (iv) the ‘crisis of representation’ (see above), which includes reflexive writing of oneself into the field (see also Galani-Moutafi, 1999) and subjectivism (see Li, 2000); and, finally, (v) the abandonment of grand narratives and the embrace of the local and advocacy. Riley and Love (2000: 179) show that, to date, the fourth moment has hardly been touched in the ethnographic tourism literature, and the fifth, they claim, is completely absent. This chapter attempts to refine a rather crude account of the progress of research methods by going beyond ‘ethnography in general’ and injecting the key question, the ethnography of whom or what?

While autobiographical ethnography may do a great deal for understanding an author’s feelings and experiences, it cannot contribute automatically to the ethnography of other people, unless, of course, these other people are of the same social background (nationality, ethnicity, class, gender, education, etc.) as the author. Even here, the problem of cultural similarity and difference occurs. Liu, for instance, in his recent ethnography of a north Chinese village In One’s Own Shadow (2000), casts some doubt over how much he shared their local culture. Selänniemi (1996) makes the opposite point in asserting that his ethnographic success with Finnish sunlust tourists stems in part from his own lower-middle-class Finnish upbringing. This hitherto rather unusual ethnography of the ‘Us’ brings an advantage, in that the objects of his academic gaze are likely to feel no threat from one of their own, and that he knows their subculture so well he can use his research instruments with great care and sensitivity. Similarly successful ethnographies of one’s own kind as tourists include Hastings’ (1988) participation in a 3-month yacht cruise through the Pacific, the Counts’ (1988) ethnography of American RV (recreational vehicle)-using retirees, Foster’s (1986) observations of wealthy retirees on the Lindblad Explorer, and Yamashita’s (1999) account of being a Japanese tourist in Palau. It should be added that Les Blank’s wonderful film of American coach tourists in Europe, Innocents Abroad (1991), is a comparably illuminating visual ethnography, although the key character, the guide, is British and takes advantage of that cultural difference. Yet few ethnographic films about tourists are successful. Dennis O’Rourke’s well-known Cannibal Tours (1987) is, like most, heavily biased against the tourists portrayed (Bruner, 1989).

Most anthropology is still practised in societies foreign to the observer, even in an increasingly connected world, and even in those cases where ethnographers live in the same national society as their subjects, but, because of differences of class and status, they may be feared or resented
more than outright aliens. In such instances, auto-ethnographies of tourism provide much weaker insights into the tourist experience without specific ethnographic contacts and questioning of the ‘Others’. A few anthropologists have the foresight and opportunity to undertake full-time participant observation of tourists other than their own cultural fellows. Here, of course, one is for the most part considering the ethnography of tourism planned as such and not as a by-product of other researches. Again, one of the outstanding examples is the American Nancy Frey, who accompanied European and American pilgrim/tourists on the Camino de Santiago on three occasions (Frey, 1998: 232–236), as well as using other field techniques (see below).

Jenny Beer, after working in the Osaka office of JTB (the world’s largest travel agency), where she witnessed the creation and monitoring of package tours to Asia, either went along on some of the tours or else observed the tourists at some of their destinations (1993a, b). In this way, she became a participant observer of Japanese package tourists for the few-days-long tours, but she also interviewed many of the locals and contact-zone staff as part of her study of management and impacts. Her research, while aided by command of the Japanese language, long familiarity with Japan and unusual knowledge of its tourist industry, did not result in close or long-term relationships with these tourists or in really personal data about their cultural and physical experiences. The present writer’s research on domestic tourism in Japan (in 1974, 1979, 1989–1990, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 2000) consisted of personal experiences, of course, but, as an ethnography of the Japanese, most of his work was based on informally accompanying Japanese relatives, families and friends on their trips (which were markedly different from most of the outings made on his own or with his family). Given the brevity of Japanese vacations, each excursion lasted no longer than 3–4 days, these ethnographies, like most, were grounded on composites of many occasions and several people. The advantages of his fieldwork, unlike that of many other ethnographers of tourism, is that because of living in Japan, he was able to know most of the informants in their before and after lives, to see their preparations and their leaving, their rearivals, gift distribution and dispositions of photographs.

The anthropological study of tourists also commonly takes the form of part-time participant observation. In other words, the researcher, presumably equally conversant with the language and culture of the people under study, meets, observes and interviews them at specific points that form a small part of the tourist’s overall trip. Again Frey practised this strategy by working as a volunteer *hospitaleria*, welcoming tired and hungry tourist-pilgrims off the Camino for their nights of rest; her intimate ministering to and mixing with them gave her very sensitive ethnographic data about their social, spiritual and bodily experiences. She also stayed at their ultimate destination, the city of Santiago, welcoming and helping them, reminiscing with them about their journey and experiencing their feelings of
attainment or frustration when they reached their ‘goal’. These personal contacts resulted in the formation of long-term relationships, by e-mail and letter, which allowed her to follow up on their lives by visiting them afterwards in their home countries, meeting their families and often their local community of pilgrims. Similarly, but less successfully, Eade, who studied pilgrims to Lourdes (1992), regularly worked as part of the reception staff there, but focused on rivalry, competition and conflict at the sacred site. Van den Berghe (1994) was a tourist among tourists (mostly from his country of residence, the USA) during many winter stays in Chiapas. However, he observed and interviewed these tourists only in the main town, San Cristóbal de Las Casas, asking them about their experiences elsewhere and their intended itineraries. While he claimed to have such a good grasp of average tourist behaviour that he could predict most of their activities in the town and many of their answers to his questions, he did not develop any in-depth understanding about their motivations or their ‘inner journeys’. Of course, several of the present writer’s own observations bumping into tourists at Japanese places of convergence, as well as many of those of Frey in Spain and of Beer in East and Southeast Asia, are of the same random type.

Even without much in-depth interviewing, researchers can learn a great deal by observation. The ephemeral nature of the tourist presence often requires what have been called ‘fast and dirty techniques’. For instance, Beer (1993a) drew several interesting conclusions from short-term but repeated observations of the very different styles of photography by Japanese and Western tourists in Asia. Others have studied the results of tourist photography back home (see below), though these findings are often directed at learning about domestic cultural patterns and social networks. Littrel (1990), Lee (1993) and Moeran (1995) have extensively investigated souvenir purchases and, in some cases, their eventual fate back home. Even so, while these insights may provide information about the economic and cultural systems observed, they rarely produce in-depth ethnographies of the tourists themselves.

Non-participant Observation

It is also possible to carry out ethnographic research without actually participating in the ritual behaviour itself. One common technique is to talk with tourists after their journeys. This strategy is in many ways similar to ‘salvage ethnography’, as practised by American anthropologists early in this century when they worked with key native American informants to try and find out about cultural and social patterns which were no longer extant (Heizer and Kroeber, 1979). Of course, a native informant’s attitude of anger or loss towards a destroyed or dead culture may be quite different from tourists’ feelings of celebration or excitement about their recent trips, although both may share elements of nostalgia for something better than present daily life.
(Dann, 1994; Graburn, 1995a,b). Much of the ethnography of tourists carried out even ‘in the field’, i.e. during a tourist trip, can rely on data of this type, i.e. persons’ recall of their recent experiences. Even where the field-work involves participant observation shared by the researcher and the informant, it is still necessary to discuss the experience afterwards in order to uncover other layers of meaning, or the changing nature of the experience under later recall when contrasted with it at the time. Frey was able to make use of this multipronged approach, as was the present writer sometimes in Japan.

Other potentially more powerful research instruments may be used after the fact. These devices include the writings and photography created by tourists for later consumption, which can be shared with the researcher and employed as mnemonic devices for probing conversations. Though some tourists are prepared to share their spontaneous diaries with researchers, Selänniemi’s technique of additionally asking co-participants about their tours ‘to the South’ proved very successful. He was able to construct (1996, 1999) time and activity budgets, patterns of sociality and sleeping, as well as menus of eating; he was further able to tap internalized thoughts and opinions that might have been recorded or even at hinted through the diaries. Similarly intense examinations were undertaken by Canadian

Table 2.1. Ethnographic methods for mobile communities.

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1. N. Frey, Camino de Santiago, Spain and other European countries.
2. T. Selänniemi, Finnish sunlust vacationers, Mediterranean and Finland.
7. P. Van den Berghe, North American and Europeans in Mexico.
8. J. Harrison, Canadian tourists in Canada; M. Littrel, Americans in USA.
anthropologist Harrison (2001), when she interviewed at length returned tourists in their homes, along with all their mementoes and photographs. Even though she was not a participant on these journeys, her closeness of class, nationality, educational level and, probably, age and gender to many of her informants stimulated the production of in-depth ‘personal ethnographies’. Littrel (1990), too, was able to learn the significance of souvenir textiles for tourists by interviewing them after their return.

Conclusions: What Did We Learn?

Not all social research has the same goals, but most ethnography aims at ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) and understanding the ‘native’s point of view’ (see Hollinshead (1991) for an interesting amendment of Geertz’s ethnographic goals). Although questionnaires may be administered or forms filled in as an adjunct to ethnography, the results produced – observable facts and conscious goals – may supply the background parameters for a study or they may satisfy the needs of marketers and planners but, as Counts and Counts have found (1988: 6–8), they only provide an inkling of the relationship of the experience to people’s social, cultural and inner lives.

One major goal is to understand the ‘meaning’ of the tourist or ritual experience in the total lives of their subjects. This insight might not reveal much about their spending, demonstration effects or other measures of impact; nor does it necessarily relate to their satisfaction or the likelihood of their return, though it might. More importantly, meaning has to do with the feelings experienced and the values expressed by temporary travellers, almost always in relation to their whole (i.e. the rest of) lives. The identical observed behaviour of two travellers or the very same responses to questionnaires might tell little about the meaning, in relation to different ‘other lives’. For instance, to give a banal example, the experiences of visitors from the French village of Chatte to nearby Lyon compared with that of visitors from Paris are very different; for the former, the visit to the ‘big city’ might be about as much excitement or stimulation as they can bear, whereas for the latter, the visit might be boring, or might be regarded as a way of ‘getting away from’ the stresses of the metropolis.

However, to move on from such a simple example, it is necessary to consider what has been called the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ journeys (Myerhoff, 1993), which parallel the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of experience. Frey commented pointedly on the inner and outer aspects in the present writer’s account (Graburn, 1999) of the personal ascent of Mount Sinai (Mount Moses, Gebel Musa), much as she had found by carefully analysing (1998: 44–46) her own work; she is continuing this line of inquiry and finds, for instance, that travelling through certain kinds of landscape
tends to produce specific kinds of feelings and introspection (personal communication, 1999).

This is a suitable point to introduce an area of research which might not be exactly ‘ethnographic’ but which can be equally illuminating. Harkin (1995: 659) has drawn attention to what he calls ‘dreamwork’, i.e. the unconscious synthesizing of fragments of experience into narratives. Thought of this way, all narratives, even post hoc tourist narratives are ‘constructed’ and their analysis can be revealing. Narratives can indeed be ‘dreams’, dreams of vacations to be, authentic experiences yet to come, which reveal cultural and individual structures of desire, which bear a close relationship to Parrinello’s ethnography of anticipation (1993). Unfortunately, this kind of experimental work has been carried out less in the study of tourists (Elsrud, 2001) than of a somewhat comparable category – athletes (Bruce, 1998; Oliver, 1998). This topic in turn is closely related to literary analyses of leisure experiences, which have been attempted for both tourism (Gray, 1986; Greenblatt, 1991) and sports (Brown, 1999).

As pointed out in earlier work (Graburn, 1977, 1989), tourism, like life itself, can be represented as a journey. Indeed, the relationship between an inner and an outer metaphor may be the key to understanding tourists’ motivations, expectations and satisfactions. For instance, researchers have often found (Dann, 1996; Selänniemi, 1996) that tourists want to regress and to enjoy life again in the ways they had as children, either through physical sensations – nudity, playing on the beach – or through psychosocial moods, such as absence of responsibility, lack of a strict timetable or the feeling of being able to rely totally on the indulgence of others, what the Japanese call amae. Another strong association between the touristic journey and life’s voyage comes from considering the tour as a ‘rite of passage’, i.e. an occasion and an opportunity to leave one stage of life and enter another. Though the most obvious of these transitions are from childhood to adulthood or from working to retirement, Hastings (1988) and others have also found that tourism has been used to ease travellers through divorce and separation, the death of a loved one, or a change of profession or location of residence. It is crucial to be able to understand the difference between an ongoing need, such as the nostalgic desire to be young again, and a hopefully one-time need, for example to mourn the loss of a spouse, a child or a home.

Another feature of certain kinds of tourism, which has not been fully explored, is the relationship of temporal activity to physical needs and changes. The necessity for related research has been strongly advocated by the Finnish authors, Jokinen and Veijola (1994). It becomes dramatically apparent in the case of Frey’s Camino tourists. Few of them realized at the start of their journey that feet would play such a major role – bruises, blisters, socks, pain shared with others, taking care of others’ feet – and that, after walking 700 miles or so, they would be more fit perhaps than they had ever
been in their lives before, enjoying new experiences of their own bodies, which gave them a sense of achievement that perhaps outshone the spiritual. Yet the pain, of the feet, of the muscles, on the very surface of both the outer and the inner journeys, may have had deep meanings connected with guilt, self-punishment or identification with St James the Martyr.

Of the small sample of writers considered here, Frey and Selänniemi were probably the most successful in revealing the inner–outer relationship, with their intense and empathetic participant observation, when compared with Jenny Beer or the present writer, who did not fully reveal the inner–outer connections felt by their Japanese tourist subjects, in spite of long-term participant observation. The latter situation might be attributed to poor fieldwork techniques or personalities. However, it would be much better explained by the particularly Japanese ability to express the *tatemae* (the socially acceptable) and to hide the *honne* (the inner feelings, which must never be revealed because they are by definition selfish). Hastings, on her intense, often drunken, and intimate yacht cruise was probably able to probe the inner journey of some of her small group, cooped up as they were for 3 months. Harrison (2001) and Littrel (1990) were able to mine a lot of data and some very interesting associated feelings from their middle-class tourists, interviewed at home at great length after the tour. Yet, what these feelings revealed might have perhaps been more guarded, more self-congratulatory, and more *tatemae* than data gained by participant researchers.

In conclusion, it can be safely stated that, as with the study of any modern peoples on the move, role labels (international, domestic, married, short-term, female, target worker) of today’s tourists and travellers sometimes do not reflect accurately either their inner realities or even their own initial expectations. For instance, this writer’s original desire to visit Sharm el Sheikh for a look at ‘mass tourism’ stemmed from a professional curiosity about Wahab’s account (1995) of the planning of this major national project. It devolved into a personal environmental/cultural tourism trip to ascend the nearby sacred Mount Sinai and to visit St Catherine’s Monastery. This odyssey, in turn, became an inner and outer journey bringing together idiosyncratic thoughts of age and mortality, combined with the expected birth of his first grandchild at that very time but thousands of miles away in Lisbon. It was, as jokingly referred to later, a form of grandparental *couvade* (Graburn, 1999)\(^6.7\). When the ethnographer is the subject of the social scientist in the journey that is tourism, then the claim that Abbott (2000) makes becomes a tautology. He says that sociologists undertaking research are like tourists exploring a city (of social life), systematically sightseeing in an unfamiliar territory, trying to know all parts lying behind the many façades in order to understand the whole (the authentic) truth. It is the fate of modern man, like Abbott’s sociologist, not only to undertake touristic journeys but to live life as a tourist, and reflexively to examine one’s inner and outer journeys as a tourist and as a modern.
Notes

1 This inquiry has three specific roots. First is the writer’s long-standing interest in the anthropology of tourists themselves, as opposed to more commonly researched topics such as the tourist–host contact situation, or the economic, ecological, social or cultural impacts, a subject that was pointed out strongly in his 'Introduction' to the special issue of *Annals of Tourism Research* on the 'Anthropology of Tourism' (Graburn, 1983a) and which he practised in his studies of Japanese domestic tourists (Graburn, 1983b, 1995a,b, 1999). Secondly, the chapter is prompted by the response of Nancy Frey (in her *Pilgrim Stories*, 1998) to an account of the writer’s own visit to the Egyptian Sinai and the experiences of 'mass tourism' at Sharm el Sheikh and of 'Alternative or Ethnic tourism' while visiting St Catherine’s Monastery and climbing Mt Sinai (Mt Moses) at night with Bedouin guides. Thirdly, and most definitively, this presentation is a response to the remarks made by anthropologist cultural historian James Clifford, author of *The Predicament of Culture* (1988) and of *Routes* (1997), at a conference on 'Tourism, Gender and Desire' in Berkeley, when, after a long day of discussions about tourists and tourism, he remarked 'I’ve read MacCannell’s *The Tourist* (1976) and, although it’s a stimulating book, I don’t find any tourists in it. Where do we find any good ethnographies of tourists?' An earlier draft of this chapter was presented at the July 1999 meetings of the International Academy for the Study of Tourism, Zagreb, Croatia.


3 It has been pointed out (Liu, 1997) that the early Chinese anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong, although himself a student of Malinowski, wrote his classic *Peasant Life in China* (Fei, 1939) not on the basis of extensive fieldwork but rather on the memories of his childhood community.

4 Kottak returned to the fishing village in eastern Brazil where he had carried out his dissertation research some years before. He was appalled that half the village had been taken over as a weekend resort by affluent urban Brazilians. He thus decided to stay in the fisherman’s part and sent his field research assistant to do the ethnography of the newer touristic half!

5 Such home communities-of-experience are comparable to *hajji* in the Islamic world and may well be a measure of the depth or importance of the experience even in contemporary secular times.

6 Ethnography has been the method of choice for social and cultural anthropological field researchers for over a century. However, it has become widespread and popular in other disciplines such as sociology, architecture and cultural studies. There it is often used as a label for any kind of field research in which people are observed and questioned. The announcement of a new Journal *Ethnography* (Sage 2000) surprised members of the Department of Anthropology at Berkeley when it was noted that most of the editorial board were not even anthropologists.

7 One could take many other examples from this trip, which turned out also to involve the observation of other tourists, as well as awakening a strong interest in alternative/ethnic tourism when it was realized that the whole climb was managed by the local Bedouin. The small tourist group on this journey was extremely diverse: for instance, there was a blue-collar couple from the East End of London on a cheap junket in which boredom drove them to climb the mountain and focus on their own relationship; a Chinese couple only came because their Jewish biologist colleagues in Tel Aviv said it was an interesting bus journey and old monastery; the Chinese
husband belittled the idea that it was really 'religious tourism' (as the Egyptian guide told him) because it was of no interest for Buddhism – ‘Oh, only Christianity, Islam and Judaism – tourist religions’, he said!

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Introduction

The literature on tourists and their practices is characterized by a curious dichotomy that, in an intellectual sense, can be quite unsettling. On the one hand, over the past two to three decades, there has been the development of a quite sophisticated social theoretical discussion on the nature of tourism and tourist behaviour. With increasing confidence, scholars, principally from the disciplines of sociology, human geography, anthropology and cultural studies, have incorporated broader disciplinary theories, concepts and debates into their analyses of tourism. Indeed, many have deliberately investigated tourism as a crucial barometer and testing ground for the social and cultural processes so hotly contested within the social sciences in general. Theoretical profundity, often on quite a grand scale, is not uncommon in this subset of tourism research, as indeed is the inevitable leavening of such grandiosity through directing attention to the empirical or more constrained interpretations of tourism and tourist activity. While no doubt many still bemoan the lack of rigorous and robust theorizing of tourism in general, the fact remains that there is at least a flavour of strong intellectual work being undertaken in the area.

On the other hand, there is a rather larger body of tourism research that has as its focus, not so much the aim of general and explicit theorizing about the social and cultural processes of tourism, but rather the self-set purpose of cataloguing, modelling and describing a range of characteristics of tourism and, in particular, the individual dimensions and processes of tourists. These psychological emphases include an often fetishistic pursuit of lists of
‘motivations’ (i.e. motives), the production of models of decision making, the repeated measurement of tourist ‘satisfaction’ and ‘perceptions’, and a general concern with the subjective experiences undergone by tourists. To a large extent, this amalgam of work is based in the disciplines of psychology, social psychology, consumer behaviour and management, and is often concerned with issues perceived to have an immediate consequence for business practice. It is quite wrong, of course, to claim that this research is ‘a-theoretical’. Modelling and theory building operate at any number of levels. There is little point in arguing that ‘theory’ can only truly occur at the socio-cultural level, since such a position is clearly false. Nevertheless, *prima facie*, at least, it is not clear how this latter type of inquiry, with its heavy focus on the psychological, intersects with the broader socio-cultural level of theorizing.

No doubt this intellectual impasse between bodies of tourism research dealing with tourist activity and experience partly reflects the general disjunction (in tacit assumptions) between the ‘parent’ disciplines involved. Undoubtedly, it also reflects the ‘pure’ versus ‘applied’ focus of different groups of researchers, however such a distinction is drawn and conceptualized. The aim here is not to address these larger questions. Rather, the task is to provide a framework in order to bridge, and therefore connect, tourism research conducted at the broadly social theoretical level and that concerning the more microlevel processes and experiences of individual tourists. The hypothesis is that a fully coherent account of the tourist – one which connects these two streams of research and understanding – is not possible without adopting an essentially social constructionist or discursive explanation of the psychological, and not simply of the social.

It is perhaps little known beyond psychologists (and not even all of them) that there is a growing and, in some quarters, vigorously promoted alternative view of human psychology to the varieties of individualistic psychologies that have underpinned the efforts of the majority of psychologists in the past and still today. These alternative approaches (there is a variety of these as well) obviously have in common an eschewing of the individualistic features of much psychological theorizing. They also tend to be particularly critical of the main tradition within the dominant cognitive approach, a tradition that situates psychological events in individuated minds and, by strong analogy, in the supposed information-processing capacities of the brain. This increasing body of criticism has been applied to both the social cognitive approach within psychological social psychology and to the ‘heartland’ of cognitive psychology (e.g. language, perception, memory, decision-making and emotion).

At the same time, the following discussion inevitably confronts one current attempt to link the two bodies of tourism research just distinguished: postmodemism. According to this perspective, postmodern and post-industrial trends within society have created forms of tourism that are
continually changing through an often self-conscious and reflexive process that de-differentiates the social and cultural differences supposedly promoted by modernist structures (e.g., Urry, 1990; Rojek, 1993). Further, a multiplicity of meanings replaces hard and fast categories and definitions. It is even possible to conceive of a tourist – naturally the ‘post-tourist’ – who no longer needs to travel (Urry, 1990).

More generally, this almost infinitely mutable process of de-differentiation finds its most distinctive form in the dissolution of the ‘real’ into the ‘hyper-real’ (Eco, 1990) and ‘simulacra’ (Baudrillard, 1983). ‘Reality’ becomes a vestigial concept, serving little or no purpose and having only a residual meaning as a basis for comprehending ‘hyper-reality’. The latter dispenses with the concept of the ‘original’ or foundational reality against which copies, imitations, reproductions and even fakes can be measured. In its most refined forms, postmodernism is said to undermine attempts at ‘grand narratives’ in the social sciences and assertions of the ‘real’ and the ‘true’, in general.

Within tourism, the call has been made to focus on the increasingly diverse ‘needs’ and ‘desires’ of tourists as consumers, since the de-differentiation of tourist activity supposedly has resulted in the growth of ‘boutique’ travel engineered for, and often by, the individual tourist. Playfulness, fickleness and unpredictability are said to be the order of the day for tourists, and so, for practical purposes, attention should turn towards the particularity of individual tourists. In fact, tourism is often highlighted as one of the important sites of the postmodern and even to be at the forefront of forces leading people further towards the postmodern in a world that still retains archaic vestiges of modernism.

Here there is no intention of dealing with the empirical validity of such claims. This issue is largely beside the point in the current focus. Rather, interest resides in the realization that the postmodern thrust in theorizing in the tourism literature, which has occurred at the social theoretical level, has provided a sort of bridge between that level of debate and the microlevel discussion of tourist practices as expressions of diverse and ever-changing ‘motives’, ‘needs’ and ‘desires’. To that extent, it has, on the face of it, accomplished the connection that I hope to establish through different means in the following account. Arguably, however, this loose postmodernist ‘connection’ between levels of theoretical and research activity in tourism is ill conceived, since it leads to the acceptance of elements of tourist psychology that are decidedly modernist. It therefore cannot, as currently articulated, serve the purpose of uniting the breadth of tourism research on the practices and experiences of the tourist.

To achieve these fairly ambitious aims, it is first necessary to mention some of the developments within psychology that have led to what has been called the ‘second cognitive revolution’ (Harré and Gillett, 1994: 18). This development admittedly is discussed only partially with a few observations
on the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, George Herbert Mead and Lev Vygotsky leading to the output in the last 20 years, in particular, of a variety of social constructionist and discursive psychologists.

Subsequently, attention turns to the application of this new understanding of human psychology to the tourist (hence, the ‘discursive tourist’). It is important to realize that this process involves reconceiving the psychological features of tourists and not just the social and cultural features of their actions and experiences. This point is vital.

Finally, there is an examination of aspects of the broad postmodern analyses of tourist practices in the light of observations made by Edward Bruner (1994). To his critique will be added the previously discussed reconceptualization of psychology in order to argue that a thorough-going social constructionism is required in order to ‘bridge the gap’ between the social and the individual in tourism research.

**Psychology, Social Constructionism and Discursive Psychology**

In the social sciences, social constructionism is not a particularly new idea. Within psychology, however, such thinking has been relatively slow to penetrate the strongholds of the discipline. In fact, Harré and Gillett (1994: 2) go further to argue in strong terms that it ‘should be of interest to sociologists of science [that] old, outdated, and manifestly inadequate theories, have [in psychology] persisted alongside new and better theories and methods.’ They are referring to the fact that as social constructionist and discursive approaches have developed within psychology in the past 25 years, the ‘mainstream’ approaches (especially cognitive psychology) have remained relatively unmoved, despite the unanswered challenges of the new approaches to the prevailing practices of psychologists. In short, these new approaches, like tomorrow, have been postponed through lack of interest.

In the past 100 years, psychologists, nevertheless, have succumbed to two quite different dominating influences. The first of these was the behaviourist approach, a decidedly positivist, deterministic account of behaviour. In its variety of forms it stood relatively steadfast against ‘internalist’ accounts of the behaviour of humans and other animals. ‘Relatively’, because in a number of its so-called methodological versions it did incorporate a number of ‘intervening variables’ between stimulus and response (Leahey, 2000). However, these were variously understood as operationally defined, mathematical or temporary theoretical variables that perhaps would be eliminated when more precise specifications of behavioural laws could be established. This tradition was, and still is, experimental, laboratory-based and quantitative. It is, however, a much richer tradition
than for which many other psychologists and certainly other social scientists
give it credit. While in some forms the formulation of human behaviour is
admittedly crude, in many versions it is intensely subtle. Burrhus Skinner, for
example, was perhaps the most erudite psychologist of the 20th century. His
literary and cultural knowledge is evident in many of his major works (e.g.
Skinner, 1957, 1974). He was also by no means unaware of the criticisms
made of his particular brand of behaviourism, and was particularly
conscious of the misinterpretations of his position (see the Introduction to
About Behaviorism).

‘In any event’, as Chomsky has put it, ‘however one assesses it, an
important change of perspective [then] took place.’ This transition was from
‘the study of behaviour and its products (texts and so on) to the internal
processes that underlie what people are doing, and their origin in the human
biological endowment [typically, the brain]’ (Chomsky, 1996: 1). The word
to note in this quotation is ‘internal’. While there are any number of debates
within cognitive psychology, the common element for all disputants is the
assumption that the causes of behaviour lie, essentially, internal to the
organism (both biologically and psychologically). This assumption does not
mean that the surrounding context (whether physical, social or cultural) is
unimportant. What it does mean is that everything external is first filtered
through the assumed internal processes before it leads to behaviour. In
Neisser’s (1967: 1) words, for the cognitivist, the world of experience is a
‘mediated’ one. What is known is not the world directly, but the world as
‘processed’ or ‘mediated’ by the human cognitive apparatus. In this sense –
and hopefully without confusing the terminology too much – the cognitivist
perspective can be said to be a ‘constructivist’ approach, since the world is
constructed by such things as ‘information processes’ or ‘cognitive modules’
manifesting such processes. It is vital to understand the question of ‘what’
or ‘who’ does the constructing in distinguishing between the cognitive,
social constructionist and discursive approaches. There are some fascinating
debates to be pursued in current cognitivist theorizing – such as whether
connectionist theories require the concept of ‘representation’ – but the main
point to understand here is that cognitivism involves the privileging of inner
states (whether ‘beliefs’, ‘memories’ or more arcane technical ‘information
processes’) in the explanation of human behaviour.

For all intents and purposes, the cognitive perspective is the ‘main-
stream’ or dominant approach adopted in psychology today. There is,
however, an important corollary to this statement. In psychological social
psychology (in order to distinguish it from the sociological versions of social
psychology, e.g. ‘symbolic interactionism’, about which more below), it is
accurate to say that the approach is also cognitive in spirit. Importantly,
however, the flavour of cognitivism in social psychology is far less technical,
as Farr (1996) has observed, than is the case in cognitive psychology itself.
That is to say, while social psychologists in the North American tradition, in
particular, postulate cognitive processes to explain interactions between individuals, and have developed an ever-expanding sub-branch known as ‘social cognition’ (which threatens to engulf the discipline at times), the cognitive processes they discuss are far more recognizable to the lay person than those modelled in cognitive and neuropsychology. There is a ‘common sensicality’ to cognitive social psychology that is not always obvious in the technical arenas of cognitive psychology. This point should not be overplayed, however, since it could be argued that potentially, at least, cognitive social psychology could carry out an exercise of theoretical ‘filling-in’ to substitute (reduce) its terms and features of its models with the most technical of cognitive psychological constructs.

To some extent, then, social psychology can be seen as a development out of ‘folk psychology’, or the everyday psychological assumptions and ‘theories’ employed by ordinary people in their social interaction. Once again, however, it emphasizes a thoroughly individualized conception of this exchange. The important causal features of interest to the social psychologist are those internal processes that mediate the knowledge of, and interaction with, the social world.

One surprising feature of all this work has been pointed out by Coulter (1989). In his book *Mind in Action* – which should be compulsory reading for any sociologist – he points out that sociologists often have relied on oddly ‘unsociological’ explicit and implicit assumptions ‘about the “psychological properties” of human agents’ (Coulter, 1989: 55). He is not referring here merely to the obvious attempts to reduce the sociological to the psychological, but also to ‘the accounts of the nature of the “self” and of “mind” which are elaborated by, and which undergird the research of, symbolic-interactionist sociology’ (Coulter, 1989: 55). He goes on to detail how Blumer was responsible for an ‘extreme intellectualisation of human activity’ in which the ‘self’, through internalized ‘self-indications’ of private and therefore subjective ‘meanings’ or ‘interpretations’ is both a mechanism for producing these meanings and also an object of an individual’s own conduct. The resulting psychology is, of course, highly individualistic and mentalist and is almost indistinguishable from the, later, cognitive tradition in psychology.

There are a number of salient points to be made here that may help clear up some of the confusion introduced into the social sciences by this subjectivist reading of the mind. They also provide a basis for understanding those developments that have led to the so-called ‘second cognitive revolution’ in psychology. It is now common knowledge that Blumer seems to have seriously misinterpreted George Herbert Mead’s social behaviourism when he took over his course of lectures in 1931 (Farr, 1996). Mead, it should be remembered, saw himself very much as a philosopher with a great deal to say about psychology, despite the fact that the students who were encouraged to attend his course on *Mind, Self and Society* were predominantly from sociology (psychology students of the day presumably were so
smitten by the experimental tradition developing under the generic title of ‘behaviourism’ to be lured by what must have seemed like a rather ‘stretched’ and ‘metaphysical’ variant of the discipline – Farr, 1996: 55). Mead may well have studied briefly under Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig and, certainly, was impressed by Wundt’s volumes of Volkerpsychologie, which, unlike Wundt’s ‘physiological’ or ganzheit psychology, was a study of the socio-cultural evolution of consciousness. Mead was a Darwinian and, while he had some sympathy for John Watson (whom he taught) and his form of behaviourism (called ‘Watsonism’ by Mead), he actually criticized it for not going far enough (Farr, 1996). Mead, unlike Blumer, had in mind a thorough-going social understanding of ‘mind’ and ‘self’ and regarded Watson’s outright denial of the mind as metaphysical nonsense, and simply as a lack of courage to push the behaviourist analysis further.

Farr (1996) is surely right when he argues, based on Markovà’s (1982) analysis of approaches to thought and language, that the main reason Mead was not accepted by psychologists was because he was, fundamentally, approaching social behaviour from an Hegelian rather than a Cartesian perspective. (The continuing influence within psychology of Descartes’ prescription for mind should not be underestimated, for example see Dennett (1991) for an attempt to expel the Cartesian ghost from cognitive science.) For Mead, the mind was not something ‘metaphysical’ to be banished through limiting study to observables (as advocated by Watson). Such a strategy can be understood in terms of its latent Cartesianism. ‘Latent’, because it accepts the basic metaphysics of the Cartesian distinction between mind and (inert) matter and then severs one branch of the dualism. This excision simply leaves psychologists with a unilateral Cartesianism expressed as empiricism. The conflict between behaviourism and cognitivism (mentalism) then reduces to an argument between empiricism and rationalism, both of which rest on a Cartesian base. According to Farr (1996: 69), Mead attempted to solve the Cartesian problem of a dualism between self and other by adopting a basically Hegelian strategy of understanding the self, and mind, as a dialogical relationship occurring via the medium of language. Self and other, that is, are to be understood ‘in relation’ (i.e. as expressed over time) rather than conceptualizing the ‘self’ as a private entity carrying out various ‘understandings’ or ‘interpretations’ about the ‘other’ and itself.

The irony is that the subjectivism (Cartesianism) of the original formulation of symbolic interactionism was to infiltrate sociology as a reaction to the behaviourist ‘threat’. The actual working out of the legacy of Mead has had to wait for a development in psychology rather than sociology.

This development had an early – though much delayed – input from the writings of Lev Vygotsky, a Soviet developmental psychologist in the 1920s and 1930s. Until some 20 years ago, Vygotsky’s efforts were known by few psychologists. Today, his work receives quite frequent mention, even in introductory psychology texts, particularly in relation to his theory of child
development, which lies in stark contrast to the prevailing Piagetian (cognitivist) tradition. In brief, Vygotsky operated from within a Marxist perspective which, unsurprisingly, emphasized the use of ‘tools’ in developing, first, practical intelligence and, then, through the use of language, more abstract, distinctly human intelligence (Vygotsky, 1978: 20-24). The latter is achieved through the mastery of the use of signs and their corresponding symbolic activity as a specific development of the employment of tools for other purposes. As Vygotsky (1978: 24) emphasized, ‘the most significant moment in the course of intellectual development, which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and practical activity, two previously completely independent lines of development, converge.’ This conclusion is based on simple observations of the way in which children use speech to solve practical problems. The importance of this understanding is that psychological functions become ‘internalized’ only in the sense that ‘tool use’ (principally that of speech) is mastered by a developing person. Individuals, therefore, gain capacities and powers, as Harré (1983) would put it, which are then executed in order to achieve social action.

The distinction between this view of the psychological and the cognitive view is crucial. For the cognitivist, the mind is a mechanism that, not unnaturally, mechanistically processes information to produce action as ‘output’ of the mechanism. The latter is a system of rules (‘laws of thought’) that generate behaviour (Harré and Gillett, 1994: 14-17). The person is very much ‘along for the ride’, understood, at best, as a ‘self’ which is the accumulation of such rules and their enactment. In contrast, the alternative view, promoted in particular by Harré, depicts the individual as mastering skills, through an idiosyncratic appropriation of the grammar of speech and language, which can then be employed in social and discursive acts. The normative nature of the regulations concerning socially grounded speech contrasts with the causal role given to the cognitive ‘rules’. In the former, the subject as agent remains in one sense constrained by the discursive ‘tools’ at hand, but these tools also provide the freedom of action that enables certain accomplishments to be made. Mastering dissembling, for example, should not mean that one is causally determined to dissemble in any particular situation. It is the adoption of a social skill to be employed, or not, in particular situations. As such, it introduces new possibilities of action. Persons are seen, therefore, very much as ‘activists’ in their own lives rather than driven by cognitive mechanisms. Action, and the social, political and moral orders within which it occurs, remain central to the action. To make use of discursive ‘tools’ in this way is to be an agent in its most significant sense (see Harré, 1983, especially Chapter 1; Harré and Gillett, 1994, especially Chapter 8).

The distinction between the cognitivist and the discursive, as depicted above, can be made in another way: ontologically, the cognitivist adopts the
Cartesian (and Lockean) mind of a subject that ‘has’ ‘beliefs’, ‘desires’, etc., as entities or things within it. The discursive approach described above adopts an ontology of action. As Harré (1995: 369) puts it, ‘Psychology, as an account of the mentation of human beings, must be rooted in an ontology of activities, skills and powers, not in an ontology of substances. There is thinking, but, in a deep sense, there are no thoughts.’

This ‘ontology of action’ (rather than of private, internal entities) inevitably leads to a psychology whose focus is on the social world in which the action makes sense and can therefore be understood. There is now a profusion of broadly social constructionist and discursive approaches developing within psychology. Although, thus far, the emphasis has been on that most often associated with Harré and his associates, some mention of the breadth, however, would be useful in order to reveal the possibilities that these new approaches promise.

One of the earliest advocates of a social constructionist perspective in psychology was Kenneth Gergen (e.g. Gergen, 1973, 1978). In many ways, his approach has remained the most radical, in that psychological knowledge is seen to be fundamentally contestable and questioning of the notion that ‘[through] empirical assessment [the scientist] can claim truth beyond culture, comprehension beyond “folk psychology”, universality rather than historicity’ (Gergen, 1997: 738). It is also true, however, that in some of his most recent writings, as Osbeck (2001: 443) notes, ‘he portrays social construction as an ongoing dialogue in which even the scientific traditionalist might find room to contribute.’

Gergen is also an advocate of a decidedly ‘postmodern’ extension of the broad social constructionist and discursive approach. The ‘self’ becomes fully relational in such an account, and all psychological concepts, including ‘self’ and ‘identity’, become contestable. From this perspective, Harré and Gillett’s (1994) interpretation becomes a ‘conservative’ social constructionism that is representative of constructionist work characterized by its ‘congeniality with traditional individualism and its close alliance with empiricist metaphysics’ (Gergen, 1997: 736). Traditional psychological concepts and processes remain in terms of ‘individuals as cultural carriers’ (Gergen, 1997: 736). This variant of postmodernism will be considered in the final section. There has been a similar debate over the contribution of postmodernism to psychology (amongst the ‘alternative’ psychologies) as in the social theoretical tourism literature.

In this more ‘relational’ vein, detailed analyses of the operation of the psychological in the social and discursive world have been carried out by those who originally called themselves ‘discourse analysts’ (e.g. Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwards and Potter, 1992). The term ‘analyst’ emphasizes the methodological focus of this early work and the fact that discourses about the psychological become themselves the data of interest. Potter and Wetherell (1987), for instance, argue, through empirical examples, that
attitudes are not ‘fixed’ internal states but, in fact, are extremely changeable even within a single conversation. This volatile aspect of attitudes, they maintain, is quite deliberately filtered out of consideration by the methods of mainstream social cognitive psychology. Experiments and scales are engineered to reduce variability in response in order, ironically, to create reliable and valid measures of attitude. The very aspect of such a psychological act (expressing an attitude) that would demonstrate its discursive function (e.g. to avoid being accused of being a racist while still expressing racist attitudes) is made invisible to the investigator. The social is finessed out of the psychological, not unlike a magician pulling off a trick by distracting the attention of the audience at the crucial moment.

Edwards and Potter (1992) provide a more detailed contrast between what they now call ‘discursive psychology’ and mainstream cognitive psychology. Re-analysed from a discursive perspective, talk of memory, for example, can be seen to be highly oriented towards discursive action rather than being reports of what is going on ‘under the skull’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 177) and thus as a ‘route to cognition’ (Edwards and Potter, 1992: 15). The whole thrust of their approach is that psychological language does not (indeed, cannot – Wittgenstein, 1953) refer to internal states. Instead, it is always principally a discursive positioning within a continuing discourse, often involving such matters as blame and responsibility. The ‘truth’ of a psychological claim (e.g. ‘I can’t remember’, or ‘I’m very satisfied with my trip’) is not to be checked against any internal state. Its ‘truth’ is as much a function of the discourse as is the initial claim itself.

This discussion concludes with what in some senses marked the beginning of the intellectual development of discursive and constructionist psychology. (These points have been left until last as they will be returned to more fully in the final section.) Underpinning these new approaches within psychology have been two important philosophical insights. The most recent is from the so-called ‘sociology of knowledge’ within the philosophy of science (e.g. Bloor, 1991; Mulkay, 1992; Barnes et al., 1996). The ‘anti-foundationalist’ emphasis of this work serves to situate scientific knowledge and practice within specific cultures, time periods and societies. Perhaps the main insight, however, has come directly from the later work of Wittgenstein (1953), a suggestion that the meaning of psychological concepts is formed in the ‘use’ or ‘grammar’ of these terms. There is much to this simple observation that has repercussions for contemporary psychology and psychological knowledge (e.g. see Moore, 2000). For present purposes, however, it is enough to notice that this argument, if correct, situates knowledge of psychological phenomena within a strongly normative (i.e. ‘grammatical’), rather than causal, analysis. Thus, the two insights converge in propelling (personal as well as scientific) knowledge of the psychological into the public and social realm, and out of the Cartesian privacy of the individual’s mind from which only empirically based inference can supposedly separate it.
While still in a period of vibrant development, the social constructionist and discursive approach in psychology is sufficiently developed for it to be applied to the area of tourism. As argued above, the multidisciplinary tourism literature, which is itself in a process of development, could do with an account of the individual tourist that is compatible with the social theoretical work in the area. In the next section, there is an outline of the beginnings of a framework based on the social constructionist and discursive work being carried out in psychology, where it is argued that such a framework is the best current option to provide this compatibility.

The Discursive Tourist

Tourists, as people, clearly can be understood from a discursive psychological perspective. The important differences in comparison with a standard ‘cognitive’ rendering of tourist action and experience would include seeing tourists’ own accounts of their decision-making, motivation and experience as constructed in a discursive process with other tourists, hosts, family members, friends and, in particular instances, researchers. Tourist ‘behaviour’ would be conceived as action that carries out discursive work in order to achieve positioning in relation to others and to remaining aspects of each tourist’s life. Such discursive work could, for example, be aimed at providing accounts which justify destination choices, assert competence and sophistication as a tourist, deflect blame for problems or present them in ways which limit the tourist’s accountability, etc. (Of course, these are just possibilities – in particular settings analysis might reveal very different ‘discursive work’ being carried out in tourist discourse.)

Importantly, a discursive account of tourist experience and action would also not limit itself to the immediate activity of being a tourist. Context is a vital ingredient in discursive analysis, and so an understanding of the ongoing ‘conversations’ within which persons make use of their experiences of being a tourist would be essential. ‘Context’, in fact, is implied by the assumption that psychological phenomena are constructed and reconstructed over time. Even stability (e.g. of an attitude) comes to be seen as a result of repeated acts of reconstruction, which then implicate the context that affords such reproduction (and the reproduction of discursively constructed judgements of the fidelity of that reproduction).

Further, a discursive analysis would be sensitive to the different versions of an experience that a tourist might provide under diverse circumstances to various people. It may, for example, be that a tourist expresses attitudes about a destination quite differently to hosts than to fellow travellers. The aim, of course, would not be to identify the ‘true’ or ‘accurate’ report of such an attitude but, instead, to understand the discursive practices which construct each account. Interestingly, this approach would have the consequence of reflexively highlighting the researcher’s interests. A focus on
the attitude expressed to fellow travellers, for example, could indicate the
desire of the investigator to map discourse related to ‘word-of-mouth’
advertising. This emphasis would in turn implicate the discourse(s) within
which the researcher was operating (e.g. the idea that good tourism is more
tourism) and could itself become a fascinating area of inquiry. What would
become transparent is the process by which tourism researchers actively
construct different psychologies of the tourist. What would be novel, in this
regard, would be the full integration of tourism researchers’ understandings
of ‘the tourist’ as a socio-cultural phenomenon with a similarly social and
constructed tourist psychology.

At another level, the development of a ‘tourist psychology’, as mani-
fested in a particular setting, could be finely tracked, and any connections
with non-tourist depictions of human psychology could be examined. For
example, the ‘tourist as consumer’ (e.g. ‘hard-headed’, ‘discerning’,
‘uncontrolled and carefree’), ‘tourist as fellow traveller’ (e.g. ‘fellow’,
‘advisor’, ‘experienced’, ‘playful’, ‘relaxed’), ‘tourist as family member’, etc.,
could be tracked in terms of the discursive efforts made by tourists to
demonstrate and manage such varying discourses. In a sense, this agenda
may be the natural counterpart to Leiper’s (1990) definition of tourism as the
ideology of being a tourist. That is to say, it may be possible to begin to
understand how the various ‘ideas’ comprising such an ideology (or varieties
of ideologies) are put to work by tourists ‘on the ground’ in the developing
discourses that surround them.

Perhaps surprisingly, a discursive investigation of tourist psychology
may be best suited to understanding the flexibility and changeability of tour-
list action while still making sense of it overall. Tourist behaviour, under-
stood as an outcome of sets of beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, motives and
needs, may produce a degree of complexity, but this amalgam is essentially
the sophistication of an intricate ‘mechanism’. Modelling the output of such
a complex mechanism in order to gain any predictive power (which is one
of the attractions of any mechanistic programme of research) is as daunting
as is operationalizing the different ‘parts’ of the mechanism. Motivational
and decision-making models produced in this tradition thus far remain oddest
attempts at best. The discursive approach, in contrast, can account relatively
easily for changeability and ‘adaptability’. The mastery of discursive skills
and their employment in ‘multivocal’ discourses, within which all people
can be understood as being immersed, positions such flexibility centre stage
in the form of the moves accomplished by the tourist in the continuing
activity of travelling. This, essentially, is the advantage that any ‘ontology of
action’ has over an ‘ontology of entities’. (In fact, it finds an analogue in the
recent attempts to research ‘artificial life’ rather than ‘artificial intelligence’
in cognitive science – but that is another story.) Discursive approaches are
thus ideally suited to answer questions about how tourists ‘negotiate’ the
tasks of being tourists, since they highlight acts and strategies that not only
accomplish ends, but also help to redefine those ends spontaneously.
This type of analysis is perhaps the most important contribution that a discursive account of tourist psychology can provide. On the one hand, it can explain individual differences and dynamic and responsive flexibility, and yet also the commonalities of tourist action (i.e. common discursive practices). On the other hand, it can do so without appeal to an individualistic and privatized account of human psychology. Because of this capability, a discursive approach should be able to mesh cleanly with social theoretical analyses of ‘the tourist’, especially those that also adopt a basically constructivist stance. More importantly, the individual tourist would not be seen as an essentially passive vehicle for the expression of internal ‘needs’, ‘motives’, ‘desires’ and ‘wants’ (for which a technology of manipulation could perhaps be conceived). Instead, the tourist and all of those others involved in tourist encounters (and research) become conceived as active social agents – sometimes seeking similar, sometimes different ends – engaged in the production of tourism and tourist experiences at the microlevel. Continuing the constructivist project ‘all the way down’ to the level of psychological performance and experience would create a seamless theoretical framework. As they stand at present, psychological accounts of tourist actions and experiences owe far too much to perspectives that are, rightly, under siege in the rest of the social sciences. Perhaps it is psychology’s close alliance with the biological sciences that causes other social sciences to accept a remarkably ‘unsocial’ psychology of the tourist. As John Ralston Saul (1993) has pointed out, specialization makes everyone lions in their own territories but pussycats beyond.

This irony is most acute when postmodern interpretations of tourism (e.g. Urry, 1990) hand over explanatory responsibility to distinctly modernist and even positivist accounts of individual tourist psychology. Standard decision-making and motivational models in the tourism literature have been constructed largely along standard lines of psychological theorizing (e.g. van Raij and Francken, 1984; Mansfeld, 1992; Pearce, 1993), and yet are asked to blend with postmodern social theoretical accounts of tourism. The meshing, however, is extremely rough and leads to a bumpy intellectual gearing. A discursive approach overcomes this problem by being formed from theorizing in psychology that is itself based on the notion that social processes of construction are involved.

The one thing a discursive approach would not achieve, particularly in a more radical constructionist form, is the privileging of one or other foundational account of tourist actions and experiences. While a discursive perspective would be helpful in providing revealing and often unexpected accounts of tourist phenomena, the reflexive impetus of the approach inevitably prods researchers to see their own accounts as participating in another discourse of explaining ‘the tourist’. This situation leads the discussion to one of the most common criticisms of constructivist, discursive, and what some would call ‘postmodern’, accounts of human action. The final section of this chapter deals with this issue.
The Discursive Tourist and Postmodern Relativism

Within the tourism literature, there has been some anxiety expressed about what is loosely called a ‘postmodern’ perspective on the tourist and tourist experience. In particular, Bruner (1993, 1994) has voiced concern about the claims of some postmodern readings, especially in relation to the question of authenticity. His concern focuses on a discussion of copies and originals particularly at tourist (often historic) sites. Eco and Baudrillard come under special scrutiny from Bruner (1994) because of their contention that the present world (and American life in particular) has generated the loss of the distinction between the original (or the ‘true’) and ‘simulacra’ (the simulated ‘real’). Thus, ‘the simulacrum becomes the true, the copy becomes the original or even better than the original’ (Bruner, 1994: 407). Bruner’s main worry is that such a claim ignores the fact that what Eco and Baudrillard describe is not some newly evolved condition associated with the electronic age but is in fact ‘the human condition’ (1994: 407). In contrast, the constructivist position that Bruner (1994) adopts assumes that culture is always being invented (constructed) and reinvented (reconstructed). In an interesting sense, Bruner is pushing the postmodern argument to a conclusion that is immanent in its account of the social world. (This realization may explain why, in an earlier piece of work, Bruner (1991: 238) refers, presumably with approval, to his analysis of the transformation of the self in tourism as a ‘postmodernist view’. Certainly, in psychology, social constructionists, such as Gergen, have advocated a similar ‘postmodern’ undermining of knowledge claims.) In adopting this stance, he can uncover some of the implicit contradictions and paradoxes in the arguments of Eco and Baudrillard. In particular, he maintains that the depiction of America as obsessed with the hyper-real – a reality that is ‘better’ than the real – carries with it, in the writings of these two Europeans, the implication that Europe is the ‘implicit original’ of which ‘America is a satellite’ (1994: 409). The historic site, for Bruner (1994), is a place at which meanings are constructed (as they are elsewhere), and therefore what should be of interest is documenting these constructions rather than indulging in what he terms ‘grand generalizations about America, without nuances’ (1994: 409). Paradoxically, the movement that is meant to have proclaimed the death of the master narrative is, according to Bruner (1994), drawn towards the grand account itself and makes the mistake of relying on ‘implicit originals’ to make its points.

To put the matter directly, the ‘true’, the ‘real’ and the ‘authentic’ are, for Bruner, socially constructed, irrespective of whether one is in the prehistoric or the electronic age. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the postmodernist theorizing of Eco and Baudrillard, as Bruner portrays it, can only make its claims if it accepts the distinction between the absolutely ‘real thing’ and the (inferior) ‘absolute fake’ (Eco, 1990: 8). In Bruner’s eyes, it is actually business as usual, as meanings continue to be constructed in the same way.
they always have been. One person’s absolute fake is another’s meaningful experience.

It must be stated that Bruner (1994) is to an extent mistaken, at least about Eco’s (1990) essay *Travels in Hyperreality*. First, Eco is clearly writing in a humorous vein. Secondly, and more importantly, Eco does not in fact claim that all American tourist sites are of this ‘hyper-real’ variety. New Orleans and the Atlantic Coast, for example, are suggested by Eco (1990: 25–30) as being in far less need of the hyper-real since they do have a past which is incorporated into their museums and sites. According to Eco (1990: 31), ‘the Absolute Fake is offspring of the unhappy awareness of a present without depth.’ Where there is depth there presumably is less need for the reassurance of the ‘hyper-real’. Thirdly, Eco (1990) is as much concerned with the profit and commercialization motives underpinning ‘hyper-real’ attractions as he is in the responses of the visitors. Nobody, after all, owns the past in a way that could allow it to enter directly into an exchange system. Anyone with enough money can, however, own a ‘hyperpast’, ‘more real’ than the past, and charge money for access to it.

There is also more than a hint of indignation underlying Bruner’s criticisms. The condescension Bruner detects in these postmodern European works – whose focus is on American society – clearly offends him. Thus, Bruner adopts a constructivist perspective in this debate partly in order to make use of the implication that, really, Europe is no more or less the ‘original’ against which America can be judged than the reverse. Once again, his is a more thorough-going, relativist position than that which may be associated more often with ‘postmodernists’ such as Eco and Baudrillard. Bruner’s criticisms do not appear to be the usual ones that oppose the relativistic implications of postmodern theorizing. He is not a ‘realist’ as are so many critics of postmodern accounts. Rather, his complaint is that these ‘postmodernists’ are not relativistic enough – they are not sufficiently postmodern. That is to say, they do not reflexively deconstruct their own implicit claims that they are able to recognize the differences between the real and the fake. Because of this contradiction, they end up adopting an elitist European stance towards American society and its historic sites.

Bruner’s constructivist viewpoint in many ways is compatible with the social constructionist and discursive perspectives in psychology that have been promoted here. In particular, it has been argued that tourists’ psychological practices are themselves discursively and socially constructed and reconstructed often through ‘microlevel’ discursive processes. In this sense, there are no ‘absolutely real’ needs, motives, desires, memories, attitudinal orientations or perceptions lurking inside people which have to be identified, catalogued and measured ‘scientifically’ and ‘objectively’ for all time. Indeed, there is also no absolutely definitive way of understanding these phenomena.

The approach adopted here, which is also constructivist, sees merit in Bruner’s complaints against Eco and Baudrillard. Unlike Bruner, however, it
is maintained that a thoroughly constructivist position in fact coincides with acceptance of the notion of the ‘real’, ‘original’ or ‘true’, as opposed to the copy. One can therefore disagree with Bruner (1994: 407) when he suggests that ‘better yet . . . we could just abandon the distinction [between the original and the copy].’ It may appear paradoxical (although it is not), but one finds oneself to this extent supporting the analyses of Eco and Baudrillard, rather than Bruner, on the question of the ‘real’, ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ and therefore of the ‘hyper-real’ or ‘fake’. How is it possible to adopt such a position? Although this issue has been discussed in more detail elsewhere (Moore, 2000), a few points on epistemology and the foundation of knowledge may illustrate the main thrust of the argument.

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein variously described as ‘idle’ (1969: 4e) and an ‘illusion’ (1969: 18e) the sceptic’s positing of a ‘super doubt’ in relation to knowledge. Since Wittgenstein’s analysis of what is wrong with scepticism, raised to a philosophical position, applies just as well to the relativistic excesses of the postmodernist argument as it is sometimes met in psychology (e.g. Gergen, 1985), it is worth pursuing.

Wittgenstein (1953, 1974), of course, was fully aware of the notion that language (and thought) appear to have an all-enveloping nature. (By analogy, processes of social construction also seem to have this quality.) That is to say, the naïve realist position, according to which it is possible to have access to something ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ language and thought, runs up against early epistemological difficulties. Thus, in On Certainty, Wittgenstein confronts G.E. Moore’s famous realist view discussed in the latter’s essay Proof of an External World. The argument amounted to the claim that Moore knew for certain, while raising one of his hands, that ‘Here is a hand’. Wittgenstein, by all accounts, found Moore’s reasoning the best defence for a realist position that he had come across. He repeatedly maintained, however, that in using these arguments, Moore was mistaking the case for which it made no sense to doubt for the case of certain knowledge. In other words, there are instances in which there simply is no sense in raising a doubt but – and this is the important point – that is not because there is certain knowledge. People may think they can imagine a ‘super doubt’ (after Descartes), a doubt that could apply to anything. However, Wittgenstein (1969: 18e) pointed out that ‘If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything’ because ‘[t]he game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.’ That is to say, doubting requires some certainty that is presupposed. It is therefore impossible to query literally everything – the grammar of the concept of doubting, as Wittgenstein might have put it – shows that that would be an incorrect use of the concept.

What Bruner (1994) has identified in postmodernist discussions of ‘hyper-reality’ and ‘simulacra’ turns on this very point. The argument that distinctions, such as that between the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’, are somehow redundant from a constructionist perspective (since the notion of both the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’ are socially constructed) is a conceptual error of the
same order as that made by the sceptics in philosophy. The only ‘real’, ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ that exists is that produced by social construction. Therefore, to denigrate and delegitimate the concepts of the ‘real’, the ‘original’ and the ‘authentic’ is, ironically, to suggest that they are not really the ‘real’, the ‘original’ or the ‘authentic’. However, this would only be a justified position if there were, in fact, some non-socially constructed criteria for judging when something is ‘real’, etc. Of course, if anyone were to argue that the ‘original’ is the original in some transcendent sense, then clearly nothing would be added to the basis of its status as an ‘original’. (It would be like an emphatic addition rather than the presentation of an additional criterion to decide the issue.) Here, the point is that Bruner’s (1994) call for abandoning the distinction between originals and copies, paradoxically, may well be making use of just such a transcendent criterion. For Bruner, there is no distinction to be made between originals and copies because there is no transcendent criterion to make the distinction. However, in that situation, what people must be left with are the socially constructed grounds for each concept (‘original’ or ‘copy’). These bases are as good as they get and must, to be consistent from a constructivist perspective, be just as valid grounds as for any concept. (This point is not unlike the one made above with regards to the lop-sided Cartesianism of Watsonian psychology – what individuals try to get rid of can stay behind to haunt them.) ‘Original’, ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ are concepts having as firm a foundation as any other. The interesting issue from a constructivist perspective is why the concepts are used in particular circumstances (as Bruner, 1994, observes) and also why attempts are made to abandon the concepts.

Although these points may appear a trifle esoteric, they are nevertheless the inevitable outcome of adopting a social constructionist (or discursive) perspective. This situation is not to be regretted. In this way, social constructionists can be both suitably reflective (and reflexive) and reassuringly pragmatic. The ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ does not disappear. It remains, unmoved, but its grounds are now better understood.

Here, then, the case has been made for a thorough-going constructivist position in tourism studies (and generally). It need not be at the expense of other approaches. Indeed, it provides the best means of uniting them into a truly multidisciplinary area exhibiting coherence and clarity. Such a programme can now, with the previously outlined developments in psychology, extend ‘all the way down’ to the psychology of the individual tourist. There is a certain elegance to this agenda and, if constructionists are correct, perhaps it is these elements of a theoretical suggestion which weigh most heavily in its favour (see Gergen, 1985).

There is one final point that is worth making in this connection. It is an old claim in the tourism literature that, as MacCannell (1976: 1) stated at the beginning of his renowned work, ‘Our first apprehension of modern civilization . . . emerges in the mind of the tourist.’ This claim reappears in Urry’s (1991) suggestion that there is an inverse relationship between the objects of
the tourist gaze and the ‘ordinary’ elements of the tourist’s own society. This idea continues today and indeed is the theme for this volume – *The Tourist as a Metaphor of the Social World*. A discursive and constructionist view of tourist psychology helps to demystify the allure of this metaphor. First, and perhaps unfairly, a discourse analysis of the use of such a trope in the tourism literature could quite usefully deconstruct the intellectual advantage to be gained from making an examination of the tourist appear central to an understanding of society. Secondly, and more internal to the theoretical enterprise, it would not be surprising from a constructionist perspective to learn that tourist forms of life encapsulate and mirror broader social forms. After all, the tourist employs available social discourses (including those about psychological experience) to be a tourist. Further, the discursively mediated mind of the tourist is made in just the way that the social world is created. The metaphor, therefore, may be an even deeper one than realized and may cut beneath content (e.g. motivation and meaning) to the process of construction itself. Individuals, in a social world, negotiate their way discursively through the uncharted possibilities of mind and experience (in the sense of tackling an obstacle course), in the same way that tourists chart their course through the unfamiliar territory of their travels – in both cases armed principally with the socially provided tools of discourse.

References


The Tourist Experience and Everyday Life

Scott McCabe

Introduction

This chapter reassesses the dynamics of the relationship between the tourist, the tourist experience and some of the theoretical frameworks traditionally used to underpin analyses of tourist behaviour. Specifically, the discussion focuses on the extent to which tourist experiences reflect wider issues in the ordinary, everyday lives of members of society. It suggests that concepts developed in sociological understandings of the tourist, in particular the idea that the key catalyst of demand for tourism is a search for authentic and meaningful life experiences, in contrast to everyday life, are becoming more intricate and problematic. This complexity is created by a number of developments predicated on the changing character of society in a postmodern era. The extent of an individual’s experience of ‘being a tourist’ problematizes the relationship between the ordinary and the extraordinary. The changing nature of work and leisure, access to information and the fragmentation of time and space (Lash and Urry, 1994) collectively blur the distinctions between fantasy and ‘reality’, freedom and work, tourism and everyday life. The tourist experience, it is maintained, reflects, magnifies and distils everyday life. Touristic experiences infuse the mundane, and vice versa, in relation to the developing and maintaining of an individual’s social identities.

The analysis of tourist experiences, tourist interactions and discourses of tourist behaviour, approached from an ethnomethodological perspective, can illuminate the social world of an individual’s everyday life. This chapter
accordingly proposes three ways in which the tourist reflects the nexus between tourism and everyday life, through a discussion of identity and resistance, the body and gender relations, and the ‘home’ space. Seen in this light, the tourist experience becomes more than simply a metaphor of the social world, since it mirrors and replicates that everyday world, along with the social concerns of ordinary members of society. This discussion is developed initially out of a critique of MacCannell’s (1976) influential early contribution to the ethnomethodological study of The Tourist.

Locating the ‘Tourist’ in Tourism Studies

Leisure travel has become the focus of much empirical research and theory development over the last three decades. A pivotal point at which applied and conceptual work converges has been the debate about the causes of the expansion in travel demand, in terms of either internal motives or external factors (Krippendorf, 1987). There is a burgeoning literature that has addressed these issues from such diverse disciplinary perspectives as sociology (Dann, 1981; Urry, 1990, 1994; Cohen and Taylor, 1992; Parrinello, 1993; Selwyn, 1996), consumer psychology, (e.g. Moutinho, 1987; Woodside and Lyonski, 1989; Fodness, 1994), geography (e.g. Crouch and Ravenscroft, 1995) and business management studies (Crompton, 1979; Crotts, 1990; Mansfeld, 1992). In this array of conceptual and empirical work about the tourist, it is interesting to note some recurring themes that surface between them. One such theme is the idea that leisure travel is motivated by a desire to escape ordinary, ‘normal’ (Urry, 1990: 2) life, an hypothesis that is ubiquitous (e.g. Ryan, 1997). As a consequence of this emphasis, everyday life itself has received little attention, apart from outlining the assumed features of quotidian reality that drive members of society towards a search for meaningful experiences elsewhere through travel (MacCannell, 1976; Urry, 1990). Scant theoretical consideration has been paid to those aspects of everyday life that are sustained in tourist experiences. There has been little concern for the everyday discourses that influence the ways in which tourist experiences are formulated and constructed as legitimate pursuits for the complexity of individual mundane lived experiences that are influenced by touristic experiences.

This neglect has resulted in a situation where some studies of the tourist have been limited to ‘snap-shots’ of consumer behaviour (such as destination choice and activity preferences) from a positivist perspective. For others, tourist behaviour has been theorized in broad structuralist terms. Since there is little common ground between these two approaches, there has been very little dialogue or methodological debate. As a result (and even though there has been much useful theoretical work in the field of leisure studies (e.g. Kelly, 1983, 1989; Rojek, 1995)), theoretical or empirical
analyses of the tourist from the perspective of everyday life have been scarce in the literature (only two studies were found in a recent search that included the term ‘phenomenology’ in their title: Cohen, 1979; Masberg and Silverman, 1996).

Even though MacCannell identified and began to develop an ethnomethodological approach to the study of the tourist (1976), ironically the net result of his thesis was to divert attention away from everyday life as a useful starting point of qualitative inquiry in theorizing the tourist, preferring instead to direct research into more macrosociological interpretations.

However, other fields of study have demonstrated that analyses of how individuals experience the social world can contribute to understanding related phenomena in society, such as shopping and social identity (Miller et al., 1998). It is therefore proposed here that an analysis of what tourists are doing when they are being tourists or talking about their behaviour can provide a unique insight into the everyday lifeworlds of members of society. Thus, studies of the tourist can cast light upon the concerns of individuals in society through an examination of the discourses, experiences and dynamics of interaction between tourism and everyday life. It is argued that the concerns of everyday life are expressed and magnified in tourist activity, and therefore tourism behaviour itself provides a framework for understanding changes in society more generally. By suggesting that such an outcome is possible, a better understanding can be reached of how ordinary members of society deal with and relate to the issues of postmodernity placed upon them by society. Indeed, that was the focus of Urry’s analysis of the tourist gaze:

Such practices involve the notion of ‘departure’, of a limited breaking with established routines and practices of everyday life and allowing one’s senses to engage with a set of stimuli that contrast with the everyday and the mundane. By considering the typical objects of the tourist gaze one can use these as to make sense of elements of the wider society with which they are contrasted. . . . Thus rather than being a trivial subject tourism is significant in its ability to reveal aspects of normal practices which might otherwise remain opaque.

(Urry, 1990: 2)

The major premise of the argument developed in this chapter is that tourism is now so pervasive in postmodern society that, rather than conceiving tourism as a ‘departure’ from the routines and practices of everyday life, tourism has become an established part of everyday life culture and consumption. In the foregoing passage, Urry suggests that through an analysis of the tourist gaze, the theorist can develop ideas about the nature of society that is distinguished from, or contrasted with, tourist behaviour. According to him, the objects of touristic consumption represent the opposite of the features of everyday life. Thus, the conditions and concerns of people in society can be detected from an analysis of the touristic
activities in which they engage. Urry is not alone in seeking to locate the identifiable social conditions that have been responsible for the postmodern tourist phenomenon. Early theoretical focus was on the ‘tourist’ in the sociology of tourism. While Cohen developed a typology of tourist experiences (1974; see also 1988; and also Smith, 1989, it was left to MacCannell to extend theories of the tourist into broader trends in social theory.

MacCannell and the Legacy of ‘The Tourist’

MacCannell (1976) supplied scholars with an interest in ‘the tourist’ with the definitive statement in his ‘ethnography of modernity’. Adopting an eclectic structuralist stance, partly derived from Lévi-Strauss, MacCannell travelled across the USA, Canada and Europe, ‘blending in’ with tourists, becoming a tourist himself, and (following Goffman’s (1959) methodological approach) developing a critique of modern social structure. Focusing on the issue of authenticity of tourist experiences (partially in response to Boorstin’s (1964) broader critique of contemporary American tourism attractions), and also providing a sociology of ‘sightseeing’, MacCannell’s thesis retains its command, despite numerous critiques (such as Cohen, 1988). MacCannell raises some interesting issues, in terms of both methodology and subject matter, that provide the basis for the argument developed in this chapter.

First, MacCannell notes early on in his study an emerging fascination amongst ‘tourists’ for resisting being labelled as such. It is a subject to which he returns in a later work (MacCannell, 1992), and is one taken up by Dann (1999). This issue, however, appears to have been all but neglected in favour of a debate concerning the authenticity of the individual’s tourist experiences, even though it appears to be the most significant aspect of MacCannell’s thesis to those interested in the rhetoric of tourist experience. Although MacCannell’s citations all appear to be educated middle class in origin, taking passages from Boorstin, Lévi-Strauss, students and girlfriends, he attempts to show that it is the propensity of everyone to loathe simultaneously, and become irresistibly drawn to being a tourist. Others have since found alternative ways of associating themselves with the classification of ‘the tourist’, by using the term ‘traveller’, for example.

The rhetoric of moral superiority that comfortably inhabits this talk about tourists was once found in unconsciously prejudicial statements about other ‘outsiders’, Indians, Chicanos, young people, blacks, women. As these peoples organise into groups and find both a collective identity and place in the modern totality, it is increasingly difficult to manufacture morality out of opposition to them. The modern consciousness appears to be dividing along different lines against it (sic). Tourists dislike tourists. God is dead, but man’s need to appear holier than his fellows lives. And the religious impulse to go...
beyond one’s fellow men can be found not merely on our work ethic, where
Max Weber found it, but in some of our leisure acts as well.
(MacCannell, 1976: 9–10)

MacCannell goes on to say that: ‘Touristic shame is not based on being
a tourist but on not being tourist enough, on a failure to see things the way
that they “ought” to be seen’ (MacCannell, 1976: 10). For him, tourists
seek to go beyond the immediate appreciation of society and culture of
destinations, since they desire some deeper involvement with society.
Indeed, this feature forms their basic motivation to travel and their enduring
interest in the authenticity of their experience.

The realization that individuals can and do demonstrate such vehement
opinions about a category of behaviour in which most people partake is a
fascinating area for ethnomethodologists, since such a concern lies at the
core of their work. An analysis of the mundane ways in which individuals
define and give meaning to their lives, how they construct social reality in
interaction is the major focus for ethnomethodology. Why should people
display such negative feelings towards the behaviour of other people while
on holiday? What possible explanations can be given for their so doing? Are
such issues still important at the turn of the millennium? Some possible
connections can be made between these questions and MacCannell’s analysis
to Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of ‘distinction’ with regard to consumption of
cultural capital and the processes of identity formation. This chapter
suggests that an analysis of tourist behaviour within the perspective of every-
day life, and particular ethnomethodological approaches, can go some way
towards understanding how and why people in postmodern society work up
negative associations with being ‘tourists’.

In The Tourist, MacCannell goes on to give a brief account of the
ethnomethodology of sightseers by presenting ‘some observations . . . on the
authenticity of the experience or the accomplishment of touristic certainty’
(1976: 135), and by showing that ‘information’ is bounded by formal
considerations of learning, reliability and completeness. In other words, to
be a scientist is to go through a process of learning, adhering to, and
believing in, the standards and techniques of the profession (1976: 135).
MacCannell thus argues that the process of becoming a tourist is the same,
yet different, as regards the ambiguity of the rules:

Touristic information is found in guidebooks and travel writings, but it is more
thoroughly diffused throughout the modern world than is the case for some
other types of information, and the taken-for-granted reality which it pre-
supposes and supports is also much more general. An ethnomethodology of
sightseers would explore the touristic consciousness of ‘otherness’, and the
ways tourists negotiate the labyrinth of modernity.

(MacCannell, 1976: 135)

Hence, for MacCannell, tourists are free to express their own ideas by
projecting them on to their activity as sightseers, something he calls the
‘plasticity of the tourist image’. The ‘truth’ about the history of an attraction is only as good as the information supplied and received by tourists’ involvement and interaction at that site.

Although MacCannell makes some interesting ethnomethodological observations concerning the socially oriented and constructed nature of tourist reality, and also presents some useful qualitative data highlighting the superficiality of touristic experiences, he does not, nor, it is suggested, cannot, go much further with his analysis. Whereas his recommendation for an ethnomethodology of the tourist is laudable, his approach in *The Tourist* is too methodologically eclectic, concerned as it is with macro- and micro-structures, attempting inclusiveness, yet primarily imbedded in post-structuralist thought. Even though MacCannell scratches at the surface of an ethnomethodology of the tourist, in doing so he has obscured his study from the perspective of everyday life by engaging in a debate about authenticity of touristic experiences.

**Everyday Life and Postmodern Tourism: the Dynamics of the Tourist Experience**

Everyday life consists of the mundane events that constitute typical social life for ordinary members of society. It is made up of people and places, routes and networks, encompassing work, the domesticity of life at home and leisure (MacKay, 1997). In conventional conceptions of tourism, everyday life appears as distinct and separate from being on holiday.

In ethnomethodology, however, everyday life is something that is practically accomplished by members of society in an ongoing process of maintenance of social relations (Garfinkel, 1967). As such, the methods used by ordinary members of society in their talking about, or achievement of, tourist behaviour can also be studied as a practical accomplishment.

Garfinkel claimed that ordinary social actors were not interested in the methods that they used in their constructions and formulations, but rather that they were taken for granted. Thus the ethnomethodologist is able to analyse these methods for the features of the indexical expressions, reflexivity and practical reasoning that would otherwise remain opaque. The ethnomethodologist, rather than being interested solely in the content of practical actions as related to the broader concerns of post-structuralism, is more concerned with ‘how’ social life is achieved, established and maintained for all practical purposes. In this sense, ethnomethodology conflates the ‘how’ with the ‘what’ in social life (Heritage, 1984; Cuff et al., 1990; Coulon, 1995). An analysis of ‘how’ touristic activity is practically accomplished by members allows broader relationships to be developed between wider concerns of individuals in their everyday lives in postmodern society. Therefore, an ethnomethodology of the tourist can expand theories of touristic behaviour, since everyday life provides the starting point of inquiry.
and the rationale for touristic behaviour. An ethnomethodological approach can be applied to tourist studies through an elaboration of how the concerns of individuals in their everyday lives are extended into tourist behaviour via the considerations of: identity and resistance, the body and gender, ‘home’ and the ‘other’ (or ‘interiors and exteriors’).

Identity and Resistance

In the earlier discussion, MacCannell’s treatment of ‘resistance’ to the category label of ‘tourist’ was criticized for the narrow sample of voices on which he depended for his analysis, even though in a recent work McCabe (2001) has found that ordinary members of society also frame ‘resistance’ to being labelled as tourists in a similar manner.

However, in ethnomethodological studies, such talk is problematic. Rather than talk-in-interaction, interviews represent reflexive formulations with an ‘expert’ on tourism. Members in conversational interviews can be understood to be oriented towards the demands of the interview setting in making responses to questions that they consider to be what the questioner wishes to hear. In such focused conversations, McCabe (2001) has found that subjects are ‘doing’ ‘resistance’ to the category of tourist. In so doing, members (interviewees) develop alternative categories of behaviour, such as ‘serious walker’, and such work allows the ethnomethodologist to relate to the wider concerns of members of society in terms of their everyday lives. Members of postmodern society can be understood to define their lives, not only through their work, but also through their consumption of everyday activities and places. The number of such category labels to define leisure identity in postmodern society is endless (Kelly, 1983). Unlike work, these leisure activities are not to be avoided through the taking of holidays, but are refined, honed and expanded – made ‘serious’ through the act of taking a vacation. The identity of a member of society in everyday life as, for example, being a walker (hiker), mountain biker, para-glider, sadomasochist, dancer, disc jockey or gambler is reinforced through leisure travel experiences that are created specifically to cater for such niche activities. The tourism industry, through increased segmentation (as well as via organized, specialist-interest groups), has created identity-rich, as opposed to culture-rich, holiday phenomena and experiences. Since many members of postmodern societies have much experience of travel (Parrinello, 1993), independently organized vacations can easily be arranged. Parties with a particular interest can meet through the Internet, and soon disparate communities eager to share knowledge and interest in their activities are created. Tourism in such scenarios does not easily fit within the traditional mould. The act of travel in such cases is much more related to everyday life leisure, habits and norms than to notions of a search for the ‘other’.
In terms of the phenomenon of ‘resistance’ to the category of ‘tourist’, a new framework for analysis can be developed that takes as its basis members’ understandings and constructions of practical activity such as tourist activity. Under an ethnomethodological approach, members’ own interpretations and classifications of behaviour can be used as a starting point of analysis. Research can be developed and directed towards an analysis of how people construct categories of behaviour differently from one another, how these categories are compared and contrasted with other categories, and what rules or rational properties of accounts of social activities can be discerned in members’ constructions of touristic activities.

In a recent ethnomethodological study, McCabe (2001) has noted that ordinary members of society use the term ‘tourist’ in a variety of different contexts and apply their own definitions of touristic activity to their own behaviour and that of others. However, individuals can also develop other categories of activity that are quite different from being a ‘tourist’. These other categories of activity are constructed in order to achieve different kinds of work in interactional settings. Relating to categories of touristic activity allows members to demonstrate legitimacy for their actions, or warrant-ability of their behaviour, and, at other times, to construct themselves as distinctive members of society, by using categories as devices towards this end. This type of labelling and categorizing of social activity or behaviour enables individuals to make claims about their identities – a theme to which this chapter returns later.

In contrast, MacCannell’s analysis in *The Tourist* takes the issue of ‘resistance’ to the categories of the tourist away from the level of the individual and the interactional significance of such behaviour, and abstracts the possibilities way beyond the level at which an ethnomethodological account can be developed. Far from seeing such interactional work as being a ‘rhetoric of moral superiority’, an ethnomethodological reading of such work might include an analysis of the work that such rhetoric achieves for the participants in terms of self-presentation (after Goffman, 1959), or membership affiliation work. MacCannell’s distinctly middle-class, educated sample certainly begs the question as to how different class groups construct and define their own touristic activity – an under-researched topic in tourist studies. Also possible under ethnomethodology is an investigation into different cultural constructions of being a tourist. If tourists disown the category of tourist to define their own behaviour, then how do they construct and define their experience? What categories do they use? These are all potential lines of ethnomethodological enquiry. The examples given above represent only a tiny fraction of the possible subjects and topics of analysis from which to approach tourist studies. Indeed, any touristic information or communication, or situation or interaction data may be analysed for the features, methods and procedures by which touristic activity is accounted for and given meaning.
The Body and Gender Relations

Although it is still a very contested area (see Miller et al., 1998), recently there has been a change in the nature of gender relationships and a blurring of the traditional consumption patterns, roles and behaviours of the sexes, particularly in relation to body image and leisure activity. A timely example is the press furore over the issue of women’s boxing in the UK. Given public debate and concern about the legitimacy of pugilism as a healthy sport for anyone, whether male or female, it is not surprising that it has become a big issue. Of equal interest is the growing concern among men about their own body image. Recent articles have pointed to an increasing trend towards ‘bigorexia’ (the Adonis complex), where males will stop at nothing to develop larger and better-toned, muscle-bound bodies, even if it means endangering their health by taking harmful steroids (see the plethora of men’s ‘health’ magazines). This trend forms one extreme edge of a more general interest in men’s image, health and beauty in post-industrial societies. Members of society are concerned with their looks; men’s grooming has become an enormous growth industry, and so have private leisure and health clubs (Nixon, 1996). Here again one may detect parallels with the development of tourism – an increasing tendency towards more sport- and activity-based holidays (see Poon, 1993), creating a means of extension of the everyday leisure activities and the more general concerns of members of society into the touristic sphere.

However, the body and the sexualized image of the body have become an increasing focus for members of society in relation to tourism. On the beach, tourists’ behaviour may be shaped by how they think they look in relation to other beach-goers, how members express their bodies through their touristic pursuits. Members of society travel to experience bodily pleasures, not only in a simplistic ‘gaze’ at other bodies, but also to experience hedonically what may only be glimpsed voyeuristically at home. The UK reality TV show, Big Brother, failed to provide viewers with a real-time, reality TV sexual moment, in the greatest exponent of (hyper-real) ‘everyday’ life. However, another reality TV show, Around the World in Eighty Raves, did supply a truly ‘touristic’ extension of everyday life leisure identity for six young adult clubbers from Leicester, in that real sexual encounters were made possible through the abandoned hedonism of the participants. Tourist experiences as sites for sexual expression and of performance of the body may be nothing new in sociological understandings of touristic activity. Yet an exploration of how gender roles are maintained and accomplished, the importance of the body and associated images of the body in the context of gender values, sexual performance, physical attraction and desire, are all under-researched aspects of tourism. Such topics can give a unique glimpse into the everyday norms and values of ordinary members of society, through an analysis of the site of their most forceful and omniscient presence. Ethnomethodology is different from...
conventional sociology in that the latter treats actors as irrational beings, whereas the former is interested in the actor’s practical experiences. Traditional sociology applies values and norms, rules and structures from pre-existing theoretical frameworks, but ethnomethodology proceeds from a viewpoint of the processes through which the supposed stable features of organized everyday life are continually being created and recreated (Coulon, 1995). Tourism as a social phenomenon can be mundane or exciting, depending on a range of factors, including purpose of the trip, the people with whom the tourist travels, the social experiences whilst at the destination and also the place itself. Yet tourism also represents a microcosm of everyday life, a magnifying glass through which the entire miscellany of life is distilled into a fragmentary week or fortnight. Tourism as a phenomenon provides a frame through which everyday life is not abandoned, but enriched and heightened. Concerns over body image, gender and sexual identity are central for members of society in their everyday lives, and such preoccupations are evident in the choices which people make in their touristic behaviour.

**Home and ‘Other’ Places (Interiors and Exteriors)**

In an earlier ethnomethodological analysis of tourists’ talk, McCabe (2001) found that members of society account for their ‘day visitor’ behaviour in relation, or in opposition to, what life is like at ‘home’. The domestic space and the distinctiveness of destination places make up a large component of tourism studies of ‘other-ness’. Such research has concentrated on theorizing what people are looking for in their quest for the ‘other’ and what purposes such a quest serves.

Previously, it was argued that much postmodern tourist activity is reflected, not in a search for alterity, but rather in a concentrated extension of everyday life leisure. The fact that members choose to carry out these activities in other places adds a new dimension; their engagement with the pursuit may be heightened, reinvigorated or broadened. The chance to share similar interests with new ‘others’, either the people of tourist destinations or fellow tourists, appears to be at odds with analyses of everyday life. Yet again, it is argued that everyday life is pervasive even in terms of the tourist within the destination for a number of reasons.

First, even though tourists are away from home, they are constantly referring their experiences at the destination to life back at home (see Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Cohen and Taylor, 1992). The universal frameworks of time and space govern the leisure travel experience (Dann, 1999). Tourists know that their time in a destination, doing a particular activity, is limited to a certain period and can lead to modified behaviour. Tourists contrast the time available on holiday with the time available at home to recover, reminisce, recuperate and return to a routine. In terms of routine
itself, tourists continue the same rituals on holiday as they do in everyday life. On holiday, tourists may veer away from their normal culinary fare; they may imbibe and indulge more. Yet it would be interesting to identify the extent to which tourists modify their behaviour in terms of vegetarianism and demand for, say, organic produce. However, it is in the constant appraisal of the contrasting features of places of tourist destinations to home space that ethnomethodology can contribute a greater understanding of tourist behaviour. In asking tourists about the attractive features of tourist destinations, the ethnomethodologist can establish through what processes tourists contrast destination spaces with home spaces in their accounts of everyday life.

Tourists are reflexive in their formulations of their behaviour. It is simply not credible to say that holiday destinations are the same as home places. Rather than providing typologies and characteristics of spaces, surely what is needed is more research into the processes through which spaces are constructed and contrasted.

Take, for example, a holidaymaker who lives in a National Park who chooses to visit another National Park. Even though the countryside is different, will not the ‘type’ of environment be the same? Yet tourists feel obliged to make distinctions between their home spaces and tourist spaces. An ethnomethodological investigation would analyse the properties of these processes of distinction. Earlier, it was noted that tourists often resist the category of tourist in favour of some other category of behaviour. However, what is apparent is that when tourists are called to account for their behaviour, they often refer back to a cultural norm of ‘tourist’ in such ‘contrasting work’ in order to achieve their accounts.

Recent cultural trends in the UK can be drawn upon to illustrate these points. The rise in popular culture focusing on the home as the centre of social life was stimulated by an increasing incidence of home ownership, in turn brought about by changes in the credit law and council housing policy of the Thatcher era. This situation led directly to a consumer boom in DIY markets and to a spin-off in terms of home and gardening TV shows, magazines and websites dedicated to home improvement. The home, therefore, changed from its conventional modern use as a back-stage space where formal display rituals could be relaxed (Goffman, 1959), to the most potent symbol of postmodernity, the most front-stage of places for displaying social identity and cultural worth. This space now includes a display of the souvenirs and artefacts collected in travel experiences. In the postmodern sense, the roles of home and destination are becoming reversed. The places of tourism destinations are no longer the primary spaces to parade identity and status; it is the home (or the postcode) that has taken on that role. Tourist destinations are now class-neutral; rich and poor alike can all share the same holidays, side by side on the beaches of Mallorca or in the souks of Morocco, since travel is the universal preserve of the classless society. In reconceptualizing the dynamics of the everyday lived space of tourist
destinations, a clear set of relationships can be developed. Social identity and social representation of identity in the context of the home and the tourist destination are complementary arenas. The places that individuals visit in their leisure travel do not necessarily serve to reinforce social identities generally. Recent research suggests that members’ social identities should be situated in the context of interaction. In other words, identity is a social, interactional accomplishment (see Abell and Stokoe, 1999). Individuals can choose types of travel that contrast distinctly from the types of behaviours and activities partaken in everyday life. This type of inversion can be linked not only to theories of dissonance with everyday life, but also of role inversion through tourism (Gottlieb, 1982). Yet, because the cultural artefacts and souvenirs that tourists accumulate on their travels are brought back into the home, the domestic space changes and reflects the touristic social identity of the individual. New meanings and values are acquired that reflect developing experiences and situated identity constructions.

Conclusions

Tourists can be conceived as reflexive members of society, having available a cultural stock of knowledge that allows them to define and construct ideas about touristic behaviour and experience. Tourists can therefore draw upon this cultural stock of knowledge to accomplish touristic social reality in a natural and taken-for-granted way. Far from being a social activity that is separate and distinct from everyday life, from an ethnomethodological perspective tourism can now be understood as a social accomplishment, intrinsically bound to, and reflecting, everyday life. Rather than merely being a metaphor of the social world, tourism experiences and interactions provide, in their distinctness, a window through which the real social world of the everyday lives of ordinary members of society can be glimpsed. To construct tourism as different, distinct, separate and more meaningful than ‘normal life’ is to do what is required of ordinary members in accomplishing touristic social reality. Using natural language and having available a set of cultural discourses about appropriate tourist activities, tourists are both obliged and constrained by everyday life to construct their experiences in warrantable and credible ways. It is simply not acceptable to talk about touristic experiences in a resigned, bored or blasé manner. Society requires that members do not talk about tourist experiences as being drudgery, a set of chores to be undertaken, but rather as exciting, invigorating, renewing and relaxing. Therefore, touristic experiences are constructed in contra-distinction to normal daily routine. It is the methods by which members achieve such formulations and the work that these accounts achieve that are of interest to the ethnomethodologist. Avoiding the issue of authenticity allows the analyst to concentrate on how touristic social reality reflects
everyday life, how ‘being’ a tourist achieves identity maintenance (Desforges, 2000). Further, ethnomethodological analyses can inform the processes through which tourists orient reflexively to wider social discourses in accounting for their touristic behaviour.

This chapter has attempted to open up a debate concerning traditional sociological approaches to tourist studies. It has argued that tourism has been conceived theoretically as being distinct and separate from everyday life. Conventional sociology has been concerned with the condition of postmodernity in interpreting tourist activity and its causes. Early ethnomethodological analyses, such as MacCannell’s, did not go far enough. They obscured the potential of the study of the mundane practices of individuals in accounting for their touristic activities, thereby excluding a rich and useful approach to understanding the dynamics through which everyday life and tourism are becoming fused in the postmodern context. MacCannell conflated structuralist concerns with an ethnomethodological approach and thereby created a constrained legacy of research interest in the authenticity of tourist experiences. However, this issue loses significance since the object of analysis is on the procedures by which individuals work to demonstrate the authenticity of their experiences and the interactional purposes these formulations serve.

This chapter, in developing an ethnomethodological approach, claims that such studies of the tourist have neglected some pivotal issues, including the fact that ordinary members of society define and construct their experiences in many different ways. Topics that can now be investigated include aspects of how individuals formulate and construct identity, place, time and meaning and the relationships developed in these constructions between home and touristic activities. Furthermore, tourists use cultural resources and common-sense understandings of touristic behaviour in their formulations of experience, which can provide a rich seam of data from which to develop theory. Also, tourists’ talk (either naturally occurring, or interview derived) is conceived as being constructed reflexively from cultural knowledge, and can be analysed for the work that it achieves for members as warrantable and legitimate behaviour. This chapter proposes that tourist studies can benefit from an engagement with an ethnomethodological perspective in terms of the mundane and everyday methods by which tourist activity is constructed. Tourism creates a world for a person that is not separate from everyday life, but intrinsic to it. Tourist activity reflects a microcosm of everyday life as seen through a prism, concentrated, magnified and fused back into the home setting.

Note

1 This is not to negate the contribution made by other studies of the tourist such as those by Gottlieb (1982) and Lett (1983). However, these papers were not
approached explicitly from an everyday life or ethnomethodological orientation, whereas MacCannell clearly aimed to open up tourism research to such a perspective.

References

Abell, J. and Stokoe, E.H. (1999) I take full responsibility, I take some responsibility, I'll take half of it but no more than that: Princess Diana and the negotiation of blame in the 'Panorama' interview. Discourse Studies 1, 297–319.


The Home and the World: (Post)touristic Spaces of (In)authenticity?

Tazim Jamal and Steve Hill

Introduction

The linguistic and postmodern turns have been slow to come to tourism research, itself a multidisciplinary pastiche of fragmented theories on the spaces and places of travel, offering a multiplicity of perspectives on motivations, experiences, resident ‘impacts’, (new) tourism forms and the culture of nature. The local and global spaces of natural/cultural heritage and nationhood are being produced, packaged and managed for consumption. The modernization, globalization and rationalization of the public and touristic spheres raise critical issues for tourism scholars, such as that of the ‘authenticity’ of attractions, cultures and places, and their sustainability in light of such global geo-political influences. As Hughes (1995: 781) notes, ‘[t]he issue of authenticity runs, like an obligato, through tourism studies.’

MacCannell’s work on tourist motivation and authenticity is arguably one of the most influential in the academic literature on tourism. The substantial impact of his book *The Tourist* (1976) has been noted by scholars such as Bruner (1993), Dann and Cohen (1991) and Uriely (1997). While key contributions to a further understanding of authenticity have been made since that time, postmodernism’s influence has contributed to making this concept almost mythical, a tradition in tourism studies that sometimes appears as impalpable today as it did in 1976.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore a range of meanings that have been attributed to this concept in the literature, particularly with respect to the authenticity of the tourist experience. The analysis suggests that the ambiguity that surrounds it is in part due to: (i) using the term without...
clarifying whether it is the object or experience that is the source of the authenticity; and (iii) a lack of philosophical clarity with respect to its underlying assumptions and attributes. In particular, it is shown that the tourist experience lacks theoretical and philosophical underpinnings that enable, for example, a clear understanding of how an experience may be ‘authentic’ and whether an object or event is ‘real’ or ‘fake’. A few scholars who have begun to contribute to this task are drawn upon in order to elaborate further on this experiential aspect of authenticity.

This chapter therefore not only focuses on the tourist experience, but demonstrates how the tourist, at the microlevel of travel, is intimately connected both to the object/event being experienced and to greater macrolevel global, social and geo-political structures. This exercise, of course, brings this ‘tour’ of authenticity back home to a question that is often ignored: how do (authentic) tourist experiences relate to (authentic) tourist existence? The argument works towards addressing this issue by commencing with a review of various works on authenticity and tourism. Subsequently, a theoretical framework is compiled, one that uses a philosophical and interdisciplinary perspective. Here, the distinction of *de dicto* and *de re* is introduced in order to clarify some of the ambiguity that results whenever the researcher’s own methodological and philosophical assumptions are not clearly delineated or understood. Specific micro–macro level linkages are later discussed, including those related to post-colonial space, heritage tourism, alienation and performativity, along with the ‘home’ and ‘world’ of tourist experiences and existence. Finally, a few suggestions are offered for further critical and reflexive analysis of authenticity in tourism.

### Approaches to Authenticity

A discussion of authenticity in tourism is well served by commencing with MacCannell’s seminal contribution, *The Tourist*, in part a response to Claude Lévi-Strauss’s assertion that no scholar can undertake successfully an ‘ethnography of modern culture’. MacCannell, seeing in tourism a parallel to social structure as a whole, has produced a complex work that even today stimulates debate about tourism and modernity. The quest for authenticity, he argues, is rooted in a particular modern, ontological anxiety about the ‘reality’ of life. The tourist is a modern pilgrim, seeking authentic existence and meaning to modern life’s artifice. Hence tourism and the tourist metaphorically represent the inadequacies of the modern world. Tourist settings can be arranged on a continuum, with the first and foremost region being the one that is mostly for show purposes (‘staged authenticity’) and the sixth or backmost region being the one that is most authentic and motivates touristic consciousness (p. 102). While MacCannell does not elaborate on the relationship between the individual and the thing perceived, he does...
tackle authenticity with respect to the social world, particularly later on where he examines the dialectic of authenticity:

The dialectic of authenticity is at the heart of the development of all modern social structure. It is manifest in concerns for ecology and front, in attacks on what is phony, pseudo, tacky, in bad taste, mere show, tawdry and gaudy. These concerns conserve a solidarity at the level of the total society, a collective agreement that reality and truth exist somewhere in society, and that we ought to be trying to find them and refine them.

(p. 155)

Genuine structure is composed of the values and material culture manifest in the ‘true’ sights. These true sights, real French country homes, actual Dutch towns, the Temple of the Moon at Teotihuacan, the Swiss Alps, are also the source of the spurious elements which are detached from and are mere copies or reminders of the genuine. The dividing line between structure genuine and spurious is the realm of the commercial.

(original emphasis; p. 155)

Here ambiguity surrounds what actually constitutes authenticity, though one may infer that it has a great deal to do with a traditional ontology that privileges the ‘real’, ‘true’, ‘genuine’ and ‘objective’ world. Favoured is the ‘original’, the premodern, and perhaps even the primitive or the exotic, as opposed to the modern or the contrived, that which is ‘phony’ or ‘pseudo’. In the above passages, MacCannell appears to identify some potential components of inauthenticity or spuriousness: the everyday, the tasteless or tacky, the commercial, which all lead to societal discontent. By identifying French homes or Dutch towns as ‘real’ or ‘actual’, MacCannell hints that there must be some (essential) property or attribute that qualifies them as such. One has to assume from the subjects that he chooses to illustrate authenticity – an ancient temple or quaint and probably premodern European homes, communities or establishments – that historicity, or at least a tie to something in the past, like a previous era or a premodern culture or tradition, merits the designation of an entity as ‘authentic’. All the while, however, the relationship between the authentic object and the authentic tourist experience remains vague.

In the three decades that have followed his original treatise, many other tourism scholars have integrated the notion of authenticity into their analyses. Table 5.1, which is far from comprehensive, describes a range of works that illustrate diverse ways in which this term is used. It also offers interesting avenues for conceptualizing authenticity in the tourism domain.

This review of tourism studies reveals a scholarly tendency to: (i) characterize tourism experiences as ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’, often indirectly and by implication rather than by a direct application of the term; and (ii) ascribe characteristics such as ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ to an experience, object or event, in a way that belies a normative/personal bias or ‘hidden’ philosophical assumptions. Among the researchers who have also observed
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boorstin</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Tourists thrive on ‘pseudo-events’ (inauthentic contrived attractions); The Image is a critique of modern tourism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Four types of ‘touristic situations’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>A typology of tourist experiences based on the notion of the ‘centre’ (explored earlier by Eliade in his writings on religion, and by Turner in his study of pilgrimage).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>‘Emergent authenticity’</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>‘Communicative staging’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacCannell</td>
<td>1976/1989</td>
<td>The tourist as a modern pilgrim in search of the authentic (lost in the modern world). Front and back regions in tourist spaces; ‘staged authenticity’ occurs in the front regions (contrived tourist spaces).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redfoot</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Tourists as symbolic of the ‘triumph of personal meaning in an increasingly impersonal world’ (p. 306). For the modern individual (tourist), authenticity lies in celebration of the private sphere (time with family and friends).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urry</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Tourism as the search for difference; authenticity and the tourist gaze are contrasted with everyday (non-tourism) experiences. ‘Post-tourists’ enjoy inauthenticity and voyeuristic play.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruner</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Authenticity is based on verisimilitude, genuineness, originality and authority (to museum professionals at New Salem). The visitor experience at New Salem includes a sense of meaning, identity and attachment – meanings generated in social context involving performance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harkin</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Semiotics of authenticity – ‘site sacralization’ (MacCannell) of tourist objects or sights; the production and consumption of the ‘authentic’ through a system of signification is unstable (the tourist is active in experience-creation). The experience of alterity, dialectics of authenticity and familiarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rojek</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Modernity, alienation and inauthentic existence (Marx). Homo faber/homo ludens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mowforth</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Authenticity within the context of globalization and cultural consumption practices (e.g. consumption of ‘real’ lives, poverty, civil war, developing-world cultures, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Munt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richter</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The social construction and politics of authenticity – particularly with respect to heritage (tourism).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang</td>
<td>1999, 2000</td>
<td>Modernity, society and existential authenticity as particular types of authenticity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
this trend are Sharpley (1994: 129), Salamone (1997: 306–307, 318) and Wang (2000). Bruner (1994: 398), too, notes how scholars like MacCannell, and even Eco and Baudrillard, ‘retain an essentialist vocabulary of origins and reproductions’ which tends to establish oppositions and a judgmental bias, where one term becomes privileged at the expense of another. Two examples illustrate the ambiguity that shrouds authenticity in tourism, and raise the question of the researcher’s role. What philosophical assumptions underlie the researcher’s understanding of this concept?

**The postmodern view**

It is perhaps best to start with an article whose featured attraction – Santa Claus – is as mythical and difficult to grasp as is its conceptual linchpin. Pretes (1995) appears at first to confront the concept of authenticity head-on with his examination of a completely constructed phenomenon: the ‘Santa Claus industry’ of Lapland. His main research question revolves around what motivates tourists to visit ‘overtly contrived’ attractions, because it appears that in Lapland they ‘are not seeking authenticity’ (Pretes, 1995: 2). He concludes that Lapland’s Santa Claus is inauthentic because he is a simulacrum, a copied image for which no original exists (the typical postmodern condition). This image is similar to many others around the world, and only Lapland’s ability to convince tourists that its Santa is the ‘original’ (p. 14) will help Finland to succeed in its tourism strategy. So what constitutes an authentic experience of Santa Claus, especially when he is at best a mythical figure? Given the impossibility of dredging up the ‘original’ object, does it require a good imitation, a good narration, a good experience of (what)? How does location play into conveying an ‘authentic’ experience?

**Heritage as contested space**

A study by Teo and Yeoh (1997) of a Singaporean theme park based on the sculpture garden of an historic villa is instructive in showing the authors’ role in presenting authenticity-related issues. The article’s main focus is not explicitly stated to revolve around authenticity, but its practical concerns indicate that authenticity is a crucial issue that supports MacCannell’s idea that what is commercialized or commoditized cannot be authentic. Recounting the failure of a highly mechanized, adventure ride-based theme park to live up to either tourist expectations or resident memories, the authors laud a return to a more walking-oriented, sculpture-dominated park with depictions of, among other things, ironically out-of-place exotica such as hippopotami and polar bears. The villa’s original owner was an international businessman with an eclectic taste for products of cultures and environments from around the world, and he designed his garden to reflect
that eclecticism. However, as the villa’s grounds had long been open to
locals, they had appropriated them as their own. The grounds’ eventual
return to their original sculpture-dominated state was presented by the
authors in this way: ‘By highlighting what is (sic) perceived to be the more
authentic aspects of Haw Par Villa, the park appears to have come full
circle’ (p. 209). Hence, the authors seem to imply that while the highly
mechanized ‘Americanization/Disneyification’ of the park was not authentic,
the original park grounds were – even if they included sculptures of
flamenco dancers and a Greek discus thrower. They also suggest that
perceptions and various socio-political forces play a role with respect to the
authenticity of the attraction.

A Spatio-temporal Typology of Authenticity

Authenticity in tourism experiences, objects and events can represent sev-
eral things to many people, making the task of defining or even describing
it a difficult one. For scholars and researchers, not delineating one’s philo-
sophical assumptions contributes to the ambiguity associated with this term
and may lead to potential abuse of tourism places, peoples and products
through misappropriations of the concept. At this stage of the knowledge-
building process in tourism studies (cf. Jafari, 1990), a comprehensive analy-
asis of the various meanings attributed to the idea and use of authenticity can
help bring together some disparate threads of scholarship, and offer useful
direction for research, theory and practice. Thus, previous work is built upon
here by clarifying some philosophical assumptions and by proposing
a framework of key dimensions (the objective (real), the constructed
(social–political) and the personal (phenomenological)) and aspects of
authenticity (e.g. space and time). Based on a detailed analysis of scholarly
literature, the typology presented here bears some resemblance to Wang’s
(1999, 2000) framework. However, in attempting to go further, a philosophi-
cal clarification and a finer-grained local–global analysis of this concept are
added, particularly with respect to spatio-temporal and philosophical issues
and perspectives.

Time and space

Two key aspects of authenticity that appear especially helpful for concept-
ualizing authenticity are time and space (Table 5.2). Heritage tourism is a
useful example to illustrate these two dimensions. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett
(1997) offers a worthwhile description of three types of time involved
in heritage tourism: historic time, heritage time and visitor time. These
approaches to time roughly parallel three types of authenticity. Historic
time, which can also be thought of as real time or a ‘stopped clock’, is the
Table 5.2. Dimensions and aspects of authenticity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of authenticity</th>
<th>Objective ('real')</th>
<th>Constructed (social / political)</th>
<th>Personal (phenomenological)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>'The stopped clock' Historic time</td>
<td>'The rewound clock'</td>
<td>'The crystal ball'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MacCannell's (and Goffman's) 'back stage': the real and the genuine are found in premodern locations, outside one's own spurious society</td>
<td>Heritage time</td>
<td>Resident/visitor time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sights, markers, 'scientifically' dated historic artefacts, etc.)</td>
<td>Production (manufacture) of attraction, community, destination</td>
<td>Interactive space, performative space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>Scientific and positivist paradigms</td>
<td>Social constructionism; postmodernism</td>
<td>Psychological (perceptions/emotions), Interpretive and narrative, hermeneutics, phenomenology, performance theory, performativity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>Realist; essentialist (authenticity is a fixed property of an object/event); the premodern as original/unique</td>
<td>Meanings negotiated and emergent; political contest among stakeholders; space is mediated by ideological and technological forces</td>
<td>Phenomenological, historical and embodied 'being-in-the-world'; performative and performance-based experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

point in which an event being judged in terms of its authenticity takes place or occurs. This moment (or period) cannot be repeated; the instant and all that occurs during that time is unique for those who experience it, whether
the event be an individual touristic experience of limited impact beyond personal meaning, or ‘historic’ in the usual sense of being important culturally, politically or socially. Heritage time can be thought of as a ‘rewound clock’, in which those attempting to present an authentic experience from another age constantly move the clock back (or, theoretically, forward) to a point at which other factors (i.e. costumes or settings) can be created or recreated to add to the authenticity of the experience. Finally, personal or ‘crystal ball’ time can almost be thought of as a ‘transcendence’ of time. The tourist is conscious that an event took place or occurred in another time, but is also aware of that moment’s importance in, and in relation to, the tourist’s own life. Thus the experiential moment can be simultaneously in the past, present and even future.

It is important to realize how ‘time–space compression’ (Harvey, 1990) plays out in the postmodern world of de-differentiation, difference and the ‘tourist gaze’ (see Urry, 1990; Rojek, 1995). In manufactured heritage environments such as Las Vegas, for instance, neither time nor distance mediate the visitor’s encounters in constructed, themed casino complexes simulating such ‘exotic’ sights as the Piazza San Marco and the Rialto Bridge, two Venetian icons. No cross-Atlantic trip preparations nor jet-lag confront regional American visitors, and in the honest, obvious ‘authentic fakery’ of Las Vegas, why should they worry about minor details – the Rialto bridge crosses the Grand Canal in Venice, but at Las Vegas it connects two powerful gambling institutions? (AlSayyad, 2001). Since these tourists know that they are in Las Vegas and not in Venice, what difference would constructing an exact reproduction of the Venetian icons make to their experience? Come to think of it, what is the ‘authentic’ aspect of ‘authentic fakery’ (to use AlSayyad’s (2001) term)?

**Category 1: Objective Authenticity**

Authenticity in this category (Table 5.2, column 1) typically refers to an objective property or fact in the world. Hence it includes references to the real and to facts pertaining to the physical/natural world, i.e. ‘brute facts’ (Searle, 1995). Vague references, such as ‘really authentic’, may indicate the presence of such a realist ontology. In general, scientists (who examine natural phenomena) tend to be realists, as do mainstream archaeologists and anthropologists. In their view, an authentic historic event or site is one that has been scientifically and objectively situated in the original time period, setting, materials, etc., of that era. Such an objective approach to authenticity appears to be espoused by MacCannell (1989). As discussed earlier, he seems to relate authenticity to the old, ‘premodern’, and unique. However, it may be inferred from his position that MacCannell holds more than a realist and objectivist view of authenticity. For him, authenticity can also
be something that has been lost in modernity, i.e. does not exist in anything modern, but rather may be found in exotic (e.g. primitive cultures) or historic artefacts that hark back to some objective date, time and original material quality.

This conflation of objective and romantic views makes it difficult to consider MacCannell’s work as an archetypal example of objective authenticity in tourism studies, despite his often-lauded sociological contribution to the field. Teo and Yeoh’s (1997) previously mentioned article on a Singaporean theme park exemplifies this vague objectivist–romantic approach. It implies that authenticity lies in the old, real and true, and explicitly criticizes modern and ‘Disneyfied’ tourism.

Another frequently cited work that precedes and parallels MacCannell’s approach is Daniel Boorstin’s (1964) look at ‘pseudo-events’ in America. In contrast to MacCannell, Boorstin claims that tourists and other moderns are driven by a desire to view the ‘inauthentic’ (Boorstin, 1964), thereby causing scholars to focus on the Boorstin–MacCannell ‘debate’ and the obvious differences in their conclusions. The two adversaries actually appear, however, to share three important tendencies that may be considered more valuable for analysis: a lack of clear definition or description of authenticity; an implicit view of authenticity as an objective concept or property; and a seemingly critical attitude towards society’s acceptance of the putatively inauthentic.

An interesting example of an objectivist (but non-romantic) approach to authenticity is evident in the work of Littrell et al. (1993). It must be noted, however, that these authors do not assume a fixed meaning. Instead they make a distinct effort to come to terms with the meaning of authenticity through specific indicators, primarily through the words of the tourists in their study. Most of their respondents, however, tend to take an objectivist view of authenticity, citing such factors as handmade appearance, high quality workmanship, functionality, illustration of cultural and historical ties, written documentation of authenticity, production techniques, time and location of production, and other primarily objective criteria. When asked, the majority of these participants provide well-defined (‘empirical’) parameters for judging authenticity, even though the indicators they use vary somewhat.

By letting the tourists share their own definitions of authenticity, Littrell et al. (1993) contribute both methodologically and conceptually to the literature with a clear idea of how many tourists take the ‘objective authenticity’ approach to tourism activity, and how various objective dimensions of authenticity come into play in the tourist experience (see Category 3 below). In this regard, they show how tourists experience authenticity through acts of meaning-making, including selecting the indicators that denote authenticity to them rather than passively accepting the appearances provided by (staged) spaces of craft manufacture and sale.
Category 2: Constructed Authenticity

A frequently highlighted meaning of authenticity is that it is socially and politically constructed – a function of stakeholders’ values, beliefs, culture and aspirations interacting with the larger geo-political and socio-cultural matrix, so that reality is not only socially, but also politically constructed (cf. Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Cohen, 1979, 1989; Richter, 1999). Cohen conceives of authenticity as a negotiable concept influenced by ‘the mode of . . . aspired touristic experience’ as well as by developments which ‘acquire the patina of authenticity over time’ (1988: 371). Authenticity therefore is ‘emergent’ and can also be enacted by ‘substantive staging’, for example by an operator’s interest in providing a particular experience of authenticity to tourists (Cohen, 1988). Furthermore, Cohen rebuts the notion that commoditization destroys authenticity. Tourism does not succeed because it is a mass deception, but because tourists entertain concepts of authenticity that are much looser than those entertained by intellectuals and ‘experts’ such as curators and anthropologists.

Of particular interest to Cohen (1988) is the case of ethnic art, an example that illustrates well the conflict over the authenticity of artistic products. African art is declared to be authentic where it is created for a traditional purpose by a traditional artist and when it conforms to traditional forms; it must not be manufactured specifically for the market (p. 375). However, Cohen also notes that the Hmong of Cambodia depart from traditional symbols in embroidery that depict more recent and difficult events in their history, but still use traditional methods to produce their handiwork; it can thus be considered authentic, even though it is a new and evolving cultural expression, part of an ‘emergent authenticity’ (p. 380).

The social constructionist and postmodern turn in cultural studies has given an impetus to analyses of authenticity in tourism. Socially and culturally constructed meanings of authenticity are examined by Salamone (1997) in his comparison of the culture of the original San Angel Inn in Mexico City with that of a ‘daughter’ hotel in Disney World, Florida. Using the concept ‘culture’ in a broad way, so that it can refer to almost anything from a local community to a transnational ‘tourist culture’, Salamone notes that culture can be an ‘ever-shifting created and kaleidoscopic “reality” contingent on negotiations and personal backgrounds and only partially-shared understandings’ (p. 307). Acknowledging concerns about such a perspective (e.g. that it can be reduced to an extreme relativism), Salamone goes on to accept the idea that different versions of culture can all be authentic in their own way.

A variety of scholars have endorsed a socio-political approach to authenticity, where multiple stakeholders compete for control over destination or attraction development, protection, image, interpretation and sense of place (see Ehrentraut, 1993; Harkin, 1995; Hughes, 1995; Pretes, 1995; Fees, 1996; Selwyn, 1996; Shenhav-Keller, 1993; Wilson, 1997; Richter, 1999). For this group, authenticity may be grounded in an ontology and
epistemology of social constructionism or constructivism, subject to ideological, political and cultural contests, so that authenticity is not a quality of objects themselves, but one that is ascribed to them, often by those with the authority to do so. Fees (1996) looks at the practical consequences of such authorization and ascription in an English village that has shifted from an industrial character to one marked by retiring urban citizens of the upper-middle class, arts festivals and a sometimes-contrived ‘quaintness’, all issues which lead to political strife between ‘locals’, ‘outsiders’ and others.

Another useful example is the piece mentioned earlier by Pretes (1995) on the Finnish Santa Claus industry, which he identifies as an ‘artificially created’ attraction (p. 4) resulting from a tourism development strategy by national and regional tourism authorities. Pretes focuses on the ‘cultural product’ of tourism in Lapland and finds that all has been purposely transformed into consumable commodities which act as markers for the intangible sights of Christmas. Tourists ‘consume the marker and thereby consume a nostalgic conception of Christmas’ (p. 14). Pretes thus shares the view of Harkin (1995), who notes the importance of examining tourism and authenticity as a system of signs (semiotics) consumed by the travelling public. In contrast, Bruner (1994), while favouring a contextualized meaning-making tourist, agrees with Appadurai that authenticity today concerns the politics of connoisseurship and the political economy of taste (cf. Mowforth and Munt, 1998).

Category 3: Personal Authenticity

This category is perhaps the most complex of all the dimensions examined here, partly because of the ‘mess’ of the tourism literature that deals with the tourist’s own particular interaction with an attraction. MacCannell’s and Boorstin’s objectivist and generalized approaches do not appear capable of capturing the full range and diversity of touristic experiences. Also missing from their work is the differentiation of social groups and individuals whose motivations to travel may vary quite widely. MacCannell’s tourist seeks an authentic experience akin to the religious experience of a pilgrim in search of the sacred (Cohen attempts to rectify this singular or undifferentiated motivation in his 1979 typology). Wang (2000) categorizes authenticity into three different types (objective, constructive and existential) and further divides existential authenticity into intrapersonal and interpersonal authenticity. Here, in this chapter, an overall dimension called ‘personal authenticity’ is employed, where studies of a tourist’s experience can be generally classified as:

- emotive and psychological aspects (e.g. perceptions, fun, play . . .);
- ‘authentic experiences of fakes’, or of reconstructions that are not (objectively) real, or of the ‘original’ or real. The philosophical notions
of *de dicto* and *de re* are applied in order to offer an alternative interpretation of how a tourist may have an authentic experience of a fake object or event; and

- a deeper existential aspect related to personal meaning and identity.

Scholars who have added to an understanding of a personal type of touristic authenticity include Redfoot (1984), Moscardo and Pearce (1986) Shenhav-Keller (1993), Daniel (1996), Kirschenblatt-Gimblett (1997), McIntosh and Prentice (1999) and Wang (2000). Although Wang does well to point out how the personal/existential category helps to explain how experience is felt to be ‘authentic’, his comprehensive analysis of authenticity in tourism does not flesh out the relationship between tourist and object in the situated touristic space. An attempt to remedy this is undertaken here, as well as subsequently, where performative and existential themes are explored in greater detail.

**Personal experience – emotive/psychological**

Constructed forms of authenticity constitute the focus of important research by Moscardo and Pearce (1986), who have studied visitor perceptions of Australian historic theme parks. There they find that tourists generally perceive the parks as being authentic, even though the sites are primarily recreated (and thus constructed) versions of the sites, rather than being actual historic remains. Still, the tourists perceive most elements of the theme parks to be ‘very historically accurate’ (from 59 to 87%, depending on the category), with somewhat smaller percentages considering them as ‘somewhat accurate’ and only very small percentages (from 1 to 6%) regarding them as ‘not very accurate’. Among similar findings related to personal experiences of authenticity are those of Daniel (1996), who discovers that variations from traditional cultural dances can be perceived by tourists as genuine, particularly as they are drawn by amiable feelings, sociability, and musical and kinaesthetic elements of performance that help explore their own rhythmic, harmonic and physical potential and arrive at sensations of well-being, pleasure, joy or fun.

Moscardo and Pearce (1986) attempt to demonstrate how the objective dimension relates closely to that of the personal (something that can be found in other studies more directly focused on personal tourist experiences). They refute what they see as MacCannell’s argument that tourists cannot gain insight into the lives of those who have lived in the past. Their survey of tourists to various sites shows that the tourists themselves, by large majorities, believe they are gaining insight. Moscardo and Pearce conclude that perceived authenticity is very important to those travelling to historic theme parks, and that people vary in their perceptions of authenticity.
Existential authenticity

Perceived authenticity, however, is a characteristic of tourist experience that needs to be distinguished from existential authenticity, an aspect that relates more to the everyday life of the tourist. Cohen’s (1979) early work presents an interesting ‘phenomenology’ of tourist experiences, which ranges from recreational tourists to experiential and existential tourists. However, his descriptive paper, while very challenging, does not theoretically ground the concept of ‘centre’ to which the former return (home) and to which the latter two types travel for authentic experiences and a sense of being. Redfoot (1984) offers a more theoretically based ‘inexhaustive typology’ of tourists according to their supposed orientation towards authenticity, from a first-order ‘true tourist’ who ‘bears the brunt of accusations of inauthenticity’ (p. 293) to a fourth-order ‘spiritual tourist’ who participates in the ‘most intense’ search for reality (p. 291). While finding that all these types are capable of participating in their own form of authenticity, Redfoot argues that experiencing family and friendship relationships is a travel motivator that enables grounding the self in everyday existence. So the tourist ‘may be due for a metaphorical rehabilitation as the symbol of the impressive, if unheroic, triumph of personal meaning in an increasingly impersonal world’ (p. 306).

Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1997) similarly maintains that tourists’ transcendence of both historic and personal time allows them to experience ‘authentic’ historic events in significant ways because of their ability to see current impacts of past events, particularly as regards their own lives (a notion that is incorporated into Table 5.2 as part of the categorization of time elements in various forms of authenticity). Both Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett apply a performance-theory approach to explaining tourist experience, one that is discussed further below, along with the existential aspect of the everyday life of the tourist.

An authentic experience of the ‘fake’ object?

The tourism literature is replete with ambiguity and debate about authenticity with respect to built attractions and destinations, such as Las Vegas and Disney World, or to reconstructed heritage sites, and terms such as ‘fake authenticity’ and ‘authentic fakes’ continue to abound, as much as they confuse for their lack of theoretical or philosophical support. While much remains to be done to this end, a distinction that may be helpful in this regard is that of de dicto (‘of what is said’ or ‘of the proposition’) and de re (‘of the thing’).

There appears to be an important ambiguity in the notion of an experience of X, where X is some particular object or event. On the one
hand, to say that a person has an experience of X is to say that s(he) is actually in the presence of X, that it is X itself that causes the experience. Thus, to say that an individual experiences the Mona Lisa in this sense is to say that s(he) is in the Louvre observing Leonardo’s masterpiece directly. Since the focus here is chiefly on the relationship between the agent and the thing experienced, it is referred to as the de re notion of an experience of X.

On the other hand, by an experience of X, one may be focusing instead on the character of the experience rather than on the cause of the experience. Thus, the character of one’s experience in the presence of a highly accurate reproduction of the Mona Lisa, a ‘fake’, in a mock-up of the Louvre in Las Vegas may be identical, or nearly so, to the character of the experience one may have in the Louvre gazing at the actual Mona Lisa; it may be ‘as if one were really there’. Thus, so long as the character of one’s experience in some situation is similar to what one may experience in the presence of some actual object or event X, one can still be said to have an experience of X. This is the de dicto sense of an experience of X. Thus, it is possible to have a de dicto experience of X without having a de re experience of X.

This distinction helps clarify an important ambiguity in the notion of authentic experience. On the one hand, an authentic experience of X may require a de re experience – X itself must be the cause of one’s experience. For an experience of the Mona Lisa to be authentic in this sense, one must be in the Louvre gazing at the actual painting, and the Las Vegas simulacrum will be inauthentic. Accordingly, this type of authenticity can be referred to as de re authenticity. On the other hand, another sense of authenticity – de dicto authenticity – requires only de dicto experience. Here it is only the character of the experience that matters. Thus, in this sense, a Las Vegas experience is indeed an authentic experience of the Mona Lisa, since it is only the character of the experience – its similarity to the character of a de re experience of the Mona Lisa – that matters.

It is worth noting that, unlike its de re counterpart, de dicto authenticity comes in degrees. The degree of de dicto authenticity to an experience of X depends on the extent to which that experience is similar to the character of the experience one would have in a de re experience of X. Hence, the story, narration, the interpretation of the attraction is a crucial aspect of the experience, because the quality of the de dicto experience is in part influenced by tourists’ perceptions, evaluation and comparison of the storied object or event to their own cultural and historical frames (which may include stories of the same attraction).

**Applying the typology**

This review of tourism and authenticity shows that the concept is often used ambiguously, without clarifying whether it is the object or the experience...
that is the source of the ‘authenticity’ being described. Furthermore, the dimensions of authenticity (see Table 5.2) are often intricately related but the actual character of these relationships is not well explained. The foregoing typology and discussion therefore attempt to provide some philosophical and conceptual grounding for understanding authenticity in the tourism domain. Salamone’s (1997) study shows the intricate linkage between objective, constructed and personal authenticity well, the dimensions of the typology in Table 5.2. The San Angel Inn in Mexico City is ‘original’ because it stresses the romance and dignity of Old Mexico, efficiency and courtesy of service, and knowledge of when to allow visitors to linger – in a nutshell, a ‘coherent pattern of elegant and efficient living . . . a Mexican variation of the modern good life, solidly based on the virtues of inherited élite status’ (p. 318). Meanwhile, the daughter inn ‘romanticizes Mexico’s past though imparting a message of classical Mexico’s great achievements, one that combats stereotypes in a spirit of old-fashioned cultural pluralism’ (p. 319). Specifically, it integrates elements of the ‘Ballet Folklórico’ dress worn by the staff, Mexican high cuisine (as opposed to a greater emphasis on American and European variations in the Mexico City inn), and incorporation of a water ride that passes through exhibits focused on pre-Columbian, Spanish colonial, and modern Mexican culture (p. 316). Thus it can be seen that each inn depends on a mixture of objective actions or items (i.e. response time to requests, quality of furnishings, colourful dress), constructed presentations of history or social mores and status, and tourists’ personal reactions to various elements of the inns’ presentations.

Yet, Salamone’s analysis, while typical of much of the more functionalist-oriented papers in the tourism literature, does not address the geo-political, capitalist and cultural context in which tourism-related issues and experiences of authenticity are embedded. While full justice to these issues cannot be done in the limited space remaining, the following section examines authenticity within this larger spatio-temporal framework, particularly with respect to the existential relationship between the ‘home’ and the ‘other’ world of tourist experience and travel, including the post-colonial tourist space and the notion of ‘home’ in a postmodern world.

(Post)touristic Spaces of (In)Authenticity?

A spurious society is one that must be left behind in order to see a true sight. From the standpoint of the tourist, his (sic) own everyday life in the modern world is spurious – it begins to take on some of the negative attributes culture critics have claimed for it.

(MacCannell, 1976: 154)

For some scholars, like MacCannell, tourism is a metaphor for the general inauthenticity of modern life, where the tourist journeys away from modernity’s artifices in search of authentic objects and experiences
elsewhere. Camera lenses, interpretive guides, brochures and other media, as well as sight markers, all intervene in the tourist’s encounter with the attraction or event, and commercialization, as well as commodification, contributes to thwarting this religious quest for a (sacred) ‘true sight’. While a number of scholars grapple with the authenticity of tourist objects and experiences, others focus on activity in the tourist spaces, both at home and in the world. For instance, rather than puzzle over how the tourist can possibly have an unmediated account of authenticity, Redfoot (1984) argues that a substantial portion of travel is related to being with family and friends, having fun and celebrating togetherness – they are not restlessly searching for the ‘authentic’. More importantly, and drawing on Berger’s review of Trilling’s work, Redfoot observes that most people muddle through life using a variety of resources as ‘ontological sandbags to shore up the realities of identities and meaningful relationships’ (Redfoot, 1984: 306). This situation, he says, includes a heavy reliance on the private sphere, and tourism in this context is experienced as a liberation of the private sphere, a time to devote to family and friendships ‘as the core of what is most importantly real’ (Redfoot, 1984: 306).

This dependence on the private sphere for identity is particularly important when public spaces and natural spaces are being rationalized and commodified at a rapid pace through globalization and diffusion of technology, neo-liberal trade and business practices worldwide. How well does the typology of Table 5.2 stand up to macroglobal scrutiny, and, more interestingly, how well does the tourist as a metaphor of the social world fit into this picture of global rationalization and change? Addressing this issue requires a closer examination of the spatio-temporal aspects of authenticity as related to: (i) the ‘home’ space and the various spaces in the ‘world’ to which the tourist travels; and (ii) the concept of ‘alienation’, which ties in with work, modernity and authenticity. This introspective voyage commences here with a brief summary of Rojek’s (1995) helpful analysis of (post)modernity, work and leisure. There follows a short discussion of modernity and alienation, post-colonial spaces of travel, the mobile home of the nomadic tourist and performative encounters in the various spaces of home and world. This odyssey offers the traveller some direction towards authentic experience and existence.

(Post)modernity, work/leisure and alienation

Rojek (1995) summarizes the evolution of leisure and tourism in modernity in terms of two structured and interdependent periods. In the first (Modernity 1), control and organization of work and leisure space enable social order and ‘progress’ via a structured, productionist work ethic. Science’s explanatory mechanisms contribute towards the causal ordering of the natural world, while social stability is derived through technological progress and
structured work–leisure activities. This ensemble is driven predominantly by the organizing mechanisms of capitalism in Western industrialized nations. Leisure becomes a necessary, legitimate, democratic feature of civilized modern social life, and the mass production and circulation of commodities are seen to widen the choice of escape alternatives. Nature becomes an ‘authentic’ place to escape to since little of it is found in the urban–industrial landscape, but like the overall travel and leisure experience, nature-based tourism also has to contribute to the standardized stability of modern social life. Rational, recreational opportunities in commercialized and commodified natural and cultural spaces ensure that ‘self-discipline’ and control continue to be exercised in leisure/touristic space as in the workplace, for these constraints are crucial to the maintenance of social order. Ritzer (1996) draws strongly upon the classical sociologist Max Weber in order to demonstrate how systematized processes, job-role structuring and technology are applied to create rational (and bureaucratic) control and efficiency in the organization of commercial recreation and other businesses. The organization of mass tourism via packaged tours and a global travel-industry network, it has been argued, is based on a similar institutional rationality (cf. Mowforth and Munt, 1998; Holden, 2000).

In the second period (Modernity 2), disorder and fragmentation drive human societies to seek order and control. Ambivalence is the key feature, and mass production and mechanical reproduction, while widening consumer choice, propagate a consumptive culture enamoured with aesthetic pursuits in daily life, such that leisure is no longer a separate activity, but one woven into daily life. Aided by technological and communication innovation, the distinctions between ‘high’ and ‘low’ (mass) culture, between the original and the reproduced facsimile, between truth and fiction, are reduced to a state of equivalence where ‘authenticity’ is mediated by images, signs and symbols. Since these standardized accessories and mass-produced items can be found anywhere, in fact everywhere, de-differentiation reigns supreme and stands in contrast to the rational differentiation of leisure in Modernity 1. Under Modernity 2, then, leisure consists not of searching for authentic experiences, but rather of fulfilling the need for distraction activities, those that help people avoid ‘the realization that originality, uniqueness and spontaneity are dead’ (Rojek, 1995: 85). Rather than widen the consumer’s freedom and choice, the bewildering array and bombardment of signs and impressions reinforce the individual’s sense of alienation and loss of control, with the result that inauthenticity prevails in all spheres, i.e. there is no escape. Rojek’s description of Modernity 1 and 2 provides a good context for discussing the rich theme of alienation that runs through a number of works on tourist motivation and authenticity, as well as the recent growth in tourism forms such as extreme eco-challenges and heritage tourism.

Theoretical threads of alienation and authenticity weave through various scholars’ works, but reasons for the alienation or for seeking a
‘centre’ elsewhere are not always clear (cf. Cohen, 1979). For MacCannell, it is the malaise of modern society that drives tourists (as pilgrims) away from home in search of the authentic (sacred), only to be frustrated by the touristic event or object being staged for their consumption by the tourism industry or the local people. Additionally, by highlighting a sight as ‘authentic’, an attraction’s marker denies the possibility of it being authentic – it is not possible to get at the authentic without the mediation of the marker. The tourist, unable to obtain an authentic experience, desires ever more real (authentic) experiences – so it seems that MacCannell’s tourist is doomed to be a constant traveller, alienated both at home and in the world.

Another account of alienation can be obtained from the environmental literature. Separation of humans from nature in the modern period, it is argued, has resulted in a disenchantment with the world, i.e. a loss of spiritual and emotional wonder and connectedness to the earth (Berman, 1981; Merchant, 1982). This condition is exacerbated by the rapid pace of globalization, population mobility and the technological rationalization of society (see Barber, 1995; Urry, 2000). Nostalgia for lost traditions, a sense of alienation from a meaningful daily existence, drives the search for ‘authentic’ experiences in the other – in other lands and in other (premodern) cultures, or more locally within a consumer culture of instant gratification and a high-speed sign-economy offering symbolic reality, a ‘virtual’ authentication of existence in a postmodern world. The ‘post-tourist’, like Baudelaire’s flâneur, is a sophisticated traveller who enjoys ludic experiences. Modernity 2 is thus the playground of homo ludens (while homo faber slaves away under Modernity 1), and the visitor participates in an illusory, hedonistic consumption of signs, symbols and images where the aesthetic experience rates higher than capturing the ‘authentic’ original (cf. Harkin, 1995; Rojek, 1995). In this postmodern scenario, accumulating aesthetic and culturally driven experiences becomes a game of achieving status, distinction and ‘difference’ for ‘ego-tourists’ (see Mowforth and Munt, 1998).

**Post-colonial space and the post-colonial tourist**

The tourism system contains a multitude of spaces, such as urban/rural spaces, natural spaces (e.g. wilderness reserves), sacred spaces, work/leisure spaces, (post)-colonial spaces, heritage spaces, sensual spaces (e.g. of ‘exotic’ food and other cultural experiences) and even ludic spaces (Lefebvre, in Rojek, 1995). The notion of space in authenticity is an important one, both in itself and as linked to time, for instance heritage time and heritage space. While much has been written about authenticity with respect to natural and cultural experiences, and with regard to postmodern spaces of de-differentiated leisure and cultural consumption (Feifer’s ‘post-tourist’), the post-colonial space and the role of the post-colonial
tourist have not received similar attention. Yet, travel to the developing world increases and these primarily post-colonial spaces continue to be rationalized through such terms as ‘globalization’, ‘free-trade’, ‘technology transfers’ and ‘international travel and tourism’. The important characteristics and contributions of post-colonial tourism have yet to be conceptualized succinctly in order to enable scholars and practitioners to identify modes of post-colonial subjection and domination. A few works are cited below that offer beginnings in this direction.

It is a romanticism for travel modes of the colonial periods which, unwittingly perhaps, recreates the subordination of Third World peoples in an invidious aura. And it has invoked a longing for untouched, primitive and native people who are there to meet the demands of tourists: both in terms of service and as an object to be enjoyed and photographed.

(Mowforth and Munt, 1998: 69)

Mowforth and Munt (1998) argue that despite changes in the ownership of tourism resources, tourism in the developing world continues to remain a special form of domination and control, where: (i) less-developed nations are subordinated to the flows of tourists, tourism capital and resources from advanced capitalist economies; and, more importantly, (ii) historic, socio-cultural and material conditions that occurred under colonialism, racism and slavery continue to be perpetuated through forms of subordination where the symbolic representation of servility is the tourist. These authors offer a number of examples to illustrate their case, such as eco-safaris, where long trails of porters trudge through the ‘eco-colonial landscape’ carrying supplies for a few tourists, and a resurgence of colonial rail travel. All these forms are embedded in unequal relations of power and development, implicating local people, local élites and the external interests of tourism and capitalism. Dann (1996) and Edensor (1998) similarly examine forms of subordination through institutionalized and international tourism in post-colonial settings such as India.

Van den Abbeele (1980) points out that institutionalized tourism establishes a double-edged imperialism, since not only are foreign cultures and destinations turned into objects of cultural consumption, but it is also the tourist whose participation in the tourism system contributes unwittingly to the modern State’s power over its own and foreign populations. A couple of examples illustrate, however, that the roles of the post-colonial tourist and the post-colonial local (subaltern) are highly complex and involve discursive power relations as well as performative resistance, i.e. an intricate micro-macro relationship of structure and agency.

Gregory (2001) describes spaces of constructed visibility where the formation of a visual economy links political economy and cultural appropriation, producing a spatially ordered modern nation, Egypt. ‘Traditional Egypt’ is also constituted geo-politically and economically as an obstacle to, and object of, modernization, as well as a rationalized space for tourism.
Landscapes are codified and made ‘timeless’, ‘authentic’ and ‘real’ through imaginative geographies along with the disciplining of human bodies. Using actor-network theory to examine the micropractices involved in the formation of these spaces, Gregory argues that both European agencies and Egyptian locals (merchants, guides, boat-owners, donkey-boys, etc.) participate in the power relations enacted within heterogeneous networks in such a way that the spaces and privileges accorded to them are ‘constantly interrupted, confounded and dislocated’ (Gregory, 2001: 116). Modern symbolic media, such as tourist brochures and guidebooks, play a significant role in promoting a sense of authentic, intimate connectivity with the colonial period. Drawing upon Rosaldo’s description of ‘imperialist nostalgia’, Gregory emphasizes a ‘distinctively colonial nostalgia’ in the modern tourist’s desire to visit Egypt. It is the modern traveller and tourist’s nostalgia for colonialism itself, a desire to recreate and recover the world of late Victorian and Edwardian colonialism in all its majestic glory (p. 140). Authenticity thus lies in the ability to recreate and relive the colonial myth.

Mowforth and Munt (1998) offer an interesting discussion of ego-tourists seeking to differentiate themselves as travellers rather than tourists, through the construction of travellers’ tales that provide symbolic currency in the form of cultural capital. These accounts, they note, are a modern (or possibly postmodern) continuation of stories of colonial encounters, for they constitute the reality and meaning-making experiences of the ‘First World’ tourist in much the same way that colonialists create meanings through fantastic stories (of the other). The construction of modern travellers’ tales is also bound up with the quest for authenticity, but authenticity is expressed somewhat differently here, through a romantic aura and exclusionary experience resulting in emotional responses and sagas that are almost spiritual in their content. Risky adventures, travel in new and potentially dangerous and remote locations all serve to legitimize and authenticate the travel experience – aestheticizing risk and demonstrating that purposeful travel enables the ego-tourist to create cultural capital through the weaving of narratives.

As Mowforth and Munt (1998) point out, this genre of tale-telling has come to the fore in travel guides, reviews, discussions among fellow ego-tourists and in television coverage. The year 2001 saw the voyeuristic televising of eco-challenges in locations such as Borneo, while the television show Survivor heads to yet another post-colonial destination, Kenya. Are post-colonial tourists, then, only the ego-tourists and the participants in such shows? Is the viewer of such reality drama not also a post-colonial tourist, interpellated into the global game of cultural commodification and aestheticized consumption? Bruner (1994), however, argues convincingly of the need to consider both the exploitative and transformative potential of cultural, historic sites. Tourists are consuming nostalgia (for a vanished past) and buying ideas of progress that are embedded ideologically in heritage.
and cultural sites. Hence, ‘New Salem and similar sites enact an ideology [traditional America – honest values, virtue, etc.], recreate an original myth, keep history alive, attach tourists to a mythical collective consciousness, and commodify the past’ (Bruner, 1994: 411). Yet, can the post-colonial tourist resist the colonial game, often disguised under the ‘innocent’ label of heritage or cultural tourism? What constitutes an ‘authentic’ experience of Egypt and other post-colonial destinations?

**Mobile homes of familiar existence**

While the culturally related experience occurs in diverse spaces such as museums, historic cities, (post)-colonial destinations, or even in the tourists’ own ‘home’ spaces (e.g. dining in ethnic restaurants), the personal experience in all cases involves relating the present event or object (‘immediately’ being experienced) to an object or event in the past. So, for instance, how ‘authentic’ an historic site appears to be is an evaluation made relative to a concept the tourist holds of what it might possibly have looked like back in the time period this historic site (via its markers) purportedly depicts. The tourist’s concept itself is, of course, mediated by a number of factors, including the ever-ready guidebook, interpreter and brochure. As Bruner points out, heritage sites (like New Salem in his 1994 study) are constantly in the process of production and reproduction, always being constructed anew. This condition is not so much postmodern, he says, as it is ‘the human condition, for cultures constantly invent and reinvent themselves’ (p. 407). As such, the construction of a heritage-related experience involves acts of meaning-making by the tourist that influence personal identity as well as a sense of (non)-belonging – (in)authentic existences, (in)authentic experiences of the home and the world.

However, home in the postmodern evanescence of the 21st century is not such a simple concept. MacCannell gives an insightful analysis of the link between the tourist ‘self’, home and the social world, through the attractions visited, which are interpreted by the tourist relative to a fixed point of reference that is the ‘self’ or ‘home’. Even a single attraction providing such a link ‘is the starting point for the endless spherical system of connections which is society and the world, with the individual at one point on its surface’ (MacCannell, 1976: 56). Van den Abbeele (1980) clarifies that the tourist is not at one fixed point, but rather at the centre of this interpretive interaction with the sight(s), for it is in relation to the self that the individual structures and orders the universe of meanings that allows identification and a sense of belonging to society. Authenticity, according to MacCannell, comes from the tourist feeling the immediacy, the presence of the sight. However, rapid technological change has accelerated the growth and diffusion of information and knowledge worldwide, through advances in the media, transportation and the global mobility of transnational corporations.
and human populations. As Benedict Anderson puts it so well, we live in a world of ‘imagined communities’. Yet, after all the discussion on alienation and the new imagined world, the question still needs to be asked: ‘where is home?’

Van den Abbeele suggests that rather than consider home as an opposition between a fixed place and travel, it is necessary to employ a metaphor of nomadism (borrowing from Gilles Deleuze’s ‘nomadic thought’) that does not privilege motion. The nomad ‘can no more be said to be moving than not moving’, since there is no stable point of reference from which to perceive or measure movement. In the postmodern world, then, is it not the relationship between the self and the other (whether this be place, person or event) that more usefully conveys the performative and narrative construction of home, reality, identity and travel experiences, rather than a geographic location ‘home’? By drawing other (strange) objects and events into one’s ‘travel community’, by making them ‘familiar’, perhaps home grows in relation to one’s travel experiences – geographically, emotionally and metaphorically.

A glimmer of this familiarity through travel is seen in MacCannell (1976), but more so in Harkin (1995), who draws upon the ‘dialectic of authenticity’ and familiarity to demonstrate how tourism involves an increasing experience of alterity (via a spatio-temporal chronotype – the ‘tour’ is both circular and cyclical). Having seized the systems of signification that once framed the sights and offered a sense of authentic experience, the tourist now has a semiotic framework to help organize and enable meaning-making of both the travel experience and the social world. Repeat visits allow the visitor to engage in deeper searches for authenticity since there is past experience (familiarity) to organize new experiences cognitively and emotionally. Without such a semiotic and phenomenological framework to help organize everyday life and experience, the provision of an abundance of local knowledge only results in disorientation. Therefore, the ‘rupture between experience of alterity and everyday life is more fundamental than the problem of local knowledge’ (Harkin, 1995: 634).

The dialectic of authenticity and familiarity, as explained by Harkin, draws the home and the world even closer by linking both to meaning-making and identity formation. Bruner (1994) suggests that the interpretive acts of heritage tourists in his New Salem study go well beyond the quest for authenticity, and are related to meaning-making, identity and belonging. However, neither Bruner nor Harkin explicitly connect touristic experiences of alterity and meaning-making acts to (authentic) personal existence rather than (authentic) tourist experience. This distinction/relationship is also less than clear in much of the literature on tourist motivation, experience and authenticity, particularly as it relates to modernity and alienation. For what is the tourist ‘searching’ (if anything) in the postmodern world of ‘difference’ – an authentic tourist experience (which may not necessarily require ‘authentic’ objects or events in the realist sense), authentic tourist objects
and events or escape from the everyday, social and personal identity, togetherness and sense of belonging? Or does it go deeper than all of these considerations to an existential quest for ‘home’ or maybe freedom from home?

Of course, tourist motivations vary, but so do the existential tourists of Cohen (1988) and Wang (2000) with respect to their existential experiences. While space does not permit a longer discussion here, the concept of a mobile home presented above offers a third form of existential tourist. As the world becomes more familiar through both travel and other previously identified factors, it is encompassed into ‘home’ so that authentic experiences are not something exclusive of authentic everyday existence. The existential tourist is at-home-in-the-world, as much as (s)he is also a ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1996). The ‘authenticity’ of both experience and existence as a being-in-the-world can be influenced greatly by the degree of ‘mediation’ between the self and the world, and by the ideological worldview constructed by and for the tourist. Inauthenticity results when the tourist is not able to participate meaningfully in interpreting the sights, events and other objects of touristic encounters. A glimmer of a ‘postmodern’ (tourist) ethic of place and space is evident here, particular and situated at the level of narrative identity and sense-making – it is a performative ethic.

**Performative experience and resistance**

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, space is a difficult concept to characterize in terms of authenticity in tourism. Many objects, individuals, actions, feelings and concepts ‘occur in’ or ‘fill’ space, including language and various communication media. How tourists engage in the interpretive task within various (post)spaces in the tourism system is important to understand, for they may be participating (perhaps inadvertently) in eco-colonialism, post-colonialism and other ‘isms’, such as neo-liberalism, that affect sustainability and well-being. Relations of power are enacted through micropractices and discursive structures, both local and global (cf. Hollinshead, 1999).

Consider, for instance, the space of heritage. Heritage and tourism, suggests Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1997), deal in the intangible, absent, inaccessible, fragmentary and dislocated – features of the lifeworld itself. Heritage is the transvaluation of the obsolete, created through the process of exhibition, as knowledge, as performance, as museum display, where the lifeworld itself becomes a museum, as virtual images and representations of the ‘real’ are enacted and destinations and locales attempt to invent themselves through a process that is ‘museological’ (p. 141). As she points out, there is a reciprocity between the exhibition of the world and the world as an exhibition of itself, one that is mediated by the tourism industry, which
wants the world as a picture of its representations. These dual features are both ‘hypervisible’ (offering close encounters with the actual or virtual) and an imaginary space, i.e. the site is imagined into being, aided by technologies and techniques that fill in the ‘truth’ which the tourist (supposedly) cannot obtain unaided or without being at the site/location of this experience.

Authenticity, as the typology of Table 5.2 indicates, is not simply a property to be sought within the artefacts or tourism constructions, models and sites. In the latter perspective, authenticity is taken to be an intrinsic property of an object or event and arises from that object or event holding certain essential properties. However, a postmodern or social constructionist view presents authenticity as an extrinsic property of things – authenticity here is a moving target in a political field (Richter, 1999), and is determined by the discourses and the methods by which the experience is provided and received – in ‘a way of doing, which is a way of knowing, in a performance’ (p. 196). Like Bruner (1994), Kirshenblatt-Gimblett (1997: 194) argues that learning occurs via ‘a performance epistemology that places a premium on experience’. Yet the process is an active one of mediating between the tourist world (constructed with the help of advertising, brochures, souvenirs, gift shops, and other technologies/techniques) and the actual world, artefact or thing. It is a process that is partial, negotiated, interactive and polyvocal. Hence, the struggle or conflict lies in the ability of tourists (or local residents or ethnic groups that are being ‘constructed’ by the myth makers) to negotiate, interpret for themselves and resist the ideological or hegemonic meanings being imparted by the industry or destination/attraction managers’ represented offerings. Tourist sites can therefore also be socio-political heterotopic spaces of struggle among participants (Foucault, 1980), where tourists, residents and cultural performers have the agency to exercise performative freedom and resistance to being normalized into the dominant discourses (cf. Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1994).

A performative theory of interpretation (and experience), as suggested by Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, provides for agency, struggle and resistance by the tourist and ‘the other’ being represented at the destination, in the interactive, experiential and interpretive space between the tourist and the other. This focus on performative learning, experience and narration shifts the tourist experience away from the modernist preoccupation with efficiency, vision and measurement, and also away from a postmodern inclination towards the virtual. It moves towards a situation that locates the tourist body within a physical/material space in a dynamic engagement with experience and meaning, sense and touch. It is therefore also a performative ethic of place that involves respect, responsibility and care towards others and towards otherness (see Heidegger (1996) on respect and care).

A performative ethic of respect, responsibility and care towards the interpretation and protection of tourist attractions holds potential for overcoming historical dualisms entrenched in the notion of the other (e.g. the Orient;
Nature) and bridging the chasm of human alienation from the natural world (discussed earlier). Those who dwell in destination spaces and share dialogically and meaningfully with those who visit them thus engage in a performative ontology of being embodied and embedded in the world and in an epistemology of narrative understanding.

A performative ethic of respect, responsibility and care (cf. White, 1991) is also one to be embraced by the tourism industry and destination managers, where an attraction is presented or re-presented in such a way as to facilitate the tourist’s ability to experience it in a meaningful fashion, and thereby create self (identity). In a fragmented world of images, technology, hybridity, global human migration and urbanization, the search for the Other is even more emphatically a search for the self, i.e. self-identity by relating the self to the other. A performative and performance-based management approach to tourism therefore involves being cognizant of the pluralism (multivalence, as Selwyn (1996) puts it) in the tourist’s motivation to visit a cultural site, and also the pluralism of views and interpretations of that site. A key task for the site’s managers and operators is to ensure that these multiple narratives are presented, including those of ethnic groups in the area and their spiritual relationships with the land. Such an experiential, dynamic, meaning-based approach thus enables the visitor to experience nature through more than one metanarrative (e.g. the park management’s ‘nature’), and may help satisfy a diversity of motivations by allowing the tourists to explore, experience and construct for themselves what being in the natural world means to them. For when it comes to the tourist’s experience, the search for authenticity is an intersubjective, emotional, ethical/moral and spiritual quest. As Bendix (1997: 17) states, ‘Authenticity, unlike “primitive society”, is generated not from the bounded classification of an ‘Other’, but from the probing comparison between self and Other, as well as between external and internal states of being.’ Not surprisingly, Moscardo and Pearce’s (1999: 430) study of ethnic tourists concludes that the high satisfaction scores lie in the experience of visitors at Tjapukai Aboriginal Cultural Park (Australia), where they are allowed to ‘move at their own pace, to select their own levels of contact, and to follow their own interests’.

The reader may have noted the slippage from ‘performativity’ to ‘performance’ in the last few paragraphs. This transition has been effected intentionally in order to raise the question of what these two terms mean – are they being used as synonyms? Bruner and Kirshenblatt-Gimblett seem to treat them as the same, since they focus on performance theory (with its base in theatre studies)11. Certainly, MacCannell’s original concept of staged authenticity (drawing from Goffman’s work) lends itself well to the metaphorical description of authenticity in touristic space. Consider the destination/attraction/world as a stage, and focus on all the elements of a staged production that impact on its authenticity, from the physical, objective props to the actors and directors who construct a performance, to
the audience, which ultimately judges the performance, whether or not in terms of authenticity. This approach is useful, for it helps to avoid totalizing destination spaces and attractions as ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’. For within the overall destination space or within the particular attraction (e.g. a festival) may lie specific places, objects and events of authenticity and inauthenticity. ‘Santa Fake’ may have pseudo adobe structures where tourists ‘consume tradition’ (AlSayyad, 2001), but a world-class (authentic?) opera setting and performance is also noted as one of its key attractions.

An ‘Other’ Tourist Phenomenology

Despite the substantial amount of academic work that has focused on authenticity as a significant topic of both research and practice, ambiguity continues to shroud this important idea. Scholars have tended to base their work on implicit assumptions or a naïve realism where ‘the authentic’ is taken for granted as an objective characteristic or concept. What is also not clear in many such studies is whether this authenticity pertains more to things, or to tourist experiences in the immediate sense (in the presence of a sight), or to ‘existence’ in the metaphysical sense (one of Wang’s main categories).

Here, by contrast, an attempt has been made to provide a finer-grained analysis of authenticity in tourism, particularly with respect to spatio-temporal issues and events in the local–global nexus. It is in time and space, after all, that the objects and activities related to tourism are interpreted and evaluated, a situation that inevitably requires an examination of modernity’s construction of work and leisure (space and time).

These introspections into alienation, the postmodern condition, the post-colonial tourist and the performative self at home-in-the-world suggest that the tourist is a metaphor of the social world, but that it is a ‘postmodern’ social world in which home is no longer a fixed location in time and place. It is not merely an ‘imagined world’ (to paraphrase Benedict Anderson); it is a world constructed by the interpretive acts of the tourist who is a ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1996). Here, home commingles with a sensory world of situated being, where subject and object are intricately linked through both historicity and physicality. In such a sensate world, the perception of a real object (authentic in the objective meaning of the typology in Table 5.2) intimately involves being-in-the-world, so that experience is not merely perceptual but also richly phenomenological. Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962) argues that as a ‘being-in-the-world,’ people are ‘through and through compounded of relationships with the world’ (p. xiii), and they ‘do not succeed in extricating themselves from it in order to achieve consciousness of the world’. For him, the lived world cannot be reconstructed through a transcendental reductionism, as Edmund Husserl attempted to do, since individuals...
are beings embodied and embedded in the lived world, i.e. ‘always already in the world’ (Hammond et al. (1991: 162), using Merleau-Ponty’s expression)\(^{13}\).

The framework proposed in Table 5.2 thus categorizes authenticity into three key types using an unadorned nomenclature: objective, constructed and personal authenticity. These divisions are based on an analysis of the past theoretical, empirical and descriptive works, as well as a close examination of the philosophical assumptions and positions underpinning them. Several suggestions arise from this study for furthering research into authenticity, tourist motivations and experiences. They can be summarized as follows.

1. ‘Authenticity’ is neither a unified static construct nor an essential property of objects and events. It is better to approach it more holistically as a concept whose objective, constructed and/or experiential dimensions are in dialectical engagement with each other and with both the home and the world of the tourist. Tourism becomes a metaphor for a changing, bio-political world in which (post)modernity, capitalism and globalization furnish complex meanings to authenticity and the authentic in everyday life. Hence, sustainability and interdisciplinary research are needed where (post)modernist and functionalist narratives of the tourist can be brought into meaningful dialogue with the Other.

2. This interrogative study suggests that the investigator’s own theoretical and methodological assumptions about the concept of authenticity must be clearly understood and specified. Since the tourism researcher is also a ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger, 1996), embodied historically in the social and cultural world, reflexivity in research becomes a key requirement (cf. Jamal and Hollinshead, 2001). This realization means ensuring that researchers are clearly aware of their own representations and interpretations of tourism and authenticity in the places, spaces and events of ‘the other’, and thus of their own performative role in the sociology of tourism-related knowledge. It therefore requires the researcher to address the ontological and epistemological features of tourist motivations and experiences.

3. The political and experiential nature of authenticity points to the need to develop more robust methodological tools and theoretical frameworks to address it. Especially helpful here may be Foucault’s work on discursive power-knowledge and truth regimes (cf. Foucault, 1980, 1995; Urry, 1990; Hollinshead, 1999), in order to discern how power is enacted discursively in such local, global and post-colonial spaces.

Approaching authenticity in tourism as a dynamic concept for meaning-making and personal/place identification gives it a significant role in tourism planning and research, as a performative agent in the sustainability of natural and human spaces and cultures. Integral to such study is paying attention to the micro–macro relationships (e.g. local–global,
the tourist self–other) through which global and local processes enact ‘nature’ and culture for tourist consumption and ‘motivate’ travel to natural sites. In other words, it is necessary for scholars to come back ‘home’ to MacCannell and other scholars who have challenged them to examine the tourist as a metaphor of the social world. But note, too, that this is a social world of global, postmodern and post-colonial spaces and places, where home constitutes a dynamic, performative Other to travel – constantly deferred, constantly deferring.

Notes

1Following Urry and Cohen, the authors additionally conclude that other factors, such as tourism styles and ‘travel careers’, can impact on craft choices and views on authenticity.

2Richter (1999) is particularly concerned with the political issues around which some battles over authenticity occur, noting that such questions are especially important in heritage tourism.

3Another grouping can be developed under the dimension of ‘personal authenticity’ to take into consideration the relationship between authentic experience and authentic existence, as well as phenomenological being-in-the-world and performative experience. This ‘new’ grouping is later discussed in detail under theoretical introspections on the home and the world spaces of the tourist.

4Similarly, McIntosh and Prentice (1999) examine ‘insightfulness’ as an appropriate characterization of how cultural authenticity is affirmed by tourists through their ‘encoding’ of an experience with their own personal meanings.

5See also p. 183 of in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, R. Audi (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995, for a brief definition of de dicto/de re. Note that there is also a de se (‘of oneself’), an attribute that is accepted by a number of philosophers - see p. 184 in the dictionary. We are grateful to Dr Christopher Menzel (Philosophy, Texas A&M University) for assistance with this preliminary exploration of the use of the de re/de dicto distinction for understanding ‘real/fake’ objects and events.

6This, of course, is the promise of tourism as a ‘peace industry’, but elaborated here to show how the world becomes an extension of one’s home; implications for ‘sustainable tourism’ follow with respect to the interrelationship of the local and the global.

7From an existential perspective, (in)authenticity and (in)authentic existence have been referred directly to by a number of philosophers and other scholars (e.g. Heidegger, Foucault and Charles Taylor). Even so, the meaning of authenticity varies among these scholars.

8Cohen’s existential tourists feel at ‘home’ in a centre away from their geographical locale, and their journey resembles a pilgrimage to their ‘Mecca’. For Wang (2000: 49), existential authenticity is a distinctive source of experience in tourism and comprises ‘personal or intersubjective feelings that are activated by the liminal process of tourist behaviours. In such liminal experiences, people feel that they are themselves much more authentic and more freely self-expressed than they are in everyday life, not because the toured objects are authentic, but rather because they
are engaging in non-everyday activities, free from the constraints of daily life . . . existential authenticity is a potential existential state of Being which is about to be activated by tourist activities.¹

¹Language and communicative meaning, for both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, are intricately intertwined with the animate world and with individuals’ sensorial experience of each other, so that subject and object are brought into authentic experience through a dialogic and dialectic encounter; the narrative construction of identity may be another theoretical area for investigating the existential tourist.

²Van den Abbeele (1980) observes that when MacCannell refers to tourists creating a worldview through interpreting and ordering the attractions relative to themselves and their own (home) society, it is not clear whether this ideological representation is a societal worldview (e.g. a Marxist one) or a personal one (e.g. an Althusserian one, where ideology refers to the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence). This ambiguity throws into doubt whether it is authenticity or an illusion of authenticity that the tourist experiences.

³The study and use of the term ‘performativity’ should not be confused with performance theory. Feminist studies (especially the work of Judith Butler, e.g. Excitable Speech) offer a theoretical approach to performativity, drawing upon post-structuralism (Foucault particularly). Lyotard’s (1984) notion of performativity is also socio-political.

⁴Edensor’s (1998) extensive study of tourists at the Taj provides a useful examination of how the meaning or purpose of space is reproduced or contested by tourist performances. The Taj Mahal ‘is neither a wholly enclavic or heterogenous tourist space and there is a multitude of tourist performances, each articulating a distinct praxis and disposition’ (p. 202).

⁵Heidegger’s (1996) seminal treatise also offers a detailed exposé on the ontology of being and ‘being-in-the-world’, which is also insightful and relevant to understanding the embodied nature of being.

References


Introduction

Foundational knowledge is dependent on and encouraged by solitude. With the isolation of location, social or cultural experiences, insights, thoughts and, ultimately, ways of knowing can be taken for granted as fiducial and infallible.

Travellers have always sought the unknown, the difference of alterity from which they were able first to observe, then later construe, the lives of others. Their quest was the magic of possibility. Maybe they harboured a suspicion that what the Bishop, the King, their neighbours, their fathers or husbands used to say was not all there was to know.

Tourism has since become a formalized, well-organized and economically based provision for this longing for otherness. It facilitates opportunities, first to observe and experience, and later to accommodate or assimilate alternative conceptualizations and ways of being. There is thus an implied delicate balance between the profane and profound, challenge and reward, pleasure and effort.

For people to venture to the ends of the earth, to places inhabited by dragons, requires bravery of spirit, a trust that they can be safe from harm, even in unknown territories and with strangers. Dragons are a lovely metaphor for that which is as yet undiscovered. They embody visions of hoped for wonder, of the mystery promised by other worlds. At the same time, dragons evoke images of the frightening, of that which is horrendously huge and engulfing. Those who witness such sights return as changed persons, different in their own eyes, if not in the eyes of others. Tourism
activities, whether they are of the organized mass variety or involve exploration or drifting (Cohen, 1972), can be thought of as continuing to represent, for the individuals concerned, some experience of otherness — a gesture towards the mysteriously awesome or terrifying. For Simmel (1990) and Wang (2000), the appeal of remoteness constitutes a psychological and sociological framework for this desire for otherness. In furnishing experiences of the unfamiliar, tourism pursuits refer back to individual proclivity to, and comfort with, various levels of trust or mistrust. From the manufactured vicarious experience of a crocodile sandwich, to camping with Iranian nomads and drinking sour mare’s milk, tourists demonstrate styles of trust and, in so doing, exhibit behaviour ranging from foolhardy bravado to deep suspicion.

Trust and Tourism: a Theoretical Framework

This chapter explores the role of trust in social order and knowledge formation as it relates to tourism, and the part played by tourism in fostering cross-cultural trust requisite to a new social order.

Two commonplace ideas accepted by philosophers and social theoreticians are initially assumed. The first is that society and culture evolve over time, and the second is that the social order of society and culture is trust dependent. In drawing attention to trust dependence, human relationships within social groupings are configured as having moral character. Putting these suppositions together leads to the idea that the way in which trust dependency is played out will change over time, along with transformations of social and cultural groupings. In other words, the sense of the self as a moral being may also be expected to evolve. From this perspective, it is useful to explore tourism as an activity capable of provoking social, cultural and moral change.

Tourism is a phenomenon that takes place at boundaries. It occurs at the periphery of the taken-for-granted, unnoticed trust-indicator systems within which a person typically exists. Tourism activities may also transport people to previously unknown places in terms of their own constitution as trust-worthy beings, along with their own sense of knowing how to present themselves as truth tellers worthy of trust. Tourists may be regarded by those interacting with them, not only as personal, idiosyncratic entities, but also as iconic indicators of that other place, that other nation they represent: ugly Australians, timid Thais or promiscuous young persons.

‘Trusting tourists!’ In the everyday enactment of tourism, who trusts whom? Is it that tourists are required to lay aside temporarily their normal means of establishing others as trustworthy? Are they obliged or challenged to believe that the exotic other, although unknown to them, may be worthy of trust, may potentially exist in a reciprocally moral relationship with them,
in which tourists *ipso facto* give the other the right to colonize their minds? Or is it that those interacting with them are called upon to suspend their judgements, and in inviting strangers into their territory (comprising shops, homes, sacred sites or situations of intimacy) hope that their faith in those unknown others will be validated?

Though recognizing the two-edged sword of tourism activities not only to develop a more encompassing acceptance of otherness, but also, unfortunately, to alienate and reinforce cultural intolerance, it is not unreasonable to see the potential of tourism for reworking cultures and expanding a sense of self and others as trustworthy beings. In this regard, the sentiments of Rorty (1998) may be endorsed, that a ‘multicultural global utopia’ can be achieved by people over time unravelling each culture into many fine component threads, before weaving them together with strands drawn from other cultures, thereby promoting an expanded sense of tolerance. If this weaving is to occur, it will be on a loom of trust.

### Trust and Social Order

Philosophers and social theorists, from the early Greeks onward, have identified trust as an essential ingredient of social order. Cicero, whose writing dates from about 45 BC, represents one such early thinker who recognizes social order as depending on trust being placed in morally bound truth-tellers and promise-keepers. Cicero stresses to his son, in his treatise entitled *On Moral Duties*, the importance of justice, as it ‘knits together human society and cements our common interest’. He goes on to explain: ‘The foundation of justice is good faith – in other words, consistency and truthfulness in regard to promises and compacts’ (Cicero, 1951: 11–12).

Today, the central role of truthfulness and trust to the constitution of society continues to be emphasized. MacIntyre (1994: 192) argues that participants in any given social undertaking share the standards and purposes characteristic of that exercise and, whether it is acknowledged or not, people define their relationships with one another ‘by reference to standards of truthfulness and trust’.

Consider, for example, exponents of two very different social practices. Authors of academic papers on tourism adopt certain agreed standards by which they indicate their trustworthiness as scholars. They do not plagiarize, but make decisions about when to reference the writing of others, either as a direct quotation or as paraphrase. Through acknowledging these and other conventions, they present their work as trustworthy, and enable others to accept them in this way. Similarly, Roma peoples – the so-called ‘gypsies’ often mistrusted by non-Roma – present themselves as trustworthy to each other in ways that outsiders are generally unable to decipher. Though
manifested quite differently, both academic writers and the Roma are
embedded within systems of social trust, through which relationships are
defined.

Goffman (1969) and Shapin (1994), in highlighting the role of trust and
faith in the functioning of social life, discuss the presentation of self as being
reciprocally related to both actor and audience. Goffman shows how
individuals, in presenting themselves in particular ways, signal that they are
likely to behave in a certain fashion. Moreover, in doing so, they also
request of others that they be accepted as that kind of person. Trust in the
self-presentation of others is an act of faith – essential to social interaction,
yet only the future will reveal if that trust has been placed appropriately.
In Shapin’s words, the ongoing coherence of social life ‘depends upon
morally textured inference’ (1994: 14). It is precisely here that there can be a
problem for tourism. Hosts may display acceptable trustworthy character-
istics, yet, under the constraints of time and place, may do so in such a way
as to appear superficial. They may thus, inadvertently, depict themselves as
untrustworthy: ‘beware Greeks bearing gifts.’

Trust and distrust can be thought of logically as part of the same system.
Distrust is dependent upon a taken-for-granted, over-arching framework of
trust. In this regard, trust is a bipolar concept. In order to be trusting, a level
of mistrust is implied. In this sense, both trust and mistrust form useful
judgmental parameters lying along the same continuum.

As Shapin (1994: 19) puts it, distrust ‘takes place on the margins of
trusting systems’. It is through knowledge of what is trustworthy that people
recognize the untrustworthy. Pickpockets in crowded trains know this
scenario all too well. While surreptitiously searching for a potential victim’s
wallet, they depict themselves as innocently being bumped up against or as
simpletons fiddling thoughtlessly.

In another sense also, distrust may be considered as a marginal activity.
It is marginal for moral and pragmatic reasons, in that it presents a serious
threat to the coherent functioning of a society.

The manner in which trust is placed is thought by sociologists to be
related to the complexity of a given society. So-called ‘premodern’ societies,
deemed ‘simple’ by many theorists, are thought to be more tolerant
of untruthfulness than modern, highly differentiated and interdependent
societies. Simmel (1950) explains that this situation occurs because, in
contemporary society, social existence is reliant upon many premises that
the individual is unable to verify personally. Today’s society, according to
Simmel, constitutes a ‘credit economy’. For while contemporary society
presents a highly complex plethora of social information, it reduces the
familiarity people have with one another, which was formerly the basis of
traditional trust. Instead of their being able to place their trust in individuals
in the context of face-to-face interaction, they are required to trust in systems
and abstract capacities.
Giddens’ (1989) concept of society, comprising sets of ‘disembedding mechanisms’, aptly describes postmodern existence, whereby relations take place between individuals separated in space, and according to which social relations in a given time and place are likely to be infiltrated by physically absent others.

Trust in contemporary societies can be understood in relation to its antecedents. English-speaking societies, for example, have within their heritage the paradigmatic representation of the ‘gentleman’ as the type of individual who can be trusted as truthful. Those classified as belonging to this genteel class are considered as being able to act freely, in not being socially and economically beholden to others. They can, therefore, be relied upon to speak the truth. Indicators reinforcing this notion, such as persons representing themselves as having some level of financial substance, continue as influential signifiers of trustworthiness.

There is recourse in contemporary society to a complexity of trust-imbued, interactional possibilities, including personal, face-to-face relationships, particular material systems or systems of expertise. With all three styles of trust-imbued relationships, there exist culturally specific, as well as evolving, multiculturally rich, means of presentation capable of denoting trustworthiness.

Tourism in this respect faces a challenge. The host, for example, will be judged at various strata of assessment: the self-presenting individual, the context of exchange and national/cultural reputation. ‘The western part of the world is gentlemanly while the east is a den of thieves’ becomes a delightful, if not stereotypical, paradox if one continues moving along an orientalist continuum.

In Australia, there was recent widespread media coverage of an airline that was temporarily barred from service by the national regulatory body for not meeting acceptable standards of air-safety maintenance. Following this exposure, the company sought to re-establish trust. It did so via television advertisements, in which certain high-profile, ‘successful’ individuals reassured their viewers, while seeming to gaze candidly at them, that ‘Do I Fly Ansett? Absolutely!’ In this example, Ansett could be seen as presenting itself as a trustworthy agent, by recourse to face-to-face truthfulness signifiers such as direct eye contact and the appearance of success. Behind the notion of success, as an indicator of trust, lay a logic along the lines that, if persons were successful and well-known in a field, there were others who could vouch for their trustworthiness. Additionally, if a successful person could trust the airline, so should the general public, for successful individuals could be assumed to know whom and what to trust.

Furthermore, Ansett promoted itself as being able to be trusted on account of the sophistication of its customer relations systems and the level of comfort it offered. As regards the former, the audience was invited to trust
the airline through visual images of smoothly operating ticketing procedures and their attendants’ attention to, and knowledge of, the needs of the passenger. Part of the message implied that ‘A person can be trusted who has the client’s needs at heart.’ As far as images of in-flight comfort were concerned, there were echoes of British history and the concept of the English gentleman whose word was his bond that attempted to ensure that gentility was equated with trustworthiness. Finally, the company also promoted itself as trustworthy by reminding the public that it functioned through the use of highly sophisticated systems – again shown through visual images. Recourse to technological expertise as trustworthy was appropriate in a diffused society, where the idea of competence had come to represent a kind of shorthand for ‘true know-how’.

Today, people move across various cultural and social settings, at both micro- and macrolevels. Hence, they are involved in depicting themselves and reading others as trustworthy, according to differing sets of accepted indicators. At the microlevel, for example, individuals may experience and sustain differences in indicators of trustworthiness as exhibited in their church, gardening club and the scientific research institute at which they are employed. Nevertheless, there is reliance on presenting the self, and reading other selves as truth tellers and worthy of trust.

As knowing subjects in the postmodern world, everyone constitutes and is constituted through multiple trust-reliant systems. In this sense, tourists become a metaphor of the contemporary social world, where they no longer engage with a narrower, more homogeneous range of trust-reliant systems. Rather, through the compression of space and time, they engage with multifarious other trust-reliant social groupings in diverse places, over an extraordinarily short period of time.

Understanding tourism in terms of the role of trust in developing and maintaining social order reveals tourism to have greater significance as social interaction than that usually associated with more passive forms of recreational travel. Through tourism, a higher level of social evolution is played out.

The question may therefore be posed – whose interest and responsibility is it to relate to tourism at this level? Such reflection reveals some troublesome paradoxes for tourism as it presently exists:

1. Should tourism activities strive to find better ways of mediating trust? Building trust leads to a certain standardization in terms of recognizing the ‘other’. It may become a disincentive to travel, where there is no adrenalin rush that comes from experiencing the exotic, unknown other. The potential for existential distancing may become, in this way, substantially diminished.

2. Should these deeper philosophical questions be overtly addressed in the tourism planning debate? Should one not think of serpents in the Garden of Eden?
Knowing Otherwise: Knowledge as Trust Reliant

From time immemorial, theorists have placed in binary opposition two stances regarding the best sources of ‘true’ knowledge. One perspective assumes direct experience as being the surest grounds for ‘factual’ understanding. Today, this remains a commonplace view. To see with one’s own eyes is to truly see.

A second perspective suggests that, as social creatures, all knowing experiences are mediated by social interaction, so that it is impossible to know directly. Along with Rorty (1998) and allied thinkers variously described (by others) as social constructivists, social constructionists or social relativists, here an anti-dualist view is adopted, one that rejects the idea of there being a distinction between ‘the world out there’ and knowledge of it. In other words, humans, as social beings existing in social settings, bring forward the world that they know.

In securing knowledge of the world, people inescapably rely upon others. Systems of valued knowledge, far from being solely empirically based, depend upon observations, interpretations and understandings, both mundane and scientific, that have their grounding within the knowledge of others (individuals and institutions) who are deemed trustworthy.

While the importance of trust in developing and maintaining social order has long been recognized, the role of trust in construing knowledge has received far less attention. Shapin (1994) presents a convincing argument concerning the ineradicable role of trust in others, in the evolution of what counts as ‘real’ or valuable knowledge.

As reported by Shapin (1994: 22), the phenomenologist Schutz, in writing about everyday knowledge, emphasized its social character by stating ‘only a small part of my knowledge of the world originates within my personal experience . . . The greater part is socially derived, handed down to me by my friends, my parents, my teachers and the teachers of my teachers.’

Similarly, Kitcher (1983: 5) notes that mathematical and scientific knowledge is based upon trust in others. ‘There is very little that we know without reliance on the testimony and support of others. Even in the case of empirical science, most of the knowledge of each individual is based, not on direct experience, but on the communication of others.’ Polanyi (1962: 208) supports this view, arguing that most so-called ‘facts’ are really ‘factual beliefs’, ‘held at second-hand through trusting others’.

Trust, Morality and Knowing as Non-foundational

Biological theorists, such as neurobiologists Maturana and Varela, likewise emphasize humans as bringing forth their own world of knowing. As they state it, ‘every reflection, including one on the foundation of human
knowledge, invariably takes place in language, which is our distinctive way of being human and being humanly active’ (1987: 26).

Maturana and Varela assert that self-consciousness and awareness are generated through human existence in language. Hence, knowing is emergent from and constitutive of social order. They argue that ‘since we exist in language, the domains of discourse that we generate become part of our domain of existence, and constitute part of the environment in which we conserve identity and adaptation’ (1987: 234). This perspective emphasizes experience as socially mediated, via systems within which trust has been placed, along with taken-for-granted background knowledge. Individuals recognize their experiences as specific types of experiences because of their existence within certain kinds of knowing communities. Indeed, experiences are always located within trust relationships.

Trust is integrally involved in the processes of assimilating and accommodating information (see Piaget’s schema; Vuyk, 1981). From existence as social beings, the construction of knowledge is inextricably trust reliant. Knowledge has a moral character because it is based upon trust. Social relations and knowledge form a complex that is mutually constitutive and trust dependent. ‘[The] fabric of our social relations is made up of knowledge – not just knowledge of other people, but also knowledge of what the world is like – and similarly, that knowledge of what the world is like draws on other people – what they are like as sources of testimony, whether and in what circumstances they may be trusted’ (Shapin, 1994: xxv–xxvi). Moreover, knowledge of whom to trust – trust indicators – is itself learnt from existence within particular cultures and societies.

While isolation appears to reinforce suspicion and distrust of the other, the opposite is not necessarily the case. Humans are complicated, emotional beings, autopoietic – self-producing. It is not simply a matter of training, of providing people with certain experiences that can be guaranteed to result in certain predetermined outcomes. Although Brown (1989) relatedly argues that the tourism industry ought to strive to find ways to design a product that creates a better world, surely the construction of an ameliorated world cannot be dependent in this way on certain products or other manufactured experiences. As self-directed beings, there are many layers involved in the personal proclivity to trust or not trust, and only some of these are conscious. There can be no certainty regarding the relationship between particular defined experiences and the interpretations, learning and actions of the respondent. For a start, even the notion of an experience is more complex and less certain than people may like to think. Their experience is tied up with themselves. While certain events may be independent, experience and knowledge of them are connected with the individuality of the knower.

Tourism may contribute to the potential to expand the realm of those with whom persons may enter into trust relationships. While these associations are not all of the same ilk – they trust different people for different reasons and to different extents – trust in others as rational is necessary,
as is learning to read their self-presentation as trustworthy. There is potential in meeting the other for people to become more tolerant and circumspect.

**Tourism, Complexity and Management**

In terms of Complexity Theory metaphors (Dimitrov et al., 1996; Woog et al., 1998; Kuhn, 2001), tourism may be viewed as an intricate, evolving social system, constituted by, and situated within, systems of trust. When both the observer (tourist) and the observed (exotic other) are included, it may be assumed that interactions will result in changes to these systems. It can be expected that the observer and the observed, as well as the systems of trust, will thereby each co-evolve.

Complex systems are self-organizing. This feature has management implications. The intricate, evolving system that comprises tourism is so large and sophisticated that it is virtually beyond comprehension and control. This situation does not mean, however, that would-be managers are completely disempowered. The very essence of self-organization requires some understanding of the higher-order principles that are found within the self-ordering process. It is in this realization that individuals can gain management intelligence through the interplay between influence and understanding. It is different from action–reaction management. It implies a new sophistication of knowing and doing. Potential managers may envisage their interventions as nudging the system in certain ways. This manner of thinking sees their inputs more as a form of seeding for change, rather than a linear-based cause-and-effect line of response. This conceptualization is both more humble and more realistic, recognizing, as it does, the complexity and propensity for self-directed change within the tourism system.

Reactions of the gazer (the tourist) and of the observed (the exotic visited other society or culture), as well as the nature of the gaze, can be discussed usefully in terms of challenges to accepted understandings of meanings of trustworthiness. That tourist activities can both develop a more encompassing acceptance of otherness (and hence foster a more global sense of social cohesion) and also alienate and reinforce cultural intolerance can be explained by consideration of the role of trust.

**Tourism as Ethical Development**

It is not trivial that people often mistrust one another in tourism contexts, because their ability to take part comfortably in interaction within their own society is dependent upon their knowledge and experience in recognizing and demonstrating themselves as truth tellers. This is necessary to social cohesion. In being confronted with other culturally predicated means that thwart this goal, it is clear that mistrust can result. This chapter could thus
just as well have been entitled, ‘Mistrusting Tourists’, for such is the other, complementary side of its focus.

As tourists in a foreign situation, at some level people need to have faith or trust. Although they may be unable to read the culture of the other, the latter can, nevertheless, be understood as rational and comprising people like themselves, in the sense that they too make agreements, one with another, as to reciprocal trust arrangements, whereby social cohesion and epistemic formation may be established and nurtured. Without such minimum trust, the other becomes construed as dangerous and monstrous.

Consider the number of languages where the words for ‘human being’ or ‘worthy man’ are the names by which the clan, tribe or nation calls itself. Conversely, think of the use in English of descriptors such as ‘barbarian’ or ‘vandal’, nouns once referring to unknown, unappreciated and mistrusted others, but which are now generally employed as indicators for those who are perceived to be uncultured or uncouth.

Tourism’s potential to function as a form of transformative education is alluded to in the literature (Goeldner et al., 2000; Wang, 2000). People’s ways of understanding and being in the world can be challenged and even dramatically changed through experiencing other modes of existence. Similarly, it is well documented that visitors to a community or destination area typically create different social relationships from affiliations with the local population (Butler, 1980; Wyllie, 2000).

Tourists, in travelling to a strange location, find themselves in an unfamiliar environment, not only geographically, but also personally, socially and culturally. Within this setting, they have to manage social interactions in order to obtain shelter, food and, perhaps, companionship. The different social relationships that evolve between visitors and the local population comprise new forms of trust. Novel styles of self-presentation as worthy of trust evolve as people with diverse social and cultural histories mutually construct ways of meeting their interactional needs.

These metamorphoses can usefully be considered in terms of expanding trust. That the worldview and lifestyle of others may come to be seen as attractive enough to experiment with, or at a lesser scale to partake of tokenistically, indicates that visitors have come to trust some aspect of the otherness that they have experienced, as being rational, worthwhile and trustworthy. To that extent, they have begun to expand their sense of an ethical and moral context.

Freedom of thought, exploration of ideas and places, and the transgression of boundaries imposed on these activities have been evident as part of the driving force of the continuing movement of history. Interestingly, and additionally, there is almost a countervailing form of human action that appears. Men and women, while seeking change and making a commitment to transgression, also seek to order and suppress that which is viewed as radically different in others. A tension between openness to otherness and a resistance to it is what ethics implies in a tourism context.
The experience of travel involves tourists examining their own and others’ normative principles, in terms of which they act and make judgements. They are accustomed to considering their own norms as universal truths. Ethics linked to such principles presupposes that their behaviour, which arises from their thinking and knowing, is unified. It is not. The experience of travel demonstrates this reality. It reveals the futility of searching for universal, all-embracing principles, both externally and internally.

Through travel, people may come to realize the relational nature of themselves and actualize their capacity to be active moral agents. In doing so, they take the realm of ethics away from the theoretical, from the ‘expert’, and return it to themselves as human travellers or tourists, recognizing ethics as an embodiment of lived experience. This realization does not reject the idea of normative frameworks. On the contrary, experiences can show how frequently such models exist. Moreover, that their frameworks are non-foundational – emerging from live experience, from the interplay of dialogue – is also revealed.

In the context of tourists needing to know how to interact fruitfully and ethically in socially and culturally alien contexts, they are placed slightly and momentarily outside the everyday surroundings of their own society/culture. In this sense, they can be considered as emblematic of a post-modern world, where, while being embedded within particular systems of trust, they must also take on the role of heretic, in sorting out from ever-more complex contexts whom to trust and how to make decisions regarding trustworthiness. There is thus the potential that expanded ethical awareness, and the behaviour flowing from this conscientization, will benefit from revelations and insights that so often characterize travel.

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References


The Tourist as a Social Fact

David Picard

Introduction

The theme ‘The tourist as a metaphor of the social world’ raises a certain number of questions. What, exactly, is the ‘social world’? Who is a tourist? The tourist as a metaphor of whose social world? How do different social worlds interact? In order to respond to these issues, an attempt will be made to theorize a certain number of ideas and to articulate them according to different social science approaches dealing with the phenomenon of tourism. The conceptual framework thus constructed will subsequently be illustrated in relation to tourism in La Réunion (France, Indian Ocean).

Contesting the Social World of Tourists and Locals

Social facts and social worlds

Although the concept ‘world’ has several meanings, nevertheless they have a common point of reference to an intrinsically ordered system within a closed space (Ridler, 1971). The addition of the epithet ‘social’ connotes a construction of sociability, an organized and structured ensemble. As Durkheim (1976: 422) has it, such a world as an idealized reflection of society necessarily grows out of social facts. Symbolic and Marxist anthropologists, in contrast, emphasize the primordial role of economic production and exchange in the social and symbolic organization of society (Mauss, 1973; Polanyi, 1983; Godelier, 1984). Caillois (1950) stresses the...
structural articulation of political power, economic relations and the symbolic construction of the social world. The ‘social world’, then, is a particular way of conceptualizing and organizing social facts. It is a ‘model’ or ‘form of interpretation’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1974: 335), an ‘imaginary world’ linking socially relevant signs of reality. According to linguistic methods of syntax analysis, such signification is produced through a system of social and symbolic relations. Signs of relevant social facts are socially interpreted within significant frameworks as symbolic systems of signs (Augé, 1979).

The social scientific modelling of the tourist as a social fact

The tourist is an empirically verifiable social fact. Social scientists from different disciplines have produced alternative series of systematic observations. Due to their idiosyncratic approaches, aesthetics and ideologies, they propose dissimilar scientific models or paradigms explaining this similar social fact. Since the beginnings of the social scientific investigation of tourism in the 1970s, two or three main perspectives have emerged.

Symbolic anthropologists have tended to focus on the tourist as a social actor within symbolic superstructures. Here, a journey to external ‘authentic’ places has been considered as a sacred time–space structuring modern society (MacCannell, 1976; Cohen, 1979; Graburn, 1989). Seen in this light, tourists are regarded as a sort of pilgrim, and tourism as the liminal state of a rite de passage (Turner and Turner, 1978; van Gennep, 1981; Gottlieb, 1982; Lett, 1983). The odyssey as a cyclical break from the ordinary world has been explained by a double motivation of ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors (Yiannakis and Gibson, 1992: 299–300). On the one hand, travel is described as being driven by the ideology of an ‘authentic’ state of being projected into a geographically situated ‘sacred’ world beyond the ordinary world (MacCannell, 1976; Selwyn, 1996). On the other hand, it is understood as a ‘push factor’, a still unexplained, and thus mysterious, ‘basic need of recreation’ (Graburn, 1989: 36; Nash, 1989: 41), a remnant of the hunter and gatherer.

Another perspective, lying at the ‘heart of the tribe’ (Amselle and M’bokolo, 1999), has been adopted by researchers carrying out field studies of ‘exotic’ cultures and societies, scholar-tourists who are disturbed by the presence of (other) tourists. Among the former group, Greenwood (1989) was one of the first to highlight the ‘negative impact’ of tourism in a situation where traditional Spanish dances were adapted to tourist tastes and thus ‘lost’ their social signification. Other ideologically inspired authors of similar persuasion have considered tourism as a modern form of imperialism, as the capitalistic spread of centres towards peripheries (Aisner and Plüss, 1983; Nash, 1989). Even when not defending a special cause, by taking a ‘local’ position, researchers of this ilk nearly always come to conclusions about ‘dominated culture’ and ‘impacts’ (Bruner, 1991). Tourists are seen by them
as potentially dangerous diffusers of modernity (de Kadt, 1979), as ‘polluters’ of indigenous culture.

By the end of the 1980s, social scientists were operating an ‘epistemological rupture’. Quoting the field study results of McKean (1989), Lanfant preferred to consider tourism as an ‘international social fact’, rather than simply as a positive or negative impact (Lanfant, 1980; Lanfant and Graburn, 1992). She urged that tourism analysis should adopt a perspective of in-between rather than from inside, that tourism should be thought of as an economic, social and symbolic relation of the transnational system of international tourism, as opposed to a strictly local phenomenon (Lanfant et al., 1995). Crick, coterminously, invited social scientists to reflect on their own ideologies and aesthetics of the exotic (Crick, 1989). A discussion about the differences between tourists and anthropologists arose, one that led anthropology into an existential crisis (Errington and Gewertz, 1989; Graburn, 1995; Clifford, 1996; Geertz, 1996). Historically born within the romantic ideology of naturalism, of exotics and the \textit{bon sauvage}, anthropology was obliged to redefine its objectives and methods (Augé, 1979), its ‘relevance to the contemporary world’ (Ahmed and Shore, 1995). As a result of this identity debate, social scientists involved in the study of tourism began to propose different inventories of knowing and of corresponding methodological frameworks (Dann et al., 1988; Graburn and Jafari, 1991; Selwyn, 1994; Nash, 1996).

\textbf{‘Savage’ modelling of the tourist as a social fact}

As Durkheim has put it, ‘Man (sic) cannot live amidst objects without inserting them into ideas regulating his (sic) behaviour’ (Durkheim, 1992: 15, author’s translation). The tourist as an ‘object’ of social space is thus transformed into an idea; s(he) is metamorphosed into a sign of the social world. As a social fact empirically observed, typed and ‘known’, s(he) becomes an object of ‘savage’ modelling, of \textit{a pensée sauvage} (Lévi-Strauss, 1962). Very different social and contextual relations with the tourist as a social fact appear. For locals, the tourist may be considered as ‘a special kind of stranger’ (Simmel, 1950, quoted by Nash, 1989: 44); for nostalgic anthropologists, as an impact on ‘traditional culture’; for those remaining at home, as a symbolic, ‘temporary dead man’. Many other relations – of tourist agents, of politicians and economic developers, of anthropologists – are observable.

Of particular interest are the dialectics of historically related or empirically observed economic, sociological or geographical facts and the symbolic and aesthetic construction of the world operated by individuals or groups. Here, \textit{Lévi-Strauss’ ‘models already constructed by the considered culture’ or ‘forms of interpretations’} (Lévi-Strauss, 1974: 335) articulate a certain selection, configuration and understanding of these facts. A recital of
life and a myth of origin thus have in common the presence of a narrative structure symbolically articulating social facts – but using different signs. As an ordered narration explaining one’s being in the world, signification is constructed within a meaningful framework of symbolic relations.

It is worthwhile focusing on two specific relations articulating the tourist as a social fact: the social world of locals and the social world of tourists. The particularity of these two relations lies in their interactivity. Tourists and locals directly interact. The tourist becomes a social fact of both social worlds. As will be shown, contesting the social worlds of locals and of tourists means considering them as socially useful narratives of social facts (the tourist) and not as relics of Cartesian history.

**Contesting the social world of locals**

Those social scientists particularly interested in the local dimension of tourism are often united in the belief that locals of touristic regions nearly always construct their social world in opposition to the outside world. The identity of this indigenous world operates within a framework that connotes it in terms of ‘tradition’, ‘authenticity’, ‘truth’, etc., and by explicitly opposing it to the ‘modernity’, ‘superficiality’, ‘pollution’, etc. of the ordinary world of tourists (Doumenge, 1984; Evans-Pritchard, 1989; Cherubini, 1991, 2000; M. Picard, 1992; D. Picard, 2002b). In such regions, ‘tradition’ often becomes a politically motivated (and constructed) means of defending a cause or of organizing local society (Matthews and Richter, 1991; Lanfant et al., 1995). Michel Picard relatedly discovers that ‘local heritage’ in Bali has adapted to Western taste quite easily, since it has been institutionalized by the Dutch colonial administrations since the 19th century in order to govern local society (M. Picard, 1992). The French tourism engineering association AFIT proposes ‘tradition’ as a means of creating local development dynamics in French rural regions (Jotter, 1998). ‘Alternative’ and ‘sustainable’ tourism becomes an ideological development framework for ‘underdeveloped’ countries (Smith and Eadington, 1992) and – especially rural – regions of ‘developed’ countries (de Weerdt, 1989).

‘Tradition’ and ‘culture’ hence become products. McKean first formulated tourism development as a force for economic change. For him, two distinct worlds co-existed: an economic ‘tourist world’ where an ‘involuted’ culture had become a tourist product, and a ‘social world’ more interested in traditional values (McKean, 1989). Michel Picard, carrying out research in Bali after McKean, observed the development of a tourist culture. Here he found that ‘traditional heritage’ as a product of the economic sector of ‘cultural tourism’ was celebrated by locals in front of a local public (M. Picard, 1992).

The crucial problem of societies developing such forms of ‘cultural’ tourism therefore seems to be the superimposition of different definitions of
‘culture’: on the one hand, the anthropological definition of culture as a system of social relations and action models articulated within collective myths; on the other hand, the socially useful selection and interpretation of specific – maybe distinguishing – signs of social being (Barth, 1995). This twofold superimposition results in a cacophony of signs, a de-socialization of the sign and the signified. Affirming traditional signs does not necessarily mean ‘being traditional’. It can imply, on the contrary, participating within the significant framework of nostalgia associated with postmodernism (Urry, 1990; D. Picard, 2002b). ‘Traditions’, then, may be signs not of historically based social difference, but of an affectively and aesthetically motivated ‘differentiation’ (Baudrillard, 1970). Put on a world scale, ‘tradition’ and ‘culture’, as specific signs of local space, may become a means of symbolic exchange within world systems (Appadurai, 1990; Wallerstein, 1990), within an ‘economy of signs and spaces’ (Lash and Urry, 1994).

Locally, the tourist as a social fact may become a metaphor of economic and symbolic participation within a ‘world outside’. As one of the principal means for operating/affirming local identity and being in the world, the tourist and the specific spatiality s/he occupies may become local ‘primordial’ values. The story (the myth, the recital) locally told integrates these facts within a global social world articulating the opposition of the local and the global. The ‘world outside’ may then be constructed as an anti-myth of the local world. Fundamental social facts related to recent economic, spatial, and social transformations may be negotiated as the ‘loss of a traditional world’. The culprit, then, is ‘modernity’ assimilated to negatively connoted externalities going under the names of ‘globalization’, ‘Americanization’ and ‘occidentalization’.

Contesting the social world of tourists

One of the main characteristics of tourists as social facts is their idiotic nature (Urbain, 1991). They always seem to ask the same inane questions: ‘What are your traditions?’, ‘What do you live on?’, ‘What is your food like?’, ‘What are your religious beliefs?’ Tourism as seeing the ‘other’ thus implies a specific aesthetic disposition (Roger, 1997) towards alter. The ‘other’ is captured by a selective tourist gaze that only focuses on certain signs and ignores the rest. Just as in Hegel’s dialectic of love, tourists seem to operate a dialectic that opposes the self of the other as an antithesis to their own. By appealing to the identity of alter, they impose a specific communication matrix, a particular form that locals have to fill in with contents. They ask locals to become ‘readable’ within touristic signifying frameworks. Like many ethnographers do, but should not do (Cresswell and Godelier, 1976), tourists approach the other through such thematic pigeonholes as ‘history’, ‘economics’, ‘family’ and ‘arts’ that frame their own social world.
Tourism as a search for ‘authenticity’ (MacCannell, 1976) or a moment of ‘liberty’ (Graburn, 1989) articulates the idea of an ‘external world’ connoted in opposition to the ordinary world. For tourists, visited places may appear as ‘original’ or ‘primordial’ worlds. They become prehistoric – or rather a-historic – locations ‘out of time and space’ (Wagner, 1977), metaphors of a ‘lost state of being’. Journeying to ‘underdeveloped’ regions seems to be like travelling to Western countries ‘as they were one hundred years ago’. Going to a tropical island seems to be like visiting Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden or, at least, like witnessing Bougainville’s descriptions of Tahiti. The historian Délumeau notes that such ‘lost worlds’ historically appear as a nostalgic reaction to the epistemological and cognitive ruptures caused by geographical or industrial revolutions (Délumeau, 1992). They become the antithesis of new visions of the world. As myths of origin, they formulate an actual state of being through an historic recital, and thus contrast the actual with a narrated past or otherness. The ordinary world of tourists thus becomes situated on the right-hand side of a temporal continuum.

By the selection and arrangement of historic signs, Disney World narrates an American (short-) story. At the same time, as Rojek points out, it opposes the magnified reality of a theme park to a then relatively ‘greyer’ reality of the ordinary social world (Rojek, 1993). Urry (1990) relatedly notes the appearance of an important heritage industry in Great Britain in the 1980s serving a socially disparate public. He emphasizes the different meanings of, for example, staging a proletarian workplace. Here elderly ex-labourers can tell their children about their lives of the past, while individuals of the upper class can discover the exotic world of the working class.

A structurally equivalent symbolic relation to the ‘tradition’–‘modernity’ dichotomy is the ‘nature’–‘culture’ opposition. ‘Nature’ appears out of history. As a primordial state of being, it is opposed to history. The symbolic relationship of a-historical ‘nature’ and historical ‘culture’ is mediated by alternative metaphors of procreation. As Graburn puts it, the success of tourism as a ‘sacred journey’ is proportionate to the degree that the myth of the Holy Grail is realized (Graburn, 1989: 33). Nineteenth-century naturalists’ Holy Grail – which gave birth to anthropology – was based on the idea of evolution, the search for the origins of mankind, for that ‘magic’ moment of transition when animal became human. Today, and retrospectively, it is of little concern whether creation took 7 days or 7 million years. In both cases, it remains an imaginary world. Darwinism’s evolutionary model, or the Genesis-as-told-in-the-Bible model are no more than metaphors of the identical symbolic relationship, the same set of oppositions between man and nature, culture and wilderness, the golden age and history.

As Cohen has stated, the ‘authenticity’ (nature, culture, tradition) of tourist destinations is a social construction (Berger and Luckmann, 1986) which depends on different forms of tourism and tourist motivations (Cohen, 1988). There are, then, different ‘authenticities’ defined within socially
differentiated signifying frameworks opposing them to the ‘in-authenticities’ of the respective ordinary social world of industrial society. The double construction of reality operated through tourism seems to transform basic social facts structuring social life and space. As Gottlieb (1982) has observed, the world realized by tourism represents an anti-structure to the ordinary world. Working-class tourists can become king for a day, while middle-class backpackers can temporarily experience poverty, and upper-class American students in France can be found living in miserable attics . . . reading Henry Miller and Anaïs Nin. Compatriot bourgeois tourists visiting Paris observed by MacCannell (1976) were opposing their middle-class origins by entering the magnificent palaces of their imagined European ancestors. Urban tourists seeing the countryside can experience a ‘whole’ production process like making bread. The ‘whole’ is opposed to the divided and highly mechanized production procedures of the industrialized bakery (Sennet, 2000).

The Example of La Réunion’s Maroon Legend

The narrative structure of La Réunion’s maroon legend

La Réunion is a French island in the Indian Ocean. Its space, society and demographic structures are historically defined by the essentially economic functions of a plantation society. Before the abolition of slavery in 1848, runaway slaves known as ‘maroons’ fled the plantations and escaped into the island’s mountainous hinterland. This fact – which historians actually know very little about – has today become the raw material of local legends narrated to tourists, and uncritically told also during public and private celebrations. Additionally, it can be verified that, regardless of whether it is related to tourists or paraded within local performances, the narrative structure of the ‘story’ is significantly always the same. Mainly politically motivated differences appear only in its conclusion.

Once upon a time, slaves from Africa and Madagascar were brought to the island. They had to work very hard in the sugar cane fields and mills on the West coast. They lived in camps and were treated worse than animals. White planters, who were very crude, cruel and wicked, whipped their slaves. Therefore, many of them decided to flee, to go ‘maroon’. To avoid this situation, owners planted thorn edges all around the slave compounds. Assembling food, cooking pots and utilities, the slaves prepared their escape. The then called ‘maroons’ fled into the mountains of the island’s interior where they could hide. There, they built huts, became small farmers, had many children and formed democratic societies. The slave owners sent slave hunters who scoured the rivers and climbed up into the mountains looking for them. To prove that they had caught a maroon, they killed him and cut off his ears. Therefore, until today, white people from France are called z’oreils (ears).
Meaning is built up by the construction of opposite ‘worlds’. The cruel world of slavery became associated with white slave owners, hunters, plantation society and the coastal region. That world was opposed to a harmonic and democratic world of freedom associated with the marrons, to small farming and the mountain region of the island’s hinterland.

**Politically motivated ways of finishing a story**

The way to let a story end seems to depend mainly on the political intentions of the narrator. The legend of Anchaing illustrates three different versions, each using the same narrative base. These three renditions are told in different contexts and propose different models for conceptualizing Réunion’s evolution since the abolition of slavery.

One day, Anchaing and his wife Héva were burning dried herbs in their fields when Bronchart, an infamous slave hunter, came up the river. He it was who saw the smoke rising from the top of the hill on which Anchaing and his family had settled.

By monitoring local guides, this first ‘romantic version’ seems to be the most common, one that is told to tourists and to local audiences. It poetically explains that the moral values of the maroons were superior to the material concerns of the whites. Freedom becomes more important than possessions. As a virtue, liberty is finally realized by becoming a bird, a ‘spirit’ still present.

[romantic version] It was too late to flee when Anchaing and Héva discovered Bronchart’s approaching. Hand in hand, they went to the edge of a cliff and jumped... In the air, they changed into papangues [an endemic bird of brown colour]. Today, if you see a couple of papangues flying through the valleys of La Réunion, you may be witnessing Anchaing and Héva.

As Lilette (1999) has shown, the legend of the maroons in its romantic version was created by bourgeois Réunionnées poets in the 19th century. It was only rediscovered in the 1970s when a new class of local intellectuals, often close to the Communist party, used it as a metaphor for their struggle for independence. The second version, the ‘die-hard version’, is therefore especially appropriated by local movements struggling for greater autonomy from the French central administration. The quintessence of the story is that
the world is (still) dominated by cruel white slave owners, a poor labour
class being exploited by capitalists, the still-colony La Réunion being
exploited by the French State.

[die-hard version] Anchaing and Héva were caught by Bronchart and brought
back to the coast. The two slaves were separated and punished. Anchaing had
his leg cut off and was branded.

The third version with a Hollywood-like happy ending is very rarely
told. It can sometimes be observed in celebrations organized by associations
where the mixed and multicultural character of the island’s population
constitutes the central theme. Everybody is happy, peace and love prevail,
the past has become ‘history’, people have shaken hands to form an ideal,
mixed and self-respecting society.

[Hollywood-style version] Anchaing and Héva were caught and brought back
to the coast. The sugar mill owner, being emotionally touched by the couple’s
love decided to free them. Anchaing and Héva lived together in love and
harmony happily ever after.

**Constructing the social world of locals**

As told to tourists, the legend of the maroons allows local actors to
communicate different ideas in relation to social facts. The special distrib-
ution of social entities’ roles within the story situates the locals in opposition
to the (mainly white) tourists. By ‘going maroon’, ‘their’ ancestors are
transformed into the heroes of the story, whereas the forebears of the tourists
are the cruel slave owners. This situation is explicitly achieved by reference
to the term *z’oreils*. Settled in the interior of the island, their precursors then
become small farmers in an ideal countryside, and within a multicultural
and multiracial society.

In fact, until quite recently, the modernization of local space, especially
via capital intensive farming, self-help and urbanization, has essentially
been a phenomenon of the coastal regions. Economic development and
the social-symbolic promotion of the island’s mountainous hinterland, by
contrast, are very recent, especially due to ‘eco-tourism’ and new forms of
agriculture.

In opposition to the coastal region, the local story constructs the island’s
inner sanctum as an ‘original’ and ‘authentic’ space – a place of liberty with-
out the ‘pollution of modernity’ (Fleurant, 1989: 61), ‘where La Réunion’s
soul is’ (Région Réunion, 1995). The narrative thus adopts a touristic
signifying framework that sets authentic and in-authentic space in binary
opposition. This particular conception of space, as articulated by the legend,
is accepted by locals and celebrated specifically in the Sunday family picnic
taken in the mountain and forest regions of the interior. ‘The French
mainland’ and the coastal region connoted by such attributions as
‘dehumanization’, ‘stress’ and ‘racism’ are formulated in opposition to this interior.

As one of the principal signs of local identity, and as a means of symbolic exchange and being in the world, tourists and the specific spatiality that they occupy become newly formulated ‘patrimonies’, locally celebrated and mythologized as ‘primordial’ values. New spiritual models project the collective Réunionnese being into a mythology of the ‘natural’ (D. Picard, 2002a). Below, there operates a sacralization of economic resources and of action models in order to preserve the ‘authenticity’ of certain spaces and species.

**Constructing the social world of tourists**

Tourists to La Réunion construct their social world by employing the same system of oppositions used by the locals when they contrast the cruelty of slavery with a harmonious world of freedom. However, their respective interpretations differ.

For certain Germans observed during their stay on the island, the maroon legend seems to be a sort of Schindler’s list inserted into a tropical context. Often, and only shortly after having listened to this story, they start a conversation with reference to the Auschwitz debate in their home media: ‘You know, in Germany we actually have the same sort of discussion about how to treat the past. [...] How do descendants of slave owners deal with their past?’ They then identify with the cruel slave owners in the persons of Nazis, while for them the slaves become Jews.

Another more general observation among tourists is the projection of a European urban–rural dichotomy. Just like the coastal region of the legend, urban space becomes a synonym for social limits, dehumanization and cruelty. Many French tourists here relatedly integrate ‘globalization’, ‘cultural homogenization’ and ‘inauthenticity’. As is the interior of La Réunion, the countryside is regarded as ‘real’ space, the location of liberty, life quality and ‘authenticity’. The neo-rural and ‘anti-globalist’ José Bové becomes the contemporary maroon, a hero fighting against the sugar mills of modernity.

Through a longitudinal observation of tourists during their stay, and after revisiting them at home in Europe, three principal tourist types, depending on different social situations, can be identified. These types seem close to Cohen’s categories that lie between the extremes of ‘existentialists’ and ‘diversionary tourists’ (Cohen, 1988). They are as follows:

1. ‘Re-socializationers’: hard-working couples and groups of friends, very much involved in everyday life, whose touristic aim is to ‘take a break’, ‘have fun’ and reinforce social relations;
2. ‘Sense hunters’: persons experiencing a midlife crisis, frustrated by their jobs and unhappy with the world; their purpose is to recreate a meaning to life and to their being in the world;
3. ‘Sociality hunters’: typically retired or persons living alone with few social contacts, whose goal is to talk with others, especially about tourism and tourist destinations.

Conclusion
The construction of the social worlds of tourists and locals appears to operate within a framework of tourist–local interaction. Concretely, it seems to be negotiated according to a matrix of aesthetic signs that relates to the touristic imaginary worlds imposed by their ‘idiotic’ nature and their economic role within the local social organization. Though they share a common narrative structure, the stories told by the particular configuration of signs are not the same for tourists and locals. On the contrary, by linking signs of a particular selection of social facts (economy, imagination, myths, social and spatial organization, etc.), tourists and locals adopt specific versions of their own social worlds. Narrative structures are thus semantically negotiable, capable of simultaneously ‘accounting for’ the very different social worlds of tourists and locals. Social worlds are hence systems of signs poetically integrating and explaining ‘causalities’ of apparently incoherent social facts. The tourist as a social fact becomes a key sign of the social worlds of tourists and locals. As the linking agent of the local and global, s/he becomes a metaphor of locals’ participating and being in the world. As a pilgrim passing and celebrating a primordial state of social and spiritual existence, s/he becomes a metaphor also of touristic existence in the contemporary world.

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The Tourist as a Social Fact


Tourism as Metempsychosis and Metensomatosis: the Personae of Eternal Recurrence

A.V. Seaton

Is it nature or by error of fantasies that the seeing of those places we know to have been frequented or inhabited by men whose memory is esteemed or mentioned in Stories doth in some sort move and stirre us as much or more than the hearing of their noble deeds or reading of their compositions?

(Montaigne, 1958: 576)

When I am out on a bleak wintry night, I can always find one pleasure at least in the situation, and that is in the images from various novelists and poets which surrounding sights and sounds recall. I should think your wild day on the moors must have brought vividly before your mind several passages from Jane Eyre, and the passages in Dickens are innumerable which a wretched night in London summons to the thoughts.

(Gissing and Gissing, 1927: 30)

Introduction

In a previous paper (Seaton, 2001a), a kind of travel text was defined and characterized which has existed in literary form for more than century but which has multiplied greatly in the last 30 years, in both literary and broadcast form. It was called the ‘metempsychotic text’ – one in which an author or broadcaster assumes the persona of an historical traveller and repeats a journey made by him (so far there have been no metempsychotic texts by or about women).

The original paper had begun life as an invited contribution to a conference convened by the Department of History at the University of...
Oulu in Finland, celebrating the 200th anniversary of a journey made by the Italian traveller, Acerbi, in 1799, through Finland to the North Cape. The symposium was organized in an unusual way, being staged not in one location, but peripatetically, with the papers being delivered at different points along the route taken by Acerbi. The paper was not about Acerbi’s original journey, but about the practice of repeating other people’s odysseys, and making them the basis of books, articles, films, TV and radio transmissions. The association between travel and the adoption of a persona seemed to be an interesting one, and, given the fact that texts based on metempsychotic travel had multiplied significantly in recent times, a social phenomenon worthy of analysis.

The metempsychotic persona was viewed initially as a textual convention, adopted on a temporary basis by the author, following in the footsteps of Hannibal (Levin, 1985), William Cobbett (Wightman, 1957; Winder, 1964), or whoever, and one that was abandoned once its textual utility had been exhausted – once, for example, the author had put the final full stop at the end of his account repeating Doctor Johnson’s tour of Scotland (Birkbeck Hill, 1890; McLaren, 1954), or after the credits had rolled over the last shot of the metempsychotic narrator arriving at journey’s end of crossing the Alps along the route taken by Hannibal. However, the more the features of metempsychosis and repetition in travel narratives were examined, the more they seemed to extend beyond the confines of textual representation into tourism behaviour itself and, in so doing, provoked a new set of questions. Might the adoption of, and identification with, a persona, or even several personae, be not just a textual convention within travel representation, but a constitutive element, even, to some extent, a pre-condition of the tourist role? Might the quest to repeat what others have done, in ways they imagine others have done it, be a central identifying and defining characteristic of the tourist?

The purpose of this chapter is to examine metempsychosis, not just as a conventional artifice propelling texts, but as an ideological dynamic, driving and structuring the behaviour of tourists, and to explore the ways in which such a reading of tourist behaviour might be theorized in relation to paradigms within anthropology and sociology. As the argument develops, a distinction will emerge between two metempsychotic levels of tourism behaviour – a manifest, unilinear level, and a more implicit, embedded level, which will be treated at length in the second part of this account.

**Metempsychotic Tourism as Manifest, Unilinear Repetition**

The unilinear form comprises tourism behaviour in which a subject knowingly repeats a single journey made by one named significant other or
others. This form includes all the journeys made and written up in the texts dealt with in the first article (Seaton, 2001a), as well as many kinds of touring holiday taken by people following in the footsteps of the famous. The tourism industry provides metempsychotic tour packages, and the unilinear strain can be found as an element in promotional discourse, as in this Explore Worldwide advertisement:

Follow in the footsteps of Darwin to the enchanted Galapagos Islands. View the prolific bird-life and unique animals – a fascinating insight to life on earth as it used to be.

(Daily Telegraph, 1999a).

The identifying characteristics of the unilinear form of metempsychotic tourism can be seen here as explicit role-play through the adoption of a persona from the past and a repetition of at least part of the itinerary taken by the role model. In some cases, the tour operator may simplify and accelerate the itinerary of the former famous traveller for the contemporary tourist, as in this Jules Verne package through the landscape of Lawrence of Arabia:

In many ways this journey follows much the same route as that made by T.E. Lawrence 80 odd years ago when he travelled from Aqaba across Sinai and Suez to Cairo and recounted in his classic ‘Seven Pillars of Wisdom.’ Then the journey by camel took a considerable time but today modern highways and hydrofoil services across the Red Sea have very much reduced the journey time...

(Daily Telegraph, 1999b)

The unilinear level of metempsychotic tourism may not be confined to the role adoption of one significant individual other. There may be named groups with whom the tourist seeks, or is invited, to identify. The following extract comes from a prospectus offered by Lieutenant Commander J.R. Stenhouse for an inclusive Antarctic cruise in 1929–1930:

The ship will penetrate the Great Ice Barrier, the limit of Southern navigation, within seven hundred miles of the South Pole, and will be the first passenger to cross the Antarctic Circle. The destination of the cruise will be the Bay of Whales in the great Ross Barrier at which Amundsen and Byrd made their bases and from which they started on journeys to the South Pole. During the seven days cruise in the Ross Sea, the ship will proceed, ice conditions permitting, to McMurdo Sound, from where Scott and Shackleton started their epic journeys. Visits will also be made to the huts in which they wintered at Hunt Point, Cape Evans and Cape Royds.

(Codling, 1998: 172)

This advertisement, published during a period that has been regarded as one of polar media hysteria (Riffenburgh, 1994), negotiates two contradictory elements that are by no means unusual in tourism discourse. It simultaneously casts the tourist in the role of explorer, breaking new ground (ice breaking, maybe), but one who, in so doing, will at the same time be
associating with prestigious forerunners through following in the footsteps of Amundsen, Scott, Byrd and Shackleton. The language of tourism regularly offers the paradoxical promise of novelty and discovery within parameters of the already valorized and authenticated. The tourist in effect makes ‘discoveries’ whose significance ironically resides in replicating the importance attached to them by others who have gone before.

Metempsychotic travellers avoid, on their journeys, the existential uncertainties of ‘the stranger’, anatomized by Simmel and Dennison Nash. They are not ‘subject to displacement in space, time and social position’ (Nash, 1963: 470) in the same way as ordinary travellers. Though physically displaced, they are entering a psychological space colonized by the perceptions of their quarry. Similarly, though they are entering a new time, it is a partly known one, that of the original traveller. And they enter a pre-assured position in the new–old environment, as mimic role-players of the figure who earlier navigated the territory. Thus metempsychotics by-pass the otherness of foreign culture, because it is not a completely foreign culture they encounter, but a version of it that has already been mediated through their quarry’s culture, which is nearly always an historic version of their own. The path has been mapped. The metempsychotic follows a beaten path, tending to screen out what is not part of the historical script.

At the unilinear level, then, metempsychotic tourism may be seen as a specialist kind of tour, either packaged by the industry or undertaken as an independent tribute journey, allowing homage to be paid to the life and travel of a cultural hero or heroine. It is striking how strong and recurrent the instinct of emulative tourism is. Buzard notes how, in their European travels, Byron and Shelley followed in the footsteps of Rousseau, and how Disraeli, in turn, followed in the footsteps of Byron’s Childe Harold (Buzard, 1993: 123).

However, metempsychosis may be conceptualized in a more profound way, which locates it, not just as a specialist kind of tourism planned around a single itinerary, but as an embedded structural force in all tourism. To anticipate, it may be argued that all tourist behaviour is activated, constructed and enacted fundamentally as repetitive imitation of historical role models that are multiple, implicit and unconsciously adopted. All tourism may be read, to a marked degree, as metempsychotic repertoire. Before elaboration of this more radical view of the relationship between tourism, metempsychosis and repetition, it is necessary to address an issue that is central to everything that has been said so far – the place of ritual repetition in human behaviour, and the way it has been discussed and explained in social theory. The discussion that follows draws on the work of modern cultural and anthropological writers whose work offers suggestive insights into the significance of repeated journeys.
Eliade and the Myth of the Eternal Return

Mircea Eliade’s book, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*, published in English in 1954, focuses on the phenomenon in primitive societies of what he calls, ‘the archaic ideology of ritual repetition’. Eliade asserts a duality in the world view of Vedic, Scandinavian, Roman and other ancient civilizations, in which each thing or event appears under a double aspect, *getik*, the visible, and *menok*, the invisible archetype (Eliade, 1954: 6). *Getik* is the perceptual world of immediate, sensory experience, a potentially chaotic field of disorder and ambiguity, while *menok* is the underlying meaning, a kind of platonic template beneath the seeming of the moment.

According to Eliade, archaic societies made sense and order of the universe by ceremonials that differentiated the sacred from the profane, transforming ‘chaos into cosmos’ (Eliade, 1954: 11). This ritual process involved the selection of certain objects and events for ritual sacralization.

In a later work on shamanism, Eliade spoke of the ‘hierophanies’ that involved ‘the singularization of objects’:

> That are nothing but a radical ontological separation of some object from the surrounding cosmic zone: some tree, some stone, some place, by the mere fact that is reveals that it is sacred, that it has been, as it were, ‘chosen’ as the receptacle for a manifestation of the sacred... (Eliade, 1964: 32)

The ‘singularization of objects’ affected places and objects that became sacred sites through their ritual separation, among which, according to Eliade, were: trees of life, fountains of youth, sacred places such as Mecca, Hardwar, Jerusalem, the Golden Fleece, the Herb of Life and Golden Apples, all of which figured ontologically as the ‘symbolization of the centre’ (Eliade, 1964: 12–17).

Eliade’s ideas obviously bear resemblances to conceptualizations of pilgrimage by anthropologists, such as Turner (1974, 1992), Turner and Turner (1978) and Graburn (1977), including his account of the transition from everyday time and space to sacred time and space in the rite of passage associated with approaching the goals of ritual separation:

> The road is arduous, fraught with perils, because it is, in fact, a rite of passage from the profane to the sacred, from the ephemeral and illusory to reality and eternity, from death to life, from man to the divinity. Attaining the center is equivalent to consecration, an initiation; yesterday’s profane and illusory experience gives place to a new, to a life that is real, enduring and effective. (Eliade, 1954: 18)

However, the transformation of *getik* into *menok* through acts of repetitive ritual did not, in Eliade’s view, simply relate to the universe of places and things. It also affected the world of actions, including the act of travel and the goals and ways of engaging in it. Repetition, *per se*, had
sacred significance, irrespective of whether it was associated with explicit ritual:

. . . Among primitives it's not only rituals that have their mythical model . . . any human act whatever acquires effectiveness to the extent to which it exactly repeats an act performed at the beginning of time by a god, a hero, or an ancestor.

(Eliade, 1954: 22)

Eliade cites the researches of Williams and Lévy Bruhl on role enactment and repetition among those making long voyages in New Guinea, which offer unexpected similarities to metempsychotic tourism:

When a captain goes to sea, he personifies the mythical hero Aori. He wears the costume which Aori is supposed to have worn, with a blackened face (and in a way prematurely) the same kind of love in his hair which Aori plucked from Iviri’s head. He dances on the platform and extends his arms like Aori’s wings . . . A man told me that when he went fishing (with bow and arrow) he pretended to be Kivavia himself.

(Eliade, 1954: 32–33)

After presenting a number of anthropological case histories of repetition, Eliade concludes:

Each of the examples cited . . . reveals the same ‘primitive’ ontological conception: an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype. Thus reality is acquired solely through repetition or participation; everything which lacks ‘an exemplary model’ is meaningless.

(Eliade, 1954: 34)

In summary, Eliade’s work deals with sacred replication and prototypical correspondence. In the light of his ideas, the metempsychotic tourism exemplified in the texts and adverts presented earlier has parallels with notions of the sacred, constructed through repetitive rituals modelled on the actions of mythical figures within an individual’s culture. However, there is of course a problem, namely, if Eliade is right that such forms of ritual repetition are characteristic of archaic societies, then metempsychotic travel today must be seen as a throwback, a premodern survival at odds with the broader dynamics of modernity. How can the expansion of metempsychotic texts, promotional appeals and practices, based on the repetition of historic travel, be authorized and accommodated within any theorizing of modernity? Why, if the repeated journey is an archaism found, according to Eliade, in simple societies without notions of history, is it not seen as odd in developed societies with a strong notion of history and development? Why, moreover, are repeated journeys socially valued as narratives and, it seems, as tourism experiences? How do they conform to notions of the sacred and profane? Should repeating the journeys of others be seen as a kind of recovery or retreat?
Walter Benjamin and Eternal Recurrence

One way of responding to these problems is to question the ontological distinctions Eliade makes, and to interpret the social facts against which they are posed – the role of repetition and cyclic return – in a different way.

One social critic whose work invites interesting comparisons with Eliade (though neither knew the work of the other) is the German social and cultural critic, Walter Benjamin, who dealt with issues of repetition and recurrence in that melancholic compendium known as the *Arcades Project* (Benjamin, 1999a). Begun in 1927, and continued almost until his death in 1940, the *Arcades* was a massive, unfinished – and perhaps unfinishable – compilation on 19th-century Paris in the first great age of industrial capitalism. Its main methodological strategy was the use of *convolutes*, juxtaposed extracts from writers and critics, interspersed with Benjamin’s own reflections, which were then organized loosely under thematic chapter headings. The work reads as a kind of common-place book of quotations and meditations that oscillate around a never precisely defined central core that might be the characterization of 19th-century Paris; life in the modern metropolis; the technological and social impacts of capitalism; or the nature of modernity itself. The methodology establishes what the editors call ‘a dialectical relation – a formal interfusion of citation and commentary’ (Benjamin, 1999a: xiii). Arcades, the new, wrought-iron shopping thoroughfares that transformed Paris during the 19th century, were for Benjamin the quintessential and overarching metaphor of a modernity stemming from the fetishized plenitude of a burgeoning consumer culture created through technology, in the same way that shopping malls have since been read as ideographic shorthand and condensed metaphors of postmodernity, as in Urry’s analysis of West Edmonton Mall (Urry, 1990).

In *Arcades*, Benjamin devotes a chapter of *convolutes* to the subject of Eternal Recurrence, a leitmotif derived from Nietzsche’s cyclic vision of history. Far from being just an archaic phenomenon, Benjamin sees eternal recurrence as the inevitable, logical and tragic end point of modernity. The *convolute* ‘Eternal Return’ has the joint heading ‘Boredom’, and the quotations and comments that constitute it reflect a deep pessimism about the nature of contemporary life, heavily influenced by the ideas of Nietzsche and Baudelaire. In contrast to Eliade’s reading of repetition as sustaining sacred ritual, Benjamin depicts eternal recurrence as an iron law binding present humanity:

The notion of eternal return appeared at a time when the bourgeoisie no longer dared count on the impending development of the system of production which they had set going. The thought of Zarathustra and of eternal recurrence belongs together with the embroidered motto seen on pillows: *Only a quarter hour.*

(Benjamin, 1999a: 117)
For Benjamin, modern urban capitalism represents the demystification and death of the sacred, as it did for Nietzsche, and the end of the possibilities for individual human agency to impact creatively upon a world dominated by the juggernaut of technological advance and the anarchic abundance of material goods created by capitalist production. The glittering fashions, displays and consumer fixations of the city constitute a restless agitation under which lies a terrifying void. Benjamin, like Baudelaire and other French romantics, saw the realities of material life as a dream show beneath which lay a darker underside, literally and symbolically called up in images of sewers, crypts and the spaces that lurked beneath the showy streets.

One aspect of this scenario was the emptiness of action. People were doomed to repeat what others had thought and done. Boredom, ennui, the blasé attitude were responses to an eternal recurrence that underlay all kinds of apparent novelty in urban, industrial capitalism:

In the idea of eternal recurrence, the historicism of the nineteenth century capsizes. As a result, every tradition, even the most recent, becomes the legacy of something that has already run its course in the immemorial night of the ages. Tradition henceforth assumes the character of a phantasmagoria in which primal history enters the scene in ultramodern get-up. (Benjamin, 1999a: 116)

Such a vision of society provides access to no transcendental menok beneath the shows of the getik; the getik is all there is, a cyclic treadmill. Powerless to influence or shape the world around him, all the sensitive modern can do, Benjamin implies, is invent himself, as a Baudelairean dandy, or a Nietzschean intellectual whose heroism lies in maintaining a stoic distance from life, and not being fooled by its delusions. While eternal return in Eliade’s archaic societies is sacred renewal, in Benjamin’s it is meaningless and inescapable repetition and its recognition as such:

The essence of the mythical event is return. Inscribed, as a hidden figure in such events is the futility that furrows the brow of some of the heroic personages of the underworld (Tantalus, Sisyphus, the Danaides). Thinking once again the thought of eternal recurrence in the nineteenth century makes Nietzsche the figure in whom a mythic fatality is realised anew. (The hell of eternal damnation has perhaps impugned the ancient idea of eternal recurrence at its most formidable point, substituting an eternity of torments for the eternity of a cycle.) (Benjamin, 1999a: 119)

However, despite the pessimism of this vision, there are contradictions within Benjamin’s analysis. If the résumé so far suggests that the past acts as a leaden weight on a present that is a passing dream of empty material and technological plenty, much of Benjamin’s writing connotes a different view of both the past and present. This different view emerges in Benjamin’s
analysis of the two social roles that he was first to isolate for cultural analysis – the flâneur and the collector.

Much has been written of the flâneur, the detached onlooker, who, through his perambulations, observes, interprets and understands the life of the streets. Part of his talent – and it was always ‘his’; there is no flâneuse (Wolff, 1985; Wilson, 1995) – is an ability to decipher the meaning of consumer objects and the conspicuous consumption of bourgeois lifestyles:

The flâneur is the observer of the marketplace. His knowledge is akin to the occult science of industrial fluctuations. He is a spy for the capitalists, on assignment in the realm of consumers.

But Benjamin gives the flâneur a more mystical role as seer of the new urban world. Quoting Messac, he asks: ‘Is not the big city as mysterious as the forests of the New World?’ (Benjamin, 1999b: 441), and it is the flâneur who is the explorer who maps it and its inhabitants, sometimes, according to Benjamin, intoxicated by empathy with the things observed. Yet the flâneur is always in control of his responses, never evincing what Benjamin suggestively calls ‘the excited impressionism with which the travel writer approaches his subject’ (Benjamin, 1999b(2): 263).

There is an exhilaration in Benjamin’s evocation of the flâneur abroad in the streets with their kaleidoscopic displays of sights, sounds, technological wizardry and the mysterious variety of the crowd – all that constitutes the passing show of the great city.

If the present is more than the inescapable déjà-vu that Benjamin at times suggests, so too the past is much more than a dead hand on the present to the collector. For the collector, the past offers an infinite variety of traces to gather, meditate upon and re-present in the present. The collector’s acquisitions are not just spent residues of the passing show. They come back as small epiphanies – dialectical images whose ephemeral status is re-energized through contact in the present. Benjamin’s editor sees the dialectical image as a key concept in the writer’s view of the relationship of the past to the present:

The dialectical image . . . is Benjamin’s central term . . . for the historical object of interpretation: that which under the divinatory gaze of the collector, is taken up into the collector’s own time and place, thereby throwing a pointed light on what has been. Welcomed into a present moment that seems to be waiting just for it – ‘actualized’ as Benjamin likes to say – the moment from the past comes alive as never before. In this way the ‘now’ is itself experienced pre-formed in the ‘then’, as its distillation . . . The historical object is born as such into a present day capable of receiving it, of suddenly ‘recognizing’ it. This is the famous ‘now of recognizability’, which has the character of a lightning flash. In the dusty, cluttered corridors of the arcades, where street and interior are one, historical time is broken up into kaleidoscopic distractions and momentary come-ons, myriad displays of ephemera, thresholds for the
passage of what Gerard de Nerval . . . calls the ‘ghosts of material things’.
Here, at a distance from what is normally meant by ‘progress’, is the ur-historical, collective redemption of lost time, of the times embedded in the space of things.

(Benjamin, 1999b: xii)

Here the past is not merely associated with the inescapable futility of eternal return, but constitutes a fascinating and vital residue of objets trouvés to be re-ignited in the present. Benjamin was a notable collector and, it should be remembered, wrote and broadcast on such nostalgic, and now collectible objects, as old children’s toys, early children’s books, ‘chambermaid’s romances of the last century’, and was the first to explore the psychology of collecting (Benjamin, 1999b). Previous journeys may be seen as dialectical images that become part of the collectible residue of the past in the present. Every repeated journey, as suggested previously, energizes and intensifies the valorization of the original one:

The metempsychotic journey may be seen as the semiotic recovery of a kind of travel virginity. The possibility of being a pioneer, the first to go ‘where no man has gone before’, has almost disappeared in modern times as the whole world has been opened up. Instead, opportunities for journeys to new kinds of constructed virgin territory have come into being, more abstract and ideational than earlier, physical journeys, and more socially and temporally, as well as spatially, delineated. This terra nova of new possibilities is the revisited journey space of travellers from the past, refracted through the social and cultural perspectives of the present. This constructed magic land, conjured up from a recombination of space, people, and time, constitutes the essence of the metempsychotic journey. The metempsychotic traveller enjoys the interplay of difference between the landscape of then and now, and between his/her responses, and those of the absent, but immanent, original traveller. The tensions of the journey arise from this tectonic rubbing together across place and space, of the sensibilities of the present living and the illustrious, but absent, dead.

(Seaton, 2001a)

If the flâneur for Benjamin was a dilettante stroller through space, the metempsychotic traveller may be seen as a temporal flâneur, a stroller through time. Metempsychotic travel began in the 19th century, a period which, according to Benjamin, ‘provided all new creations, in every area of endeavour, with historicizing masks’ and which, quoting Geidon, he thought was characterized by a ‘regressive tendency to allow itself to be saturated with the past’ (Benjamin, 1999b: 406–407).

Metempsychotic travel thus has relationships to Benjamin’s conception of the persona of the flâneur, except that the commodity under inspection is not just people and places, but time. But it may also be seen as one of the dialectical images assembled in another persona – that of the collector, the object of which, in this instance, is journeys from the past. The collectibility of tourism experiences is by no means a new idea in academic analyses:
Places... are marketed as desirable products, not necessarily as an end in themselves, but because visits to them and the seeking of anticipated signs and symbols, are a vehicle for experiences which are to be collected, consumed and compared.

(cited in Herbert 1996: 79, emphasis added)

The dialectic potential of metempsychotic journeys to produce, through repetitions of the past, novel responses in the present has made them particularly attractive to writers:

... On repeated journeys something always happens which is, infallibly and inevitably, both new and remarkable, namely, what-has-already-happened-in-the-light-of-what-is-now-happening, and vice versa. It is this dialectic relationship between the past and present which constitutes the promise, the guarantee of narrative interest and resolution when the journey ends. The metempsychotic traveller always has a good story to tell.

(Seaton, 2001a)

Briefly, in Benjamin, eternal recurrence has contradictory connotations – at once an inescapable sentence, but also a kind of epiphany through which the modern suddenly connects with a past that has been waiting to have its discoverer. So too, the metempsychotic journey, in Benjamin’s terms, might appear in two guises – either as futile pastiche in which the past is brought on stage in the dress of the present; or, more optimistically, as an instance of the dialectical image in which the reappraisal of the past in the light of the present produces a magic renewal and recreation. It is important to be aware of these contradictory tensions in Benjamin’s view of eternal recurrence and the relationship of the past to the present, because they have their equivalents in approaching the metempsychotic journeys that form the subject of this chapter.

Finally, it should be observed that the reading of Benjamin just offered is itself problematic. Arcades is a notoriously enigmatic and ambiguous work (Broderson, 1996). One of the difficulties with an unfinished work as shapeless as Arcades, and one, moreover, that is made up of colliding extracts from a diversity of writers, is that it presents an inviting and enigmatic openness, rather like Rorschach’s ink blots, on to which the reader may project closures and outcomes never intended by the author. The next writer to be discussed would have seen no problem in this situation, and would even have regarded it as inevitable.

Barthes and the Semiotic Determinants of Authorship

Roland Barthes’ essay The Death of the Author does not deal explicitly with time and eternal recurrence, but authorship. Published in 1977, it controversially set out to dethrone the author from the centre of literary texts by suggesting that all writing represents not the original, autonomous aims and
accomplishments of its author, but rather should be seen as an inter-discursive pot pourri in which the writer manipulates established idioms, generic elements and thematic emphases that have come down from previous writing. In short, authorship is a myth; the author is, in reality, an orchestrator of literary conventions residing in previous texts, just as a speaker can only manipulate a pre-existing language:

We now know that a text is not a line of words releasing a single ‘theological’ meaning . . . but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture . . . (The writer) can only imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original. His only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such a way as never to rest on any one of them.

(Barthes, 1977: 146)

Moreover, the author, according to Barthes, did not control the meaning of the text he compiled, which could vary among different audiences, though not randomly so:

The same lexical unit or lexia (of the same image) varies according to individuals . . . The variation in the readings is not, however, anarchic; it depends on the different kinds of knowledge – practical, national, cultural, aesthetic – invested in the image and these can be classified, brought into a typology. It is as though the image presented itself to the reading of several different people who can perfectly well co-exist in a single individual: the one lexia mobilizes different lexicons.

(Barthes, 1977: 46)

Barthes’ dethronement of the author, by challenging the notion of original invention, and reducing all writing to, at best, unwitting permutation of existing generic modes, or, at worst, to pastiche, has been widely attacked, particularly by traditional literary critics. However, whatever its validity to literary texts, the article has suggestive bearing on travel and tourism. Tourism may be understood as a scripted ritual, through which the individual acts out a performance, and the elements that make up that performance may be seen as analogous to the lexical units of a literary text, which, in turn, may be seen as a metaphor for the components of a journey. The performance, and the persona associated with it, may be seen to be based on implicit rules governing: the sequencing and structuring of the journey; the linguistic and aesthetic repertoires for its successful discursive enactment; appropriate codes of self presentation; and other learned features that may be conceptualized collectively as the desiderata of successful tourism enactments.

In modern times, when tourism has been naturalized to a great extent in the Western world, this problematizing of tourism enactment may be seen as strange, but one does not have to go far back in tourism history to find evidence of texts that effectively were grammars of travel, consumer guides
which scripted the role requirements of being a tourist (Seaton, 2001b). Three early texts may serve as instances. The first is a compendium by the cleric, Fosbroke, who, in 1826, published *The Tourist’s Grammar*, which had the subtitle ‘or the rules relating to the scenery and antiquities incident to travellers’. It was essentially a crash course on how to develop the sensibility necessary for looking at landscape as an aesthetic object, a digest of picturesque theory and a typology of picturesque effects (much of it anthologized from Gilpin and other writers) that enabled the tourist novice to ‘do touring’ properly. A year later, Kitchiner’s *Traveller’s Oracle* provided ‘maxims for locomotion containing precepts for promoting the pleasures and hints for presenting the health of travellers’. This book also supplied the traveller (synonymous with ‘tourist’ at that period) with a raft of practical advice on the role of being a traveller, including journey start and finish times, health tips, clothing to be worn, choice of inns and beds, costs and extensive information on transport arrangements, notably on horses and carriages as conveyances.

The most successful of these 19th-century texts was *The Art of Travel* by Sir Francis Galton, a well-received travel writer and secretary of the Royal Geographical Society. First published in the early 1850s, it went through several editions up to the 1880s. It had the subtitle ‘shifts and contrivances available in wild countries’. Its popularity lay in offering the Victorian middle classes the flattering fiction that their tourism was dangerous, liminal adventure, and supplying them with a range of recommended consumer items that conspicuously supported this persona. Though some of its readership may indeed have come from people undertaking journeys to frontier regions and outposts of Empire, it is probable that most were making less taxing, recreational tours to places such as Scotland and the Lake District, but sought fantasy identification with more adventurous and heroic personae. The process is analogous to the present day marketing of four-wheel-drive vehicles by motor companies to urban and suburban dwellers, allowing them to enjoy fantasy participation in the world of off-road competition and rough-terrain living.

To these texts could be added libraries of ‘stranger’s guides’ (a particularly suggestive use of language found in the title of many late 18th- and 19th-century tourist texts) and other guidebooks, as well as the entire generic output of texts classified as ‘travel memoirs’ that burgeoned in the 19th century. The supply of how-to-do-it manuals on tourism continued into the 20th century as new modes of tourism evolved and were learned. *Holidays and How to Use Them*, published on the eve of the Great War, included chapters on farmhouse holidays, walking tours, cycling tours and seaside holidays (Musgrove, 1914); Harry Batsford’s *How to See the Country* (1940) was a thoroughgoing ideological treatise on rural tourism with chapters on, ‘How to appreciate the country’, ‘How to explore the country’ and ‘How to stay in the country’, while Shelton’s *The Tourists’ Handbook*
(Shelton, 1936) was issued as part of Pitman’s Motorist’s Library and devoted the whole of its 104 pages to:

...The most vital and interesting information required by the motorist who proposes a touring holiday – information which otherwise can only be obtained from years of experience or from a number of unrelated books.

(Shelton, 1936: v)

From these textual evidences of tourism as a highly coded and learned activity, it is possible to distinguish that the tourist has two needs, which generate two functional kinds of travel text: stage directions (where to go, what to search out, what to see), and a second, less obvious set of instructions on how to play the part of responding as a bone fide traveller/tourist. The two differentiated functions have been said to equate to two distinct types of travel book, the vade mecum text and the belles lettres travel text (Seaton, 1990). The vade mecum text directs attention through the senses to objects in the external world for the tourist gaze, by objectively inventorying places, sites, routes and their features in the way that guides such as Baedeker, Murray and Fodor have done. Belles lettres texts, in contrast, are a more diverse category, which encompasses travel memoirs and diaries, poetry, novels and the how-to-do-it texts just discussed that, implicitly or explicitly, offer discursive modes of apprehension of, and response to, travel and place. (Seaton, 1990). If the vade mecum text inventories the external world, the belle lettres text inculcates mind sets for apprehending it.

In summary, Barthes’ structuralist view of writing offers a kind of semiotic determinism suggesting that authorship cannot be seen as an original, autonomous creation, but as manipulation of, and variation upon, a finite number of discourses, and the operationalizing of syntactical and generic rules residing and accreted in the history of writing and language. By analogy, tourism may be seen as an equivalent kind of structured performance, historically determined, and involving choices and negotiations from pre-established travel roles and repertoires handed down within culture, along with the mythic personae attached to them. Later in this chapter, an attempt will be made to identify some of the repertoires and personae inscribed within tourism practices that ultimately derive from ritual repetition or, according to Barthes’ semiotic model, structural necessity.

Althusser, Ideology and Interpellation

The work of Louis Althusser on ideology, and in particular his notion of ‘interpellation’, later developed by Laclau (Althusser, 1971; Laclau, 1977; Morley, 1980), offers insights into the way in which subjects accept role taking. Interpellation, in the work of Althusser, is the mechanism by which
subjects connect to ideological positions offered through representation. From Althusser’s Marxist perspective, the connections made are typically mis-recognitions by subordinate groups of real social conditions, and the adoption of subject positions constructed and willed upon them by dominant class factions through ideology. It is not necessary to share Althusser’s view of the origins of ideology (ultimately, as false consciousness produced and disseminated by capitalistic interests) to view interpellation as a useful conceptual tool for understanding the way in which people adopt roles and positions offered to them, including those active within tourism. Interpellation may be viewed as a process of hailing – a form of address inscribed within representation that calls out identification and self-recognition in its audiences. The effects of interpellation are to provide pre-constructed positions and self-evaluations for the subjects of ideology. One of the mechanisms of interpellation is, for instance, the widespread use of personal address in advertising (‘Now you can look your best in . . .’, ‘At last you can have . . .’, ‘Now you can be . . .’, etc.), in which the reader or viewer is encouraged to align him or herself with constructed identities based on ownership of certain kinds of product. Dann (1996) has demonstrated how interpellation is a critical element in tourism promotional texts.

Tourism may be viewed as a network of interpellations, offering repertoires of pre-constructed, consumer positions or personae which rarely involve novel behaviour, but rather enactments of pre-existing patterns of thought and response. In the 20th century, the motor industry (car and tyre manufacturers and oil companies) made huge investments in advertising and promotion designed to get people into the habit of driving, not just for work purposes, but for leisure and pleasure. This was done by interpellating people into two main roles – of nationalist heritage-seeker (e.g. Shell ran advertising campaigns that urged people to ‘See Britain’, ‘Look at Britain’) and natural historian (Shell promoted country trips through an extensive output of films, school posters, brochures, books, and the Shell Book of the Country was widely reprinted).

Althusser’s presumption of mis-recognition as a product of political interpellation is not completely irrelevant in the context of tourism ideology. For many, tourism is only successful if it is denied and concealed. It must seem like personal travel, not programmatic repertoire, as with the success of Galton’s Art of Travel, described earlier. Historical evidence suggests that tourism repertoires are learned, and that what seem to constitute original travel choices are the product of interdiscursive learning, which has been so well absorbed that it has come to seem like second nature. Even celebrated travellers from the past have fallen victim to delusions of original discovery. Richard Burton, the Victorian traveller who has gone down as an explorer rather than a tourist, in preparing his travel memoir on Iceland deplored the way in which parts of the island had become so popular with tourists that they constituted ‘cockney’ routes, but then proceeded to repeat, and write
about, just such an itinerary in southwest Iceland which had been described in more than 20 previously published accounts (Burton, 1875).

Tourists seek the security of known itineraries and appropriate personae through which to repeat them, rather than taking on the existential uncertainty of blazing new trails in unfamiliar personae, but they do not want to be reminded of the fact. These implicit, conservative tendencies are concealed within a rhetoric of search and discovery. The success of the guidebook series branded as *Rough Guides* to travel lies in their astute naming, which suggests the reader will travel in the heroic persona of an explorer-adventurer. The subtextual connotation of difficulty residing in the word ‘rough’, for which the more accurate denotation is ‘cheap’, enables the backpacker to assume a stylistic *way-of-doing tourism*, which tends to mute the truth that his/her itineraries and destinations are the same beaten paths and honey-pot destinations sought by all. In short, as backpacker and rough traveller, the young tourist is interpellated into play-acting the role of tramp/adventurer, a persona that has been established and sanctified historically within Western culture.

**Metensomatosis and the Multipersonae of Tourism**

Four theoretical positions have been outlined that bear on the subject of the metempsychotic persona and repeated journey. They suggest that ritual repetition may be seen: as an archaic, sacred ritual; as the final fate of modern man doomed to find that all apparent novelty is eternal recurrence; as an inescapable semiotic necessity, arising from the inevitability of operating textual codes that have evolved historically; and as an interpellated role induced through ideology.

It is now time to bring these perspectives to bear in postulating a much broader kind of metempsychotic element in tourism than the one described earlier. In contrast to the unilinear version, in which the tourist subject adopts one *explicit* persona in the repetition of a *single* journey, in the broader, embedded version the subject *implicitly* adopts *several* temporary personae, and repeats not just, or even any of, the elements of a specific journey, but enacts historically and culturally situated personae attached to the role of tourist. This adoption of several personae by one actor may be called metensomatosis, ‘the migration into one body of many souls’ (Webster, 1971: 1422), and evidence of it can be found in promotional discourse, literary texts and by observation of tourist behaviour. A Kidscape advertisement for a package tour to Cuba may be used as an introductory exemplar. Under the headline ‘Join the Party’, and an inset photograph of Castro addressing a crowd, the advertisement offers the following text:

Set the tone for the new millennium with this adventure to remember. Cuba entices you with its picturesque colonial towns, intriguing Afro-Cuban culture, rousing revolutionary monuments, almost 300 unblemished beaches,
enchanting countryside, and potent rum. All this and more is on offer on this
wonderful Cuban trek, in the footsteps of Fidel Castro and the revolution . . .
(The Times, 1999)

The peculiarity about this promotion is its focus. Its obvious thrust is to
interpellate the reader/consumer into the role of crypto-political scientist, an
observer, trekking the fields of history in the footsteps of one of the 20th
century’s most successful revolutionaries. But the focus is fractured and
fragmented, suggesting other subject positions. The reader is ‘hailed’ as an
aesthete of the picturesque; as an anthropologist (presumed to be interested
in ‘intriguing Afro-Cuban culture’); as a beach hedonist; and as a bon viveur
drink (attracted by the promise of ‘potent rum’). In short, the advertise-
ment interpellates the subject into several personae, all within the overall
role of being a tourist. This multidiscursive construction of the tourist is not
only common in adverts, but, it will be argued, serves as an implicit basis of
much tourism.

A second tourism advertisement, a Noble Caledonia Cruise to the
Douro costing £2000–£2895, invokes the same multipersonae of tourism. Its
prime focus is on wine tasting and appreciation but, like the Cuban one just
described, it switches register several times, hailing the reader not just as
a wine buff, but in a number of other roles. One is as historical, military
strategist:

An added interest will be the opportunity to listen to Julian Paget as he
discusses some of Wellington’s Iberian campaign during our onboard talks.
Then, later in the voyage to stand on a battle site with Sir Julian and hear of the
strategy and outcome of the battle from one of the greatest experts of the
Peninsular War.

(It is possible that a second subject position is invoked in this extract, not
just the role of military historian, but peer companion of aristocrats, evoked
in that archly familiar reference to ‘Sir Julian’).

From this military focus the advert shifts to interpellating the reader as
sociologist of religion:

Who could not be moved as they stand in the great Cathedral of St. James at
Santiago de Compostela or on Mont St Michel whilst they ponder on the faith
of millions who have made their pilgrimages over the century?

Finally, after these somewhat academic personae have been invoked,
the advertisement addresses the reader as elitist explorer, cosseted in luxury
off the beaten tracks of the mass tourist. The reader, it asserts, will join a,
‘small number of people’ who, ‘can sail in a truly civilised manner . . .’, not
just to, ‘important large ports’ but to, ‘small fishing villages . . . . fishing
islands . . . landings in otherwise inaccessible places . . . without spectacle of
a dozen coaches waiting on the quayside . . .’ (Telegraph Travel, 2000).

Tourism may be seen in these texts as a unique form of social enactment
in which a number of temporary personae, rather than one, are rapidly
permutated, none of which may bear much relation to those roles required and acted out in other parts of the individual’s social life. This may even be part of tourism’s appeal, the bitter-sweet, kaleidoscopic window it offers into roles and personae unavailable in everyday life, but which can be acted out in the temporary spaces of tourism. Gottlieb (1982) first drew attention to tourism as temporary role-playing, but her analysis suggested that tourists select one persona from two available alternatives, that of peasant or king, according to their social background. The perspective taken here is that the tourist may permute a whole range of personae during the course of a single trip.

Exemplification of the multipersonae of tourism may also be found through revisiting one of the metempsychotic texts analysed in Seaton (2000), Hannibal’s Footsteps by the journalist, Bernard Levin. At a superficial level, this journey across the Alps, following the route of Hannibal, appears to be a unilinear, metempsychotic text in which the author adopts a single persona and travels within it. However, throughout the book, Levin’s enactment of the persona of Hannibal is interrupted by the recorded interests and activities that seem to have their origins in other personae. The metamorphoses of Levin as he works his way south, and the breadth of cultural repertoires he brings to them are as diverse as the relish with which he presents them to the reader. His personae comprise, among others, those of: gastronome (making ‘a pilgrimage’ according to the blurb, to ‘the table of three-star chef Jacques Pic at Valence’); wine buff (‘enjoying the hospitality of the Moussets, fifth generation of their family to produce wine at Châteauneuf-du-Pape’); musicologist, singing along to Schubert songs on his Sony Walkman; pedantic scholar glimpsed in such asides as:

On the way to Villeneuve, I passed the rue Gerard Philippe, Comédien: I have always thought this to be an odd word for an actor and more so than usual in the case of Gerard Philippe.

And amid these alarmingly versatile enactments of high cultural competence, Levin play-acts an earthier persona, as gentleman of the road rubbing along with peasants and horny-handed sons of the soil, a bucolic role that had been trailed in the blurb:

His reasons unfold with the journey, as do startling discoveries – that he is a natural goatherd and that he could take to a life of truffling without much difficulty.

This ease with the peasant class is conspicuously evoked in his typification of his guide, Captain Mimi, apparently an earthy Sancho Panza to Levin’s ebullient, polymathic Don Quixote:

Hannibal had his Hanno to prepare the success of the crossing . . . My Hanno was the redoubtable Captain Mimi, a weather-beaten Popeye who had made
himself an expert on every aspect of the Rhone – its history, its currents, size and volume, its hydro electricity, its fish, its birds, its traffic . . .

(Levin, 1985: 22)

In summary, Levin displays a whole gamut of personae, presenting himself by turns as gourmet, wine buff, historian, littérateur, musicologist, seasoned traveller, camarade of French peasants; but it would be unfair to see in them the constructions of an original poseur. Rather, he is only a particularly articulate embodiment of a particular kind of evolved, touristic sensibility, based on multipersonae performance, which may be seen, like Barthes’ grammatical and generic variations on an embedded linguistic structure, or like Althusser’s interpellated positions, not as original creation, but as changes rung on the canonic carillon of middle-class cultural performance. This touristic sensibility is the result of cultural patterning that extends back, not just to the socialization of Mr Levin, but to the history of the previous two centuries, during which many of the personae of travel he enacts so deftly were established.

Evelyn Waugh, a travel writer in his youth who was particularly acute at anatomizing the historical origins of the personae associated with travel, offers insight into the cultural patterning at issue here. He describes the impact of Hilaire Belloc’s (1902) celebrated and much reprinted book, The Path to Rome, as an influence on long-distance walking in Europe:

At the beginning of this century Mr. Belloc invented a new kind of traveller; again a male type, though it is disastrously aped by intellectual women . . . The pilgrim on the path to Rome wears very shabby clothes, and he carries a very big walking stick. In the haversack on his back he carries a map and garlic sausage, a piece of bread, a sketchbook, and a litre of wine. As he goes he sings songs in dog Latin; he knows the exaltation of rising before day-break and being overtaken by dawn many miles from where he slept; he talks with poor people in wayside inns and sees in their diverse types the structure and unity of the Roman Empire; he has some knowledge of strategy and military history; he can distinguish geographical features from scenery; he has an inclination towards physical prowess and sharp endurances; he maintains a firm reticence about the subject of sex.

(Waugh, 1930: 43)

The description sheds light on the personae of Bernard Levin, represented verbally and pictorially in his book and the TV series. The stick-carrying, intellectual show-off in khaki fatigues, singing Schubert along the mountain paths of Europe suddenly comes into focus less as an original, than as an innocent trudging his way along the paths of eternal recurrence, blissfully unaware that he is repeating practices inscribed in the myths of tourism. Levin’s repertoires are not just those demanded by the metempyshotic pursuit of Hannibal, but implicitly enact the metensomatotic performances of the middle classes on holiday, which have been shaped, not just by the residual effect of Belloc’s text, but from discursive strands
disseminated in cultural representations over the last two centuries. In the same way that it is possible to trace Levin’s textual personae back to Belloc, it would equally be possible to track Belloc’s textual personae to prior representations of the outdoor walking life, for example to literary influences such as the philosophy of Rousseau; the poetry and practices of Coleridge and Wordsworth; the tramping trips of Borrow; the walking notebooks of Heine; and Sterne’s (1768) *Sentimental Journey*, a slight enough work, but one that achieved classic status, in constructing a new kind of traveller persona – the sentimentalist who, avoiding the stereotypical, censorious nationalism of the Englishman abroad, was pleased by difference and took a delight in the otherness of foreigners, particularly those in peasant life. There are similarities between Levin and the ideal type of tourist inscribed in his repertoires and Lévi-Bruhl’s New Guinea voyager, cited by Eliade, who goes to sea wearing the costume, and mimicking the behaviour of, mythic, cultural heroes. Both perform travel in cultural masks that have been ritually scripted within their cultures.

Identity, History and the Enacted Personae of Tourism

It is now time to attempt a more systematic formulation of the relationship between repetition and the personae of tourism.

Tourism as a mode of travel to, and being in, a strange place resuscitates existential questions of identity and self-presentation that every adult has previously confronted and settled in the many role contexts of socialization within his or her society. Travel tends to remove the former certainties, and to require the individual to renegotiate versions of self through interactions with strangers in an alien environment. How do I know how to be in another place? How do I know what to be? Who should I be or seem to be abroad? For some, these enforced experiments with identity may seem threatening or liberating.

This existential uncertainty means that nobody steps directly from everyday life at home into a journey to a different place. Travel typically involves necessary preparations – physical decisions on the clothes to be worn, choices of travelling accessories, notions of the itinerary and how it will be negotiated. It may also involve arranging practical matters at home, and measures for maintenance of social relations with significant others, left behind over the period of one’s absence. The anxieties implicit in these physical and social antecedents of departure are often handled through ritual, in the form of ‘rites of separation’ (van Gennep, 1960). These ritually clear the way behind, leaving the traveller free to confront the psychological demands ahead, the need to prefigure the place to come, and to evolve a persona for managing within it. The poet Robert Minsky puts it this way:

In a way every stranger must imagine
The place where he finds himself – as shrewd Odysseus
Was able to imagine, as he wandered,
The way and perils of a foreign place:
Making his goal, not knowing the real place,
But his survival, and his progress home.  
(Minsky, 2000: 6)

Where and how does the tourist find the appropriate persona and role enactments? Tourism is always about visiting places where others from one’s own culture have, and are known to have, been. The tourist travels into socialized space, prefigured by the accounts and represented experiences of others from the past, which shape the social imaginary of places in the present, and offer appropriate personae for negotiating them. One way of understanding this process of anticipatory identifications is through G.H. Mead’s (1934) notion of taking the role of the other in the development of identity. Mead postulated that people learn roles through the observation of others observing them, and ‘taking on their behaviour’. Mead differentiated between two types of other – significant others and generalized others – which, in slightly modified form, offer approximate parallels to the processes of metempsychosis and metensomatosis.

Metempsychotic travel, in the unilinear form described earlier, may be seen as tourism in which the tourist takes on the persona of a significant other or group, as a role model for a particular repeated journey. The significant other, who may be real or imaginary, dead or alive, achieves his/her significance through provoking the identification, more or less knowingly, of the tourist, who perceives the significant other to have had charismatic status as a pioneering or exemplary traveller within a particular environment. A tourist visiting Patagonia, for example, may identify with Bruce Chatwin and seek to visit the places he visited, or to adopt aspects of Chatwin’s behaviour in his self-presentation (through, for example, wearing the same type of clothing, visiting the same places, engaging in the same activities while there, etc.). A middle-aged, male architect on a trekking package round Iceland might dress in a Norfolk jacket and cap, and carry a stick and field glasses, implicitly imitating the persona of some Victorian gentleman explorer (a situation observed by the writer in Iceland). Or, as in the advertisement quoted at the start of this chapter, package tourists in the Middle East might follow in the footsteps of T.E. Lawrence. In all these instances, the identifications and enactments derive from scripts drawn from the travel myths of the tourist’s culture and the representations they comprise.

The generalized other, in contrast, is not a single, role model, but an ideal, composite type constructed from a potential role occupant’s understanding and perception of the aggregate traits and enactments necessary for the successful performance of a role, like that of the tourist, that is not fully exemplified in any one individual. The tourist role has evolved as a multi-dimensional one in which, like Levin walking through the French Alps, the occupant moves in and out of many different parts, chosen and learned from
the repertoires passed down in cultural representation. It is possible to
inventory some of the different personae that may be kaleidoscopically
permutated in modern tourist performances.

1. The dilettante/aesthete: this persona had its origins with the European
Grand Tourist, who made it fashionable to visit galleries, museums and
collect cabinets of curiosities and objects of ‘vertu’ to take home. The
persona was elaborated in the 19th century through the efforts of touring art
critics such as Hazlitt, Ruskin and Pater whose writings tended to enlarge
and/or codify the appropriate discursive perspectives for aesthetic judg-
ments. Since the 19th century, the discursive field has been infinitely
extended through the professionalization of art history, cultural studies and
all the many academic and semi-academic disciplines that have tended to
appropriate and monopolistically control the discursive sphere of aesthetic
judgements. The persona of dilettante primes many kinds of cultural tourism
today. It can be observed among not just tourists visiting galleries and
museums, but also among those inspecting gardens, architecture, industrial
design and, indeed, any form of human production that has been culturally
installed as a legitimated object within a canonical field of aesthetic
discrimination.

2. The antiquarian heritage seeker: related to the dilettante, the role of
antiquarian developed out of the Renaissance obsession with the past,
particularly the classical past, and was institutionalized in antiquarian
societies formed in the late 17th and 18th centuries (Evans, 1956). Antiquarianism was a major influence on the professional development of
the roles of the historian and the archaeologist, and, to a profound extent,
the touristic persona associated with the pursuit of that elusive and multi-
faceted construct – heritage (Lowenthal, 1998).

3. The explorer-adventurer: the construction of the traveller as explorer-
adventurer, which influenced the development of mountaineering, hiking,
trekking and backpacking, was strongly influenced by 19th-century imperial
ideology, as well as longer-standing, cultural attitudes to peripheries (see
Seaton, 2000). In America, the role of frontiersman and backwoods survivor
has influenced the travel roles of a people who have historically conceived
encounters with landscape as a matter of ‘taming the wilderness’
(Lowenthal, 1982).

4. The sportsman: the traveller-sportsman originated in the days when
European, national life was dominated by royalty and aristocratic élites who
owned or controlled estates that served as settings for hunting, which came
to be quintessential gentlemanly pursuits. The growth of empires broadened
these activities to the middle classes and expanded the sporting role to
big-game hunting abroad. Today, the role takes in many non-blood sports,
including those associated with the pursuit of fitness.

5. The religious pilgrim and spiritual seeker: the religious pilgrim is the
oldest and most enduring of tourist roles, and one which is international
through the requirement in many world religions (including Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu) of pilgrimage for complete membership of specific religious communities. To these orthodox aspects of religious pilgrimage was added the persona of the tourist as transcendental spiritual seeker, which was a by-product of Romanticism’s revaluation of landscape and nature as spiritual encounter, and which was re-energized in the 1960s by hippie travellers extolling the spiritual effect of Eastern religious cultures.

6. The festive charivarian: the origins of leisure as fest extend back to rural festivals which allowed European, peasant classes license for excesses of drinking, eating and sensual indulgence at particular times of the year. Part of the tourist impulse derives from these traditions of fest, and the allowable license releasing the individual from the controls and disciplines of everyday work roles on given occasions. The persona of noisy celebrant can thus be seen to extend across a range of historical tourism from the unofficial carousing of medieval pilgrimages to the nightlife of Club 18–30 tourists in Ibiza.

7. The sun and sand hedonist: the sun worshipper emerged at a particular cultural moment in the early 20th century, when southern Europe, and, later, seaside resorts in both Britain and America, were sought as ways of acquiring the outdoors look of fishermen and peasants. This fashion was influenced by film and artistic élites in the south of France (Turner and Ash, 1975). Before then, it was winter sun that was sought, not summer tanning.

8. The littérateur: literature has profoundly coded landscape and the personae of travel. The literary pilgrimage to the topography of authors’ lives, or the settings of their works provide major instances of the linear form of metempsychosis. Authors are among the most significant of significant others in stimulating identifications and travel (Herbert, 1996).

9. The modernist: a number of academic writers have seen tourism as a quintessential attempt at engagement with modernity (especially MacCannell, 1976). This chapter constitutes a refutation of his overarching perspective, in its insistence that the personae of tourism are mainly conservative, even nostalgic, ones that have been shaped historically in culture. However, in a much more restricted sense than modernist tourism commentators envisage, tourism may be seen to connect to the personae of literary and artistic modernism, and that is in places distinctively associated with figures from the modern movement, notably Paris and New York (it is interesting that MacCannell knows New York well and seems to have written most of the The Tourist in Paris, and may have inadvertently exaggerated the modernist dimensions of tourism). However, even in these two cities, the personae of modernism are metempsychotic ones in that they comprise pursuit of iconic figures of modernism through their life spaces (the places where they lived, worked and ate as in the Montmartre district of Paris) or viewing of their works. In Greenwich Village, for example, there are ‘beat tour’ guidebooks, available – among other retail outlets – at the
Museum of Modern Art, that map out walks following the trail of iconic beat writers. However, it could be argued that this restricted version of the modernist persona is not a discrete one, but an offshoot of the roles of dilettante and littérateur.

10. The familiarch (formerly the paterfamilias): the distinctive personae of family tourism, with the differentiated roles of mother and father, only emerged in the bourgeois tourism of the 19th century. Before that, tourism was mainly a male activity. Now family roles and enactments are central components of tourism performance in the modern leisure economy.

11. The epicurean: food and drink became fetishized as central tourism experiences in the late 19th century and first half of the 20th. Until then, travel and tourist memoirs suggest that food, drink and accommodation were singled out for special commentary only if they were rated as bad or poor value (a common complaint among both domestic and European travellers). The epicurean dimension became important after the rise of both hotels and restaurants (rather than inns and ordinaries) which were accompanied by the role of the gourmet, bon viveur and wine buff, which also made national and regional cuisine a factor in destination choice and experience.

12. The natural and social scientist: from the late 18th and early 19th century, the tourist role was associated with scientific interests (collecting botanical specimens, geological exhibits, observing flora and fauna, etc.), particularly in peripheral areas (Seaton, 2000). Today, this scientific impulse is less observable in general tourist roles, but it has shaped the specialized role of eco-tourist, who may be seen as a form of anti-tourist who misrecognizes his/her own tourism through fantasy identification with the role of natural scientist and conservator (Wheeler, 1996). The tourist role of natural scientist also primes interests in industrial heritage, and visits to science and technology museums and parks. In recent years, academic institutions and societies, including the Smithsonian museums in Washington, have recognized the scientific potential in tourism and developed their own conducted packages around scientific agenda. In addition, the tourist may also be seen as mimic social scientist, particularly as amateur anthropologist whose tourist persona is partly invested in discursive inspection of other cultures. This role has attracted disproportionate interest from academics, whose discussions of ‘othering’ have implicitly marginalized or ignored all the other metensomatosic roles identified here.

This preliminary list of the personae of tourism may be contested, modified or extended but its purpose is to demonstrate the central thesis of this account – that all tourism is metempsychosis and metensomatosis, a journey in the personae of historically evolved others, significant or generalized, that help to shape where, how and why people go. In the listings, some attempt has been made to periodicize when and how different discursive personae (the dilettante, the scientist, the antiquarian, etc.) were incorporated into the composite repertoires of tourist performance.
The tourist is thus typically a multipersonae traveller, a polyphrenic bricoleur, whose tourism enactments are based on representations of what others have been in the past. Metempsychosis and metensomatosis provide the tourist with historically intelligible, significant and culturally legitimated personae for undertaking journeys (including, paradoxically, the role of anti-tourist). Tourists travel to find what others have found, to have been what culture suggests they should have been, or in Barthes’ terms, the parole of tourist performance is structured within the langue of tourism. Or as the poet Rimbaud famously observed: ‘It is wrong to say, “I think.” One ought to say, “I am thought.” Je suis un autre’ (Robb, 2000: 83).

How deterministic is this view of the tourist? Clearly, since this essay has focused on the tourist as a role-player in the realms of eternal recurrence, there is a certain degree of inevitability in the outcomes of taking on the mantle of tourist. However, this does not mean that the tourist is a hollow vessel awaiting masks and personae to adopt piecemeal to fill the vacuum of identity, or that every tourist (or indeed any two tourists) will behave in precisely the same ways. There will be wide variations in performance aspirations and enactments for several reasons.

First, like the metempsychotic textual travellers described previously (Seaton, 2001a), there are differences in both the degree of scripting and the extent of the performance involved in particular roles. Tourists vary in their knowledge of the cultural scripts (e.g. the knowledge of literary history necessary to travel as littérateur), and they also differ in the time and commitment they are prepared to invest in these temporary roles. However, the maintenance of tourist personae on holiday is not merely a matter of personal choice and effort; it is partly supported and structured by travel firms in the organization of their package holidays and the way they animate them through guides, entertainment staff and tour leaders. An ethos of ludic silliness may be encouraged at a holiday camp through the games and activities on the menu; an ethos of reverential interest may prevail through a conducted art tour in Italy.

Secondly, the roles are not static. They change because cultural representation expands the range of personae available as tourist role sets. The role of surfer, for example, is one which has emerged in the last 20 years at resorts in Australia, the USA and the UK, and has attached to it a repertoire of self-presentational features (clothing, accessories, party habits) which are said to be observed most punctiliously by those with least experience in the activity, but greatest desire to wear the lifestyle badge of conspicuous participation.

Though most of the personae discussed here relate to cultural tourism, role adoption is also a feature of mass tourism where the tourists at sun, sea and sand resorts wear badges of liminal charivariing. The multiplicity of things that can be bought and consumed on a Blackpool pleasure beach (hats, badges, masks, joke items, fantasy rides, etc.) act as signs of being-on-holiday (Bennett, 1983). Selänniemi’s (1996) work on Finnish mass
tourists also suggests that they adopt roles that differ from those they occupy in everyday life. Wickens (1994, 1999), in her work on mass tourists in Greece, identifies five principal role types. In many mass tourism forms – the theme park, the holiday camp, the medieval banquet – the tourist has to ‘enter into the spirit’ of the occasion in order to enjoy it, which means to take on a ludic persona in which there is a suspension of disbelief in the mundane world, and a willingness to play-act new roles. The distribution of personae, of course, varies in a stratified society, and the metempsychotic/metensomatosic roles preferred and adopted will very according to the education, status aspirations and material resources of different groups. Isaac Disraeli, in his discussion of metempsychosis, cites Clavigero’s history of Mexico, which asserts that the people of Tlascala:

\[\ldots\] believe that the souls of persons of rank went after their death to inhabit the bodies of beautiful and sweet singing birds, and those of the nobler quadrupeds; while the souls of inferior persons were supposed to pass into weasels, beetles, and such other meaner animals.\]

(Disraeli, nd (1): 194)

This may seem to some as an early metaphor for the cultural tourist and the mass tourist.

**The Main Features of the Theory**

This chapter has theorized the tourist in a conservative light as one who experiments with identity through role enactments that are grounded in historical, cultural continuities. It may be worth noting some of the ways in which this perspective relates to previous conceptualizations of the tourist.

First, it offers a structuralist, social interaction model of tourist behaviour, in which the tourist is seen as a temporary role-player who acts out personae, the scripts for which have come down to him/her within culture. While Mead’s interactionist theory presupposed that people negotiate identity through dialogues and negotiations between themselves and actual, present, significant and generalized others, the approach adopted here suggests that tourists choose and perform their roles through fantasy dialogues with significant and generalized others from the past, who may be alive or dead, real or mythical.

This role-taking approach reduces the need for essentialist explanations of the tourist found in typologies, and also in constructs such as personality and motivation, which have for 20 years dominated attempts to explain tourist behaviour. Tourist typologies and psycho-graphic classifications, such as those of Cohen (1972) and Plog (1977), have always presented difficulties, not least in their failure to explain how and why individuals come to be particular types, and how they might change. They have also been difficult to support empirically (Sharpley, 1994). The metempsychotic/
metensomatotic model does mean abandoning tourist typologies, since it views the typical characteristics associated with them, not as fixed traits, but as transient personae, chosen and adopted from a reservoir of culturally patterned, tourist roles. Another way of expressing this reality is to say that personality is fixed and singular, personae are multiple, temporary, ludic masks, adopted and jettisoned with relative freedom. An individual tourist may enact several roles to different degrees during the same trip – a dilettante art lover in the morning, a ludic liminalist at night. This perspective sheds light on the temporary nature of tourism; the reason most tourists return and revert to their former life is because they understand that a mask is not for ever. Only in rare instances does the tourist, on returning, refuse to relinquish the roles played on holiday, with the result that the mask, as in Beerbohm’s Happy Hypocrite, becomes permanent, causing the returning tourist, for example, to abandon his/her former role commitments and make a major life change.

The metempsychotic perspective also dispenses with the need for separate motivational analysis, another debated ground in academic discourse. Once tourism and its modes are seen to be structurally inscribed within historical discourses and representations, it is unnecessary to agonize over identifying discrete motives. Metempsychosis and metensomatosis are fundamentally and exclusively motivation-for-travel, in that the concepts recognize that people do not become tourists because they are driven by intrinsic needs, but by the socially nurtured desire to achieve personal transformation through playing different, culturally approved roles. It is surely better to ask not why they want to go, but who they want to be on their travels.

Secondly, the approach begins to redress a major bias in academic analyses of tourism – a pre-occupation with sight-seeing, the gaze and the objects of the gaze, including myths of place. Anthropologists and sociologists of tourism have put excessive emphasis on what is seen, naively assuming that tourism is synonymous with sight-seeing. This emphasis on what is seen extends from MacCannell (1976), through Urry (1990) to a variety of contemporary writers who have focused on othering in analyses of tourist constructions of, and gazes at, host cultures. Selwyn’s (1996) edited collection may serve as a representative text within this tradition in its central premise that tourists are concerned mainly with the pursuit of the myths residing in the imaging of host places and people (inevitably, seen as exploitative, debasing, stereotypical othering). For Selwyn and his contributors, the tourist is conceived predominantly as a Foucauldian inspector and scopophilic chasing myths of other peoples and places that are false and oppressive. Such analyses simply do not encompass the representative realities of international tourism. They are uniformly, but implicitly, based on a myopic tourism geography, in which it is assumed that tourism is constituted mainly by encounters between people from the developing world and the West, rather than, the quantitatively much more significant
ones, between people from the developed world meeting others from the
developed world (Europe, America and Australasia both generate and
receive the majority of world tourism). Similarly, they suggest that the
tourists’ main reason for travel is place contact, a naïve example of taking
them at their own words, rather than tracking what they actually do. In the
face of these entrenched tendencies, metempsychosis turns its attention to
the tourists and their cultural environment, suggesting that myths of place
are less important than myths of being a particular sort of person in a
mythical place. A corrective to this overemphasis on ‘othering’ and ‘the
gaze’ in academic formulations of the tourist can be found in the tourism
industry’s research findings that between 80 and 90% of a packaged holiday
occurs in the hotel, and that interactions with holiday companions and
to be as a quest to see.

Thirdly, the metempsychotic/metensomatosic model offers fruitful
dialogue with postmodernist versions of tourism. In particular, the view that
enactment and permutation of personae are characteristic of tourist per-
formances has resemblances to postmodernist conceptualizations of the
tourist as bricoleur who ‘picks and mixes’ different kinds of behaviour
on holiday. However, unlike postmodernist formulations, the model
emphasizes the basic conservative templates behind the bricolage of tourist
repertoires.

Finally, the approach taken in this chapter may be difficult to investigate
empirically since the processes of metensomatosis, by which the tourist
adopts personae that conform to notions of the generalized other of tourism
performance, may be largely unconscious and intuitive. In societies
saturated with images, probably no one fully realizes the extent to which
representations structure the roles people choose to play and how they
play them. The fact that the model does not lend itself to direct, positivist
investigation does not mean that it does not conform to other kinds of
academic validation. Forty years ago, Lévi-Strauss argued that criteria of
utility may, in some instances, substitute for more traditional means of
evaluating theory. He named two kinds of utility:
Probability . . . If a theory throws light on what previously appeared confused or incoherent . . . the chances are that it contains at least an element of truth. Secondly, a unified solution. If a hypothesis explains a number of apparently disparate facts by means of a single principle, it is moving in the direction of science.

(Weightman, 1971: 40)

The field of tourism motivation and behaviour has been a fragmented and debated one, littered with different inventories and typologies that have never been credibly reconciled. The concepts of metempsychosis and metensomatosis derive from a single principle – that of cultural role-playing – which is broad and flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of tourist behaviour, and perhaps to integrate academic perspectives that previously have been seen to be in conflict.

Conclusion

The place of repetition in tourism has been ignored academically. This presentation makes eternal return and recurrence, and the role-playing associated with them, defining features of tourism. Tourism is invariably a repeated journey in which the tourist enacts roles appropriate to places on the basis of the discursive features, established within pre-existing protocols of ideology and social practice.

Some tourism may be seen as linear metempsychosis, where actors knowingly replicate personae from the past. Lowenthal has commented on the widespread incidence of re-enactments, copies and emulations as one category of uses the present makes of the past (Lowenthal, 1998: 195–321). However, the majority of tourism is metensomatosis, in which subjects assume personae, unaware of the extent to which they are eternal returners, enacting established roles in the cyclic drama of eternal recurrence. However, though tourism may be a repetition of roles available in the myths of a particular culture, that does not diminish its importance to identity creation and maintenance. The paradox of tourism is the perceived liberty it offers individuals to be themselves in roles that have been pre-formed in cultural representation:

Travel like culture, offers an imaginative freedom not as a rule available in modern life; it encourages the fashioning of special identities, good for the duration of the journey and afterwards – identities privately and intensely possessed, which are congruent with that freedom.

(Buzard, 1993: 81)

Tourism has been naturalized to such an extent in developed societies that, on holiday at destinations for the first time, people normally slip into familiar roles that seem instinctive, rather than ones learned through cultural
interpellations that have been transmitted historically. There is a recognition of the familiar in the unfamiliar which is equivalent to what the writer, Julian Barnes, suggests may be the desired effect of some kinds of writing:

How can I describe the sense of being there, in that village, in that room, the familiarity of it all? It was not, as you may think, the familiarity of memory. The best way I can explain it is to make a literary comparison, which seems fair enough in the circumstances. Gide once said that he wrote in order to be reread. Some years ago I interviewed the novelist Michel Tournier, who quoted me this line, paused and added with a certain smiling complacency, ‘Whereas I write to be re-read on the first occasion.’ Do you see what I mean?

(Barnes, 1996: 124)

It is sometimes said that people return from holidays changed, but the more frequent truth is that they go off changed, but return the same. They depart as adventurers, dilettanti, scientists and festive charivariasts, but return in order to revert back to, and take up, their previous roles. In more than one sense, all tourists are eternal returners.

Notes

1 The writer has compiled a bibliography of more than 100 book-length metempsychotic tours, as well as many newspaper and magazine articles, and radio and TV features whose subjects are repeated journeys. The striking fact is that between 70 and 80% of them have been produced in the last 30 years.

2 One modern author, Tim Severin, has specialized in metempsychotic travel texts. Almost all of his output has been works following in the footsteps of historical travellers, actual and mythical, including Marco Polo, Sinbad the Sailor, Saint Brendan, Jason and the Argonauts, Moby Dick and Wallace the naturalist (see Severin, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1997, 2000). Such serial metampsychosis may tend to give the impression that the impulse behind metempsychotic pursuit is less personal obsession, than the attractions of a literary formula, in relation to which the author aspires to the status of a brand name.

3 A discussion of some of the difficulties with Arcades can be found in Broderson (1996: 232–240).

4 Not all kinds of tourism demand such attention to personae and role enactments. For the business tourist and the tourist visiting friends and relatives (VFR), questions of identity and personae during the trip have been pre-established, and are immanent in the purpose of the trip. When they arrive, neither are strangers in a completely alien world. As relatives or friends, they already have a pre-ordained identity that hardly requires adjustment in the social context of friends and family. Business tourists also enter a familiar, and increasingly universalistic, role context, in which the scripted conventions of commercial negotiation and practice reduce the need for radical adaptations of identity, as do the efforts of the business travel industries who do everything to make their hotels and places as unthreatening, and as much like luxurious living in the business person’s home environment, as they can. Travel, particularly international travel, may thus be seen to present a hierarchy of existential risk, depending on the tourist’s purpose of trip, with the VFR visitor most existentially
secure, the business person next most secure, and the leisure traveller, especially the first-time visitor, most existentially at risk. Only one kind of leisure traveller does not have to negotiate these uncertain identity adjustments – the writer. For the writer, a holiday is still working space (for proof corrections, reading, seeking inspiration, etc.) so that, according to Barthes, he remains himself (sic) and does not ‘change his essence’, and therefore questions of new role enactments and adjustments in persona do not arise (Barthes, 1973: 29–31).

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Introduction: the Question of Tourist Reality

The question regarding the reality content of tourist experiences has long been a topic of interest for both the lay public and scholars working in the field. The supposed ‘blindness’ that travellers demonstrate towards their surroundings has been a favourite subject of attacks on tourism for 200 years (see Buzard, 1993: 80ff.). In this context, Jean-Didier Urbain wrote ironically of the “ophthalmological critique” of tourism, which (without laughing) reiterates one of the most hackneyed features of the stereotype: the tourist – if he even sees at all! – views the visited country only superficially’ (Urbain, 1993 (1991): 82; emphasis in original).

This suspicion has been reflected upon theoretically in the enduring discussion on the authenticity of tourist experiences. Are tourists’ experiences ‘real’? Do they reflect the ‘reality’ of the foreign country and its inhabitants? Questions such as these have been a major focus of academic discussion since Boorstin’s criticism of tourism (1961). Wang (2000: 71) recently has offered convincing arguments in support of his suggestion to extend the analysis from the simple authenticity of object experience. ‘What tourists seek are their own authentic selves or inter-subjective authenticity’; in other words, not ‘objective’ but ‘existential authenticity’.

However, while Wang’s more sophisticated plea might satisfactorily answer the nagging question of authenticity, it does not resolve the issue of
the reality status of the tourist experience. Criticism of the tourist’s ‘false perception’ has a realistic basis. Tourists generally do not perceive foreign countries ‘objectively’, as if through the eyes of social scientists or ethnologists. Instead, they project their wishes, illusions and fantasies on the regions they visit. This situation need not necessarily be appraised negatively, as traditional tourism criticism does. One can also positively assert that tourism is related to the fictional worlds of literature, film and the fine arts. It forms part of the great and bounteous realm of the imagination. Apart from very few exceptions (e.g. Dann, 1976), this feature has been brought up almost exclusively in the French discussion (see Morin, 1965 (1958); Raymond, 1960; Dumazedier, 1972 (1962); Laurent, 1973; Urbain, 1994). However, recently, Löfgren, too, has paid greater attention to the fantasy aspects of touristic travel. He describes ‘vacationing as a cultural laboratory where people have been able . . . to use the important cultural skills of daydreaming and mindtravelling’ (1999: 7). As yet, however, no comprehensive, systematic analysis of the relationship between tourism and the perception of reality has been conducted.

Within this context, the following presentation starts with reflections on the nature of the touristic experience of reality. Based on Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological approach, it is possible to establish how tourist experience differs specifically from everyday experience. This analysis is helpful in understanding the relationship between tourism and ‘modern myths’. Some of the latter will be treated in detail and their practical enactment in tourism will be examined. This exercise will shed light on the special role that tourism plays for contemporary mythology. The connection is based on the double nature of tourism, one which is at the same time ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’, ‘dream’ and action.

Provinces of Meaning

Alfred Schutz has systematically examined the stratifications of the lifeworld as ‘multiple realities’ or ‘finite provinces of meaning’. The natural lifeworld encompasses everyday life, ‘defined as that reality the wide-awake, normal, mature person finds given straightforwardly in the natural attitude’ (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974 (1973): 21). However, there are numerous other ‘provinces of meaning’, or ‘subuniverses’: worlds of dreams, science, religious experience, daydreams, games, literature, fairytales, myths, theatre and jokes.

For Schutz, the world of everyday life is characterized by:

- a specific tension of consciousness, namely ‘wide-awareness’, and ‘full attention to life’;
- a suspension of doubt regarding the surrounding reality;
a form of working that uses bodily movements to intervene deliberately in the outer world, i.e. it is determined by a ‘pragmatic motive’;
a form of sociality anchored in a common intersubjective world; and

Schutz uses these categories to examine, among other things, the difference between everyday and fantasy worlds. There are major differences mainly in the ‘form of working’ (also referred to by Schutz as the ‘form of spontaneity’). Those who live in a world of fantasy do not impact on external reality, and their ideas remain virtually without consequence. They are free of the constraints of the ‘pragmatic motive’ and need ‘no longer to master the outer world and to overcome the resistance of its objects’ (Schutz, 1973 (1962): 234). Furthermore, the ‘imagining self’ (p. 239) does not depend on the rules of standard time. Instead of a linear, continuous, intersubjectively divided notion of time, time is experienced as discontinuous and potentially repeating.

Can Schutz’s categories serve to define the specific reality status of tourist experience, in an analogous way to that of games, daydreams or literature? First of all, it is clear that touristic life has an ‘everyday’ side to it that does not differ at all from ordinary life. When tourists book a hotel room, rent a car or pay a restaurant bill, they operate within a social reality governed by the same ‘realistic’ rules and patterns of perception as those of everyday life. Obviously, tourists – unlike people who are reading a book or watching a film – cannot ‘lose themselves’ totally in a fictional world.

On the other hand, there are evident parallels between tourist experiences and the subuniverses of fantasy worlds. First, in travel, the pragmatic motive has only limited validity. Most tourist behaviour does not intervene purposefully in the surrounding outside world. As in fantasy worlds, tourists’ actions have largely no impact. For precisely this reason, their ideas, as in daydreams, can generally be given free rein. They do not collide with reality and reality does not exert any resistance. To give a concrete example of this situation: the ethnologist Hans Fischer (1984) has examined in depth the ideas and perceptions of German tourists in Western Samoa. He has found that they have nothing at all to do with the reality of the country visited. Instead, they are oriented consistently towards a South Sea mythology that has existed in Europe since the 18th century. Such an utter misinterpretation of foreign ‘reality’ would be disastrous if it had been made by politicians or businesspeople. However, with regard to vacationers, this misinterpretation is inconsequential, since they are not pursuing any concrete political or financial aims.

The experience of time during touristic travel also differs from that of everyday life. Although intersubjective standard time retains its validity to some extent – meals are eaten at certain times, opening hours of museums
must be taken into consideration, etc. – tourists enter an experiential realm in which linear, continuous time spans are often nullified. Time is expanded or compressed in the specific manner that Wolfgang Schivelbusch (1980 (1977)) has analysed with respect to modern train travel, one that also plays an important role in contemporary media perception (see Grossklaus, 1995). A symptom of this situation is the subjective experience of tourists who perceive their vacation as ‘having flown by so quickly’, and yet can paradoxically seem much longer and stretched out than everyday life. The experience of time specific to travelling is described impressively in literature in Thomas Mann’s *Magic Mountain* (1969 (1924): 102–105; for a general overview on the experience of time in vacation, see Wang (2000: 109–116)).

**Tourism and Fictional Worlds**

It is the specific reality status of touristic experiences that makes them resemble the aesthetic and artistic provinces of meaning. These sub-universes, too, are relieved of the constraints of the pragmatic motive. The tourist’s imagination is – within certain limits – free, like that of the artist.

Owing to this systematic relationship, similar motifs and forms of perception can be found in literature, film, the fine arts and touristic experiences. Historically, these spheres of reality have continuously enriched each other. Many modern aesthetic achievements would be inconceivable without the experience of travel; on the other hand, touristic travel has been shaped by pictures and books since the 18th century. A few of the countless examples are the landscape scenes painted by Claude Lorrain (on the ‘Claude glass’ as a means of aesthetic formation of touristic perception, see Mulvey (1983: 252ff.; Adler (1989); Ousby (1990: 155)), Rousseau’s *Julie ou la Nouvelle Héloïse*, James MacPherson’s *Ossian* poems, James Hilton’s *Lost Horizon* (see Hutt, 1996) and Miguel Covarrubias’s *Island of Bali* (see Vickers, 1989). The aesthetic visions of Romanticism have profoundly influenced touristic practices since the beginning of the 19th century (Urry, 1995: 193–210; Wang, 2000: 80–90). Christopher Mulvey refers to American travellers to England in the 19th century:

> The experience of the literature that he counted his own shaped the search of the American traveller for the spot ‘most sacred’ in his ancestral soil. The time-and-space journey became a mythological and psychic one in which the traveller might reconstruct his childhood of tales, books, pictures, legends, and dreams.

(Mulvey, 1983: 18)

(On the historical connection between travel perceptions and aesthetic models, see also Bitterli, 1991; Buzard, 1993; Corbin, 1994 (1988); Löfgren, 1999). Contemporary films, travelogues and literary texts similarly have
influenced tourists’ expectations and experiences. This connection is most clearly defined in artificial vacation worlds, such as theme parks, that are often modelled directly after film subjects, with a ‘narrative’ orientation. (For the present-day influence of aesthetic patterns – including music – on tourism, see Kos, 1998; Morgan and Pritchard, 1998: 66–86.)

Tourist perceptions are thus closely related to fictional worlds and, for the same reasons, to the world of dreams. The colloquial expression ‘dream vacation’ did not appear out of the blue. Dreams, like touristic travels, do not follow the laws of practical effectiveness. Here, the imagination is confronted with even fewer restrictions than in aesthetic productions. The ‘dreamlike’ experience of travel has been stressed again and again, especially in literary texts, such as Charles Dickens’s famous description of Venice (1908 (1846)).

Systematic analysis, as well as empirical observation, shows that touristic perception does not follow the reality criteria of everyday perception. Instead, it is more closely related to the fictional worlds of art and dreams. At the same time, it is very similar to another province of meaning – that of myth.

The Concept of Myth

Recent social science research usually strips the concept of myth of its original religious content. Especially in keeping with Roland Barthes’ Mythologies (1972 (1957)), a definition of myth prevails that is based mainly on a formal relationship between sign systems. Such conceptualizations have also found expression in tourism research (see Shields, 1991; Wöhler, 1998; Kortländer, 2000). Here, by contrast, myth is defined in a different way from how it has been accepted in the sociological discourse on tourism based on Barthes or – more seldom (see Selwyn, 1996) – on Lévi-Strauss (1986 (1964)). In this presentation, modern myths are described as clusters of ideas characterized by the following qualities.

1. They refer to ultimate values that are generally accepted without question and express the relationship of human beings to a ‘sacred cosmos’ beyond everyday life (see Luckmann, 1967).
2. They contain an idea of redemption, of deliverance from the limits and sufferings of ordinary existence.
3. They are accompanied by a collective obligation, either for the whole of society, or for certain social groups, calling for action grounded in moral claims.
4. They are represented in different forms of images and narratives in literature, the cinema, the arts and popular culture. They are never isolated, but pervade social discourse in various forms.
This concept of myth is based on an older theoretical tradition as formulated by Caillois (1992 (1938)). According to this idea, possibilities excluded by the normative rules of everyday social life become embedded in myth. The main function of myth is to find solutions to problems that are not accessible through society’s conventional wisdom. The mythical hero goes beyond the confines of everyday life and opens up new, normally inconceivable, options.

These alternatives must be actualized through action, not only by the hero but also by ordinary individuals – otherwise, the myth becomes relegated to mere literature. This characteristic is especially significant in the present context. One specific function of tourism, according to the interpretation expressed here, is to allow the physical enactment of myths. Myths exist in many areas of modern society, but generally they are represented only symbolically. Through concrete enactment, tourism transfers ‘reality’ to an otherwise intangible mythological universe. This task is possible due to the specific reality status of tourism outlined above. In a particular way, it participates both in the material world and in that of the imagination, thereby allowing a sensuous experience of an imaginary world.

Modern Myths

The following modern myths have special significance for tourism: nature, the noble savage, art, individual freedom and self-realization, equality and paradise. They are all constantly encountered in social life in a wealth of narratives. They refer to the ‘meaning of life’ and contain an idea of redemption – overcoming the restrictions and difficulties of quotidian existence. First, their historical background will be outlined. Then it will be shown how they are manifested in the practices of contemporary tourism.

Nature

The notion of the purifying, redeeming power of Nature already existed in antiquity and is probably present in most cultures that, through technology and city dwelling, introduce a reflective element into the relationship between humanity and nature. In modern Europe, however, it has achieved unprecedented significance. It was only in the 18th century that an aesthetic relationship with nature developed, one that has profoundly influenced attitudes up to the present day: the pleasure experienced at the beauty of nature, of sunsets, moonlit nights, bold mountain peaks and seashores (Ritter, 1974; Corbin, 1994 (1988); Wang, 2000: 80ff.). There is a religious dimension, in its broadest sense, to this enjoyment of nature, in much the same way as Hope Nicolson (1959: 393) has written of ‘the “Aesthetics of
the Infinite”, the transfer of Infinity and Eternity from a God of Power and a God of Benignity to Space, then to the grandeur and majesty of earth’.

The concept of nature as a redeeming and renewing force has a direct impact on tourism. According to this idea, routine in the everyday and working lives of individuals drains them over the course of time. They hope that, by contact with nature, its purifying powers will somehow be transferred to them. This is the idea that underlies the concept of ‘recreation’. Until 250 years ago, it was quite inconceivable to think that strength could be summoned up in the mountains, at the seaside, on hikes or while swimming – fortitude in a mental and emotional sense, and not merely a physical one. The concept of ‘regeneration’, which originally had an essentially religious connotation, focuses on the notion of rebirth. Graburn (1977: 26f) relatedly describes how:

Varied aspects of the land, sea, and sky perform their magical works of renewal – it’s the ‘pure’ air, the soothing waters, or the vast vistas that are curative. [...] Nature is curative, performs magical re-creations and other miracles otherwise assigned to Lourdes, God or gurus.

In this sense, one can understand the current practices of beach life as rituals of an intense natural contact. At the seashore, the wind, water, sun and sand are felt intensely. The boundaries between one’s own body and natural phenomena become permeable. Swimmers become ‘one’ with the ocean. Going underwater – a practice unheard of until the late 18th century – echoes the religious symbolism of rebirth; water as the formless element dissolves identities and the individual emerges from the depths as a ‘new’, regenerated person (see Urbain, 1994: 176).

The experience of the body in contact with nature and as part of nature also characterizes, in a comparable way, many other tourist practices, such as hiking, mountain climbing, sailing, surfing, skiing, canoeing, paragliding and rafting. All of these vacation activities facilitate physical contact with nature to a degree that is inconceivable in most people’s daily lives.

Today, society pays ideological tribute to nature in many ways. The motif of ‘unspoiled’ nature appears in advertising as well as in motion pictures and literature. It influences the aesthetics of public living space and restaurants (in ‘rustic’ establishments, for example) and informs recreational and eating habits. But nowhere does it so consistently become ‘reality’ in physical practices over an extended period of time as in touristic pursuits.

**The noble savage**

Tourists’ paradies are characterized not only by nature – beautiful and preferably unspoiled by signs of civilization – but also by the special qualities of their inhabitants. Behind the perception of the native populations in travel destinations lies a classical model of European culture that
can also be assigned mythological status: the noble savage. This imagery developed in the late 18th-century accounts of the South Sea Islands. It became one of the main counter-images to the developing industrial civilization. The noble savage lives in harmony with the forces of nature, in contrast to modern man, who has become alienated from his origins. Paradisiacal man is simple and undemanding, cheerful and communicative; he lives spontaneously and is guided by his instincts. He does not know ambition, competition or the desire for power. He lives a carefree existence, unburdened by the pressures of civilization. As early as the 18th century, this tangible projection of the dream of a simple life was already being transferred from the South Seas to the inhabitants of ‘backward’ European regions untouched by modernization: Swiss mountain folk, Italian rustics and Breton fishermen. It continues to have an enormous influence on tourist perceptions, coming together, for example, in the recurrent images of Tuscan peasants, Greek fishermen or Portuguese wine growers, not to mention the (premodern) inhabitants of more exotic, peripheral regions (Fairchild, 1928; Bitterli, 1991: 367ff.; Hennig, 1997: 124ff.; Morgan and Pritchard, 1998).

Pictures of cheerful, spontaneous, naïve strangers similarly appear in travelogues, slide presentations and guidebooks. More than the textual commentary, it is especially the pictorial imagery – that is, the emotionally effective representation of the stranger – that expresses the theme of the noble savage. Tourist publications of all kinds show mostly happy faces of simple, content, ‘unspoiled’ people smiling at the readers. Native inhabitants are portrayed preferably in traditional dress and costumes, and celebrating traditional feasts seems to be one of their main pastimes. If they are shown at work, their occupations are almost exclusively pre-industrial activities. Fishermen and fish vendors are ubiquitous images, regularly supplemented by market traders, shepherds and potters. The world of indigenous peoples, it seems, is an idyllic, pre-industrial world, untouched by the hectic pace of modern civilization.

Tourists very often are merely observers of this world. Nevertheless, from time to time, the opportunity arises for them physically to step into this fictional social cosmos. Such a situation reveals the basic paradox of touristic perception: it constructs a fictional world that cannot withstand the test of reality in the face of common sense or science. Yet these imaginary realities allow physical presence and material participation.

In a number of ways, tourists partake of the fantasized and idealized worlds of a premodern idyll – through festivals and other folkloric events, via personal contact with indigenous people, by purchasing arts and crafts, in consuming traditional meals, even by becoming themselves temporary ‘noble savages’. Gottlieb (1982) has described this last variant as being a ‘peasant for a day’. Deliberate immersion in a world of reduced complexity – simple social relations and reduced materialism – characterizes many forms of travel. It applies in particular to camping vacations, in which...

Feasts – often celebrated for the sake of tourists – are an organized way for the latter to participate in local traditions and become ‘immersed’ in the rituals of communities that are apparently far removed from civilization. These events make it possible for large numbers of vacationers to take part physically in the world of the local inhabitants.

On the other hand, in the age of mass tourism, direct personal contact with indigenous peoples, beyond that of formal services, can only be experienced in exceptional cases. Corbin (1994 (1988): 219) has expressed the view that, starting with Romanticism, there has been a ‘new aim’ among travellers, ‘a quest [that] was a prelude to an immersion in the freshness, innocence, and energy, in the powerful sap’ of the native people. While this quest continues to be the driving force for many tourists today, only rarely does it lead them directly to their goal. When they do manage to obtain the highly lauded ‘contact with the native population’, some still consider it a kind of greater glory. As Graburn (1977: 27) has written:

Another way to get close to Nature’s bosom is through her children, the people of Nature, once labeled Peasant and Primitive peoples and considered creatures of instinct. Interaction with them is possible and their naturalness and simplicity exemplifies all that is good in Nature herself. What more exciting and uplifting experience could one imagine than to share a few words or, even better, a meal and a bed with such delightful people?

What ultimately remains is indirect participation in the world of unscathed, simple traditions – participation by way of consumption. All over the world, time-honoured arts and crafts are experiencing a revival in touristic areas; everywhere, traditional meals are being served that might otherwise have fallen into oblivion without tourists. When travellers purchase Moroccan rugs or Balinese woodcarvings, when they eat pasta al pesto in Liguria or Bresse chicken in Burgundy, they are symbolically entering a social cosmos of simplicity and proximity to nature. This symbolic participation gains substance through physical contact and ingestion.

Art

Art has always been closely linked to religion in European culture. Throughout the Middle Ages, it was a vehicle for religious motifs. However, the source of a work of art’s esteem shifted from the 15th century onwards; its religious value receded and instead its value depended increasingly on its formal qualities. Even so, the former high regard of art as a sacred sphere remained. Renaissance theories that took up Platonic artistic doctrine viewed artists as having been inspired by higher powers. Artists spoke of a world that was inaccessible to ordinary mortals. Not only was the work of art
itself regarded as sacred, but also its creator – the divino artista (Panofsky, (1975) 1924; Kris and Kurz, 1979 (1934)).

These ideas were taken further in the genius doctrine of the 18th century and the romantic image of the artist. Supernatural powers were seen as operating in the artist’s creativity. Accordingly, works of art were attributed some kind of sacral significance (Heckel, 1927; Loquai, 1984). The autonomous work of art that had developed historically in Europe from the sacred image (often invested with miraculous powers) thus retained one of its central functions: bearing witness to a ‘higher reality’, and guaranteeing ‘upliftment’ and ‘redemption’.

Unconscious faith in art’s magical powers continues to structure present-day viewing rituals (see Horne, 1984: 9–20; Ousby, 1990: 7–56; Hennig, 1997: 81–85). This feature is expressed first of all in the immense significance accorded to the authenticity of a work of art. The public – as well as the art market – is interested almost exclusively in originals. There is usually a long line in front of the Accademia Museum in Florence waiting to see the original of Michelangelo’s David, while, at most, fleeting notice is taken of the almost identical, freely accessible replica in the nearby Piazza della Signoria. This phenomenon has nothing to do with aesthetic qualities, since the difference between a good copy and an original can often be identified only by experts. Rather, something ‘more’ is attributed to the original from the hand of a master, which cannot be explained on rational or aesthetic grounds. It is precisely on this irrational ‘more’ that its attractiveness is grounded. This way of feeling brings to mind the medieval discussion on the authenticity of relics. Miraculous powers were said to emanate only from the real bones of a saint and only the real image of the Virgin Mary painted by St Luke the Evangelist. Today only the real painting by Rembrandt or Cézanne (and not the perfect copy of their works) attracts crowds of visitors.

Frequently the parallels between tourism and pilgrimage have been noticed only in vague terms. These parallels are, however, undeniable in tourist behaviour towards ‘great’ works of art. Their historical roots lie in the structural connection between their images and religious symbols. Like medieval pilgrims of yesteryear, today’s art tourists attach great importance to physical contact: physical proximity to a work that one wishes to stand directly opposite for at least a short time, as well as being in touch with its ‘emanations’ – reproductions, picture postcards and illustrated books. The sacred locations of masterpieces are lined up in the classical tours of Tuscany or Andalucia in much the same way as churches and monasteries are on the pilgrim routes to Santiago de Compostela or Rome. The liturgy has been replaced by what one reads in the guidebook or the oral explanations of the tour guide, discourses which have become an almost mandatory aspect of contact to art. Horne refers to travel guidebooks in this sense as ‘devotional texts’, and works of art as ‘modern relics’ (Horne, 1984: 10, 15).
The relic nature of art tourism destinations becomes particularly evident with places that are not associated with any aesthetic qualities, such as artists’ birthplaces, childhood residences and sites of death. Mozart’s birthplace in Salzburg is the classic example of a secularized holy shrine, as Horne (1984: 19ff.) has pointed out. A modern cult of the dead can be seen in Westminster Abbey, at the Père Lachaise cemetery in Paris or at other gravesites of famous personalities. The main thing is not what can be seen there; instead, the bones and spirit of the deceased hold a kind of magical attraction.

An undefined force seems to radiate from original works of art as well as the sites where past geniuses lived and died. Anyone in the physical proximity of such places and objects can partake of this force. The emotional discourse of the educated middle class, according to which art elevates people above everyday experience and leads them to purer and more noble spheres, is rarely expressed explicitly nowadays, but many tourist practices still seem to be oriented around such ideas.

**Individual freedom and self-realization**

The great emphasis placed on individualistic values appears historically to be a distinctive characteristic of modern societies of Europe and North America. Its development leads from their precursors in Greek and Roman antiquity to the Italian Renaissance, the Enlightenment and the bourgeois revolutions. Western individualism has assumed many different forms, all of which share a high regard for **individual autonomy** and a positive assessment of **subjective experience**. In the 20th century, this complex of ideas merged with the notion of **self-realization**. Self-actualization is the — in principle, a never-ending — process by which individuals dissociate themselves from ‘alienating’ external regulations and discover their own personal ‘truth’. This concept assumes that individuals have not yet achieved their full reality and must still ‘discover’ themselves. Like other modern myths, self-realization represents an ‘ultimate value’ that guarantees liberation from the restrictions of social existence (see Luckmann, 1967: 109ff.).

While individual autonomy is a central value of modern societies, it is only partially attained in everyday social life. Most contemporaries live out a tension between the claim to personal freedom and a reality that allows only minor leeway for such liberty. This contradiction results in leisure time and the ‘private sphere’ becoming the privileged space of self-realization. Yet here, too, numerous restrictions are at work (Luckmann, 1967: 109ff.; Elias and Dunning, 1986: 70).

Thus, for many, vacation travels become the ideal moment of self-realization. Many social constraints that are considered a special burden are lifted on vacation. Rigid **time rhythms** of everyday life dissolve. The passing of time becomes largely a matter of personal choice. The tight mesh of
purpose and duty disappears, since – in contrast to everyday life at home – a vacation is not organized according to functional motives. Tourists ‘have nothing to do’, ‘do not have to think about anything in particular’ and can ‘go with the flow of the day’. Finally, on holiday, there is less social pressure than at home. The power of sanctions by the fleeting social formations of a vacation is minimal, and standards of behaviour are usually less strict. All of these factors support a feeling of personal autonomy. Finally, ‘people can do what they want.’

On many kinds of vacation, tourists also construct their own world according to their individual preferences. When planning a trip, for example, tourists assemble a series of different scenes from which they eliminate potentially boring segments. The trip becomes a construction. In a different way, campers create their own social and material cosmos. It is not so much the outcome – often a copy of domestic conditions in miniature – that is important, but rather the independent activity within which this vacation world emerges. Such vacation projects form comprehensive ‘works’ that only very few people can create in their professional lives. Dealing with the vacation experiences afterwards, such as putting together photo albums, slide presentations or video films, also allows tourists space for their own activities and creativity.

The feeling of ‘being oneself’ on vacation is fostered by an intensified perception of self. Especially, the body, according to Urbain ‘the radiant center around which . . . the contemporary bathing spectacle is organized’ (1994: 165), becomes the centre of attention. At the beach, every breeze, every passing cloud, every movement of the sun affects one’s corporeal sensations. Most forms of active vacation, whether hiking, mountain climbing or sailing, promote intense physical experiences. Even ‘being lazy’ refers to the perception of one’s own body and one’s own feelings. Self-experience is therefore greatly intensified.

All these factors contribute to tourists feeling their ‘true selves’ when on vacation. The absence of everyday constraints leads to an increased sense of individual autonomy; a more intensive experience of oneself enhances the value of the Ego and its sensations. Freedom to do what one wishes creates unaccustomed space for independent action. The promise of personal freedom, one of the most expansive modern myths, that is continually made – and ends in disappointment again and again – can be fulfilled much more on vacation than in everyday life. (For an excellent overview on the factors that determine ‘existential authenticity’ on holidays, see Wang, 2000: 46–71.)

The freedom that many tourists experience on vacation is a ‘real’ experience. Compared with social and political claims to liberty, however, this kind of freedom appears as a caricature. Similar contradictions also exist for the other myths presented here. This situation derives from the special reality status of the myth as a particular province of meaning. Its solutions
are valid only within its scope; by no means are they fallacies. Seen from a
political or scientific point of view, however, they appear as purely fictional
(on the relationship of different subuniverses, see Schutz and Luckmann,

According to the present interpretation, the physical experience of a
mythological message is neither ‘illusionary’ nor ‘fictional’. The experience
of self-realization, equality or paradise on vacation is not simply a false
consciousness or, as in Lévi-Strauss’s concept of the myth, a shifting of
difficulties (Lévi-Strauss, 1964 (1965): 5). Instead, the myth conveys ‘real’
solutions that are valid only for certain areas of experience. While it would
be absurd to claim that ‘self-realization’ during vacations resolves the
political and social problem of freedom in society, it is misleading as well to
denounce the experience of autonomy on vacation as purely ‘fictional’.

Tourist practices, like all social practices, are certainly informed by
discourses of power in a Foucauldian sense. Touristic myths can be analysed
meaningfully under the aspect of social control (see Dann, 1996; Morgan
and Pritchard, 1998; Kortländer, 2000). Even so, such an analysis does not
exhaust their scope. Not only does a myth have an effect on the processes of
social control, it also establishes its own reality province that grows beyond
these functions. From this point of view, a myth is comparable to art and
literature, areas that also have their respective social functions that do not
define them entirely.

Equality

Like the value of individual freedom, equality also has both a political and a
practical everyday dimension. It is an inextricable part of the Western
history of ideas. From the heretical movements of the Middle Ages to
the French Revolution and Communism, it was the motivation behind
numerous historical movements. Despite the failure of the Marxist experi-
ment, the claim to equality cannot consistently be reduced to political rights
and legal guarantees. As a myth and utopia, it is a thread running through
social discourse. That everyone has the same worth, that command and sub-
ordination are not dignified forms of human interaction – such convictions
are firmly rooted in contemporary people’s minds, regardless of how much
they contradict social reality.

Again it is a vacation that transforms the socio-political myth into
sensorial experience. Travel not only liberates, it also equalizes to a certain
extent. There are two systematic reasons for this situation. First, social
inequality is based essentially on the division of labour. This arrangement,
however, is relatively insignificant in the leisure sphere and especially on
holiday trips. In the universe of tourists, there are no command structures
and very few dependencies.
Moreover, touristic consumption displays a peculiar character. Actual tourist attractions – landscapes, works of art, ‘atmosphere’ – are not goods. Only the additional services appear on the market: accommodation, restaurants, recreational facilities, means of transportation. Gray (1982) uses the terms ‘asset’ and ‘support services’ in describing this distinction as fundamental in the tourism economy. Hence exclusivity in tourism can hardly be created through the price mechanism. Prices regulate access to support services only, not to the attractions themselves, which remain accessible to anyone who can afford to get there. Essentially, only the cost and structure of transportation represent a barrier against an onslaught of the lower social classes.

Consequently, social groups intermingle in many travel regions. In 1825, the Westminster Review already complained about the tourist bustle in Rome, where ‘all classes, ages, sexes and conditions . . . are assembled together; the first of our nobility with the last of our citizens’ (cited in Buzard, 1993: 83). Also, today, these groups often cannot be distinguished from one another. Leisure clothing and uniform codes of conduct allow social distinctions to disappear.

This egalitarianism is particularly true for the world of beach and swimming vacations, quantitatively the most important area of tourism by far. Status symbols are irrelevant on the beach. People appear as however they display themselves physically. Material assets that are carried to the waterfront are extremely limited and not suited to mark social differences. The beach balls, towels and beach bags of the tourists all resemble one another. Exposed bodies in their bikinis and swimming trunks can hardly be ‘read’ as symbols of social status (see Raymond, 1960; Urbain, 1994; Hennig, 1997: 60–65).

The wishes and motives of vacationers are also the same, or at least very similar. Nowhere else in modern societies do so many people come together with identical goals. Similar common grounds of momentary needs are otherwise experienced at most at large mass events such as football games or rock concerts, and there they last only for a few hours.

Equality is established not only on the beach, but also on ski slopes, in amusement parks, on mountain treks and at cultural sights. Everyone crowds into the Sistine Chapel and the Eiffel Tower in much the same way; there are neither box seats nor tradesmen’s entrances. ‘In sightseeing, all men (sic) are equal before the sight’ (MacCannell, 1976: 146).

One can assume that the equalizing tendencies of tourism have greatly encouraged the ‘anti-tourist’ sentiments of the upper and middle classes. With amazing persistence, these social groups have been using the same expressions to complain about ‘other tourists’ for about 200 years (see Culler, 1981; Buzard, 1993; Urbain, 1993 (1991)). An unbroken verbal discourse focusing on the distinction between ‘good’ travellers and ‘bad’ tourists tries to satisfy the need to make distinctions, since social differences themselves are becoming too blurred in the practices of modern travel.
Paradise

The concept of paradise is not a specifically modern myth. Quite the contrary, it seems almost universal (Eliade, 1969). Philosopher Helmut Plessner (1965 (1928): 309) regarded it as inseparable from the conditio humana: ‘The idea of paradise, the state of innocence, the golden age, without which no human generation has lived... is proof of what the human being is missing and of knowing what puts him above the animal.’

Yet it has taken on characteristic traits in modern times. A culture that regards itself as overcivilized and rational designs counter-images of simple, ‘innocent’ ideal worlds that are close to nature. Whereas medieval Christian tradition viewed paradise as an ordered garden, modern ideas of paradise combine the aforementioned myths of unspoiled nature and the noble savage. In this sense, the South Pacific has become the archetype of the modern paradise. But in tourism advertising, at least, most regions of the world are potential paradises, whether Hawaii or the Seychelles, Provence or Tuscany (on the idea of paradise in tourist brochures, see Dann, 1996).

The conditions that make modern mass travel possible – increased prosperity, leisure time, improved transportation, security – have given the dream image of paradise a new dimension, a material basis as it were. ‘Totally different’ worlds (or worlds that are imagined as such) are now within easy reach. Since tourist perceptions are subject to reality controls only to a very limited extent, they can project on to foreign places the age-old image of a world without suffering, worries, burdens and obligations. This strategy works especially well, to the extent that the features of a given travel destination support such projections. Regions where signs of modernity are not in the foreground are thus particularly suited; places where the absence of new buildings, expressways and factories supports the illusion of an idyll. Entrance to industrial civilization with all its consequences represents the modern ‘fall from divine grace’. Paradise as a counter-world to modern everyday existence is not supposed to reveal its ‘alienating’ traits.

Yet the ‘objective’ qualities of travel destinations have only limited relevance in constructing the paradise fantasy. Paradise as experienced on vacation does not emerge first and foremost on the basis of experience of a particular space. A rationally analysed notion of paradise instead denotes an emotional and mental state – a state in which individuals lose the ‘burden of existence’, in which they live without fear, worries, pain or suffering. In the special situation of a vacation, in view of the elimination of restrictions that normally exist and release people from obligations, such a psychological state can indeed emerge for a time. This is why the image of paradise connected with travel is not merely an advertising gimmick of the tourism industry. If it were, it would hardly endure for such an extended period of time, but would instead fall victim to the inevitable disappointments of vacationers. One can assume, however, that the ‘paradisiacal’ feelings of
bliss associated with relaxation and being relieved of burdens continually set in, in modern mass tourism as well. During the ‘most precious weeks of the year’, modern societies manage to create a space for a levity of being that most people otherwise only experience when they fall in love. The latter, however, in contrast to touristic travel, is neither tied to cyclic rhythms, nor can it be easily booked through corresponding agents. Hence the vacation, while not the more effective ritual, is definitely a more reliable way physically to experience paradise.

Enacting the Imaginary

Modern myths significant for tourism do not build any uniform whole. Quite the opposite. They are characterized by a conspicuous heterogeneity. They become even more diverse if one extends the investigation – though space is too limited to do that here – to a number of local ‘place myths’. Numerous tourist destinations are loaded with a multifaceted imagery that with good reason can also be viewed as a ‘myth’. Consider the complex imagery of eroticism, decline and death that is associated with Venice; or that of Florence as the historical centre of humanism and individualism; the American West as the territory of ‘freedom and adventure’; and many more (see Vickers, 1989; Shields, 1991; Hutt, 1996; Kortländer, 2000).

Not only are tourism myths characterized by their heterogeneity; it is indeed a general feature of the modern sacred cosmos. Many images of redemption and ultimate values are juxtaposed here, among which the ‘individual is left to his own devices in choosing [. . .] in a relatively autonomous fashion’ (Luckmann, 1967: 98). Tourists are free to choose their preferred ritual of redemption – whether it is intensive contact with ‘untouched nature’, communication with ‘unspoiled natives’ or elevation through magnificent works of art.

They can also decide against such rituals altogether. For the qualities described here by no means characterize all kinds of tourism. Tourism in general, in the understanding expressed here, is defined by the experience of the other. Now the myth is a special, and significant, case of the other. However, there are also many other ways of experiencing it, in tourism as in other social areas.

The particular quality of tourism lies in the fact that it gives space for the physical enactment of imagined – in this case ‘mythological’ – ideas. Modern myths usually remain limited to the symbolic level. They are expressed in literature and film, in the fine arts and popular culture, in television and advertising. They inform political, cultural and aesthetic discourses. However, in contrast to the myths of traditional societies, which found their powerful expression in ritual practice, modern myths are seldom enacted physically. The short-term, individualized and primarily symbolic activities in the area of modern leisure time provide only silhouettes of
earlier ritual experiences. They remain confined to the sphere of imagin-
ation.

It is at this point that travel steps in. Tourism takes place simultaneously in the realm of the imagination and that of the physical world. In contrast to literature or film, it leads to ‘real’, tangible worlds, while nevertheless remaining tied to the sphere of fantasies, dreams, wishes – and myth. It thereby allows the ritual enactment of mythological ideas. There is a considerable difference as to whether people watch a film about the Himalayas on television and become enthused by the ‘untouched nature’ of the majestic mountain peaks, or whether they get up and go on a trek to Nepal. Even in the latter case, they remain, at least partly, in an imaginary world. They experience moments that they have already seen at home in books, brochures and films. Their notions of untouched nature and friendly, innocent indigenous people will probably be confirmed. But now this confirmation is anchored in a physical experience. The myth is thus transmitted in a much more powerful way than by television, movies or books.

Physical activity invariably contributes to the effectiveness of myth – and that is precisely for what touristic travel provides space. It is possible because of the particular reality status of the tourist experience. It is located between the everyday world and the fantasy world. To put it simply: tourism creates a fantasy world within which physical activity takes place. Fantasizing and acting, imagination and reality, take on a new config-
ation. They no longer face each other as opposites. Instead, they permeate and complement each other. Thus a myth, as part of the imaginary world, can become ‘reality’ in tourism.

References


A Love Affair with Elsewhere: Love as a Metaphor and Paradigm for Tourist Longing

Jaap Lengkeek

Introduction

We feel a love for nature; we love Tuscany; we simply adore Chiang Mai. These are expressions of everyday speech. Loving Tuscany, for instance, the Arcadian landscape, its wines, the prosciutto. What is this love? These sentiments are analogies, metaphors and similes. They allow us to assess the value of our feelings about the world around us. But do we actually know what we mean? Although it must be admitted that one-sided love also exists, love is more often regarded in terms of the reciprocity that is typical of such relationships. While most of the stories and novels that mankind has created throughout history are about love, the full mystery of love has never been adequately revealed. That is perhaps just as well for poetry and the romantic genre, but it is different for science. Can tourists possibly love a place that is somewhere else and that cannot reciprocate such love? In this chapter, the metaphor of love is examined in order to see what is to be learned from it in relation to the tourist.

From Flirting to Going Steady

Love gives rise to many emotions. Yet from experience we know that these emotions come in phases of differing intensity. They commence, they grow, they lead somewhere. Altogether five stages are involved: flirtation, contact, dating, being in love and the steady relationship.
1. **Flirtation.** People look for people. The male road worker whistles at any passing set of women’s legs. On crowded terraces, people observe each other and exchange glances. Flirtation is an innocent game with infinite possibilities. The imagination has been activated. Because something else has become visible as someone else, it seems appealing. Flirtation does not arise from discontent with the status quo. It is quite normal and amusing. It is based on exuberance and is sometimes quite trivial.

2. **Contact.** Flirtation may go one step further. We speak to the other. The other is becoming intriguing. How would it be to really get in touch? ‘Haven’t we met somewhere before?’ ‘Do you come here often?’ All rather corny, but excitement is picking up: some light conversation, a quasi-accidental touch. Then they go their separate ways. The other’s face soon fades and who it was... we don’t really know.

3. **Dating.** Should contact with the new acquaintance continue, there are standard procedures for a date: seeing a movie together, going dancing or out to dinner. Then some more conversation, yet without telling all. Both dress up in their best clothes, comb at the ready and a mint for fresh breath. It all looks so perfect. Yet it is also very clichéd; everyone goes about it in the same way.

4. **Being in love.** What else lies hidden in that other person? This is being in love indeed. We surmise something about the other that surely nobody has ever noticed before. The other is invested with all sorts of imaginable qualities. Desire reaches unbearable heights. The other becomes the revelation of a hitherto undisclosed secret. An almost incapacitating feeling of admiration for the other develops; this is what we call the ‘sublime’, which we long to know and possess.

5. **The steady relationship.** There is no more indifference. Then there is the first fight. ‘Why didn’t you call last night?’ Commitment has become inevitable; so each makes sacrifices and the knot is tied with promises of eternity. ‘Do you take...?’ The other becomes familiar and trusted. In short, it will lead to a mere grind or to deep-rooted love that shows at the breakfast table as well as in the most undignified situations. Possession of the object signals the end, the end of mere diversion.

These five stages represent different intentions towards the other that also show up in attitudes towards the tourist environment. By definition, love offers a theory about the experience of something that lies outside the individual, someone else, something else. That incentive is so strong that people will leave their usual environment and take trips or travel to discover others. Let us go over the five stages once more.

1. **Flirtation.** The game offers diversion, briefly transporting us beyond the ordinary. There is nothing threatening about the imagination being momentarily activated. The world around us, with all that human history and nature have generated, offers the possibility of diversion. Disney
World is the most explicit example. Another is the sea, where forbidding nature is the context of overcrowded beaches. Diversion soon becomes boring so the incentives need regular modification. Commerce steps in. An even faster roller coaster, an even more fanciful fairytale landscape; the flirting continues.

2. Contact takes it one step further and includes a certain getting away from the ordinary. We often just have to ‘get away for a bit’. Exactly who we are only becomes apparent in a situation of change, in which case it is important that the environment is out of the ordinary; temporary escape from oneself in the woods or on a brisk walk along the beach; a week’s package tour to a sunny destination. The exact difference in environment is not yet important; the ordinary ceases to exist for a while, after which we return home or go back to work.

3. The date is the first connection to what is attractive about the other. This stage provides a strong analogy between awakening love and tourism. We long to see and experience different cultures, people and surroundings. Brochures tell us all about them but, however interesting they may appear, it is still difficult to determine what is fact and what is fiction. This something else has been created specially for visitors, seeing and doing the same things, using travel guides and avoiding risks as much as possible. The latter are limited because we follow beaten tracks. However interesting, it holds an element of ‘kitsch’, since everybody is oriented towards the same emotion. If we visit the same place more often, we will wish to look for more personal experiences that lie behind the tourist façades.

4. Being in love stands for the sublime. A landscape or a new exotic social environment can have an overwhelming impact on those individuals open to them. We can hardly grasp what we experience. We are unexpectedly touched by the expanse of the desert, the majesty of the soaring cliffs, the silence of the Arctic seas or the scents and sounds of the tropics. We witness all these scenes, but as an undisclosed secret. At the same time, we are painfully aware that we are not part of them, even though that is exactly what we desire.

5. The essence of love lies within a committed relationship. The surroundings are appropriated; we wish to possess the secrets, the exotic rituals, the history or the details of the new environment. Appropriation may mean buying a stretch of land, fencing it in and conserving it, or using ecosystem strategies. Many biologists seem married to nature, knowing its whims and imperfections, while wishing to keep the treasure for themselves.

Do Tourists Love the World Elsewhere?

People differ from each other in their love lives. One individual may experience predominantly shallow emotions; another may be completely
carried away. Some are happy with diversion; others find the sublime indispensable, over and over again; and many need a partner to possess and control. The same metaphor applies to the love and passion that tourists feel for a certain destination. For one, the place embodies liberation from everyday cares. It is nature as promised by the brochures and validated on the *Discovery Channel*. There are others who, having found their ideal spot and fascinated by the stories about it, would rather keep it all to themselves. Thus, attitudes towards surroundings differ, and the related changes in attitude and experience are clearly visible. Real nature lovers are actually tourists of the fifth stage, appropriating the object of their love. They take offence at being called ‘tourists’ or ‘day-trippers’, those designations being reserved for more casual shallow experiences.

It is typical of tourism that its world is largely commercial, trading in experiences. In order to make those experiences as compelling as possible, the surroundings are doctored: advertisements highlight specific aspects; facilities are created, such as shelters on the pilgrim route to Santiago to protect tourists from the elements; new customer groups are targeted and novel experiences are promoted. Product enhancement is a continuous task. Eco-tourism, cultural tourism and other epithets are usually enticing terms for a world of experiences so riddled with cliché that they do not go beyond the third modality.

Experiencing the landscape is not left to chance. Visitors are taken to a spot suitably guaranteed to provide breathtaking vistas. They are seduced into going there by brochures full of catchy phrases and photos. These verbal and pictorial images pre-programme the experience. Thus, visiting the renowned site becomes a delineated, breathtaking experience, to be remembered as an event.

The world of contemporary experiences is bombarded with impressions. Television brings the world to the living room, the bedroom and the children’s rooms. Transportation technology allows travellers to access remote corners of the world. Recently, one wealthy American has even been shot into space aboard a Russian rocket, and those who are willing to pay can descend by submarine to see the *Titanic*. In a world of so many offerings, it has become difficult to be suitably impressed.

Everyone experiences the world and events. In the near future, the signs are that experiences will not be limited simply to events that have already taken place and are remembered. Events can be thought up, compiled, offered and sold. Events become merchandise with pecuniary value and satisfaction guaranteed. The mere promise of events gets people going; off to see the Grand Canyon or the *Titanic*.

The experience of the sublime and of undisclosed mystery is less easily packaged and sold as a product. It loses its existence in a world made up of buying and selling. Thus, it is important to address the desire preceding the experience of the sublime relationship with the object of desire, in order to arrive at what is essential in that desire beyond events.
A Philosophy of Reality and Desire

Desire is what transforms Being, revealed to itself by itself in (true) knowledge, into an ‘object’ revealed to a ‘subject’ different from the object and ‘opposed’ to it. It is in and by – or better still, as – ‘his’ Desire that man is formed and is revealed – to himself and to others – as an I, as the I that is essentially different from, and radically opposed to, the non-I. The (human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire.

(Kojève, 1980)

Since love implies a relationship between its bestower and someone or something else, it must first become clear what the relationship entails. The central issue is whether the someone or something else that is loved is invented by the beholder, or whether the traits recognized in the other have any realistic value. In other words, does that someone or something else really exist – is there an actual relationship?

In order to answer this question, it must first be determined how ‘reality’ should be interpreted. This task may be facilitated by Kant’s premise that reality is not just a reflection of what is around us: Kant’s Copernican revolution. Reality is that which we know. The ability to know and judge is made up of three layers: first, the empirical experience of phenomena through the senses; secondly, the terminology establishing the relationship between the internal and external world; and, thirdly, reason, enabling us to examine, understand and judge the relationship between the terminology and the empirical experience (Rundell, 1994).

Van Peursen (1992) takes the process one step further. He additionally maintains that the external world cannot be addressed in terms of object or substance when describing the fundamental nature of things. The external world only becomes visible and structured within contexts or connections as understood and judged by subjects. According to van Peursen, the term ‘object’ should be replaced by ‘relationship’. It is only within the context of relationships that the world surrounding us is disclosed.

Relational reality has its limitations in each of the three layers (Kant was deeply concerned about the inadequacy of ontology). There is much that eludes our senses; many species of animal have an infinitely finer sense of smell than we do, and birds migrate across the globe along sensory coordinates.

Our terminology for capturing experiences in language and stating the relationship between the external and the internal world has evolved through history within the limitations of the historical context. That in turn has imposed limitations on what can be known, what can be put into words. Under a second layer of terminology, words such as ‘nice’, ‘very’, ‘warm’ and ‘red’ provide only general and inaccurate perception models. It is sometimes difficult to differentiate experiences along these models: ‘nice’, or ‘nice in a different way’? General models refer without differentiating. The general nature and historic limitations are governed by the fact that
terminology has evolved in a deictic world and words have deictic (referential) properties. They are understood and explained by referring to the objects they indicate. A specification of ‘nice’, therefore, is accomplished by a more detailed, deictic story about whatever was nice in the past. However, reference is not limited to objects; it may also point to further terminology. Analogies are created through these references – similarities between one thing and another. When nature is said to be ‘awe-inspiring’, expressing the sensory experience of nature at a given time, then the obvious meaning of ‘awe-inspiring’ includes the analogy between unmanageable surroundings (present but not grasped) and a certain authority to which the spectator is subjected. This analogy may be classed as a ‘metaphor’, in which the denotation of one object is amplified by referring to another. In other words, the metaphor creates perspective and meaning. It also affects the first layer of cognition, creating the scope of sensory experience – we experience mainly what we recognize.

In the historical context of using metaphors, these perspectives become part of everyday speech and the experience of quotidian reality. Our terminology refers (is deictic or indexic) to an evolved context of stories in which it is embedded as a matter of course. At the third level of cognition, the relationship between terminology is extended. Referral becomes verbal proof (cf. Cassirer in van Peursen, 1992: 56). Metaphors offer all the necessary links. Along the lines of Kant’s epistemology, it is possible to detach this ability to prove from historical determination and connect it to the creative faculty of finding connections. The subject positions itself and objectifies the external world.

Van Peursen makes an interesting distinction between nature (in the most general sense of the physical world) and culture. The former is the empirically known material world; the latter is that which is thought and assumed. Through culture, the natural surroundings are objectified and take on a meaning that was not included in their essence. In van Peursen’s words: ‘Culture is not something that is in itself, but rather that which is sought, uplifted, the criterion for that which is.’ Thus, individuals distance themselves from their surroundings and choose a position or role (e.g. walker, forester or conservationist). Since their capacity for physical adaptation is limited when compared with evolutionary developing animals, their consciousness, language and culture are indispensable for forming lasting relationships with their surroundings. It is in this interaction between individuals and their surroundings that they are attuned to each other. However, culture is not simply ‘appearance’ detached from ‘reality’. It is a mental world that is challenged by the surroundings, one that subsequently makes the surroundings recognizable.

This layer of cognition and reason shows a limitation that stems from an undeniable inclination towards conferring continuity to verification. Culture is an instrument of human survival and coexistence. Clearly it is not
invented over and over again. New challenges are always initially met using the tried instrument of knowledge and understanding. The instrument ‘culture’ is handed down through socialization and ‘embodied’, as it were, by its users. Bourdieu (1984) introduces the term ‘habitus’ – an obvious, adopted attitude towards the external world acting as a steering mechanism in all decisions. According to him, reason is not just an independent logical structure, but a culturally based ability to find connections from a given habitus. Therein lies the ability, as also the limitation.

**Continuity and Discontinuity**

There is an inseparable link between the three layers of cognition: evidence turns into terminology, without which there would be no structure or framework for sensory experience. The three layers feed off and confirm each other through continual interplay. The interaction is also dynamic, in the sense that developments in culture influence both terminology and perception. Scientific observational techniques broaden sensory perception (we can gaze microscopically on small or distant objects).

However, it is not a completely hermetic system. Alongside the adaptation of the three layers, there is the concomitant pursuit of escaping continual reality. Continuity opposes discontinuity. Bataille (in Richardson, 1994) indicates a permanent tension between continuity and discontinuity, causing people to conform to the order created by culture, while at the same time trying to escape it. Bataille traces this tension to the most inescapable discontinuity – death, which sets in train the pursuit of the continual reproduction of life – vitality – in an iron framework. Death is the opposite as well as the inseparable counterpart of sexuality. Although at a supra-individual level, death forms the basis for continuity (dead matter feeding new life); awareness of being separated from the other is linked ineluctably to the experience of discontinuity and to the fear of dying. The realization of the iron framework creates the horizons of time and space within which life is lived. Ambition, power and urgency are the natural derivatives of the fear of dying. As Richardson says in his book on Bataille:

> For Bataille, human experience is an experience of limits and these limits are defined by the fact that the condition of life for human beings is the recognition of death.

Animals have fear and a flight instinct, but do not, as far as we know, possess a consciousness like human beings. The predator and its prey exist in proximity to each other without consciously making the other ‘object’; the state in which the difference between the two is not openly distinguished is what Bataille calls ‘immanence’ (Bataille, 1992). Animals in their state of immanence with their external surroundings live ‘as water in water’, forming
part of their surroundings. One reservation should be made, however. Our knowledge about animal consciousness is still extremely limited (de Waal, 1996).

Conscious human beings see reality as something external and their relationship to it as transcendental. This situation gives rise to the realization of being separated from others, and this awareness in turn engenders communication to bridge that gap. Thus a communicative intersubjective reality is created amid the tension between continuity and discontinuity (Husserl, 1931, in Schutz, 1976: 168).

Transgression and Desire

According to Bataille, the individual continually tries to escape from the impositions of intersubjective reality, which he describes as transgressing the borders of taboo. In the reproduction of existence, continuity and objectification are linked to tools and work in the broadest sense. In order to safeguard these instruments, which preserve human society from disorder and disruption, the idea of prohibition has formed in the human mind – the taboo. Taboos or rules are essential since ‘unchecked [life] annihilates what it has created’ (Bataille in Eroticism, cited in Richardson, 1994: 102). Taboos, however, prompt the need to transgress imposed prohibitions. In every culture, transgressions are institutionalized in forms of play or ritual. The escape from taboos has been secured within a niche of society functioning under taboos, in which *eros* and *thanatos* appear in different forms. It follows, then, that in increasingly controlled civilizations like Western society, literature, film and video produce a vast array of terrifying stories (Verrips, 1993). What is forbidden, is imagined and represented. According to Bataille, taboos are completed by transgressing them. These transgressions are probably aimed at further transcendence or a return to the state of immanence. Bataille especially regards the latter as an important drive, a primordial homesickness to restore the relationship with what we fear and become part of.

This fundamental tension between continuity and discontinuity is expressed in fascination, in longing for what is lacking – the external, missing object of a broken relationship. Von der Thüsen (1997) distinguishes three kinds of fascination or desire:

1. Related to the ‘sublime’. The discontinuity and fear of dying are met, trusting that what is ‘larger than’ (therefore external to) the individual will not remain invincible or inaccessible, but that it may be controlled by means of aesthetic transformation.
2. Related to what is ‘frightening’. Here, discontinuity is not resolved; the object of fear stays elusive, while the fear itself remains.
3. Related to what is ‘cruel’. Fear is transformed into identification with what is frightening. The fear of dying turns into murderous thoughts.

Tension is expressed in all these forms of desire, even in the desire for the sublime. According to Kant, the tension is first expressed in discomfort (in von der Thüsen, 1997). Nature, for instance, is first seen as extremely powerful; subsequently nature is reduced in size by categorizing it under an idea. This task is accomplished by using reason as well as imagination. The sublime is created through the tension or even conflict between imagination and reason. Reason provides the ideal of rational infinity, while imagination vainly attempts to cover it. This situation causes pleasure and displeasure to appear simultaneously and generates a feeling of imaginative inadequacy.

The Dutch poet Nijhoff addresses the issue in his poem *Het Tuinfeest* (*The Garden Party*):

Zij zingen, nijgen naar elkaar en kussen
Geenzins om liefde, maar om de sublieme
Momenteen het sentiment daartusschen.
(They sing and, leaning towards each other, kiss
Not just for love, but for the sublime
Moments and the sentiment between).

The reader of this verse feels the tension.

One condition for conceiving the sublime, according to Kant, is that it is done from a position of safety. Without feeling secure, there can be no aesthetic conception. Therefore, the sublime is experienced where individuals have detached themselves from the dependencies of nature. Kant considers the sublime to be the product of a culture developing to a higher stage of independence from nature.

If humans are biological creatures (‘that which is’) as well as creators/creation of culture (‘that which is not’), then the drive for immanence is created from the shock and fear of dying as well as from answering the call of their ‘genetic memory’ – being born as social creatures among other social creatures, experiencing the warmth of being nourished and cherished, experiencing pure sexual drives. Whereas the desire for terror stems predominantly from confrontation with the external world, confrontation with the internal world creates a desire for fulfilment. Even (one’s own) death can be regarded as the horror of being permanently excluded from all others (never again being allowed to play together), as well as the certainty of ultimate peace and surrender of the self.

The desire for breaking taboos (as Bataille calls it) is created through the tension between continuity and discontinuity in the external and the internal world.
Out-there-ness

Essentially, it comes down to an image of reality, created from the process of adjustment between humanity and its surroundings, which is more or less ‘internal’ – the known world is internalized as an obvious aspect of the individual psyche. Tools and assets are part of the ‘extended ego’. Elias (1969, 1970) completely bases his figuration sociology on the reciprocal bond between individuals who have internalized each other and have adjusted their behaviour to each other; fear and awe apply to the things imagined and represented outside of that framework. Out-there-ness is used to describe the authority of someone or something that cannot be infringed upon because the source of authority is not within reach of the beholder (Potter, 1996). It is the higher authority of the Supreme Being or, more trivially, the abstract expert advising consumers that a certain purchase is the best buy. Sublimation, irrational terror or fear relate to something external that is essentially inaccessible, unattainable and unfathomable; thus, it remains external.

Wittgenstein (in Coates et al., 1996), in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, asserts that ‘the significance of the world must lie outside it.’ He derives this idea from a dissertation on the ‘oracle’ who talks gibberish, who tells truths without understanding them, let alone inventing them.

Out-there-ness in itself is a source of fear and insecurity. No settlement can be made. Surroundings are always external. There is for ever an awareness of being separated from the other – a fundamental loneliness and solipsism. The imagination is pre-eminently suited to form a connection with such out-there-ness.

Out-there-ness plays an important role in Bataille’s and von der Thüsen’s work, which sometimes overlooks the fact that the quest for restoring continuity may also be conducted internally. Oriental religions, and Buddhism in particular, find the solution – enlightenment – in subjugating the out-there-ness, that is to conform to and coincide with the total focus upon the ‘self’.

Imagination as a Bridge

‘Known’ intersubjective reality can be maintained under several circumstances in which not all known elements are present. It can be augmented and changed through imagination. According to Ricoeur (1994), the term imagination can be used in several ways:

- calling up things that are not present but which exist elsewhere;
- creating images in the mind of things that do not exist;
- bringing about representations to replace things (for example, paintings, diagrams);
representing things that are not present or do not exist, but which create the belief in the subject of their empirical observable existence – the domain of illusion.

Creating images in the mind can be achieved in several ways. Kant distinguishes four (Rundell, 1994):

- the empirical manner (like a searchlight: probing one’s position);
- the associative manner (connecting several forms and phenomena that are meaningful in time and space);
- the reproductive manner (aimed at perceptions and impressions related to certain knowledge, thus confirming the relationships between past and present as well as with other fields of knowledge);
- the productive manner (the objective basis upon which unity, exchange between the senses and cognition bring about concepts and categories).

Thus imagination is twofold. On the one hand, it constitutes understanding and continuity. On the other, it is a source of creativity and reflection causing detachment. Additionally, imagination may shape the fear of out-there-ness and even the fear of what is not there at all. In that sense, it is also a source of discontinuity. Imagination may engender a form of suspension and neutralization, keeping the entire process of imagining in a state of ‘unreality’ – a free interaction of possibilities in a state of non-involvement with the world of perception, in which we try out different and new ways of existing in the world. Ricoeur refers to Kant’s theory of schematic representation as a method to link images to concepts (in Robinson and Rundell, 1994: 118–135). When reading a book or story, schematics produce concepts that echo an image, revive previous experiences, awaken memories and extend into other sensory fields.

Love as Relationship

How, then, does the term ‘love’ fit into this line of reasoning? Love between people is an attempt to negate being separated from something or someone else. While Bataille speaks in general terms of the human consciousness dissociating itself from a state of immanence, this situation may be specified for the individual reaching awareness as the transcendence from a state created by caring parents and experienced without questioning. Child and parent are indivisible in a first stage; later there is a separation, investing the parent with an impervious out-there-ness that forms a safe and uncontrollable framework for existence. Later, this authority proves insufficient to guarantee the individual continuity of existence, the point at which loneliness is first experienced. Love includes the intention to revoke this out-there-ness and discontinuity. Analogies and metaphors are mobilized by
the imagination in order to establish the connection with the ego, and to the
other whose accessibility is unavoidably limited. Few examples are more
sublime than the biblical Song of Songs (4: 1–5):

    Behold, thou art fair, my love; behold, thou art fair; thou hast doves’ eyes
within thy locks: thy hair is as a flock of goats, that appear from Mount
Gil’e-ad. Thy teeth are like a flock of sheep that are even shorn, which came
up from the washing; whereof every one bears twins, and none is barren
among them. Thy lips are like a thread of scarlet, and thy speech is comely:
thy temples are like a piece of a pomegranate within thy locks. Thy neck is like
the tower of David builded for an armory, whereon there hang a thousand
bucklers, all shields of mighty men. Thy two breasts are like two young roes
that are twins, which feed among the lilies.

Van Peursen was probably right in saying that external surroundings (in this
case, the bride) prompt (or challenge) the use of metaphors.

Love is a longing to bridge out-there-ness, where the sublime and
the fearsome, cruelty and affection may find a place. It is a perpetually
incomplete project because bridging the gap is essentially impossible and
certainly cannot be achieved without the imagination. This situation will
either result in an enduring longing, or else the relationship will be reduced
to an intersubjective obviousness, including the internalized affection,
unproblematic and safe. The sublime is as clear as is its ephemeral nature.
The fearsome is expressed in the masochistic side of love. Even identifying
Uur (The 25th Hour), a prisoner experiences ‘feelings of love’ towards an
inaccessible SS officer (Georghiu, 1961). How many battered wives refuse to
leave their husbands? Even cruelty attempts to create a state of continuity
through subjugation of the other.

Love is partly a desire to be loved, that is to return to and merge into a
state of immanence – ‘to be found’ (as in the earliest stages of individual
existence) as a form of being. Since human love involves ego and alter in a
mutual relationship where both have the intention to bridge out-there-ness,
sacrifice and surrender are means to actively remove the barriers of
inaccessibility for the other. Again, that goal is only possible in a situation of
relative (social) safety. Love as a sentiment mainly thrives in a situation in
which existence is guaranteed, as it used to be, for example, with the upper
classes in a prosperous bourgeois society. The depth of feeling is largely
determined by sexuality and fear. As Bataille states, the sexual act is one of
the most profound experiences of ‘merging into . . .’ The intensity of the
sentiments follows the tension built up between alter and ego. The orgasm
(temporarily) removes the tension, causing several worlds of imagination
and desire to collapse. Fortunately, the collapse is usually also temporary.

The issue raised earlier, whether the other is invented or actually exists,
can only be answered thus: the other becomes visible as reality and
becomes relevant through the imagination establishing the connection
between alter and ego.
The Tourist Environment as Out-there-ness

This chapter, however, is not intended as a detailed exploration of interhuman love but as an attempt to understand and typify the attitudes of tourists towards their ‘interesting’ surroundings. Returning to the five modalities, these emotions show a growing experience of tension and, consequently, an increase in fascination, eventually followed by an attempt for control in order to eliminate the tension and turn discontinuity into continuity. Paradoxically, whenever an experience of continuity has been attained, it has to be surpassed. Continuity needs recurring affirmation through discontinuity. Someone’s hand, being held for too long, needs squeezing as a reminder that it is indeed being held. Cohen and Taylor (1993) point out the necessity to deviate from the set cadence of routine in order for identity to be experienced. Discontinuity may be experienced by ‘toying’ with that which is continuous. Such latitude is restricted to realities which cease to exist when the rules are broken (Huizinga, 1940). However, the creative imagination also allows individuals to think away the boundaries of continuous commonplace, without having to share it with others. No matter how bizarre the flight of the imagination, it usually involves stories constructed from known terminology, according to the grammar of everyday reality. A well-designed and well-kept garden is a game of interaction with the natural context. Imagination creates a fairytale theme park in which to wander, childlike and invulnerable, communicating with spirits and animals.

Experiences of discontinuity may occur as a shock, accidentally invoked by sensory confrontation or by the inconsistency or inadequacy of reason. These blows to the system can be labelled ‘borderline experiences’. The unexpected view between the trees, a panorama of a sheer cliff create the feeling of losing oneself for a moment, of being connected to something higher or more essential. The something else imagined is the reference point and the cause of liminal experiences, which are so essential in their out-there-ness that all continuous human cultures use them for projecting their own discontinuities – the explanation of the supernatural or ‘something else’. Attempts to capture such out-there-ness are found in poetry, painting and music as that other essentially inexplicable expression of human imagination – art.

In 1798, Wordsworth wrote in his Lines Composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey:

The sounding cataract
Haunted me like a passion: the tall rock,
The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
Their colours and their forms, were then to me
An appetite: a feeling and a love,
That had no need for a remoter charm,
By thought supplied, or any interest
Unborrowed from the eye.

(in Honour, 1991a: 58)

The Passion for Nature

In numerous ancient and contemporary Western and non-Western cultures, nature forms the obvious and ‘continuous’ setting of the higher powers surrounding mankind. As time is bridged by keeping deceased ancestors in the houses of the living, the natural surroundings, charged with animist powers, are constantly within the reach of the social world. Nature is mother. The religious universe is a source of trust, awe and fear. In early religions, in which the extra-human increased, nature became more metaphorical and moved from the immediate surroundings to something ‘higher’ in every sense of the word. Ancient Egyptian religion serves as a good example (van Baaren, 1963). A female figure encompasses the globe (that is sometimes shown as a cow) and along it the sun boat makes its daily journey. The sun and the sun-god Ra steer the solar barque, accompanied by an entourage of gods. The sun is metaphorically the eye of the god. The sky-goddess, Nut, is the mother who gives birth to the sun every day. The earth is the domain of the male deity, Geb. This system of heaven and earth, which is also a dualism of the sexes, is kept apart by the god of the air, and, in its turn, is encompassed by the primordial god and creator of the world, Atum. The principle of discontinuity and unfulfilled continuity miraculously reappears in this early image, since Atum means: ‘he who has not yet completed himself or who will complete himself’ (p. 45). In Bataille’s terminology, this divine imagery could be taken as representing the inability to restore the state of immanence, although there is still hope. That promise has been postponed indefinitely as becomes evident when Atum says to the god of the underworld, Osiris:

Thou shalt live longer than millions of years, a period of millions of years, but in the end I shall destroy all that I have created and the earth will again become part of the primordial ocean, like the abyss of the waters as they originally were; then I shall be the one remaining, nothing but I and Osiris, after I have changed back into the Ancient Serpent whom no man has ever known nor any god has ever seen.

(p. 110)

During the short-lived religious revolution of Ichnaton, fear of the external world seemed to be transformed into a cherishing, in the affection of the external and higher. The sun or sun-god fully becomes the focus of worship, the rays of the sun being depicted as ending in hands that provide and cherish. In contrast to this affection, a style of art that is realistic and depicts humanity in vulnerable poses, as surrendering to the higher may develop temporarily.
Nature remains an uncontrollable and fearsome domain of out-there-ness. In his book *Het Verlangen naar Huivering* (*The Desire for Terror*), Joachim von der Thüsen gives examples of metaphors ascribed to natural phenomena, which can be linked to the sublime, the fearsome and the sadistic. He asserts that during the Age of Enlightenment, the sublime was, to a great extent, linked to the beautiful. In 18th-century landscape gardens, the artificial forms of the earlier formal gardens were abandoned and nature was ‘reinstated’, improved and idealized in expressions of art (Honour, 1991b: 159). The poetic and literary ideal was taken primarily from the past – in the works of Homer and Virgil, for example.

The past is also an inaccessible ‘out-there’. The influence of the painter Claude Lorrain (1600–1682) on the 18th-century representation of nature is widely recognized (Gombrich, 1992: 310). His sublime aesthetics are also based on the classics and on the hills and plains around Rome. The Arcadian landscape Poussin painted about the same time returns in themes of late 18th-century neo-classicism. Arcadia is the metaphor for simplicity and harmony. Yet, ironically, at the same time, it refers to the finite, and therefore to death (i.e. the perfection and horror of Bataille’s immanence). Poussin’s painting *Et in Arcadia Ego* (circa 1655), while depicting young shepherds and an elegantly dressed lady in beautiful, sunny surroundings, nevertheless also contains a tomb to indicate that death is ever present in the perfection and innocence of the landscape.

Goethe added the subtitle *Et in Arcadia Ego* to the book about his travels in Italy. Tischbein’s painting, showing Goethe lying with a book in his hand in wooded surroundings, is an unmistakable reference to the higher. The landscape contains the conditions of harmony that coincide with out-there-ness, raised above the reality of mortal existence.

The previously mentioned poem by Wordsworth again illustrates the situation in words:

And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought.

Discomfort and the fearsome feature in many of Goya’s works. He paints midgets, freaks, monsters and, in *The Sleep of Reason* (1796–1798), he shows that only reason may protect us from the fearsome. When reason sleeps, however, the powers we fear are unleashed. The violent forces of nature supply analogies for the insoluble origins of discomfort. For centuries, the sea has been a source of fear. In antiquity, the coastline was a metaphor for the borderline between the known and the unknown (Corbin, 1988). The
beach was a place of farewells, the sea a place of shipwreck. Monsters inhabited the oceans, and maelstroms threatened safe passage. For a long time in Christian culture, the waters referred to the unfinished part of God's creation, threatening to undo creation in another flood. It was not until the 18th century that the sea became the metaphor for eternity, as one of the expressions of God's majesty in nature. Nevertheless, scurvy, piracy and the unpredictability of rising storms and tidal waves have earned the ocean a dubious reputation.

Natural wonders may reveal their sublime side as well as their fearsome aspects. In 1799, J.P. Saint-Ours painted the Greek Earthquake analogous to the political and social revolution of those times. He previously had produced idyllic Grecian tableaux. Von der Thüsen (1997: 57–59) mentions the earthquake as a metaphor of political revolution (in this case the French Revolution) and the volcano as a metaphor of uncontrollable political forces. The Montagnards, led by Robespierre, transformed Rousseau's metaphor of the mountain as the sublimation of detachment to a metaphor of unlimited power.

The Marquis de Sade saw the volcano as a metaphor of cruelty (von der Thüsen, 1997: 39). The volcano with its orgasmic eruptions was the image of the cruelty and indifference displayed by nature. The sensory influence of the volcano on smell, touch and hearing was so strong and so closely linked to danger that even Goethe was unable to experience feelings of the sublime on top of Vesuvius. He could only do so at a considerable distance and through visual observation (von der Thüsen, 1997: 38).

The relationship between nature and eroticism emerges around the turn of the century in the Reform Movement and in naturism. Nature is the environment in which to run naked and return to one's origins. Here, nudity is a reference to affection rather than to threat. On Monte de Verità at Ascona, one can visit the dwellings of a community associated with Frederik van Eeden's Walden. Old photographs show these people completely nude, undertaking the most mundane of tasks, such as weeding their vegetable gardens. A hedonistic variation is the nude and tanning culture that has developed on beaches worldwide after the Second World War, one that also echoes an animal's surrender to warmth. Moreover, the beach culture, created and represented in series such as Baywatch, supplies associations with eternal youth, immortality and unassailable beauty.

As a result of this physical connection to nature, a debate has sprung up as to whether nature can still be connected to human existence and the world of taboos that protect social order (it is permitted to eat animals but not to kill each other), or whether it should only be seen as out-there-ness that unfortunately has become corrupted and infected by human exploitation and intervention. In the latter view, the supreme being is no longer visible in nature, but nature is the supreme being and must be given the respect it deserves. Respect is created through restoring autonomous natural processes, without interactions with human activities.
Love as Metaphor, Paradigm and Guide

Two major steps have been taken. First, the metaphor of interhuman love has been used to interpret the attitudes that tourists take towards the object of their journeys. Like love itself, these predispositions form the basis of trivial as well as unattainable projects. Secondly, love for someone or something else has been connected to an even more fundamental relationship between individuals and their surroundings. Fascination or desire is created through the tension between in-here-ness and out-there-ness, between discontinuity and continuity.

The several emotionalities in the diverse faces of love show that the tension between continuity and discontinuity can express itself at varying levels of intensity. Cohen (1979) can be credited for pointing out a difference in modalities with regard to tourism, forming a continuum between what Boorstin (1963) called ‘pseudo-events’ and the experience of authenticity. However, Cohen connects the ‘quest for authenticity’ to a loss of relationship with one’s own cultural values, the resulting alienation and the need to rediscover those values in an external world, somewhere else or, if necessary, through escape from the present to the ‘sometime’. Whether alienation is the most important explanatory factor is open to question. The tension between continuity and discontinuity seems a more essential and more structural ingredient.

What is revealed in human love may also be manifested in the relationship with places and worlds beyond one’s own environment. Indeed, that tension is more likely to be felt in contemporary society than in traditional society, where people felt more incorporated. Maybe the feeling of discontinuity is more acute when the connection with tradition is broken. Thus, the need for love as a leading principle for permanent commitment seems stronger, no matter how often it is actually frustrated. The need for getting to know the ‘other’ somehow, formerly and somewhere else, is stronger than ever before.

The metaphor of love for the longing for something else can even assume the dimensions of a paradigm, one that involves the sublime and the dedication to something else. In the light of social practices in which forms of desire are transformed into negotiable events, however, it is less credible. Nevertheless, that commercial, booming market taps into a source that springs from the same origins. Even carnivals pleasantly thematize the most fundamental desires and fears, which Bataille would have had no problem explaining. We are whirled around, bump into each other, are whisked off our feet, encounter ghosts, and our uncertain future is read. In the old days, we were also able to see all the defects in the human species: fat or deformed people and midgets.

With a basic pattern of continuity and discontinuity present, there remains the intensity with which love, imprisoned between fear and desire, is shaped. Supplementing the paradigm, it offers a lucid guide to (tourist)
policy, which must do justice to different modalities of experience and the emotion connected with them.

There is nothing inherently wrong with the market for entertainment and events. Lost paradises, forgotten physical possibilities, suppressed fears and desires and outdated rituals are brought to the fore through manufactured events – trite, but already referring to the sublime. Increasing banality leaves part of the sublime intact, in the literal sense of the word, ‘untouchable’. No matter how many people traipe round the Alhambra, sweating and eating ice cream, the edifice itself remains a marvel. Moreover, the experience creates a new collective, semi-sacred atmosphere, just as a charity concert for an injured soccer player, or a mass march past the place where a victim of violence was killed. Events are usually staged where values have an obviously strong collective nature. Rembrandt’s Nightwatch need not remain restricted to the existential art lover. Events thrive in situations of a strong public nature. Nobody needs to appropriate them. Under the metaphor of love, entertainment and the events market are forms of group sex.

However, there should remain room for individual, personal love. Sublime experiences cannot be programmed. Dedication to something special demands genuine commitment from those who are really and enduringly attracted to it.

That is what policy should accomplish. It should offer space to all varieties of love for something else: opportunities for flirting, conversation, dating, being in love and steady relationships; for amusement, fleeting experiences, growing interests, the unique sensation and a lasting involvement with the surroundings ‘elsewhere’.

Notes

1These five forms of desire have also been extended to the modes of tourist experience identified by Cohen (1979); see also Elands and Lengkeek (2000).
2Kundera (1985) calls such commonplaces ‘kitsch’. ‘Kitsch is the absolute denial of shit, in the literal and the figurative sense of the word; kitsch excludes everything from its purview which is essentially unacceptable in human existence.’ The feeling induced by kitsch must be a kind the multitude can share. Kitsch may not, therefore, depend on an unusual situation; it must derive from the basic images people have engraved in their memories: the ungrateful daughter, the neglected father, children running on the grass, the motherland betrayed, first love. Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: ‘How nice to see children running on the grass!’ The second tear says: ‘How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running on the grass!’ It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch.’
References


Leading the Tourist by the Nose

Graham M.S. Dann and Jens Kristian Steen Jacobsen

Introduction: From Amazing Gaze to Scents and Sensibility

Until quite recently, most understandings of the contemporary tourist have concentrated principally on the sense of sight. MacCannell’s (1989) reaction to Boorstin’s (1987) caricature of the tourist as a cultural dope capturing tautologically on camera the sights that s(he) was told to see lay not so much in his stress on ocular-centric ritual as in the nature of the videndum. According to Boorstin, the ‘must see’ was a pseudo-event made possible by the graphic revolution. For MacCannell, it was a marker of authenticity after which the tourist craved. Urry (1990), taking the analysis one stage further by introducing a postmodern ludic ethos into the proceedings, far from abandoning the emphasis on the visual in a cinematic, photographic, televisual, flickering society, only served to heighten it by exclusively dwelling on the tourist gaze.

However, although sight was essential to tourism in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was by no means the only sense with which travel was associated. Thermalists, for instance, sought tactile contact with waters of varying mineral composition (Lowenthal, 1962; Adler, 1989: 24), and pre-Pasteurian theories of morbidity assigned pride of place to the qualities of ‘air’ (Dagognet, 1959). Moreover, and as Adler (1989: 24) has noted, a long-standing vogue for aerotherapy, accompanied by articulations of olfactory experience, continued to affect fashions in travel destinations throughout the 19th century.
There are also growing indications from a number of commentators of otherwise quite disparate persuasions that such a sole focus on the tourist as voyeur is theoretically deficient. Graburn (1995), for example, who had for so long seen ‘eye to eye’ with MacCannell in ‘viewing’ the tourist as partaking in an authentic sacred quest of self-discovery, now began to articulate a different ‘vision’ in his later work on Japanese tourism. In Graburn’s (1995: 66) words:

The on-site and off-site markers also demonstrate the construction of Japanese tradition by using multiple channels of communication employing all the senses.

While conceding that:

They include the visual: graphic, photographic and calligraphic, as well as architectural, decorative and sartorial,

he went on to say that they also comprised:

The aural, with reference to etiquette, and the sounds and silence of the rural milieu,

and that:

Taste is emphasised in the cuisine. The tactile is explicit in references to the water and the wind and suggestive in reference to human relations, and the olfactory with many references to the kaori, the fragrance or smell/taste of nature, as well as the nostalgic odour of the spring waters.

Selänniemi (1996: 265), too, although this time in reference to the much neglected (Boorstinian) package tourist (so studiously avoided by middle-class academics intent on investigating their socially stratified analogues among independent travellers), is similarly quick to point out:

Everything in mass tourism is not about looking at places, or to put it more exactly, to see places. The sense of sight is not exclusive in experiences of the vacation.

He then goes on to speak about the pleasures of tactile stimuli, such as heat or the sensation of cool seawater on the skin, before concluding that:

Focusing on the tourist gaze (Urry, 1990) or on MacCannell’s (1973, 1989) theories based on the primacy of visual stimuli in the tourist experience are not sufficient in analysing this type of sun tourism to beach resorts.

That Selänniemi is not alone in his opinion may be gleaned from his appeal to compatriot researchers Veijola and Jokinen (1994) and their related judgement that the tourist’s body is largely absent in studies on tourism (cf. Urbain, 1994). His position is also based empirically on a number of tourist diaries that stress sensory delights other than the visual. He refers, for instance, to one of his Finnish respondent’s accounts of a holiday in Gran Canaria where she reminisces about the warmth of yesteryear
evoked by ‘feeling the heat under the bare feet, just the way it was when she was a child’ (pp. 258–259; cf. Game, 1991: 177). Even so, Selänniemi manages to combine a sense of disappointment with the enthusiasm of discovering an area for future research when he admits that ‘hearing, taste and smell have been largely filtered out from the experiences mentioned in the diary’ (p. 258).

Jacobsen (1997: 31) is similarly aware of this sensory void when he observes:

Olfactory experiences in tourism are largely neglected as the tourist’s attention is drawn to experiences generated by the eyes and ears.

(Rodaway, 1994: 61)

No doubt aware of these recent calls for restoring the balance, Urry’s (2000) latest thinking concedes that ‘vision has not simply got its own way. There has been the twentieth-century critique of the visual’ (p. 103). In relation to travel, Urry now maintains that there has been ‘denigration of the mere sightseer . . . The person who only lets the sense of sight have free reign is ridiculed’ (p. 91). One reason for this apparent change of heart, and based on an argument of Feminist origin, is that the privileging of the gaze over smell, taste, touch and hearing can lead to an impoverishment of corporeal relations and to male mastery (p. 92). Urry likewise agrees that there has been an increase in hyper-real experiences that are organized around the other senses. Odour, for example, is emphasized at the Fishing Heritage Centre in Grimsby (p. 92). Olfaction, he admits, also provides a more direct encounter with the environment when contrasted with the abstract qualities of sight (p. 96; see Lefebvre, 1991). Aromas additionally can evoke memories of place, help retain a sense of locale and ‘play a major role in constructing and sustaining major distinctions of social taste’ (p. 97). However, under the postmodern condition, with its de-differentiated quest for nature, the popularity of spicy food and oriental perfumes for both sexes (p. 100), the old subjugating Empire under Imperial Leather, together with the class and race distinctions between Nazi and Jew, have witnessed a corresponding reduction in the modernist compartmentalization and zoning of odour (pp. 98–99). At the same time, there has been a decline in the visual on account of its temporary qualities. The television can be turned off, the photo album can be closed, and people can look away from landscape. However, the other senses, including the olfactory, cannot be eliminated so easily. They are far more enduring (pp. 100–101).

King (2001: 533) in reviewing the latest offering from Urry (2000), and while claiming that it is a development of this sociologist’s earlier writings on the gaze, nevertheless observes:

Though Urry does not elaborate, tourism researchers may wish to consider how travelers will engage their other senses in an environment where sight has become increasingly disassociated from daily living,
before posing a final tantalizing question:

Will consumers become incapable of enjoying the other senses or will sensual experiences undergo a revival as people search for the ‘real thing’?

This presentation attempts to respond to the challenge of incorporating the other senses into studies of the tourist. Although it only does so in relation to smell, clearly there is scope for conducting parallel analyses of taste, touch and sound. The argument proceeds by highlighting the following points:

- The recognition of the importance of the olfactory, not only in recent studies, but also in tourism-related technology, as evidenced in Disney World and Digiscents.
- The difficulty of expressing the rudimentary sense of smell, with the concomitant need to rely on its link with tourism promotion/demotion through the mot juste of travel writers, both ancient and modern.
- The crafting of place through smell.
- The olfactory ‘othering’ of destination peoples.
- The relationship between odour and time, and the calling forth of ambivalent memories within the discourse of a bitter-sweet nostalgia.

Finally, and in light of the foregoing, it is concluded that only by considering tourists in their polysensual (Jacobsen, 1994: 8) and symbolic completeness can they truly become metaphors of the social world.

The Importance of the Olfactory in Recent Studies and Tourism-related Technology

Until quite recently, authorities were generally in agreement that the sense of smell is very elemental and basic. While Synott (1993: 85) refers to it in Freudian terms as being ‘animal like’, Porteous (1985: 357) speaks of its ‘species survival function’ in which this ‘most primitive’ sense has as its forerunners the ability to locate food, warn of impending danger (e.g. fire, predators), find mates (via the sex pheronomes (Schiffmann, 1976: 153) and vomeronasal organ) and hence to reproduce (Ronhi, 1996; Digiscents, 2001). Because it is evoked through simple arousal, the olfactory, unlike the more ‘cognitive’ visual and auditory, is described as ‘emotional’ (Engen, 1982; Porteous, 1985). Consequently, and continuing the supremacy attributed to sight, the sense of smell is often ‘overlooked’. Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel considered it to be the lowest of the human senses, Kant did not even discuss it in his aesthetics (Synott, 1993: 185) and, apart from Simmel, sociologists have largely ‘ignored odors or regarded them as an insignificant dimension of human interaction’ (Largey and Watson, 1977: 212).
Rindisbacher (1992: vii) points to a further reason for this situation of aromatic neglect when he adds:

The accidental nature of smell is reflected in the absence of public education and learning about olfaction as well as in the fact that smell has no art form associated with it. In this respect it shares the fates of the other chemical senses of taste and of touch, although the former, in the culinary, has long held a status approaching that of art.

Yet there are several current indications that the sense of smell is far more complex than originally thought. For instance, while ‘aromagenomics’ is a new discipline for exploring the relationship between aromas, genes and how the brain detects odours (Digiscents, 2001), the communicative function of smell has for quite a while been the preserve of ‘osmology’ (Wescott, 1966). Indeed, there are several works of a semiotic nature that investigate olfactory signals as forms of non-verbal communication (e.g. Key, 1975, 1977; Leathers, 1976; Poyatos, 1976, 1983; Knapp, 1978; Sebeok, 1986 in Nöth, 1990: 389). There are also semiotic studies that treat olfactive icons as a form of mimicry (Sebeok, 1979), as well as that branch of knowledge, known as ‘semiochemistry’, which examines chemical messages and the various channels (including the olfactory) through which they are transmitted (Nöth, 1990: 161, 175). Proxemics, too, which deals with codes of spatial behaviour valid for given cultures (analogous to language), contains olfactive codes based on the detection of odour or breath (Nöth, 1990: 412).

Social science researchers have also discovered a number of important socio-cultural and psychological trends in relation to smell, namely that:

- odour experiences are naturally hedonic (Ehrlichman and Halpern, 1988);
- approach–avoidance behaviour operates olfactorily according to the familiar = pleasant versus unfamiliar = unpleasant dichotomy (Porteous, 1985), where only approximately 20% of all smells fit into the former category;
- intolerance and preference smell patterns tend to be age related, so that intensity of odour experience declines through successive stages of life (Porteous, 1985);
- humans are socialized to appreciate/react negatively towards smells (i.e. aromas are normatively prescribed and proscribed via ‘nose training’ (Engen, 1979; Porteous, 1985; Synott, 1993));
- women tend to have a superior sense of smell to men (Synott, 1993);
- odour settings can be manipulated (Richter, 1999: 113).

The link between tourism practice and the olfactory is best exemplified in relation to the last of these features. The creators of Walt Disney World, for example, have long realized that scents can be fabricated to evoke
pleasant sensations in relation to themed places, activities and events. Thus Fjellman (1992) speaks of Disney World experiences as ‘utopian’ for their ability to amalgamate situations as different as horseback riding, sashimi and English high tea...a blend made possible through a combination of architecture, art, craft, sound, even smell – that surrounds us like an envelope’ (emphasis added, p. 11).

However, there are some contrived attractions, such as the Moroccan Showcase or the Frontierland Trading Post, for instance, which are predominantly olfactory and where the (nostalgic) ‘aroma of leather goods . . . wafts across the land’ (p. 73). The addition of odour to a site is considered so much part of the overall authenticity that special machines called ‘smellitzers’ are employed for the purpose. As Fjellman (1992: 133) explains in relation to the Epcot Center: ‘the “smellitzer” aroma canon creates the edge of a heart of darkness atmosphere.’ Indeed, speaking of the scene from the Age of Dinosaurs in Future World, Fjellman (1992: 362) acknowledges: ‘smellitzers work overtime, filling the space with a musky, musty swamp odor.’ Here, at Disney World at least, is clear acknowledgement that the tourist gaze is not self-sufficient, and that it must be rendered complete, as it were, by sensory appeals to the tourist nose. What is even more interesting is that the inclusion of smell in order to provide the right atmosphere occurs in relation to either the past or future, never the present. In that respect, it acts as an agent of time-transcendent nostalgia, evoking scenarios that are portrayed unilaterally as being better than current reality.

Digiscents (2001) is a new company, based in Oakland, California, similarly committed to supplying authentic and nostalgic aromas. Now, however, it intends to do so over the Internet by supplying what it considers to be an essential missing ingredient to formerly visual experiences. By adding a cartridge peripheral device, the ‘I-smell personal scent synthesizer’ to their computers, customers will be able to experience from a variety of olfactory offerings pre-trip, anticipatory/virtual reality for would-be tourists. Thus, suppose a person is thinking of visiting India, s(he) will no longer be exposed simply to images of the potential destination, but will be permitted ‘to inhale a sample of the different geographic regions, the bazaars, the foods, the rituals’. According to the accompanying publicity:

A picture can show you more than words can ever say, and a smell is worth a thousand pictures...Scent is an excellent way to elicit the nostalgia, romance, excitement and fun of travel...Digital Scent technology lets travelers get the flavor of exotic destinations before they ever step on an airplane.

Meanwhile, at London University’s Goldsmiths College, a team is working on ‘immersive’ television (available in from 5–10 years time), which will enable the public to experience smells, temperatures and sensations in addition to traditional sight and sound. (Bamber, 2001). Presumably the
release of aromas relative to a given transmission will extend to the content of holiday programmes.

The Difficulty of Expressing Sensations of Smell in Tourist Experiences, and the Consequent Need to Rely on Travel Writers for Related Descriptions

Several commentators (e.g. Lawless and Engen, 1977 in Porteous, 1985: 360; Engen, 1982; Gibbons, 1986; Synott, 1993) note that sensations of smell are typically quite difficult for the lay person to articulate (‘the tip of the nose problem’). Tourism is no exception to this generalization, since descriptions of olfactory events often require the help of those with a special gift for words, that is to say individuals of yesterday and today who are particularly adept at evaluating and conveying their lived impressions of places and peoples through the accounts that they bring to a largely inexpert audience. What makes this medium of tourism communication unique is its ability to demote as well as to promote (Dann, 1992, 1996: 157). Whereas other vehicles of ‘the language of tourism’ unilaterally speak of destinations in glowing, superlative and hyperbolic terms, only travel writing and word-of-mouth, being independent (as opposed to industry-supported agents of imagery creation (cf. Gartner, 1993; Dann, 1996: 138–139)), tell it like it is, in a no holds barred, more credible point of view. It is for this principal reason that the current presentation relies on travellers’ tales and travelogues for its base material in seeking to explore the olfactory tourist and how s(he) is led by the nose towards or away from experiences of space and time.

However, there are other justifications for utilizing travel writing in order to appreciate more fully the capturing of place through smell. One certainly has to do with the relationship of this genre to the actual process of travel. According to Curtis and Pajaczkowska (1994: 212), a journey may be regarded as a representation of narrative, and narrative structures themselves can be considered as intrasubjective journeys. Van den Abbeele (1992: xix) adds that a voyage not only conforms to the rules of narrative, but is also one of its canonical forms, while de Certeau (1984: 115) even goes so far as to maintain that every story is a travel story. If these commentators are correct, it follows that a major advantage to reliance on the travel account is that it bears the hallmarks of reflexivity (Glaser, 1989), since within cognitive reflexivity, travel temporality may be understood as narrative (Lash, 1994: 158). Taking this position a stage further in the present context, it is argued here that, just as the often silenced voice of the other can be heard through reflexive dialogue with an author, so too is there an olfactory analogue to this reciprocal activity. Ego can thus become aware of self, and by extension...
to the selves of aromatic interactants, through descriptions of the odour of Alter.

Even so, there is still some debate as to whether it is the travel writer or the writer in residence who provides the more evocative atmosphere for readers. A self-confessed example of the latter is Lawrence Durrell (1971: 156, in Jacobsen, 1997: 29), who claimed that his books were ‘always about living in places, not just rushing through them’. By contrast, there are authors, such as Paul Theroux (1980: 429), who believe that the process of travel is better than the act of arrival in both its experiences and their narration. Lending support to his viewpoint in the present context is the finding that people who have dwelt in a place for a considerable period tend to become immune to its peculiar odours, and hence are not as perceptive or articulate as transient outside visitors (including travel writers) who may be coming there for the first time (Porteous, 1985: 358). It is thus strangerhood which heightens the sense of smell and, in this connection, it becomes the task of travel writing to manage unfamiliarity in its readers (Dann, 1992).

Yet, however well intentioned the travel writer, there nevertheless remains the problem of effectively communicating the distinctive odours associated with a given place. As previously noted, smell is much more difficult to describe than sight. The related vocabulary is limited (Porteous, 1985: 358), unspecialized (Synott, 1993: 184), impoverished and idiosyncratic (Engen, 1982), due, no doubt, to a lack of consensus over basic smell attributes and their scientific classification (Schiffmann, 1976: 141; Synott, 1993: 184). The language of aroma, too, occasionally borders on the mystical, as the sense of smell (e.g. of incense) is often evoked in religious settings as an intermediary between the human and divine (Largey and Watson, 1977; British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). Thus writers sometimes find themselves engaged in the problematic exercise of trying to convey the extraordinary via the ordinary, the supernatural by means of natural expressions of everyday life. As a result, odour is often portrayed in terms of other sensory experiences (Synott, 1993: 184), even to the point where oddly combined expressions, such as the ‘spectacular aromas’ (of Marrakech) are employed awkwardly (Independent Television, 2001).

One way out of this communicational dilemma is by recourse to simile and metaphor (Gibbons, 1986: 328). Here, Dann (1996: 172–173) has observed, albeit in relation to a small sample of travel accounts featuring islands, that the more unknown the territory, the greater the tendency for travel writers to use comparison for describing the strange in terms of the familiar, away in terms of home. Although this association has not been extended to olfactory descriptions or to mainland destinations, there are no prima facie grounds for refusing to entertain it as a viable working hypothesis. Indeed, precisely because simile and metaphor are replete with symbolic content, and since olfactory symbolism in literature is said to be
responsible for creating many an evocative atmosphere (Classen et al., 1994: 7), it would be interesting to explore this connection further.

The Crafting of Place through Smell

According to Tuan (1977: 11), odours lend character to places making them different, and hence easier to identify and remember. Rodaway (1994) adds that the smell of a place as a tourist experience may be perceived as:

[...] an odour in or across a given space, perhaps with varying intensities, which will linger for a while and then fade [...] and the association of odours with particular things, organisms, situations and emotions which all contribute to a sense of space and the character of places (p. 68).

Porteous (1985) considers the olfactory to be so important that he introduces the special term ‘smellscape’ as an analogue and complement to the ocular-centric ‘landscape’. As he explains:

The concept of smellscape suggests that, like visual impressions, smells may be spatially ordered or place-related (p. 359).

For Porteous (1985), a smellscape is ‘non-continuous, fragmentary in space and episodic in time’ (p. 359). It usually cannot be considered on its own without reference to the other senses. A smellscape, experienced by a ‘nosewitness’, typically involves ‘smell events’ and ‘smellmarks’, and may be charted by means of ‘smellwalks’ (p. 360). Smellsapes may also be particularized so as to focus on certain features of landscapes, for example an ocean or a forest, even a single flower in a garden. Rodaway (1994: 69) consequently distinguishes between two types of smell experiences in relation to place. One is ‘generalized olfaction’, a kind of passive encounter with odours in the environment, providing an imprecise sense of their location but much detail about their qualitative character. The other type is labelled ‘specialized olfaction’, and is evident in exploratory behaviour based on arousal by certain odours, intensities, associations or memories. This curiosity-driven olfaction tends to seek out particular aromas, rather than attempting to compile an overall smellscape.

Although Porteous (1985) maintains that appreciation of odour operates according to a simple love–hate dichotomy, he also points out that there are no universal preferences or generalized aversions. The only exceptions are possibly a partiality among middle-class Western Europeans for natural smells over synthetic ones, and a predilection for more complex natural odours (e.g. raspberry) over simpler varieties (Montcrieff, 1966). Otherwise, olfactory likes and dislikes are personal and tend to vary from one individual to another (Porteous, 1985).

Given this valence of smells, and the realization that it is best conveyed through literary accounts of place (Porteous, 1985), this exploratory study
attempts to construct an inductive profile of smellscape according to their positive, negative and neutral evaluations by travel writers.

The positive dimension

Throughout this current preliminary review of travel accounts, it has been found that positive olfactory experiences are generally communicated via the nouns of ‘fragrance’, ‘perfume’, ‘aroma’ and ‘scent’, with corresponding similes drawn from the world of flowers (especially lilac, lily and rose), incense and aromatic oils (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001). They range from macrodescriptions of entire countries to the olfactory delights of a simple tavern or a village store.

As an instance of a country’s olfactory portrayal, here is an account from the English poet, scholar, playwright and traveller, James Kirkup (1985) entitled ‘The Smells of Japan’:

I knew at last, as I walked the winter streets of Osaka, that I was back in Japan, because of the peculiarly delightful fragrance of the air. Just as one knows one is in France from the smells of Gitânes, coffee, chestnuts, beer and garlic, so one knows one is in Japan from the mingled aromas of bath-fumes, woodsmoke, Peace and Ikoi cigarettes, hot soy sauce, dried fish, pickles and seaweed. But the most typical fragrance of all, and one uniquely Japanese, is that of pomade: the crisp, clean air of winter was drugged with the scent of rich, black, pomaded hair. It is spiced too with the clean, fresh smell of Japanese bodies, savoury with the breath of peppery rice crackers wrapped in seaweed, laced with hot sake and the sweet tang of boot polish rising from the rows of shoe-shiners kneeling on bits of old tatami matting along the edges of the pavements, where their little tin braziers were odorous with burning sushi (fish) and o-bento boxes – the disposable wood-shaving lunchboxes of Japan.

All this had haunted my nostrils ever since I had left Japan just over a year ago, and now came back to me like a remembered dream perfectly realized. At every step, I was wafted along on waves of this delicious mixture of erotic aromas.

This rather lengthy excerpt calls for a number of brief observations. First, a pleasurable impression is conveyed via a combination of positive nouns and epithets (‘peculiarly delightful fragrance’, ‘sweet tang’), even to the point of hedonistic excess (‘drugged with the scent’, ‘delicious mixture of erotic aromas’). Second, although the account is based on Osaka, Kirkup has absolutely no compunction about generalizing to the whole of Japan (indeed, the name of the city features only once, in comparison to the six mentions of ‘Japan’ or ‘Japanese’) and what constitutes its uniqueness. Third, this olfactory differentiation of the destination is cleverly highlighted by introducing another country, France, with which to contrast Japan, the only point of convergence being the homely smell of cigarettes (consonant with a usually favourable reaction to tobacco among travel writers). Fourth, the
overall positive evaluation of Japan is reinforced further by indexical transference from the country to its people (about which more will be said in the following section). Fifth, there is a reference to the past in the present (the haunting of nostrils, coming back like a remembered dream, returning to Japan), an enhancement of warm feelings via nostalgia (see last section).

A country may also be captured aromatically by allusion to a specific smellscape through which a generalizable sentiment of approval is evoked. A case in point is Roualeyn Gordon Cumming (1985), a Scottish big game hunter, speaking of South Africa:

The storm passed away at sundown, having exquisitely purified the atmosphere, while the grateful earth and fragrant forest emitted a perfume of overpowering sweetness (p. 69).

Another is Colin Thubron’s (1987) Among the Russians when he meets Voldoya, a trainee doctor from Minsk. Here he is, the representative of Russia, speaking of his homeland:

I ache to get away sometimes, particularly in the spring. You know our woods have a special smell in the spring? It’s partly rain, I think, partly the smell of pines (p. 16).

Later, Voldoya begins to describe his passion for the native Russian forest:

Mushroom hunting... I wish I could express it to you... You can even smell them. Have you ever sniffed mushrooms? The poisonous ones smell bitter, but the good ones – you’ll remember that fragrance for ever! (p. 17).

This last extract is particularly interesting because it highlights in a travel account the difficulty of articulating olfactory experiences by ordinary persons, however well educated, a difficulty that the author does little to overcome. Yet, even in this incoherent way, fragrance triumphs, and Russia, (too often portrayed by travel writers as an odoriferous mixture of boiled cabbage and potatoes) emerges with the sweet smell of success predicated on the victory of good over bitter.

Islands, too, maybe because they are considered more ‘natural’ than the mainland, are often singled out for textual praise. In this regard, Jamaica is described in the culinary terms of ‘mounds of spicy jerk chicken and barbecued pork with deliciously fragrant blackened conch’ (Nelson, 1995). Then there is Singapore with its fruit-laden waterfront (Morris, 1986: 309) and the Croatian territory of Hvar where one may take ‘an olfactory tour through the famous lavender fields, which permanently perfume the air and cover the hillsides with a soft haze’ (Hartley, 2001). Here the references are to abundance – to ‘mounds’ of spicy meat, to ‘panoramas’ of mangoes, papayas, rambutans, limes, pears and apples, to the all-pervasive lavender – in short, to olfactory enjoyment ad libitum, hedonism to excess.

However, positive evaluations of smell are frequently linked to the sense of taste and, in particular, to the food and drink which may be said to typify a place. Apart from the previous mentions of Jamaica and Singapore in
gastronomic terms, here is a similarly evocative description by Sir Cecil Beaton (1985) partaking of luncheon in Vienne:

The turbot savoured to the accompaniment of an excellent dry white Bordeaux, evaporated lightly on the tongue in a haze of the most delicate scent...

Before you can cry ‘whoa!’ your glass is filled from a vast bottle (labelled in pretty, faded handwriting) in which a whole golden William pear has been submerged to scent the liqueur (pp. 179–180).

Even a simple ‘cuppa’ is sufficient to transform Alexander Kinglake’s (1985) account of ‘a night in the great Servian forest’ to a positive experience: ‘and soon there was tea before us, with all its welcome fragrance’ (p. 154).

**The negative dimension**

In this study, among the most frequently encountered nouns describing negative touristic olfactory experiences were ‘smell’, ‘stink’, ‘fumes’, ‘vapours’, ‘reek’, ‘pong’ and ‘hum’. The last two, it should be noted, are both slang expressions and also of an auditory nature, once more reinforcing the difficulty of articulating the olfactory solely in its own terms. The most often used derogatory simile was one of death, followed closely by that of sewage (cf. Urry, 2000: 96).

At the macrolevel, and paralleling the positive evaluations of countries, there are equally many unfavourable descriptions. The poet Marinetti (1972: 42, 43, 81), for instance, speaks of Italy, the land of his birth, as ‘worm eaten and moss grown’ and of his wishing to free it from ‘its smelly gangrene of professors, archeologists, ciceroni and antiquarians’ and ‘from the numberless museums that cover the place like so many graveyards’ (in Lowenthal, 1993: 380). Then there is Graham Greene (1978) (see Atkins, 1966: 67, in Porteous, 1985: 362) who, reflecting on his exposure to ‘the smoke drifting over the sea from Freetown, Sierra Leone, exclaims that it will always be to me the smell of Africa.’

Cities, also, come in for plenty of negative olfactory criticism. Since several are the subject of a separate, complementary paper (Dann and Jacobsen, 2002), on this occasion just a single typical instance should suffice. Here is an example from the master of ‘disdain from the train’, Paul Theroux (1980), and his first impressions of a town in Costa Rica, which manage to combine the death and sewage tropes:

Limón looked like a dreadful place. It had just rained and the town stank. The station was on a muddy road near the harbour, and the puddles reflected the decayed buildings and over-bright lights. The smell of dead barnacles and damp sand, flooded sewers, brine, oil, cockroaches, and tropical vegetation which, when soaked, gives off the hot mouldy vapour you associate with
compost heaps in the summer, the stench of mulch and mildew. It was a noisy
town as well; clanging music, shouts, car horns [. . .] I said, ‘I’ll just sniff
around town. I’m like a rat in a maze when I get into a new place’ (pp.
197–198).

Islands feature less among negative olfactory descriptions, and those
that are encountered verge on the ambivalent. Patrick Leigh Fermor’s (1984)
vignette of Guadeloupe in the Caribbean is one such example:

Its murderous heat invested the place with an atmosphere of entire strange-
ness. Even at eleven in the morning a heavy tropical languor weighed on the
air.

This particular case is another instance of synaesthesia, on this occasion
where the sensation of touch carries over to smell, so that it becomes hard to
articulate the ‘heavy tropical languor’ in olfactory terms. It is not until later
on the same page that Fermor actually describes a smell, and then only by
means of a simile, when he refers to soursops ‘expelling an aroma faintly
resembling pear drops’ (p. 19). The same writer, in his widely acclaimed
Mani, also finds it difficult to express olfactory sensation in Vaphe at the
foothills of the White Mountains in Crete:

For days the sweet heady smell of the must hangs over the village . . . In the
dark crypts of the houses, in huge grooved Minoan amphorae the must
grumbles and hits out and fills the house with unnerving fumes.
(Fermor, 1985: 187)

Accounts of meals combining taste with smell for an overall sensory
evaluation are again less frequent in their negative than in their positive
assessment. Among the travel writers currently surveyed, only one such
narrative was unearthed, and that from the pen of the Australian explorer,
Peter Warburton (1985), the first man to cross that continent between 1873
and 1874 from east to west with 17 camels. He describes the eating of one of
these ships of the Great Sandy Desert as follows:

No shred was passed over. Head, feet, hide, tail all went into the boiling
pot . . . The tough, thick hide was cut up and parboiled. The coarse hair was
then scraped off with a knife and stewed until it became like the inside of a
carpenter’s glue pot, both to the taste and the smell . . . (p. 511).

Finally, whereas positive evaluations of smell rarely include references
to transportation, negative assessments are more in evidence. Apart from
Paul Theroux’s many related discomforts suffered abroad, travelling by rail
across Asia and through Central and South America, there is one such
description from Shiva Naipaul (1988) in Morocco:

I brought back with me on the long train ride not the redolence of spices but
the stench of animal droppings, of heaps of rotting vegetables, of dripping,
uncured hides destined for the tanneries. The cloying sourness of the medina
seemed to cling to my clothes, to exude from the pores of my skin (p. 220).
Earlier he contrasts his misery with the situation of the more ‘fortunate’ package tourists who are ‘sealed off by their air-conditioned coaches from the dusty anarchy through which they move . . . immune from reality’ (p. 220). Only the traveller and travel writer, it seems, are condemned to the former fate.

The neutral dimension

Already some ambivalence has entered a few of the negative accounts recorded here. However, where it becomes extremely difficult to decide whether on balance the narrative presents an overall positive or negative evaluation, one encounters more neutral territory where absence of valence reigns due to the cancellation effect of opposing forces, what some (e.g. Schiffmann, 1976: 151) refer to as olfactory ‘compensation’, as for example the smell of cedar wood cancelling out that of Indian rubber.

At the macrolevel, take India, for instance. According to Porteous (1985: 362):

No account of India, from Kipling to the recent popular novels of M.M. Kaye and the accounts of Geoffrey Moorhouse, fails to evoke the peculiar smell of that subcontinent, half-corrupt, half-aromatic, a mixture of dung, sweat, heat, dust, rotting vegetation and spices. The intimate relationship between smell and the exotic, smell and the primeval urges, is exemplified by Kipling’s joyous celebration of India’s ‘heat and smells and oils and spices and puffs of temple incense and sweat and darkness and dirt and lust and cruelty . . .’

(Fitzgerald, 1983)

In this passage, the pluses and minuses are roughly equivalent, just as they are in a later comment when Porteous (1985: 366) speaks of the importation of two of the prevalent British smells into that ‘jewel of the crown’: the railways and the flowers of the hill stations, and just as Mark Tully, BBC correspondent in India, experiences mixed olfactory feelings when he returns after 20 years – the fragrance of marigolds versus the stench of a dung stove (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2001).

But the ambivalence heightens as the descriptions become more and more problematic, when Porteous (1985: 362) talks of ‘failure to invoke a peculiar sense’ and when he lapses into such expressions as ‘half-corrupt’ and ‘half-aromatic’. No small wonder that Kipling cannot adequately convey the Indian odour of darkness, dirt, lust and cruelty, as a counterpart to the oils, spices and incense. Graham Greene (1978) runs into similar communicational difficulties when reporting his foray into Western Liberia:

I enjoyed the first day’s trek into the Republic because everything was new: the sense of racing the dark, even the taste of warm boiled water, the smell of the carriers; it wasn’t an unpleasant smell, sweet or sour; it was bitter, and reminded me of a breakfast food I had as a child after pleurisy, something
vigorous and body-building which I disliked. This bitter taint was mixed with the rich plummy smell of the kola nuts the carriers picked from the ground and chewed, with an occasional flower scent one couldn’t trace in the thick untidy greenery. All the smells were drawn out, as the heat increased, like vapour from moist ground (pp. 80–81).

Sour or sweet, bitter and plummy, flower scented, an untraceable aroma – Greene really is faced with an unenviable choice as he attempts to describe an amalgam of bivalent sensations.

The same neutralizing effect is evident in contemporary travelogues, for example Powell’s (2001) portrayal of Alsace as an olfactory dissonance of almond cake and sewage. It is also apparent in John Hatt’s (1985) reference to the Chinese custom of farting as a mark of appreciation of a good meal, and in Kingsley Amis’ (1988: 13) perplexing critique of Laurie Lee’s *A Rose for Winter*, in which he objects to the phrase ‘fragrant as water’. According to Amis, the expression ‘at first sight seems to mean almost nothing, and upon reflection and reconsideration is seen to mean almost nothing’.

The Olfactory ‘Othering’ of Destination Peoples

Earlier, it was noted in Kirkup’s (1985) essay how olfactory generalizability from Osaka to the whole of Japan was made in largely glowing terms through the distinctive pomade smell of its (male) inhabitants, an example of indexical transference from the citizenry of a destination to the destination itself. Thus, although place and people may be treated separately for analytical purposes, it is important to recognize that they very much constitute a single cumulative phenomenon, that nature and culture unite to form a given smellscape. Accordingly, what is emphasized in this section – the interpersonal olfactory dimension – must be understood in these terms.

With that proviso, a brief examination can be undertaken of what various commentators have to say about smell as it is socially constructed and experienced. For Porteous (1985: 361), ‘personal smells vary according to race, ethnicity, culture, age, sex and class.’ As examples of this observation, he indicates that ‘the smell of babies is often liked, whereas the smell of old people or the sick is avoided.’ Similarly the odour of Russian peasants, Irish farm workers or gypsies is often portrayed as offensive, while the nymphet, Lolita, is described more positively as a combination of perfume and the occasional hot breath of popcorn (Nabokov, 1959), and Gabriela as a heady mix of clove and cinnamon (Amado, 1978).

For this reason, Largey and Watson (1977) refer to a ‘moral symbolism’ relevant to interaction that is expressed via olfactory imagery, one which confers moral identity on a group. Synott (1993) is more explicit when he elaborates on the moral construction of reality through smell. For Synott (1993: 183), odour is a boundary marker, a status symbol, a device for distance maintenance, an impression management technique. In short, it is a
statement of who one is and, by corollary, a sign of the sort of social interaction one expects. As part of an individual’s role repertoire, olfactory appreciation, whether positive or negative, is built up through a process of socialization (Synott, 1993: 188), and activated in the negotiation of identity. Hence people are judged in much the same way as food or wine, whether or not they conform with or deviate from the perceived olfactory cultural norm (Synott, 1993: 190).

Smell thus becomes a social attribute, real or imagined, the moral construction of one group by another (Synott, 1993: 194), an exercise in definitional power, in which there is an overall tendency for ‘conflicting parties to impute foul odours to each other’ (Synott, 1993: 192). One can speak relatedly about ‘the sexual politics of odour’ (Synott, 1993: 198), the education of the sexes into opposite roles and the continuation of this socialization through gendered product advertising.

Clearly emerging from these commentaries, and of direct application to tourism, is the realization that the attribution of human smells very much forms part of the ‘othering’ process. Odours have valence, and the imputation of their negative qualities arises through asymmetrical relationships in which definitions of situations are imposed from those in superordinate on those in subordinate positions. This ‘looking down one’s nose’ is particularly evident in descriptions of developing countries and their inhabitants. However, derogatory descriptions can also emanate from former denizens of the developing world looking back on their past. A case in point is Shiva Naipaul who, having inhaled the *dolce vita* of metropolitan life, and possibly sharing his celebrated brother (V.S. Naipaul’s) view that Trinidad is ‘the Third World’s Third World’, has the following to say about the land of his birth:

My father’s family lived in darkest Caroni, Trinidad’s Indian heartland. They worked on the sugar estates, lived in mud huts, kept cows, goats and chickens; men and women with rough hands, who smelled of dust and sugar-cane and – all too often – of rum.

(Chancellor, 1988: 22)

A rarer example of a favourable portrayal of destination people is taken from the explorer, Eric Hansen’s (2001) visit to Long Busong where he participated in a native dance:

One of the young women then climbed on to the man’s back and placed the feathered head-dress on to my head. It took both her hands to tie the thing securely under my chin, and while she did so she pressed her body against me for balance. The damn bear skin vest was stiff with age and didn’t convey the slightest sensation of her small breasts. She had an intoxicating fragrance of nutmeg to her skin, and she breathed lightly on my face. This is very nice, I thought to myself (p. 263).

Here, the male writer makes an exception to the normally derogatory ‘othering’ process by introducing the female sex. The olfactory experience of
strangeness is heightened by the erotic aroma of spices, thereby evoking the feminine positive.

Finally, it should be noted that some travel writers contribute to the ambivalence of their accounts whenever they indicate that some host people are conscious of the smell of the guests in their midst. Colin Thubron (1988), for instance, finds himself conversing with a young Chinese woman on a flight to Beijing. After remembering that he had once been told that the Chinese thought that Westerners smelt, he ‘penitently’ asks her ‘do we smell?’ The narrative continues:

Her fragile face smiled back at me. ‘Yes, of course.’
I baulked ‘Very much?’
‘Oh yes, all the time.’
I suppose that her bemused smile was there to cover her embarrassment.
But I asked finally, edging a little away: ‘Do I smell?’
‘Yes.’
It was too late to go back now. ‘What of?’
‘What?’
‘What of? What do I smell of?’
‘Oh!’ She plunged her face into her hands in a sudden paroxysm of giggles.
‘Smell. I thought you said smile!’
The tinkle and confusion of her laughter sabotaged the next few sentences, then she said:
‘Only in the summer. Westerners sweat more than Chinese. That’s all; that’s all. No you don’t . . . smell. No, really . . . no.’ (p. 360).

The Relationship of the Olfactory to Time, Memory and Nostalgia

Thus far, the emphasis has been predominantly on place and space. Nevertheless, there have been some indirect indications of the temporal dimension, as for example Kirkup’s (1985) olfactory experience of Japan on returning to the pomade-infused streets of Osaka. In this final section, the temporal association is made far more explicit. It is attempted via the direct aromatic connections with time, memory and nostalgia.

Time

At the microlevel, olfactory sensations differ according to the time of day. In this regard, Porteous (1985: 367) points out that ‘at daybreak and at dusk smells are especially apparent.’ As respective examples, he speaks of a frosty or dewy morning and the wind shifting at sunset, the latter bringing with it the aroma of the ocean to the seashore (Porteous, 1990). In some places, too, odourful weather events may be linked to a particular period of the day. A storm occurring around noon, for instance, may stir up ‘a rich smell of
elder flower, hemlock and dog-roses’ (Kitchen, 1963: 240 in Porteous, 1985: 367) and, once the rain has abated, the landscape smells clean again (Porteous, 1985: 367).

However, odours may also vary according to which particular day of the week is involved. In this respect, Porteous notes that in the first half of the 20th century, ‘washday’ had its own distinctive set of smells of ‘heat and moisture’, followed by ‘the hot smell of iron on calico’ (Ashby, 1961: 109 in Porteous, 1985: 367). ‘Baking day’ was even more aromatically vivid when ‘the house smelt rich and sweet of cakes and buttermilk scones and hot jams’ and ‘men and boys came in to enjoy the orgy of heat and scent and promise’ (Ashby, 1961: 209, 215 in Porteous, 1985: 367). Odours have also been associated with various periods of the year. In former times, summer would be associated with the earthy smell of hay making, autumn with the acrid odour of raking and burning weeds, and winter with the aromas of barn manure and apple storing (Porteous, 1985: 367). Easter had its own peculiar set of smells and so did Christmas (Holak and Havlena, 1992: 384). Their contemporary counterparts are quite insipid by comparison, since today most westerners live in a virtual smell desert which typically revolves around an odourless supermarket (Rodaway, 1994). Hence, if they wish to savour the aromas of yesteryear, they must travel to another place where the now is constituted by the past. Tourism is the answer to that requirement.

**Memory**

Memory and the active dwelling of the mind upon the past (reminiscing) are often linked to olfactory sensations, so much so that it is sometimes quite difficult to tell whether smells evoke memories or memories evoke smells (Synott, 1993: 187). Nevertheless, scholars investigating the connection are generally in agreement that there is such a thing as odour memory (Engen, 1991), that odour-cued memory (which is highly vivid and affectively toned) can be more reliable than verbally stimulated memory (Chu and Downes, 2000), that ambient odour enhances memory performance and aids verbal recall (Schab, 1990), that smells act as contextual cues for the recall of autobiographical information (Aggleton and Waskett, 1999), and that pleasant odour conditions bring back happy memories (Ehrlichman and Halpern, 1988), so that what smells good is good and what smells bad is bad (Synott, 1993: 190).

Many of these studies (e.g. Laird, 1935; Ehrlichman and Halpern, 1988; Schab, 1990; Chu and Downes, 2000) allude to what they call the ‘Proustian phenomenon’ or ‘Proustian hypothesis’ of odour memory (Engen, 1982; Porteous, 1985: 369), a reference to a much quoted excerpt in which Proust recalls the little tea cake which his aunt Léonie used to place before him of a Sunday morning:
And once again I had recognised the taste of the crumb of madeleine soaked in her decoction of lime-flowers... immediately the old grey house upon the street, where her room was, rose up like the scenery of a theatre... and the whole of Combray and of its surroundings, taking their shapes and growing solid, sprang into being... from my cup of tea.

(Proust, 2000: 58-59)

According to Proust (1983, 1: 47–48, 51, in Lowenthal, 1993: 16), coming upon such an object and its setting is a matter of chance rather than a deliberate act of the will, what Benjamin (1969: 160 in Urry, 2000: 137) calls a mémoire involontaire, ‘a sudden memory intervention that occurs without warning and makes the past seem incredibly vivid in the present’. Yet when the aromatic trigger is activated, as in the case of the madeleine (interestingly deriving from Mary Magdalen and the tears she shed for Christ), it is clear that here is the catalyst whose smell and taste ‘bear unflinchingly, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection’!

Proust’s olfactory experience takes him back to memories of childhood, to a time in life where such sensation is said to be at its most acute (Porteous, 1985: 357, 360). It is not surprising, therefore, that autobiographers, who necessarily rely on this flashback technique, also attempt to capture episodes of their younger days some 30–60 years later (Porteous, 1985: 370). Travel writers, too, employ a similar strategy when seeking to communicate the olfactory uniqueness of a place by referring to an earlier stage in their lives. Thus Paul Theroux (1986) speaks of his holiday sojourn at a summer-house in Cape Cod in the following manner:

As the summer passes, the odours of the Cape become more intense, the sting of the salt marsh, the gamy smell of tomato vines, the mingled aromas of ripe grapes, cut grass, skunks and pines (p. 301).

Löfgren (1999) relatedly notes that going back to a coastal cottage that has been closed all winter is also something of a return to nature, to the simple life and to childhood. Before they open the windows and doors, these repeat vacationers often remark upon the associated smell, one that has the power to evoke yesteryear, just as the scent of the surrounding ocean can remind them of times gone by.

Apart from the destination itself, the process of journeying to that destination often allows a writer to recall the past. This observation is particularly germane to rail travel, especially in relation to steam trains that are only kept running by the conservationist efforts of aficionados. A typical case is Schuckburgh’s (2001) recent account of a ride through Britain on one of these vintage locomotives where ‘a smoking smell wafted through the open window bringing back memories.’
Nostalgia

Whereas memories, including those of smell, tend to be positive in nature, nostalgia (from nóstos: to return home and algia: a painful condition (Davis, 1979: 1)) can, and often does, involve distress. Although nostalgia shares selective recall with memory, it differs in its emphasis of the sensory over the cognitive and in its ambivalent feelings of bitter-sweetness (Batcho, 1998: 412). According to Davis (1979), nostalgia is usually experienced by the middle-aged and elderly hankering after a period of adolescence or early adulthood (cf. Holak and Havlena, 1992: 380). He distinguishes it into the following three ascending orders: ‘simple nostalgia’ (the largely unexamined belief that things were better/more beautiful/healthier/happier/more civilized/more exciting in the past than in the present), ‘reflexive nostalgia’ (a questioning of that claim) and ‘interpreted nostalgia’ (invoking an analysis of a given nostalgic reaction or experience) (Davis, 1979: 17–26). Nostalgia thus tends to thrive where there is dissatisfaction with the present and fear of the future (Holak and Havlena, 1992: 380–381).

Holak and Havlena (1992) point out that empirically nostalgia is most frequently associated with leisure activities (p. 381), typically holidays (pp. 381, 383), either because of the warm feelings experienced and/or due to the people involved – living or dead relatives, classmates, friends, work colleagues. Often, too, people affectionately, if not wistfully, remember the aromas of those occasions (pp. 380, 384, 386).

Many classical authors have employed olfactory nostalgia in their narratives. Tennyson, for example, in highlighting the scent of violets, often recalled ‘the times when I remember to have been joyful and free from blame’, while for Dickens’ David Copperfield the scent of a geranium leaf brought back memories of ‘Dora’s straw hat, blue ribbons and curls’ (Lowenthal, 1993: 251). More bitter-sweet in nature was James Joyce (1982: 7, 10, 16) as Stephen Daedalus in his autobiographical A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man recalling the aromas of childhood: the strange odour of the oil cloth on his bed, the toasted aroma of his mother’s slippers by the fire, and the cold night smell of the school chapel.

Travel writers, in turn, use nostalgia in their accounts when trying to communicate olfactory experiences. Take, for instance, Jan Morris’ (1986) return to Singapore:

When I landed in Singapore a homing instinct led me direct to the core of this dead colony, the downtown expanse of green called the Padang, and there without surprise I discovered that imperial ghosts live on. There was the warm nostalgic smell of mown grass (p. 303).

In this passage there is the Heimweh of the ‘homing instinct’ combined with the Zeitweh of longing for the past. Yet it is a collective past of ‘imperial ghosts’, death and bitterness that is mixed with a sweeter, more personal recollection of the aroma of freshly cut grass, and no doubt the associated,
though unmentioned, sights, sounds and smells of cricket being played on the colonial pasture.

The deodorization of contemporary Western society thus becomes a nostalgic quest for lost scents (Porteous, 1985: 368; Synott, 1993: 87; Classen et al., 1994). Today, since many rural areas in northwestern Europe have lost their distinctive odoriferous character, people travel to more remote areas of the periphery in order to experience smellscapes of the past (Porteous, 1990: 33). Hence the appeal of Greek islands, of their little shops where one can still purchase local cheeses, oil and herbs, savour the surrounding ambience, and later, in a taverna, partake of these same aromatic foods – traditional dishes prepared just like grandmother used to make.

Thus also the lure of historic attractions and re-enactments which are advertised according to their original sights and smells, whether they are referring to those of the First World War (Lennon and Foley, 2000: 115) or those of a 14th-century battleground (Luton and Dunstable Herald and Post, 1997). Yet, ironically, for history to become acceptable for tourists, for ‘nostalgia to pay the bills’ (Lowenthal, 1993: 345), the bitterness of verisimilitude must yield to the sweetness of inauthenticity: the cowpats, horse dung and pig manure, the smoke-blackened hovels of the unwashed, disease-ridden, illiterate inhabitants of New England must be re-presented as plump butter-churning, candle-making, bonneted ladies sitting round their jolly hearth-sides and blazing log fires (Lowenthal, 1993: 341). Otherwise, returning to the past stinks, and the more it stinks the more it has people yearning for the 21st century (Lowenthal, 1993: 28).

Conclusion: the Olfactory Tourist as a Metaphor of the Social World

By way of summary, it has been suggested in this presentation that the traditional ocular-centric view of tourism should be supplemented by the inclusion of the remaining human senses if the tourist experience is to be holistic and complete. This case has been made by focusing on the hitherto much neglected sense of smell and by pointing out recent recognition of its importance by both science and tourism-related technology. Just how the tourist is led by the nose is investigated spatially via travel accounts with their evaluative crafting of aromatic places and their peoples. The temporal dimension of odour has also been explored, particularly with reference to memory and nostalgia, the yearning for selective scents of yesteryear.

However, the argument can be taken one stage further, and hence open up areas for potential future research, by briefly contextualizing what has been said about the olfactory tourist within the wider theoretical framework of tourism as a metaphor of the social world. According to Bauman (1997: 93), tourists are metaphors of contemporary life, so much so that studies of
them can shed light on little-understood features of present-day existence. Indeed, van den Abbeele (1992) has an entire book devoted to *Travel as Metaphor*, and both MacCannell (1989) and Wang (2000) have argued convincingly that the tourist is the representative of modernity *par excellence*.

But what is so metaphorical about the sense of smell, when clearly it involves a very real sensation and has such elemental arousing qualities? The answer, already tentatively provided in this study, resides in the difficulty of its expression and in its symbolic content. As has been seen, destinations of the periphery are often *compared* with those of the centre in order to capture something of their idiosyncratic aroma, thereby, ironically, giving the lie to their olfactory distinctiveness and to promotional appeals based on uniqueness and difference. People, too, especially when derogatorily portrayed, are said, by way of metaphor or simile, to smell like a whore, a skunk (Largey and Watson, 1977: 1023), or whatever politically incorrect phrase is employed by a writer to denigrate and ‘other’ residents of a destination by injections of moral supremacy in the face of foreignness. As Jacobsen (1997: 31) notes, ‘olfactory experiences of place often seem to be undesired by tourists and are often negatively described, as for example smells and unwanted close contact with strangers.’

Synott (1993: 190) sums up the situation well when he acknowledges that of the three types of smell: natural, manufactured and symbolic, the last mentioned is of greatest social significance (p. 182). For him, ‘odour is a natural sign of the self as both a physical and moral being’ (p. 190). Consequently, it conveys morally constructed messages of impending interaction, particularly of asymmetrical encounters with those defined as subordinates. Such symbolism, Synott (1993) maintains, is most evident in language (itself a collection of symbols), where description becomes prescription (p. 191). Porteous (1985: 360) relatedly speaks of ‘the metaphoric load carried by smell’ as well as its ambivalent qualities. Individuals today have grown accustomed not only to employing such metaphorical clichés as ‘bad odour’, ‘the odour of sanctity’ and ‘the sweet smell of success’ in their quotidian speech, but also to applying them normatively in human settings. Tourists are no exception to this rule.

A juncture is thus finally reached where polysensual tourism in general, and olfactory tourism in particular, constitute the moral construction of reality, the essential blend for restoring a sense of place in an increasingly placeless world (Relph, 1983; Jacobsen, 1997: 28). If this restorative hope of combining promotional technology with touristic aspiration in all its aromatic fullness is itself futuristically nostalgia, at least it contributes to the realization that a social world without tourism is a static, individualistic world of odourless, permanent residents. The time has surely come to bring it to its senses.
Notes

1 A more general version of this finding is the widely acknowledged ‘adaptation effect’, whereby continuous exposure to an odorant leads to a decline in sensitivity and a corresponding increase in the tolerance threshold. Thus a person entering a kitchen for the first time may be overwhelmed by the culinary smells. After a while, however, these initial olfactory sensations diminish (Schiffmann, 1976: 149).

2 This situation is more technically known as ‘synaesthesia’, a crossing over of the senses. Here words may be expressed as colours, shapes as tastes, sounds as odours, and so on (Sieveking, 2001).

3 Maybe Thubron had read in Orwell (in Synott, 1993: 201): ‘Orientals say that we smell. The Chinese, I believe, say that a white man smells like a corpse. The Burmese say the same – though no Burman was rude enough to say it to me.’ Synott (1993: 201) also reports that: ‘the Japanese used to describe the Europeans as bata-kusai: ‘stinks of butter’ and that during the Canadian Arctic Expedition of 1913–1918 an elderly Inuit woman admitted to Diamond Jenness that she noticed an objectionable odour about the explorers.

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Re-centring the Self in Volunteer Tourism

Stephen Wearing

Introduction

In initial sociological work investigating tourism, there was a preoccupation with the individual tourist and the part that holidays played in establishing identity and a sense of self. This self was posited predominantly as a universal, and tourism, like leisure, was seen in a dialectical relationship with the ‘workaday world’. Cohen and Taylor (1976), for example, drew on Goffman’s (1974) ‘presentation of self in everyday life’ to argue that vacations were culturally sanctioned escape routes for Western travellers. In this view, one of the problems for the contemporary tourist was to establish identity and a sense of personal individuality in the face of the anomic forces of a technological world. Holidays provided a free area, a mental and physical escape from the immediacy and multiplicity of impinging pressures in post-industrial society. They supplied scope for the nurture and cultivation of human identity. Indeed, and as Cohen and Taylor argued, overseas holidays were structurally similar to leisure because one of their chief purposes was the establishment of identity and the cultivation of self-consciousness. The tourist, they claimed, used all aspects of the holiday for the manipulation of well-being.

However, in the literature, these arguments became diverted into a debate about the authenticity of this experience (cf. MacCannell, 1976; Cohen, 1988), by focusing attention on the attractions of a given destination. Such a shift objectified the destination, as place – a specific geographical site – was presented to tourists for their gaze (Urry, 1990). Thus the manner of staging became all important and its authenticity the aim of the analysis.

This chapter examines volunteer tourism. In so doing, it provides an alternative to the foregoing analyses. It suggests that the theorization of volunteer tourism, like that of leisure, needs to recognize the interrelationship of time, site and the activities provided at the destination. It also requires a fundamental focus on the individual subjective experience in providing for the significance of the tourist experience. Thus, while not being divorced from its sociological contextualization, it allows for the elaboration of the role of the individual volunteer tourist in the active construction of the ‘tourist experience’. This positing of the centrality of experience relates to individuals, their social groups, their travel experiences and the elements that are required to sustain those experiences.

This chapter analyses the enthusiasm and positive attempts to employ tourism as a means for support for both youth and communities. In a global society that increasingly uses dogma and marketing to instil values and exploit social relations, volunteer tourism represents both an opportunity and a means of value adding in an industry that seems to represent consumer capitalism at its worst. With transnationals everywhere attempting to recast themselves as people friendly, it is time to recognize that they are not the ones who are contributing to any real form of growth for developing countries and local communities. Transnational tourism organizations have pursued their colonialization-cum-globalization agenda on a ‘free and fair trade’ ticket for decades, all the while suggesting that a free market economy adopts the same principles as those espoused by Adam Smith in defiance of the system of mercantilism.

These are the ideals of a laissez-faire system of government and regulation – free competition based on supply and demand. Mass tourism operates efficiently under this ideology, as there are few regulations to limit its operations. Tourism in a free market economy can exploit natural resources as a means of profit accumulation, and consequently has been described as the commercialization of the human need to travel. The notion of unlimited gain has led to the exploitation of host communities, their cultures and environments.

Tourism perpetuates inequality, with the multinational companies of the advanced capitalist countries retaining the economic power and resources to invest in and ultimately control nations of the developing world. In many cases, a developing country’s engagement with tourism serves simply to confirm its dependent, subordinate position in relation to the advanced capitalist societies – itself a form of neo-colonialism. Developed nations’ economic patterns of consumption have enabled transnational
organizations to use modern tourism as a vehicle for packaging developing nations’ cultures as ‘commodities of difference’, filling a commercially created need in mass consciousness. The ability of the developed nations to dominate market forces through the tourism industry is changing the shape of developing nations’ communities.

Volunteer tourism represents a way of doing things differently, a way of looking forward to the future, of providing a different experience. It can supply a direct interactive experience that causes value change and changed consciousness in individuals, which will subsequently influence their lifestyle, while encouraging forms of local community development.

**Conceptualization of Volunteer Tourism**

Some analyses of the imagery of tourist destinations (Dilley, 1986; Telisman-Kosuta, 1989; Echtner and Ritchie, 1991; Gartner, 1993; C.B. Cohen, 1995; Bramwell and Rawding, 1996) assume that each individual’s experience of a tourist destination will be similar. There is, however, a significant body of research that indicates that such a view is, in fact, counter-productive (Rowe and Stevenson, 1994; Dann, 1995). This chapter seeks to explore the possibility of a more useful conceptualization that allows for explanations of the volunteer tourist experience: that is, persons who are influenced by the subjective meanings through which they are affected, constructed in interaction with the space and people that form the destination site. It is the experience of the interaction in this specific space that affects the socially constructed self of the individual who travels between specifically bounded spatio-temporal coordinates. Therefore, the tourist as a wanderer seeking simply to repudiate established tourism experiences (E. Cohen, 1995: 13) is critiqued as still failing to incorporate or recognize elements that may provide for an understanding of the experience.

In drawing upon a wide range of theory concerning agency, subjective meanings, subjectivities and the self – specifically in relation to volunteer tourism and a concomitant emphasis on interpersonal relationships – the conceptualization of the tourist destination as an interactive space (cf. Wearing and Wearing, 2002) – provisionally indicates a number of elements that may contribute to a shift in the way that the tourist experience is analysed. The move away from the tourist experience as simply that of an itinerant ‘gazer’ towards an interacting agent within a specific spatio-temporal site and a series of processually exchangeable interactions, facilitates the transition towards a consideration of the differential elements that contribute towards the totality of the experience, and allows a depth of analysis that can accommodate the complexities of the volunteer tourism experience.

Wearing and Wearing (2002) have indicated that tourism, when examined as experience, involves complex and often subtle interactions
between the tourist, the site and the host community. This suggestion presents problems and limitations if analyses are predicated on the metaphors of the tourist as ‘wanderer’, ‘gazer’ and ‘escaper’, as is common in the literature on both mass and alternative tourism. However, if the tour group, the host community and the natural environment, to varying degrees, are all considered as components of any tourist experience, there is a need to move beyond these boundaries towards a more analytically flexible conceptualization. This exercise entails a fundamental re-evaluation through the challenging of existing notions, bringing into focus often overlooked convergences and processual elements (Grosz, 1987, 1994). It allows for a critique of the assumptions implicit in the ‘tourist gaze’, the tourist ‘destination’, the marketing ‘image’ and the ‘visit’. It provides the grounds for the construction of the idea of volunteer tourism, along with a more in-depth analysis and broader conceptualization of the volunteer tourist experience.

What is Volunteer Tourism?

Contemporary volunteer tourism has tended to suffer from a lack of differentiation from other forms of tourism or volunteering. It has been the subject of selective pragmatism, rather than a specific definition or method, by being placed into such categories as alternative tourism, international volunteering, social work and conservation corps work. Here, by contrast, a more substantive boundary is provided and its more specific identity is recognized. In this chapter, the generic term ‘volunteer tourism’ is applied to those tourists who, for various reasons, volunteer in an organized way to undertake holidays that may involve the aiding or alleviating the material poverty of some groups in society, the restoration of certain environments, or research into aspects of society or environment.

Examples of volunteer tourist operations include those offered by organizations such as Youth Challenge International, The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Earthwatch. While their projects vary in location, size, participant characteristics and central purpose, the common element is that their participants can be viewed largely as volunteer tourists. They are persons seeking a tourist experience that is mutually beneficial, that will contribute not only to their individual development, but also positively and directly to the social, natural and/or economic environments in which they are involved. The philosophy of Explorations in Travel (nd), a US-based volunteer work-placement firm provides a typical insight:

Travelling is a way to discover new things about ourselves and learn to see ourselves more clearly. Volunteering abroad is a way to spend time within another culture, to become part of new community, to experience life from a different perspective . . . Every community needs people willing to volunteer their time, energy and money to projects that will improve the living
conditions for its inhabitants. No one needs to travel around the world to find a good and worthy cause to dedicate their efforts to. Volunteering should be something we do as a regular part of our lives, not just when we can take a month or two off, or when we have extra money to spend on travel. Your actions are your voice in the world, saying loudly and clearly what you think is important, what you believe to be right, what you support.

The British Trust for Conservation Volunteers (BTCV) also emphasizes this point in an environmental conservation context:

Voluntary and community action can support site and species surveys, practical conservation projects, and longer term care and management. In the course of giving their time, energy, and experience to improving biodiversity, people can gain social and economic benefits including understanding, knowledge and skills. All of this can then further enhance their voluntary commitment.

(BTCV, 2000: 1)

Volunteer tourism takes place in varied locations, such as rainforests and cloud-forests, biological reserves and conservation areas. Popular locations include countries in Africa, Central and South America. Activities vary across many areas, and include scientific research (wildlife, land and water), conservation projects, medical assistance, economic and social development (including agriculture, construction and education), and cultural restoration. Indeed, volunteers can find themselves anywhere in a range of pursuits that extends, for example, from assisting with mass eye-surgery operations to constructing a rainforest reserve. There is nearly always, however, the opportunity for volunteers to take part in local activities and interact further with the resident community. Hence the volunteer tourist contribution is bilateral, in that the most important development that occurs in the volunteer tourist experience is that of a personal nature, that of a greater awareness of self:

When volunteers come back they feel empowered, knowing they have been able to make a difference . . . You come home feeling you don’t have limits. You feel a lot more confident in your ideas and beliefs and that you can contribute to society.

(Hill, 2001: 28)

Of interest, however, is the realization that volunteer tourists almost always pay in some way to participate in these activities. Furthermore, the amount is usually more than an average tourist would expect to spend on a ‘normal’ holiday to a similar location. While there are some sponsorship programmes and alternative contribution arrangements provided by some organizations, the financial outlay required of the volunteer tourist is illustrative of the wider nature of the experience – of greater benefits for host and tourist alike.

It is suggested here that as a part of the volunteer tourism experience, interactions occur and the self is thereby enlarged or expanded, challenged,
renewed or reinforced. As such, the experience becomes an ongoing process which extends far beyond the actual tourist visit (Wearing, 1998). In Rojek’s (1993: 114) words:

Travel, it was thought, led to the accumulation of experience and wisdom. One began with nothing, but through guidance, diligence and commonsense one gained knowledge and achieved self-realisation.

Volunteer tourism similarly provides an opportunity for an individual to engage in an altruistic attempt to explore ‘self’. It has been built around the belief that by living in and learning about other people and cultures, in an environment of mutual benefit and cooperation, a person is able to engage in a transformation and development of the self (Wearing and Neil, 2001).

In contrast, the broader tourism literature suggests that holidays do not usually have a tremendous impact on the way in which individuals see themselves (Kottler, 1997: 103). It has been contended that holidays serve as an escape from the constraints and stresses of everyday life (Burkart and Medlik, 1974: 56; Cohen and Taylor, 1976; Rojek, 1993), or perhaps serve as a reward for hard work, rather than ultimately altering people’s everyday lives in terms of the way they think, feel or act. The traditional tourism literature suggests that, while individuals may have enjoyed themselves, it is not long before that holiday is a memory in the day-to-day life to which they return. This chapter, it must be re-emphasized, explores a different approach – taking volunteer tourism and investigating the more significant impacts it can have on the individual and on the development of the self.

While much has been written about the motivations of tourists, little research has been conducted on the impact that leisure experiences, such as volunteer tourism, may have on the development of the self through travel. As such, this chapter employs vocabularies of motive through the personal accounts of volunteer tourists from Wearing (1998) and Darby (1994) in order to explore this complex phenomenon.

In examining volunteer tourists, it will be seen how they make a difference not only in the places with which they interact, but also within themselves.

If I had that time over again, I would never get back and get into that same routine and structure. No one can see the difference, but things have changed. You need to have some sort of recognition in yourself that you have changed as a person. Not even so much a debriefing, just sort of on your own terms, just to be able to synthesise afterwards.

(Kim, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

The idea of travel for personal development is not new. It was the ‘Grand Tour’, which became popular in the 16th century, that best represents it. Aristocratic young men from ‘the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe undertook extended trips to continental Europe for educational and cultural purposes’ (Weaver and Oppermann, 2000: 61).
However, while high social value was placed on these expeditions, it was here that travel motives began to shift: travelling for education and social status slowly gave way to travelling for pleasure and sightseeing. The industrial revolution saw a growing need for recreational opportunities and, subsequently, transport systems allowed them to occur. Following the introduction of improvements in railways, sealed roads and even ocean liners, the nature of travel began to change rapidly. With the widespread application of air travel for leisure purposes and growing economies of scale, travel soon became a commodity to be sold to a growing number of potential tourists. As Hall (1995: 38) observes:

Mass tourism is generally acknowledged to have commenced on the 5 July 1841, when the first conducted excursion train of Thomas Cook left Leicester station in northern Britain. Since that time tourism has developed from the almost exclusive domain of the aristocracy to an experience that is enjoyed by tens of millions worldwide.

As tourism advanced into the 19th century, it became more and more insulated from the real world. In opposition to its origins, where travellers sought the unknown, tourism was fast becoming a home from home experience where participants no longer had to expose themselves to the dangers of having to meet and associate with the host community. They were now able to ‘gaze’ (Urry, 1990: 135) from the safety and comfort of coaches, trains and hotel rooms without actually involving themselves in any way. Group sizes and frequency of excursions increased, thereby ushering in ‘mass tourism’.

Similar to the way in which this type of ‘flâneurism’ (Urry, 1990: 138; Wearing and Wearing, 1996) characterized tourism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, alternative tourism has characterized the latter part of the 20th century. Tourists began searching for new and exciting forms of travel in defiance of a mass-produced product borne out of the Industrial Revolution (Hall, 1995; Weaver and Oppermann, 2000). Backpacking, adventure tourism and eco-tourism were some of the types of alternative tourism that emerged during this period and have since confirmed, via their popularity, their place as targeted market segments. Niches have been correspondingly developed that allow tourists to choose the holiday they feel best suits their needs, while at the same time maintaining an appropriate level of social status among their peers.

But how significant are these alternative tourist markets? To begin with, one of the most popular segments – eco-tourism – The International Ecotourism Society (TIES) admits that while its ‘definition has been widely accepted . . . [it] does not serve as a functional definition for gathering statistics. No global initiative presently exists for the gathering of eco-tourism data. Eco-tourism should be considered a specialty segment of the larger nature tourism market’ (International Ecotourism Society, 2001: 1). Indeed, other ‘alternative’ niche markets also suffer from the same data
collection shortcomings at the international and national level. While a supply-side attempt to measure the volunteer tourist market could prove useful, it would also be likely to face definitional, temporal and geographical limitations.

Still, alternative tourism is now being seriously considered as a significant area of tourism experience (Holden, 1984; E. Cohen, 1987, 1995; Vir Singh et al., 1989; Pleumarom, 1990; Smith and Eadington, 1992; Weiler and Hall, 1992), even though a number of authors (e.g. Butler, 1992; E. Cohen, 1995) have attempted to incorporate it into ‘mass tourism’, thereby subordinating it to mainstream tourism research. Questions thus arise as to the feasibility of alternative tourism being analysed in terms of a separate construct. This issue has been a problem historically within new and emergent areas of research, as, for example, in the case of feminist research (Stanley and Wise, 1984). The popularity of specific forms of alternative tourism, such as eco-tourism3 (a relatively new term in the world’s vocabulary) and now volunteer tourism (coined ‘voluntourism’ at a recent conference), has increased significantly and can be seen in a number of works (e.g. Wearing, 1998, 2001; Wearing and Neil, 1998, 1999).

Selves in the Tourism Experience

To date, sociologies of tourism have developed two major themes concerning the self of the traveller. First, there has been an emphasis on tourism as a means of escape from everyday life, even if such escape is temporary. Secondly, travel has been constructed as a means of self-development, a way to broaden the mind, experience the new and different and return in some way enriched. Both approaches involve the self of the tourist (cf. Wearing, 1998; Wearing and Neil, 2001). One adopts a pessimistic view, suggesting there is no escape (e.g. Cohen and Taylor, 1976; Rojek, 1993); the other takes an optimistic outlook in which everyone benefits from the tourist experience (e.g. Pearce, 1984; Brown, 1992). There are some commentators, such as MacCannell (1992), who attempt to balance the two views. He sees the touristic movement of peoples both to and from the Western world as an opportunity to form hybrid cultures, a precondition for inventing and creating subjectivities that resist cultural constraints. MacCannell claims that the neo-nomads of tourism in the postmodern era cross cultural boundaries not as invaders, but as imaginative travellers who benefit from displaced self-understanding and the freedom to go beyond the limits that frontiers present. The ‘true heroes’ of tourism, he claims, are those who know that ‘their future will be made of dialogue with their fellow travellers and those they meet along the way’ (1992: 4). However, MacCannell debunks the traveller who seeks escape through tourism while demanding the comforts of home, at an exaggerated and luxurious level. ‘This’, he says,
‘is an overturned nomadic consciousness in which the ultimate goal of travel is to set up sedentary housekeeping in the entire world, to displace the local peoples, or at least to subordinate them in the enterprise, to make them the “household” staff of global capitalists’ (1992: 5). This form of ingesting the ‘other’ into the self – and subsequently eliminating it – is termed ‘contemporary cannibalism’ – where the tourist consumes and destroys the culture of host peoples in developing countries. Far from enlarging the self, MacCannell sees this form of tourism as supplying the energy for ‘autoeroticism, narcissism, economic conservatism, egoism, and absolute group unity or fascism’ (1992: 66). The tourist self, in his view, remains rigid or static, turned in on itself – shrinking, rather than expanding, or, in Craib’s (1998) terms, closing down psychic space where the self of the host person is devalued and diminished.

Building on Kelly’s (1996: 45) work on leisure, where he proclaims that ‘this relative freedom makes possible the investment of self that leads to the fullest development of ourselves, the richest expression of who we want to become, and the deepest experience of fulfilment,’ volunteer tourists seek to discover the type of life experiences that best suits their needs. In undertaking this quest, they launch themselves into a journey of personal discovery.

I wanted to do something like working overseas in a developing country, some sort of adventure or something different.

(Lil, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

The volunteer tourist’s experiences offer an opportunity to examine the potential of travel to change the self, in the belief that these experiences are of a more permanent nature than those of the average guided, packaged holiday that lasts 2 or 3 weeks (Kottler, 1997: 103).

... more independent and self-assured and sure about who I am.

(Sue, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

Craik and Cohen have introduced the metaphor of the ‘modern day pilgrim’ to suggest that during the process of searching for something else, one may be better able to identify with one’s self. The reasons for this state of affairs could relate to the fact that, as a result of travelling for a longer period of time, people come out of a holiday mode and begin to accept things as being normal and respond accordingly (Hansel, 1993: 97). As volunteer tourists learn and interact more with the people and the culture of the place in which they are living, the surrounding environment becomes more familiar and, so, they naturally absorb, integrate and adopt elements of that setting. Being able to accept and deal with one’s milieu is an important element in the development of the self, and it can be through volunteer tourism experiences that individuals come to learn how to rely on themselves.

The rainforest itself, I didn’t expect it to be anywhere near as beautiful. I didn’t expect to like it so much because when we first arrived it was so muddy and
horrendous, but by the end of it, you were really sort of attached to the place because the time there was so good.

(Amy, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

Seeking out the new and unfamiliar and going beyond the daily concept of the self is an essential step in the development of the latter. Its attainment through ‘rites of passage’ (Withey, 1997: 3) ensures that each individual is subjected to arduous and sometimes painful ordeals (Craik, 1986: 24). Tourism can be considered an excellent example of such testing, as many situations encountered whilst embarking on touristic activities can be fraught with problems – difficulties often borne out of ignorance of one’s surroundings. However, a number of tourists ‘actually pay to be put in uncomfortable and dangerous situations’ (Craik, 1986: 25) so that they can feel a sense of achievement and reward once the experience is over.

Despite such suggestions, volunteer tourist experiences do not necessarily have to be dangerous in order for an individual to benefit from them. Darby (1994) and Wearing (1998) both indicate that an examination of travel experiences (such as volunteer tourism) endured by people during the stage of late adolescence can provide a clearer understanding of how an individual goes about developing a sense of self. A common element among this age group seems to be that persons need to feel independent, to be able to handle any difficulties that they encounter without the aid of others. As Darby (1994: 131) has stated in relation to Youth Challenge International volunteer tourist participants: ‘breaking away from previous social groups and perceptions . . . gave the participants a chance to review their self; their relation to other people; and their goals and aspirations for the future.’ Therefore, it may be argued that separation from ‘the familiar’ can provide an excellent opportunity for individuals to seek new challenges and expand or reconfirm their identities.

In Costa Rica and Santa Elena there was a sense of family, and Israel really focused that. In Australia we have a really different society. Coming from a split family, it was really wonderful to see the importance that people put on families in the community, to have a community that works as a whole family unit is really important over there. I was single and never wanted to get married, never wanted to have kids, but I came back with a real sense of what a wonderful thing it is to have a family. It’s something that is really basic, and you kind of almost think because we are such consumers, it almost defaults it. But it is such a basic part of life, and such a natural thing to have that family life. To put yourself out for your kids and your family. I don’t necessarily want kids, but I would rather kids than a house. I’d rather live in a tent in Santa Elena than have a house.

(Ros, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

Evidence from international volunteer tourist operations (cf. Darby, 1994; Wearing, 1998) and other volunteer agencies suggests that a high percentage of participants are between the ages of 18 and 25. The experience of being away from their familiar culture is imperative, in the sense that
they can begin focusing on what they, as individuals, desire in their lives independent of their peers and parents or other reference groups (Hattie, 1992: 18). Hewitt (1979: 74) maintains that all of these persons are assigned a character both by others and by themselves (whereby they are expected to act in a particular way in all circumstances). However, they may feel so trapped or stifled by the boundaries of this character that they feel obliged to seek out a new environment. Iso-Ahola (1994: 53) makes a related point:

Given the essence of perceived freedom to leisure and the positive relationship between perceived freedom and perceived control, much of leisure has to do with exercise of personal control over one’s behaviour and environment... leisure develops self-determination personality and thereby helps buffer against stressful life events.

This freedom and resulting self-determination (Iso-Ahola, 1994: 53) may have the effect of providing individuals with the opportunity to develop their sense of self. Through being largely in control, not feeling pressured to act in any specific manner, taking ‘time out’ from normal daily life and adopting different roles, volunteer tourists can become more aware of what they are seeking and be better equipped to deal with the challenges faced in their ‘real’ lives (Kottler, 1997: 29).

Examinations of prior practices in the field of tourism reinforce the belief that tourism can, in fact, improve the mind and overall character of its participants. Tourism, as it is known today, includes certain elements of pilgrimage (Craik, 1986: 30). This metaphor implies that, through the travel experience, persons can aspire to discover things about the world around them and their particular place within that world. Through the self-testing element of tourism, they can gain knowledge and confidence about themselves, their abilities/limitations (Darby, 1994) and possibly insights into the direction that they feel their lives should take.

Since volunteer tourism experiences can be examined differently from other experiences, they permit a close analysis of the self in tourism. These volunteer experiences cause value and consciousness changes in individuals that subsequently influence their concept of self.

Even so, while the volunteer tourist experience can even predicate a change in identity, Glasser argues that the pursuit of a desired identity is often channelled into consumerism through the promulgation in modern complex societies of an ideal person whose main ‘freely chosen’ leisure activity is consumption (Glasser, 1976), i.e. consumption, culture and/or nature may meet in volunteer tourism. According to this view, volunteer tourists can never achieve what they seek. The experience becomes a tranquillizer rather than an awareness-raising attempt to cancel out the stress of life. The individual is left with a frustrated search for some form of identity and an endless need to follow the latest dictates of big business and tourist markets. Local destination communities are consumed under the guise of a
legitimate altruistic activity rather than leading to an awareness and appreciation of culture, nature and discovery of the travel–self link.

Wearing and Wearing (2002) relatedly argue that sociological theory concerning the self has moved in recent years away from an internalized consistent and rational ‘I’ propagated along with the certainties of modernity, towards a fragmented, decentred notion of many selves constructed according to the changing discourses of postmodernity. They maintain that it is possible to reconceptualize the self in the postmodern era by modifying Mead’s interactionism to produce a process model of the self that includes embodiment and emotionality as well as reflexivity and openness to development through experiences such as travel. All of these ideas can be applied to volunteer tourism.

In their construction of a ‘postmodern interactionism’, Jagtenberg and McKie, for example, claim that the reflexive self is able to move beyond prior definitions (1997: 149). Craib (1998: 9) argues that post-structuralist constructions of identity have emphasized the discursive to the exclusion of individual experience. He claims that experience contributes to an ‘I’ which organizes the various ‘me’s’ and which includes not only a rational, thinking self, but also a ‘flow of feelings and unconscious processes’ (1998: 170). His ‘I’ has the ability either to close down the individual’s psychic space or to enlarge it through thinking, feeling and experiencing. When these insights are applied to volunteer tourism, a depth of understanding is opened up that allows analysis of the depth of experience found in the volunteer tourist.

The arguments of some postmodern writers (Grosz, 1987, 1994; Hearn, 1994; Seidler, 1994; Bordo, 1995; Gatens, 1996; Kimmel, 1996; Turner, 1996: 17; Lupton, 1998) point, then, to a cumulative ‘I’, not necessarily one that is rational, but one that reflects some spontaneity, originality and creativity. In any case, in order for individuals to grow and change, some sense of agency seems necessary. The ‘I’ that is retained from symbolic interactionism is a growing and changing one, a part of the self that retains some sense of agency, without being fixed. The present ‘I’ is a cumulative synthesis of past and present ‘selves’ that are being constructed in the context of former and current discourses, earlier and contemporary experiences of life, including emotions and embodiment. Such an ‘I’ has a reflexive ability to move in new directions, as it interacts with new input from significant others, reference groups and the generalized other of cultural discourses. Thus, in the interaction with people in a variety of places, spaces, cultures and contexts (as in volunteer tourist experiences) there are possibilities for an enlargement of an individual’s psychic space.

The way you think about things, like what are Third World and developing countries really like, what is the community like, how does it all fit together, how does it work and that sort of thing.

(Amy, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)
Wearing and Wearing (2002) suggest that nevertheless, in this excursion into the progress of sociological notions of the self, from modernity to postmodernity, there remains a fundamental assumption that ‘self’ and ‘other’ are separate entities in which ‘self’ is at all times prioritized over ‘other’. This situation has meant, in the tourism literature, that the potential for the expansion of the individual self of the Western tourist has been emphasized at the expense of the selves of the host people, particularly when the latter are members of a developing society with an alternative culture. It has taken the advent of post-colonialist theory to shake some of these entrenched assumptions.

The concept of the ‘other’, which is fundamental to post-colonial theory, has been developed by Bhabha (1983). He claims that colonial discourses propagated by the powerful colonizer produce stereotypes of the colonized as fixed, other from, and inferior to, the colonizer. Interestingly, it has been found that in the volunteer experience the other becomes a part of the self. Insights from post-structuralist and post-colonialist theory thus add another dimension to theorizing tourism travel and allow a more thorough analysis of the volunteer tourism experience – one that includes a critique of the self–other dichotomy where self is valued over the other. The dialogue that volunteers have with other cultures’ views of the world through their often elongated and more intense travel experiences provides a different perspective. It de-centres an excessive focus on the self that has hitherto been at the core of tourism analysis (cf. Wearing and Wearing, 2002).

Personally, in the sense of that we were doing something constructive and productive and it was actually . . . a community project and the benefits were being felt in the community. It gave me a sense that what we were doing was something that was on the right tracks . . . It broadened my ideas of what people were like and that no matter what country you are in, you all face the same kind of problems to different degrees. I think it is a chance to put your own culture into perspective too.

(Ros, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

Wearing and Neil (2001) suggest that when the ‘other’ assumes as much importance in the conceptualization of ideas surrounding eco-tourism as the ‘self’, views of tourism can be pushed beyond the boundaries of merely focusing on self-determination, self-improvement, self-enhancement and self-choice. That, however, does not eliminate the idea of self and travel. Rather, it allows an extension of the way travel is conceptualized and a more inclusive role for specialist areas such as volunteer tourism. It permits observers to decommodify their views of tourism and move them towards a more appropriate form of analysis. A focus on the self in the tourism experience enables them to establish a differential view of tourism (cf. MacCannell, 1976, 1992; Urry, 1990; Rojek, 1993), one that derives from the themes that arise from the ‘stories’ of the selves. Even though much of tourism research in the past has focused on the producers of the touristic experience...
experience, rather than on the consumers themselves, the approach of this chapter attempts to address this lacuna by considering selves, through their own recollections, and by focusing on the cultural meanings and values that they associate with their activities. Thus, in exploring the selves derived from tourist experiences, an understanding of tourists’ ‘own stories’ is enabled.

It [the volunteer tourism experience] made me a lot more critical of a consumer’s society. I think there are a lot of things here that are all very nice and convenient and are good for status. But there are a lot of things we just don’t need. If something is broken, we go down the shop and buy another one, or buy a dishwasher instead of doing it yourself. I have become more critical of my environment, because each time I buy something, I have to really justify to myself, do I need this or is it just something to do with the money I’m spending my life earning. A lot of people have an identity; their car or their job is their identity. So when you meet them, in the first couple of minutes, they’re telling you, ‘I do this’ or ‘I have this’. It shrinks your identity, but I’m not sure if it shrinks it, as much as it defines it. It takes away all the things that aren’t you and leaves you with just the core, so it is really just chopping away at the unnecessary bits.

(Ros, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

The experiences offered by this volunteer tourist challenge the notions that authors, such as Fussell (1982), have proposed when referring to the artificiality of the tourism experience. They similarly reject Turner and Ash’s (1975) description of tourists as a ‘plague of marauders’, or those who comment on tourism’s consumptive focus (Murphy, 1985; Krippendorf, 1987; Urry, 1990) in the construction of ‘commodities of difference’, which are created through the rearrangement and trivialization of cultural ceremonies, festivals, and arts and crafts to meet the needs and expectations of the tourist. Under volunteer tourism, no longer is culture consumed, photographed and taken home as a memento of the tourist’s brush with difference. Nor is it just about affluent ‘cultural tourists’ visiting ‘exotic’ destinations in poor countries and, in doing so, often quite inadvertently, causing considerable damage to the ecology, cultural lifestyle and economies of the host communities. Culture can now move beyond a pre-packaged commodity, priced and sold like fast food, as the tourism industry inexorably extends its financial grasp (Greenwood, 1989: 179). The volunteer tourist experience offers an alternative that requires a more sophisticated analysis.

Wearing and Wearing (2002) suggest that it is through common first-hand experiences, interactions and interpretive mediation between the volunteer community members that an exchange of values is effectuated, one that moves towards a common social value, an experience that goes beyond the value of a commodity. Clearly, education and increased natural awareness can be appreciated better through an understanding of the effect on the self. As Kutay (1990: 36) observes, ‘aware tour companies are attempting to combat the problems caused by mass tourism by creating an appreciation for natural areas and traditional cultures and by teaching their
clients how to tread lightly when they travel to remote regions.’ How should
this statement be taken?

Kelly (1983: 150) has demonstrated the role of physical and social envi-
ronments in structuring experiences both directly and through recollection
in the life course. His (1983: 10) conceptualization demonstrates the influ-
ence that these immediate contexts can have on the eco-tourism experience.
Through the life course, varying environments influence the development of
values which have a strong formative influence on the repertoire of leisure
behaviours in which an individual will engage (1983: 94).

Many of the visited outdoor environments offer physical, social and
psychological dimensions which function to facilitate leisure experiences
beyond, or in contrast to, other settings. These dimensions are central to the
key theoretical perspectives in outdoor recreation research (cf. McCool
et al., 1984: 7; Manning, 1986: 16; Lucas and Stankey, 1988: 364), and
Henderson and Bialeschki have relatedly emphasized the importance of
settings for leisure (1991: 42). Analysts of outdoor recreation settings have
also found that they have a significant effect on the experience and identity
of the participant (cf. Kaplan and Talbot, 1983; Knopf, 1983; Scherl, 1988;

Simmel (1936 in 1965) has argued that in urban industrial society the
variety of groups to which a person belongs produces a unique mixture
of group affiliations for each of them, thus contributing to individuality.
The individual’s background (class, race, ethnicity, age and gender) will
produce attitudes and motivations (cf. Denzin, 1994) that will be influenced
differently through the learning experience. Such socialization occurs at the
site with which the individual interacts, thereby providing the basis for
examining the idea of the self in volunteer tourism.

Erikson (1968) suggests that identity is a ‘process’, both within the core
of the individuals and at the heart of their communal culture, which gives
meaning and continuity to individual existence. Erikson maintains that
the crucial elements of identities established in youth are autonomy from
parents, sex role identity, career choice and internalized morality. Recent
feminist theorists, however, have critiqued Erikson’s notion of a unified
identity by expanding the concept to include the potentiality of multiple
subjectivities for both males and females (Butler, 1990; Braidotti, 1994), and
it is within this extended context that the selves of tourism experience can be
placed.

Wearing and Wearing (2002) suggest that, when post-structuralist
theory is applied to leisure and the self–other binary opposition is decon-
structed, it becomes clear that concern for others, understanding of others
and care of others can impact on the self in a positive way. Interactionist
theory has long recognized the interplay of the self with its emphasis on the
contribution that significant others and reference groups make to the sense
of self. Yet in interactionist thought, the self is prioritized over the other and
there is a clear demarcation between the two, the self being regarded as the
subject and the other as the object. If, through post-colonialist theory, the binary opposition of self and other is deconstructed, so that self is no longer prioritized over other, then travel can move to a situation where the commodified, individualized and self-centred focus is moved on. This scenario allows the other to take on different meanings in which involvement with the other is a part of travel (as in volunteer tourism) and not separate from it.

In the leisure and tourism literature, self and self-care have been prioritized over other and other-care. By deconstructing these hierarchized dichotomies it is possible to expand the construction to the volunteer tourist's self to include care for others, for their selves, their values and their community. The question then arises, ‘Can the selves of the volunteer tourist be enlarged if it means the diminution of others in the identified community?’

Elsewhere, Wearing and Wearing (2002) have articulated a postmodern theory of the self which is cognizant of both the subjectivity and agency of the self, as well as the constraints and opportunities presented by societal input in the forms of powerful discourses, significant others, reference groups and cultural prescriptions. A rational, emotional, embodied, cumulative and changing, non-essentialist ‘I’, in this view, interprets, organizes and gives meaning to the various ‘me’s’ which are socially constructed. It is possible then, to talk about the selves of the tourist and the selves of the hosts without falling into the trap of discourse determinism in which many selves compete against each other moment by moment, and where reflexivity, emotionality, rationality and embodiment, in fact, individual agency of any kind, are denied. The power relationships of the wider society will, of course, have a significant impact on how a person’s ‘me’s’ are constructed, and it is not being suggested that all are equal in their capacity to move within or beyond their present self-definitions. While accepting the primacy of individual sense experience and uniqueness, this situation should in no way imprison that person in subjectivism. This uniqueness of the self is precisely that condition in which societal others form a personalized social space. As people travel with themselves, they see the other as a world they are travelling through; yet, at some stage, that other becomes a part of themselves. This situation thus allows an explanation of the volunteer tourism experience, which is about that dialogue, interpersonality, boundaries, travel and self.

The volunteer tourism experience involves complex and often subtle interactions between the tourist, the site and the host community. It problematizes those analyses predicated on metaphors of the tourist as ‘wanderer’, ‘gazer’ and ‘escaper’ so prevalent in the tourism literature (cf. Cohen and Taylor, 1976; Pearce, 1984; Urry, 1990; Brown, 1992; Rojek, 1993, 1997), and yet so inadequate in providing the tools required to theorize this experience. As the tour group, the host community and the natural environment, to varying degrees, are interdependent components of
any tourist experience, there is a need to move beyond simplistic metaphors towards a more analytically flexible conceptualization that allows for the exploration of the assumptions implicit in the ‘tourist gaze’, the tourist ‘destination’, the marketing ‘image’, the ‘visit’, an alternative mode of analysis that may better account for the significant range and diversity of tourist experiences. Here, Wearing and Wearing (2002) have suggested that a conceptualization of the selves of tourists and hosts predicated on a subjective, cumulative, non-essentialist, but embodied and emotional ‘I’, which constructs and reconstructs the tourist experience in interaction with significant others, reference groups and the generalized other in the form of cultural values, may go some way to exploring the complexity of tourist experiences for both tourists and hosts. This focus is centred on the people involved in tourism interactions and the meanings they construct concerning their sense of self from these interactions, rather than on the broader concepts of discourse (cf. Dann, 1996) or culture (cf. Rojek and Urry, 1997).

Wearing and Wearing (2002) have also found that in many senses viewing the ‘other’ has always been a part of the leisure and tourism activities of dominant cultures. The ‘other’ has been seen as a source of difference and excitement with possibilities for exotic pleasure. While dominant cultures have been entranced by other cultures, such as those of the East, they have also reinforced their own sense of superiority through viewing the ‘other’, in travel. Crick suggests that unless the various voices of the tourist hosts concerning their own culture and the tourist enterprise be heard, tourism may actually be an activity through which stereotypes are perpetuated and reinforced, rather than broken down, in fact, a means of shrinking the mind rather than broadening it (1996: 34). This situation, he suggests, can obtain for both tourist and host. The more the tourist commoditizes and inferiorizes the host’s culture, the more the host will regard tourists with hostility, categorizing them as strangers, legitimate targets for cheating, a resource and a nuisance, rather than human beings. The volunteer tourist experience has the potential to be different.

I felt like they didn’t want us there when we first got there. Like I said, there were one or two who were always around helping and they were really good. I felt like I was an intruder and shouldn’t have been there. I couldn’t really communicate with them because they didn’t speak English that well. But that was definitely a warming experience. It was really fun. I felt really privileged that I was the one who could actually go and do that; otherwise I wouldn’t have had much positive feeling from the community at all. I also went to Midnight Mass with that family and sat with them in the church, so that was really nice. I was always really worried that they thought we were ‘know it alls’ and that we thought we were really good doing something for them and maybe they didn’t want that or need that.

(Ann, volunteer tourist; Wearing, 1998)

Others, such as Cohen, argue that the difference between the impact of tourist experiences on the selves of tourists depends on whether they adhere
to the ‘spiritual centre’ of their own culture, prefer its lifeways and thought patterns (recreational and diversionary modes), or to an experiential, experimental or existential mode, where they seek a centre beyond their own culture (1996: 108). For Cohen, the difference remains in the motivation of the tourist, and changes in the self through tourist experience hinge on the tourist being able to break through the staged tourist space and observe other people’s lives as they really are (1996: 105). Wearing and Wearing (2002) argue, on the other hand, that the actual experience that tourists have is authentic for them and will impact on the self in a number of ways, including both an expansion and a re-affirmation of en-cultured selves. While acknowledging the large part that initial motivation has for individual volunteer tourists, an emphasis must also be placed on each participant’s construction and reconstruction of the self in the light of the actual experiences of interaction with significant others, reference groups and the generalized other of cultural values, symbols and language in the tourist space. Tourist marketers, service providers and host communities, as well as the tourists themselves, can have significant input into these experiences. Thus, when the context moves beyond the commoditized realm of mass tourism into the sometimes altruistic ideal (Wearing, 2001) of alternative tourism, the change in focus from consumption enables a different sort of construction of the experience.

One author who has been able to tap into the impact on the identity construction of individuals in developing countries in the light of post-colonialist views is Hall (1997). Using the example of the Caribbean and his own cultural identity, he argues that cultural identity is a positioning, not an essence. It is thus open to change and transformation grounded in interpersonal interactions and experiences. On the one hand, these experiences can reinforce a sense of difference and inferiorized colonial identity. On the other, there is an ambiguity which allows for a place from which to speak for these ‘others’, one that can act as a subversive force, and hence open ways for change and transformation in the sense of self.

This ‘look’, from – so to speak – the place of the Other, fixes us, not only in its violence, hostility and aggression, but in the ambivalence of its desire. This brings us face to face, not simply with the domineering European presence as the site or ‘scene’ of integration where those other presences which it had actively disaggregated were recompensed – reframed, put together in a new way; but what Homi Bhabha has called ‘the ambivalent identifications of the racist world . . . the ‘otherness’ of the self inscribed in the perverse palimpsest of colonial identity’ (Bhabha, in Fanan, 1986: xv).

(Hall, 1997: 56)

Tourists who act as mere flâneurs and who consistently regard the host as an objectified and inferiorized other will bring about an interaction in which there is a rejection of strangers or invaders and, if aggression, hostility and violence persist, a rejection of the tourist enterprise itself. There is also the potential for negotiation and change in identity for both parties. With
some shifts in the relationships of power between hosts and guests, tourism can enlarge a sense of self for both parties, thereby contributing to its own success.

Hollinshead (1998), drawing heavily on the post-colonial insights of Bhabha concerning selfhood/otherness, culture, hybridization and ambiguity, comes closest to this attempt to move the conceptualization of the self in tourism beyond rigidly defined cultural constraints for both tourists and hosts, while at the same time recognizing the importance of both material and symbolic power. This notion of tourism allows for ambiguity in cultural definition for both tourists and hosts, as well as the possibility of hybridity of cultural discourses through cross-fertilization in tourist interaction. Hollinshead is concerned with lived, rather than learned culture for the aggregating individuals who make up such cultures. He critiques the concentration of past investigators in tourism/leisure on the macrolevel themes of racism, ethnicity and selfhood and on their broad historical influences (1998: 130). Hollinshead suggests that it is time that tourism theory and research also considered the everyday performative deeds and discourses that occur in tourist sites. Through notions of cultural ambiguity and hybridity, there is here the possibility, he claims, for previously subordinated groups 'to articulate a new future-as-open world order through their own restless energy and via their own skillful and revisionary enunciation' (1998: 131).

Wearing and Wearing (2002) find laudable Hollinshead's attempt to push the sociology of tourism beyond stereotypical reactionary boundaries of the self, by including both the ambiguities of one's own culture, as well as those of the 'other'. However, his analysis remains within a masculinized theoretical stance where the binary opposition of self/other retains prominence. In addition, his focus rests on how the individual conforms, goes beyond or hybridizes cultural images and stereotypes. His concern is with aggregated groups who make up hybridized and ambiguous cultures. His examination of tourist and host is from an outside, cultural perspective (as is Rojek's (1997) exploration of dragging, filing and indexing in tourist experience). Thus, while there is a recognition in these works of the agency of the individual within the constraints of powerful discourses and representations, there is little attempt in these male-oriented theorizations actually to get inside the heads and hearts of the tourists themselves, to ask them questions which are of the utmost importance in moving tourism to a more person-centred phenomenon. These questions revolve around issues of how individual tourists and hosts construct and reconstruct their sense of self or selves through specific interactions with others in a tourism setting. Nor is there any attempt by these writers to include in the conceptualization of the tourist, any notion of self–other care. In spite of their desire to deconstruct binary cultural oppositions and to recognize a complexity of cultural imaginings and identity construction, conceptualizations of the selves of tourist and host remain within a framework of the binary opposition of self–other where self is prioritized over the other. For those tourism managers,
educators and researchers who read Hollinshead’s scholarly and perceptive adaptation of Bhabha’s work to tourism theory, there will be a movement of thinking beyond cultural stereotypes and rigid cultural self-definitions. Wearing and Wearing (2002), however, take the agenda further towards a more feminized, person-centred approach, in which the self–other dichotomy is itself questioned, and embodiment and emotionality are included, along with the rational, mind-oriented self. Whereas the social and personal space of tourism, like leisure, opens up new possibilities for self-definition, to confine such possibilities to ideas centred on the presentation and performance of the selves of cultural groups, leaves out the possibility that care for the other, as well as care for the self, may be a part of the tourist enterprise.

In this chapter, the sociology of the self and of tourism has been explored in order to present a person-centred conceptualization of volunteer tourism which comes to grips with the ‘reality of the present’ and its interactions (Mead, 1959: 33), in the construction of the selves of tourist experience. It has been suggested that the self/other of tourist and host interact with each other with possibilities for enlarging individual psychic space as well as the social and symbolic space of communities and cultures. However, for this situation to happen, the voice of the other must be heard, rather than falling back on mere sightseeing, curiosity, objectification, inferiorization and exploitation. Some shifts in power, beginning at the personal level and extending to the providers of tourist services, is needed for this occurrence to take place.

**Conclusions**

How then would tourism look if concern for people, both tourist and host, were to become the ethical practice of the industry? At first one might say that such a scenario cannot take place while the industry is controlled by powerful multinational marketers, where the tourist dollar is the linchpin of practice. However, if people became the genuine centre, the industry would surely flourish.

In many senses, viewing the ‘other’ has always been a part of the leisure activity of dominant cultures. While these cultures have been entranced by other cultures, such as those of the Orient, they have also reinforced their own sense of superiority through viewing the ‘other’. At the same time, they have excluded the voices of the ‘other’ from their theoretical analyses. Post-colonial theorists are critical of this stance and argue for the voices of the ‘other’ to be heard, in social theory, as well as in cultural practices. In this chapter, it has been argued that, unless the voice of the other be heard in tourist interactions, a more powerful Western culture may overpower and extinguish the culture of the other, thereby also eliminating one of the most significant aspects of tourism – the desire for experience of the other.
Although hybridization may reduce the more repressive aspects of particular cultures, it is not envisaged that it will eliminate the less powerful culture. Rather, individuals will construct their own hybridization and thus enlarge social space, rather than close it down.

If it is recognized that this alternative tourist experience is based on interactions that people have with elements of the space visited, then this situation can be invaluable for understanding, and therefore providing, sustainable tourist experiences. Documentation of the real value of the tourist experience for the tourist could suggest that the industry is not compelled to create an environment artificially or to promise it in the form of an image. Instead, the focus should be on the on-site interactions and the importance of them to the tourist, developing strategies around these ideas, rather than attempting to create authentic objects to gaze upon or places for escape (cf. MacCannell, 1976, 1992; Urry, 1990; Rojek, 1993). This chapter enables another look at how the industry structures tourism and may provide directions for policy in the future.

What is being witnessed is a new form of alternative tourism – that of volunteer tourism – where new business structures, new motivations for travelling, new experiences to be enjoyed and indeed a new type of tourist are emerging. There is not only a greater consideration for the contribution the volunteers can make to the communities in which they take part, but also a much deeper awareness of the impact that the experience has on the personal development of participants. Indeed, it is through the latter that one will finally uncover the nature and potential of volunteer tourism.

Notes

1See, for example, Wearing and Wearing (1988) for a definition of leisure as experience. The term is used here to encompass tourist experiences which are considered to be a subgroup of leisure experience, leisure theory being the underlying theoretical contributor to the sociological analysis of tourism (cf. E. Cohen, 1995).

2See, for example, Gray’s Wanderlust/Sunlust theory (Mathieson and Wall, 1982), Ross’s consideration of Push/Pull determinants (1994: 21) or even Plog’s (1991) analysis of allocentric and psychocentric personalities in dictating travel behaviour.

3Boo (1990: 10) provides the most cited definition to date: ‘We may define ecological tourism or ecotourism as that tourism that involves traveling to relatively undisturbed or uncontaminated natural areas with the specific object of studying, admiring and enjoying the scenery and its wild plants and animals, as well as any existing cultural aspects (both past and present) found in these areas. Ecological tourism implies a scientific, aesthetic or philosophical approach, although an ecological tourist is not required to be a professional scientist, artist or philosopher. The main point is that the person that practices ecotourism has the opportunity of immersing him or herself in nature in a way that most people cannot enjoy in their routine, urban existences...’ As there is no strict consensus on a specific definition of...
ecotourism, numerous examples abound. The Ecotourism Society (1992) in the USA defines ecotourism as ‘responsible travel that conserves natural environments and sustains the well-being of local people’.

References


Re-centring the Self in Volunteer Tourism


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Introduction

In 1986, when he turned 50, peace activist Satish Kumar followed the tradition of his Indian upbringing and went on a pilgrimage, visiting on foot the holy places of Britain: Lindisfarne, Iona, Canterbury and Glastonbury (McLuhan, 1996). Contemporary literature on the quest for a magico-religious experience almost invariably refers to Glastonbury as a much sought after sacred destination. However, Philip Rahtz (1993: 10–11) warns that so much written about Glastonbury is of ‘dubious value . . . myth and history are inextricably woven together’, and he tries to portray a balanced picture of Glastonbury, which he describes as a ‘flourishing modern town, beset by industry and tourism’. Thus it would seem that fact and/or fiction are equally important in accounting for Glastonbury’s role as a modern tourist town and pilgrimage centre, both past and present.

According to many, Glastonbury is a contested site offering a range of choice from possible multiple experiences to the modern pilgrim-tourist. Molyneaux (1995) sees Glastonbury as a spiritual magnet, based on the location of St Michael’s Tower atop Glastonbury Tor on the trans-European St Michael ‘ley line’, a pathway of earth energy and power. Sykes (1993) discusses Glastonbury’s connection with the ‘New Age’ movement, as it is a place that many followers consider to be their spiritual home, ranking equally with the prehistoric monuments of Avebury, Stonehenge and Silbury Hill. Taylor and Jones (1997) view Glastonbury as a draw for pilgrims and tourists, regarding it as a place to experiment with various unconventional cultural and religious modalities.

Traditional Christians, including Anglicans and Roman Catholics, flock to Glastonbury for an event that is formally designated a ‘pilgrimage’, an annual celebration in late June/early July. However, individual pilgrims of all denominations are not confined to organized pilgrimage alone, but may undertake their own pilgrimage or retreat at any time of the year. To this end, Abbey House has operated as a retreat centre since 1931 and receives thousands of visitors each year, and Little Saint Michael, a retreat house near Chalice Well, is occupied by 8–12 people per month (Bowman, 1993).

The Arthurian/Avalonian complex of beliefs also attracts pilgrim-tourists of an esoteric turn of mind. This group are related to ‘New Agers’, and also enjoy an interface with Christian perceptions of Glastonbury. Arthur, legendary king of Britain, is believed to have been buried in Glastonbury Abbey and his tomb discovered by the monks there in 1191 (Alcock, 1989); he was said to have been spirited away to the ‘Isle of Avalon’ (identified with both Glastonbury and the Celtic Otherworld) only to return when Britain again needs him. This Arthurian material is linked with the ‘Somerset Tradition’ (alternative beliefs about Christianity, chiefly involving Joseph of Arimathea) in a ‘fringe Christian’ nexus of beliefs. The latter includes the idea that Glastonbury is ‘the English Jerusalem’, and, as such, that the rebuilding of Glastonbury Abbey is held to be a ‘vital ingredient in the spiritual renewal of Britain’ (Bowman, 1993: 36).

‘New Age’ pilgrims come to experience the convergence of earth energies brought about by Glastonbury’s key position on several major ley lines, interact with a sacred site of remote Celtic antiquity and participate in the worship of the Goddess. That the claims of these pilgrim-tourists contest those of Christians is undeniable. Indeed, Bowman remarks of Glastonbury ‘there can be few other places where the Synod of Whitby [when the Celtic Church came under the control of Rome] in 664... is so frequently mentioned and bitterly regretted’ (Bowman, 1993: 39).

The town also gives a notion of geographic space and connectedness with the annual Festival (the Glastonbury Festival of the Contemporary Performing Arts – ‘the Festival’) held some 6 miles east in the small farming hamlet of Pilton. This celebration has been a regular feature of the local culture since 1970, and attracts enormous crowds of fans, tourists and alternative lifestylers. It has become ‘an annual pilgrimage to recapture the sixties’ (Leviton, 1995: 8). For many, a journey to the Festival functions as a pilgrimage to an altered dimension, where music, performance art, mind-altering substances and temporary coexistence with thousands of others provide a profound experience of liminality.

Mass tourism also impacts on Glastonbury in that hundreds of day trippers come to gaze upon the ‘must-see’ tourist attractions, which must necessarily be consumed in order that they can claim to have truly savoured the Glastonbury experience. The Abbey (with Christian and Avalonian connections) and the Tor (linked with previous pagan and Christian uses) are its two honeypots. According to Martin Lofthouse, Tourism Officer for the
Mendip District (County of Somerset), both these sites receive between 130,000 and 150,000 visitors annually. Glastonbury has also diversified its destination mix, expanding into factory-outlet shopping in the adjoining village of Street. Here, tourists tired of conventional souvenirs and the eclectic mix of ‘New Age’ goods offered in Glastonbury can shop for a variety of consumer merchandise.

This chapter discusses the five visitor groups who lay claim to use of the town and its immediate environment. It also examines their interaction with each other, with tourist icons and with the local inhabitants. Despite the fact that this small Somerset town of approximately 8000 souls is a contested site for both local and visitor alike, there appears to be an uneasy truce over the disparate uses of the town. Various groups use the same icons and attend the same events and sites for very different purposes, often regarding each other with a mild voyeuristic curiosity. Some of the visitors can be described as typical mass tourists, perhaps climbing to the top of the Tor or passing through and pausing momentarily to gaze at the Abbey ruins. However, some are also pilgrim-tourists (MacCannell’s (1976) tourists seeking a genuine experience), who wish to penetrate the superficial façade of the mass tourist gaze, and engage with the natural and built environment in a way that conveys authenticity to their existence. Given that there are so many varying definitions of the same place, a wider question inevitably is raised: to what extent can one speak of the tourist as a metaphor of the social world, when both the former and the latter are subject to so many differing interpretations?

Tourists and Pilgrims

The superficial view that tourists travel solely for pleasure has been questioned for several decades, and it is now acknowledged that there are many complex reasons why people in the developed world elect to travel. In an influential paper, Cohen (1979) has suggested that there are five modes of tourist experiences: recreational, diversionary, experiential, experimental and existential. He relates these tourist modes to the experience of the traditional religious pilgrim, a connection that has been recognized in medieval scholarship for nearly a century (Smith, 1992). The tourist experience is seen as a possible way to make meaning in a de-centred, secularized and increasingly alien world.

Recent studies frequently focus on the negative impact that mass tourism has on traditional societies (Boissevain, 1996), associated with the social, cultural and economic havoc wrought by wealthy Westerners, usually operating in the recreational or diversionary modes of tourism. The tourist, as defined by MacCannell (1976), resembles the pilgrim in that (s)he is seeking authenticity of experience, and most significantly, because ‘the tourist goes on holiday in order cognitively to create or recreate structures
which modernity is felt to have demolished’ (Selwyn, 1996: 2). This argument is not without its fair share of controversy. Critics, including Cohen, have argued for a broader understanding of tourists, as not all seek meaning (Cohen, 1979). It has also been noted that postmodern philosophers find the 1960s ‘counter-culture’ concept of alienation from modernity somewhat dated (Selwyn, 1996).

Even so, there is much evidence to suggest that people are alienated and that it is not clear whether the postmodern individual, lacking affect and therefore unable to be alienated, actually exists. In support of MacCannell’s argument, it can be noted that myth, ritual and religion are among the elements which ‘modernity is felt to have demolished’ and it is not merely coincidental that religious terminology has been co-opted by areas of human experience that are not traditionally regarded as religious. Cohen sees experiential tourists as aware of the ‘other’ in their journeying; experimental tourists as sampling a number of modes or centres; and, finally, existential tourists committed to an ‘elective Centre’ (Cohen, 1979: passim).

It is fascinating to realize how much Cohen’s taxonomy owes to the voluminous scholarship on the modern religious mentality, chiefly in the sociology of religion. Campbell (1972) has famously defined the ‘seeker’ that MacCannell uses as his model for the modern tourist, and recent scholars of the New Age Movement have noted how ‘seekership’ has diffused to become the primary spiritual mode for most Westerners without traditional religious affiliation (Hanegraaff, 1996). Hanegraaff also convincingly demonstrates that the allure of the premodern or the non-modern (whether in religion or tourism) results from the gradual ‘exotericizing’ of esoteric models of understanding from the Western tradition (Hanegraaff, 1996). Cohen, too, is aware of the intimate relationship between touristic and religious discourses, as his later collaboration with Ben-Yehuda and Aviad (Cohen et al., 1997) is replete with references to contemporary scholars of alternative religion: Adler, Balch, Bellah and Wallis, to name but a few.

Therefore, alternative tourists or modern secular pilgrims, committed to an elective centre such as Glastonbury, have absorbed in ‘mainstream’ late modern (or postmodern) Western culture much that is occult, esoteric and mythical. The quest for authentic experience guides them to a true centre (outside of the self) and to their true selves. The Western individual has moved from a general acceptance that the yardstick of authenticity lies outside the self (in institutions such as the church or the state) in the early 20th century, to the notion that the experience must ring true with the inner person. This shift has led to the ‘sacralization of the Self’ as a primary spiritual drive (Heelas, 1996) and the seeking of experiences which will fulfill the self in non-spiritual contexts.

Much of the ‘history’ of Glastonbury presented here is not historically accurate or ‘true’. It is thus important at this juncture to introduce the concept of the ‘genuine fake’, a notion which Brown applies to many tourist
attractions. He suggests that the ‘genuine fake is not just the object itself but the relationship between visitors and presenters which the object mediates’ (Brown, 1996: 33–34), and that such fakes ‘arouse deep and genuine feelings’ (Brown, 1996: 33). The Christian, the Celtic pagan and the occult traditions of Glastonbury combine powerfully to create precisely such a ‘genuine fake’, where authenticity can be experienced in the presence of the artificial. Moreover, these pilgrim-tourists feel themselves to be part of a subculture, in Anderson’s terms an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991: passim), which creates an experience of communitas, defined by Turner and Turner (1978) as one of the crucial characteristics of pilgrimage: a temporary, but emotionally compelling, sense of connection to those who seek the centre with you, and arrive with you.

This chapter accordingly considers the history and pseudo-history of Glastonbury and its allure for pilgrim-tourists. The pseudo-history develops through interplay with pilgrimage/tourism to Glastonbury, supporting the contention that ‘tourism is not just an aggregate of merely commercial activities; it is also an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs’ (MacCannell, 1992: 1). The five groups which lay claim to Glastonbury are then examined, and the differing activities in which they participate are analysed. Finally, the extent to which Glastonbury is a ‘contested site’ is evaluated, with a view to clarifying the impact of tourism on Glastonbury and its population.

The Allure of Glastonbury – Fact and Fiction

Glastonbury is situated in South West England in the county of Somerset. There is evidence of possible human settlement in the area some 500,000 years ago, although the first definite archaeological evidence of such occupation only dates from the Neolithic period (4000–2000 BC) (Rahtz, 1993). The prefix ‘Glaston’ is of uncertain origin, and was first used in the late 7th century/early 8th century (Rahtz, 1993), and, according to Michell (Benham, 1993), is derived from a British Celtic word for ‘oak’. ‘Bury’ is a very common place-name suffix, derived from the Anglo-Saxon word byrig meaning a strong place, such as a hillfort or monastery (Rahtz, 1993). Visitors coming by road to Glastonbury today are met with a sign announcing that they have arrived at the ‘Island (or Isle) of Avalon’. ‘Avalon’ is the supposed traditional resting place of King Arthur, Avalon being a name known from ‘medieval sources . . . meaning ‘the island of apples’” (Rahtz, 1993).

The landscape is dominated by the Glastonbury Tor, a striking hill that is a major navigational landmark for tourists and locals alike. The ruins of St Michael’s Tower on the Tor are generally viewed as subsidiary to the Abbey and its precincts below, perhaps an eremitic retreat or a place to
minister to the needs of pilgrims honouring the cult of St Michael, the Archangel (Rahtz, 1993). During the Dissolution, the Tor was also the grim setting for the hanging of two monks and the last Abbot of Glastonbury (Rahtz, 1993). Historically, the Tor has long been a focal pilgrimage destination for a diverse range of faiths and views, and, according to Rahtz (1993: 51–52), it features strongly in what he describes as ‘extreme beliefs concerning Glastonbury’; it was, and still is, a focus for witchcraft. During the recent 2001 foot-and-mouth disease epidemic in the UK, the Tor was closed to the public. However, it was reopened on 21 April of that year as Somerset County Council started to relax restrictions on parts of its footpath network around the countryside (Somerset County Council, 2001). Bernbaum (1992: 120) calls the Tor ‘a sacred mountain’, and says that ‘the aura of Celtic myth and Arthurian legend that envelops the sacred hill has made it a major centre for people with a variety of esoteric interests.’

Between the Dissolution and the 19th century, Glastonbury was a market town for the surrounding district. Construction of the Glastonbury Canal and the coming of the railway promoted trade and increased accessibility to the town. The spring at the Chalice Well still drew those seeking cures, and, in 1751, 10,000 people came for therapeutic reasons (Rahtz, 1993). Today, this site is owned by the Chalice Well Trust (purchased in 1957) and is one of the town’s tourist attractions. The Chalice Well refers to the Holy Grail of Arthurian legend (the ‘chalice’) and also to Celtic beliefs about healing waters. The Abbey precincts were bought by the Church of England in 1907, which caused considerable controversy, particularly from the point of view of the Roman Catholic Church, which believed it had prior claims to the site that it had lost at the time of the Dissolution (Rahtz, 1993). Today, Glastonbury retains its traditional market-town atmosphere and, within its medieval townscape clustered around the Abbey ruins, there are several well-preserved 13th–15th-century buildings, many of which are open to the public.

An editorial from the Avalon Journal (‘a journal of transformation from Glastonbury’) describes Glastonbury as a ‘wonderful combination of powerful natural landscape, ancient sacred site and present spiritual reality’ (1997: 3). Today, its allure is the wide variety of experiences it promises to the jaded tourist. As noted earlier, overt conflict between different visitor groups is generally not an issue. However, based on anecdotal evidence and the writers’ experiences, many of the local residents have voiced their concern about some segments of the tourist market appropriating space in and around their town.

Christian Pilgrims

Benham (1993) notes that there are two associated traditions at Glastonbury: that which concerns the arrival of Christianity in Britain after the crucifixion
around AD 63 (through Jesus’ disciple, Joseph of Arimathea, allegedly bringing the Holy Grail with him); and the Arthurian material connected with the Isle of Avalon, the legendary resting place of Arthur and Guinevere. The Christian tradition claims that Joseph of Arimathea, supposedly a tin merchant trading with Cornwall, visited Glastonbury with the young Jesus, founding a shrine at Glastonbury. This event is referred to in William Blake’s famous poem, *Milton*:

> And did those feet in ancient time
> Walk upon England’s mountains green?
> And was the holy Lamb of God
> On England’s pleasant pastures seen?

(Kazin, 1946: 412)

This visit is also the origin point of the Glastonbury Thorn, the hawthorn tree that burst into bloom when Joseph of Arimathea planted his staff on Wirral Hill, now located adjacent to the Glastonbury–Street road. The earliest historically verifiable Christian church in Glastonbury, of Anglo-Saxon origin, dates to around the early 7th century (Rahtz, 1993). Here the conflicting claims of scholarship and esoteric ‘tradition’ are strongly opposed. A current tourist guide for Glastonbury states that ‘Somerset tradition is that it [the oldest church] was built by Joseph of Arimathea and the boy Jesus in honour of the Virgin Mary’ (McIlwain, 1995: 6), and was destroyed by a fire in 1184. After this fire, rebuilding of the Abbey began, including the Lady Chapel being constructed on the site of the earlier church. The Abbey is promoted as the burial site of three medieval kings, with miraculous cures attributed to Joseph of Arimathea in the 15th century when Glastonbury was promoted as the holiest earth in England (Rahtz, 1993). The site is also the home to many other cultural events during the year such as drama, musical concerts and the Glastonbury Carnival in November (Glastonbury Abbey, 2001). However, the shop in the Abbey has not escaped the influence of the alternative counter-culture which pervades much of Glastonbury, and compared with similar outlets at the cathedrals of Canterbury and York, offers items more at home in the High Street shops of its nearby ‘New Age’ retail competitors.

Today, the Abbey ruins still function as the nucleus for pilgrim-tourists coming to Glastonbury. In 1924, private pilgrimages to the Abbey on the last Saturday in June were started by a few churches in the county. McIlwain (1995) cites some 8000 as attending, and this event still continues to the present (the years 1939–1945 constituting the only exception). The largest recorded numbers were in 1998 on the 1000th anniversary of the death of the Anglo-Saxon St Dunstan. Other saints increasing the Anglican pilgrimage’s appeal include St Neot and St Aethelwold. Those attending the event receive pilgrim badges, whilst souvenir-relics may be purchased at the Abbey shop. Thus, pilgrims may invest in a reproduction 13th- or 14th-century Abbey seal, or purchase a brooch bearing ‘a real
HOLY THORN LEAF, picked from Glastonbury Abbey’ (Bowman, 1993: 36).

In addition to the Anglican pilgrimage, a Roman Catholic pilgrimage (by comparison, in 1997 at least, a much smaller affair) is held on the following day. However, this event starts at the base of the Tor and wends its way down to the town centre, concluding with a service at the Abbey. The aim of both pilgrimages, according to McIlwain (1995: 28), is to ‘provide Christians (and those on the fringes of Christianity) with an enjoyable day out and the chance to renew their faith in the company of an army of fellow Christians.’

Until 1998, both religious processions and the Festival have taken place on the same weekend – the Anglican pilgrimage on the Saturday, and the Roman Catholic pilgrimage on the Sunday. However, in 1997, an announcement was made at the Anglican event that the pilgrimages would be moved back 1 week, so as to fall on the first weekend in July. A flyer handed out at the Church of England Glastonbury Pilgrimage on Saturday, 28 June, 1997 gave the reason for this as ‘to accommodate those intending pilgrims, especially bishops and senior clergy, who find themselves committed to (Pentecost) ordinations’. However, the more pragmatic might think that the organizers of the religious pilgrimages did not want to hold their events in the town at the same time as the Festival, which had also been staged at the end of June since its inception in 1970.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that between 8000 and 10,000 people attend the Saturday event and, from Digance’s experiences, the crowds on that day place a considerable strain on the limited town infrastructure, particularly parking. Both High and Magdalene Streets are closed for 1–2 hours as the procession of Anglican pilgrims and clergy wends its way down to the Abbey. By contrast, Digance found that the smaller Roman Catholic pilgrimage caused far less disruption on account of both its size (~ 300 participants) and its route.

Avalonian Pilgrims

Rebuilding after the 1184 fire was costly, and the monks turned to pilgrimage as one way to amass wealth. They looked to the earlier successes of their brethren at Canterbury in establishing the devotion to Thomas à Beckett, and their exhumation of St Dunstan in 1070. The Glastonbury fraternity sought to emulate this quest for prestige and money: first, by claiming to possess the Dunstan reliquary (conveniently exhumed after the fire); and, secondly, through the establishment of the Arthurian cult. Arthur was first associated with Glastonbury in the early part of the 12th century, although he first appeared in written sources around AD 800 (Rahtz, 1993). Excavations at Cadbury Castle have revealed major fortifications of the ‘Arthurian period’, but Alcock (1989), whilst using the term ‘Cadbury-Camelot’ in some parts of
his book, is at pains to point out that ‘attempts to identify Camelot are pointless [as] the name and the very concept of Camelot are inventions of French medieval poets.’ Needless to say, the link between King Arthur and Glastonbury remains to be proven.

Contemporary historical texts record that in 1191, the monks of Glastonbury dug secretly in their cemetery and ‘discovered’ the remains of a large man buried in a tree trunk. This person, they claimed, was none other than Arthur himself, and they produced a forged inscription to prove it. Eyewitnesses had not mentioned a woman, but it was soon said that Guinevere had also been found (Wood, 1994). The bones were re-buried in a black marble mausoleum in front of the high altar by 1278: ‘the shrine of Arthur was now set up, was embellished with inscriptions and imagery’ (Rahtz, 1993). This shrine survived until the Abbey’s destruction in the Dissolution by Henry VIII in 1539. Today, the grave serves as a tourist attraction and/or pilgrimage site, as it has for the last 800 years.

As mentioned earlier, Avalonian pilgrims have an interface with Christian pilgrims, in that Arthur (if he existed) was a king in the Middle Ages, a period of Christian dominance. His grave is in the Abbey and, while it may be considered a ‘genuine fake’, is one essential site on the Avalonian pilgrimage trail. Similarly, the Chalice Well refers to the Holy Grail, one of the key icons of Arthurian legend (Alcock, 1989). Recent fictional treatments, such as Bradley’s (1982), have asserted that Glastonbury is a gateway to the Otherworld, a mystical site such as the Grail Castle of legend, to be entered only by the initiated (Carley, 1988). Cusack has visited Glastonbury eight times since 1987 and, despite being a sceptic, has always experienced a powerful sensation of ‘otherness’ there.

A subgroup of the Arthurian/Avalonian tourism is what might be termed ‘literary pilgrimage’. The best-selling author Marion Zimmer Bradley (1930–1999) wrote The Mists of Avalon (1982), which marked the beginning of a renaissance in ‘Arthurian’ fiction. This novel focused on the women of the Arthurian legend and dramatically explored the tension between the old Celtic religion and the coming of Christianity. An American, Bradley was a frequent visitor to Glastonbury, having links with a feminist witchcraft coven there. Her later novel, The Lady of Avalon (1997), furthered these literary explorations. Her personal religious allegiance shifted before her death from feminist witchcraft to the Liberal Catholic Church, a fringe Christian group (www.mzbworks.home.att.net). Literary pilgrimage, where readers visit the sites of their favourite novels or poems, is popular in England, with the Lake District, for example, playing host to Wordsworth fans and Dorset to the admirers of Thomas Hardy (Apter, 1999).

For literary pilgrims, Benham (1993) notes the importance of publications such as Geoffrey Ashe’s (1959) King Arthur’s Avalon, the magazine Gandalf’s Garden, which carried articles on Glastonbury, and the works of John Michell, in disseminating Glastonbury’s spiritual renaissance. Whilst Michell’s work caters for a specialist audience, Ashe brought the ‘message’
about Glastonbury to a wider public. The once hippie and ‘New Age’ extreme beliefs have slipped increasingly into mainstream culture, and gained acceptance with the wider populace. This approval is evident in the diverse range of shops and other commercial activities to be found in Glastonbury and other cities and towns around the world. Jones, a co-founder of the Isle of Avalon Foundation, says that the ‘future of Glastonbury is [to be] a spiritual place of pilgrimage’ and cites the change in attitudes in the town as evinced by the establishment of a Pilgrimage Forum comprising local business people and members of the alternative community (Billings, 1998). Esoteric Avalonian beliefs merge into ‘New Age’ beliefs for many.

**New Age Pilgrims**

Benham’s (1993: 4) *The Avalonians* states that 19th-century Britain saw ‘the emergence of new occult and esoteric movements which taught that myth has meaning for our inner evolution.’ William Blake and Alfred Lord Tennyson, important exponents of the Arthurian myth, added to an increased awareness of the non-material side of life. Benham recounts the spiritual rebirth of Avalonian beliefs occurring in Glastonbury in the first few decades of the 20th century, precipitated by the ‘discovery’ of a glass bowl (referred to as ‘the Cup’) at Bride’s Hill in Glastonbury. The Cup was regarded by many to be the Holy Grail, supposedly being brought to Glastonbury by Joseph of Arimathea in AD 63. For Benham, it is a ‘genuine fake’; the Cup provides a pivotal symbol for the ideas and actions that contributed to the spiritual awakening that occurred in Glastonbury in the 20th century. His conclusion speaks of the growth of the Avalonian tradition in Glastonbury in the 1960s, which occurred as part of a much wider global phenomenon, the counter culture. Rahtz (1993; 132) gives Glastonbury’s alternative community the perhaps unfortunate label of ‘hippies, poets, mystics and weirdies’.

Revival of interest in the goddess is also linked to Glastonbury by authors such as Jones (1991) and Hutton (1992). St Brigit (also known as St Bride, and Brigit the Celtic goddess presiding over fire, beauty, and all the arts and crafts) is variously linked by Jones (1991) to Glastonbury. One example is the outline of a swan (her symbol) in flight supposedly being formed by the hill contours making up the Isle of Avalon. This revival of goddess awareness is seen in the holding of the Glastonbury Goddess Conference (a 5-day event in 2001). The closing ceremony on 29 July, 2001 involved the annual Goddess in the Cart Procession through the streets of Glastonbury, ‘releasing hundreds of Goddess Balloons and holding a Fruit Feast on the top of the Tor’ (Glastonbury Goddess Conference, 2001). Such an event confirms Rahtz’s views noted earlier about the appropriation of the Tor by extreme alternative beliefs.

‘New Age’ pilgrimage has grown from the small alternative community that established itself in Glastonbury, acting as both magnet and catalyst for
other kindred spirits. Bowman (1994: 6) calls it ‘Glastonbury’s spiritual service industry’. Some also consider Glastonbury to be the external Heart Chakra of the Planet, a convergence and divergence point of many ley lines (Taylor and Jones, 1997). Rahtz (1993: 132) considers this invasion rather intrusive when he refers to ‘the shops that have sprung up, selling very odd objects and especially an astonishing variety of books (and this includes the Abbey bookstall)’. This last remark implies that even the Church has deserted to the enemy. However, in his conclusion, he very tellingly raises the issue of who ‘owns’ Glastonbury. He describes it as a conflict being waged on many fronts, two of which are important to this study: ‘the struggle of the rational against the draw of the irrational’, and ‘pilgrimages for Christians and those of a more secular if mystical character’ (Rahtz, 1993: 132).

The town’s website page on Community (Glastonbury Online, 2001) reflects the unusual symbiosis of many belief systems sharing the same physical landscape, each with its own spiritual agenda: ‘virtually every spiritual path has its followers from Christians to Buddhists, Pagans to Sufis, Magicians to Priestesses, all learning to cooperate together for the good of the whole and find that beneath all religions there are shared spiritual realities.’ The Isle of Avalon Foundation, headquartered in the High Street in the town centre, was formed in 1995 and superseded the earlier University of Avalon, with its aim being ‘to inform, educate and expand the present boundaries of spiritual knowledge, applying it to life in the outer world’ (Isle of Avalon Foundation, 2001). It offers a wide variety of alternative courses (including shamanism, goddess spirituality and wicca) and also publishes the *Avalon Journal*.

In many respects, Glastonbury is like those small settlements in other countries where there is an unusual fusion between traditional community values and New Age modalities and belief systems. Sedona, in the Arizona desert, USA, and Byron Bay in northern New South Wales, Australia are two comparable towns. Migration of counter-culture revolutionaries in the 1970s to these areas has transformed the heart of the community, and now not only draws those of a similar belief system but also attracts mass tourists wanting to glimpse/interact with an alternative culture within the safety of their own comfort zone. Sedona is believed to be a ‘vortex site’, at a crucial connection point of earth energies. Brown (1997a: 49) notes that ‘vortex sites in Sedona, Arizona, receive 5,000 visitors a month during the summer tourist season, an influx that now supports several tour companies that take pilgrims to the principal sacred sites in colourful jeeps.’

Places such as Glastonbury, Sedona and Byron Bay witness a plethora of activities that once were considered by many to be taboo and outside the normal parameters of society. One such unusual event, which was reported in the Australian press, was a ‘Stargate Alignment’ held on 21 September, 1996 at the Chalice Well in Glastonbury. It was facilitated by Chandara, the leader of the Earth Link Mission, and approximately 30 people attended
(Boland, 1997). The intention of this Stargate was to ‘realign the energies of the Eastern European continent and raise the vibrational frequency, thus allowing acceleration of the spiritual awakening of the inhabitants of these areas’ (Earth Link Mission, 1997). Earth Link Mission is a new religious movement whose cosmology is based on channelled messages from Ascended Masters, and Digance attended one of their Australian events late in 1997, finding evidence of pilgrimage, including Turnerian communitas (see Digance and Cusack, 2001).

The alternative nature of the visitors to Glastonbury influences the kind of infrastructure developed, with restaurants, shops and accommodation catering to non-mainstream tastes. As one contributor to the Knowhere Guide website (www.knowhere.co.uk) states:

There are lots of nice places to eat actually. There is the Rainbow’s End Café which was a pioneer of the vegetarian revolution. Then there is the Café Galatea, which has good food and is open in the evenings – it also has internet access and good music (Aretha, that sort of thing) . . .

The counter-cultural referents are apparent in the recommendations, and the presence of such eating places and other services ensures a continuous flow of alternative tourists.

Glastonbury Festivallers

On 19 September, 1970, the first Festival (the Worthy Farm Festival) was held at Jenny and Michael Eavis’ 600-acre dairy farm at Pilton. Brown (1997b) cites the Eavis’ vision of the Festival ethos as being somewhat bucolic and pastoral: the romance of mid-summer, the gathering, the music, the valley and the fields. Kemp (1993: 47) provides music journalist Mick Farran’s thoughts on the inaugural Festival as ‘a community sharing possessions, living with the environment, maintaining their culture with whatever is naturally available, consuming their needs and little else. It was a powerful vision.’ The first Festival charged an entry fee of £1, and provided free milk from the farm to the 1500 people who came. Each year, the Festival site is rebuilt over the empty farmland, the cows going into winter accommodation for 6–8 weeks and, since 1970, the 3-day Festival has been held annually, with an occasional year off to allow the land to recuperate. In 1994, the Festival budget was £3.5 million with over 80,000 people attending: 90% of the budget goes on overheads and 10% on charitable causes (Mountney et al., 1997).

The Festival is an enduring product of the counter-culture and of the 1960s, and whilst there were (and are) other similar festivals in Britain and Europe, the fact that it occurred at Glastonbury is seen as a logical embodiment of the power that the town exerts over the English psyche. For 10 years from 1981, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was the main
charity, Greenpeace and Oxfam jointly taking over its role in 1992. Eavis estimates that the Festival contributes some £5 million to the local economy. Today, it has gone from an amateur, alternative, impromptu, small gathering, to a mature, popularist, large, professional, rave-culture event. The Festival culture has evolved over the years, with increased sponsorship and changes in the programme to reflect these changes, for example dance music and the establishment of the Dance Tent in the 1990s.

Jenny Eavis likens attending one’s first Festival to a ‘rite of passage’ (Brooks, 1998), and anecdotal evidence indicates that the spiritual quest of those who participated in the early Festivals in the 1970s has largely been replaced by a desire to indulge in pure hedonism. ‘Baby Boomer’, Dr Anthony Daniels, sums up the transition between generations of Festival-goers in his *Daily Mail* (1997) article: ‘There is a strange combination of earnestness and hedonism about the Festival. It is very politically correct – one senses a vague spiritual longing in the air, a desire for meaning and purpose in a post-religious age.’ The Knowhere Guide website (www.knowhere.co.uk), a valuable source of visitor opinions concerning Glastonbury, has Festivallers asserting ‘the best thing is the Glastonbury Festival’, and ‘the one and only Glastonbury Festival!\

While the Festival is staged some 6 miles away in Pilton, most of the 80,000–100,000 attendees at some point make their way into Glastonbury. Roads within a reasonable radius of the site are patrolled by police and/or are sometimes closed, with verge-side parking restrictions in force and massive queues at the nearby railway station (Castle Cary) occurring before/during/post-event. Many of the local residents complain about both the number and the type of visitors, it not being uncommon to find attendees sleeping in ditches and on private property as they attempt to recover from their revelry. No Festival was held in June 2001 for a variety of reasons, including criticism of the control mechanisms for excessive numbers on site, as well as increasing noise problems and crowd-management issues. The death of nine people as a result of a front-of-stage crush at the Roskilde Festival in Denmark in July 2000 added to the Festival organizers’ concern about the latter (Official Glastonbury Festival Website, 2001).

Shopping Pilgrims

According to the local tourist brochure, in mid-Victorian times, the nearby village of Street (Costen, 1992) was a tanning centre for the manufacture of sheepskin rugs and hence was a logical site for C. and J. Clark to establish their shoe-making facility in 1825. Still headquartered in Street, Clarks has spawned a shopping village of the same name, where locals and tourists alike can buy branded goods at reduced prices. Discount shops also have spread along the adjacent High Street, and a wide range of merchandise is available to consumers. While this retail setting is very small compared with
larger outlets (such as West Edmonton Mall in Canada and Mall of America in Minnesota), some commentators maintain that retail therapy is for many a form of pilgrimage. The recently opened Bluewater complex in Kent, Britain’s newest shopping centre and Europe’s biggest retail and leisure destination, receives an estimated 25 million visitors annually and even contains its own quiet room and chaplain (Bluewater, 2001).

In discussing the Mall of America, visited by over 45 million people each year, Pesaresi (2000) describes it as kind of sacred site where ‘consumption can stimulate every possible dream, even the dream of salvation in the form of liberation from the constraints of space and time.’ Shopping malls and factory outlets offer the prospect of communitas ‘through a democracy of consumption in which young and old (though usually black and white) shop together’ (O’Guinn and Belk, 1989, citing Zepp, 1986). It is here suggested that some visitors to Glastonbury are motivated to visit purely because they want to shop, and that other tourist motivations may be secondary. However, the reverse situation can also be true, with an excursion to nearby Street (a 5-minute drive from the town centre) tacked on to a pilgrimage to the Abbey, attending a spiritual healer or after dancing with 5000 revellers at the Glastonbury Festival. A contributor to the Knowhere Guide site considers Glastonbury’s shopping appeal limited in comparison with Street:

There are a few clothes shops already mentioned in this guide, but if you want ‘high street’ clothing then forget it! The nearest you’ll come to big brand names in Glastonbury is visiting the nearby Street retail outlet.

Discussion

Mass tourists may belong to one or more of the above groups and can come to Glastonbury based on any single reason or a combination of reasons. Because of the multivalent appeal that Glastonbury offers to visitors, the town may be considered a contested site. On the one hand, there are the annual Christian pilgrimage events to the Abbey and, on the other, Glastonbury has become a magnet for alternative lifestylers or ‘New Agers’. It appears that both needs have been able to be met so far without noticeable conflict, but the weekend of the Festival certainly tips the balance in favour of the alternative lifestylers.

As noted in the discussion of the various tourist groups, there seems to be no overt contest over the use of Glastonbury per se. However, Chidester and Linenthal (1995) observe that a sacred space, such as Glastonbury, will always face a certain amount of conflict over usage and access because its very core sacredness leaves it open to many claims about its significance. Appropriation and exclusion are the most commonly used strategies in the battle for control and supremacy. In Glastonbury, the Abbey has clearly been appropriated by the Church of England, leasing its grounds to those
interests it no doubt sees to be consistent with its belief system (including the annual Roman Catholic Pilgrimage, which for the first time in 1997 was allowed to finish its procession in the Abbey grounds). None of the Goddess Conference events for 2001 was held in the Abbey grounds, although a special Lammas ceremony was held at the Chalice Well.

Christianity and the ‘New Age’ are profoundly different belief systems. Christianity is exclusive, monotheistic and historically oriented, and offers clear teachings on good and evil, and salvation. The ‘New Age’, by contrast, is esoteric, syncretistic, open-ended and tolerant of other belief systems (Milliken and Drury, 1991). Some Christians find ‘New Age’ beliefs disturbing. Indeed, one Christian resident of Glastonbury remarked ‘you start off worshipping all sorts of things and you end up worshipping the devil’ (Bowman, 1993: 54). However, atheists and rationalists may also take issue with the ‘alternative’ tourists flocking to Glastonbury. Common reactions include the view that such people are ‘a woolly-minded lot’ whose beliefs are ‘all nonsense, froth and rubbish’ (Bowman, 1993: 54).

Thus tensions exist in contemporary Glastonbury, and these strains are often located in groups outside the ‘pilgrim-tourist’ category. Most prominent among these groups are the ‘travellers’, people living the life of gypsies and tinkers by choice rather than by birth. These people are often also referred to as ‘crusties’, because of their encrustation with dirt. Bowman notes that in Glastonbury they ‘tend to arouse strong feelings on account of their sometimes intimidating behaviour, their begging, public drinking and tendency to gather in the church of St John the Baptist in the High Street’ (Bowman, 1994). She later notes that there are sound commercial reasons for objecting to such conduct. It is relevant here to note MacCannell’s equation of tourists and the homeless:

They move around in public space, their carts filled with worthless ‘belongings’, a parody of the other postmodern figure, the yuppie tourist.

(MacCannell, 1992: 111)

However, the marketing of the Arthurian and Arimathean legends, New Age beliefs and the medieval Christian historical traditions benefits both conservative and alternative communities alike, so that again the old debate concerning tourism development is being played out, namely stasis versus growth. The former denotes decay and wanting things to revert to the way they used to be; the latter signifies dynamism and economic improvement through jobs and increased investment. From anecdotal evidence, there appears to be a ‘live and let live’ attitude on the part of some locals. Nevertheless, some of the older long-term residents express disquiet about the external presence of ‘unwashed hippies and layabouts cluttering up the town’. There is ‘an undeniable tension in the town [with] some traditional Christians finding the New Age activity distasteful or even disturbing and dangerous’ (Bowman, 1994: 7). This phenomenon was observed by Digance in 1997, and anecdotal evidence from some local residents
confirms Bowman’s views. A contributor to the Knowhere Guide (www. knowhere.uk.co), who was less than enthusiastic about Glastonbury, remarked:

I recently visited Glastonbury as a tourist (the place itself, not the Festival) and these are my impressions – if you’re religious and/or a hippy, then Glastonbury is the place for you! However, if you’re neither, then there’s really not a lot to recommend it. The best thing that I can say about the place is that it’s a good base to stay whilst you visit the surrounding attractions and places of interest (the Tor, Longleat, Cheddar Gorge, Wookey Hole, Stonehenge etc.).

To consolidate this ambivalence, an undated single-page information sheet from the local Tourist Information Centre concludes its description with the telling sentence: ‘Glastonbury is one of those pleasant little towns where past and present meet in harmony.’ Maybe this is one more case where the hyperbole of a promotion masks the ironic reality that the much vaunted difference peddled by so many destinations, resides not so much in the peaceful coexistence of the visitors and the visited, or even in their unique attractions, but in the variety of interpretations that tourists bring with them. The metaphor thus shifts from a given place being a town of all seasons to a floating locale subject to the multiple definitions imposed by those whom it attracts. The social world is fluid precisely because it is the haunt of the capricious.

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Introduction

There is a body of literature that claims that the tourist can be treated as a consumer (e.g. Mazanec, 1989; Gilbert, 1991). While the adduced reasons are perfectly understandable, care must be taken in order not to reduce the tourist over-simplistically to a consumer in general. Although the notion of ‘consumer’ is too diffuse to capture the full meanings of ‘tourist’, it is still necessary to analyse the consumption dimension of this concept, by treating the tourist as a subtype of consumer. Accordingly, this chapter argues that the tourist is a ‘peak consumer’ – a specific type of consumer – and asks how and why the tourist merits such a designation. The chapter consists of three sections. The first outlines three types of consumer roles from a social temporal–spatial perspective. The second discusses the characteristics of the tourist as a peak consumer. The third analyses the relationship between modernity and touristic consumption.

The Temporal–Spatial Boundaries of Consumer Roles

The role of consumer must be defined in relation to the role of producer. From a Functionalist perspective, ‘consumer’ and ‘producer’ assume different roles and functions. Whereas the role of the producer is the creation of goods or the supply of services, the reciprocal role of the consumer is the use and consumption of these goods and services. Functionalism thus helps to distinguish the role of producer from the role of consumer. However, it does
so by overlooking the realization that consumers are themselves differentiated.

The specification of consumer roles is emphasized in the literature of consumer behaviour, which treats the differentiation of types of consumers as ‘market segmentation’. Several criteria are used for the categorization of various consumers, such as demographic, geographical, psychological/psychographic and socio-cultural (see Schiffman and Kanuk, 1997). Consumers are also classified in terms of their social stratification in the literature of the sociology of consumption. Consumer wealth, occupation, power, status and so on are combined as a multicriterion by means of which consumers are stratified into several hierarchies. While these approaches are useful for the classification of different types of consumers, they fail, however, to identify the different consumer roles of the same people. Indeed, consumers can assume quite different consumer roles in different times and places, and under different circumstances.

In order to classify the different types of consumer roles of the same consumers, it is necessary to link different consumer roles to various temporal and spatial boundaries. First of all, one must analyse the temporal structures and examine how different types of consumer roles are related to these structures (see Table 14.1).

Table 14.1 illustrates three layers of temporal structure in society and the related three types of consumer roles of contemporary people. In today’s society, time is structured between work and leisure, or between production and consumption. However, the structures of work and leisure are multidimensional rather than unidimensional. To risk oversimplicity, there are three layers of structure of work and leisure. The first layer of temporal structure is the temporal division between daily work and daily leisure. Within this temporal structure, full-time workers alternate between daily work time and daily leisure time. This temporal structure constitutes their quotidian routines. The second layer is the temporal division between weekdays and weekends. Weekdays are work time plus daily leisure, and weekends are full-time leisure in which people are exempt from institutional responsibility (work). However, at weekends, the pressure of institutional work is only temporarily released. The third layer is the temporal division

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<td>Daily Work hours</td>
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<td>Daily consumption</td>
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<td>Weekends</td>
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Table 14.1. The three layers of temporal structures.
between the work period of a year and the holiday period of a year. The
former includes both the structure of daily work and daily leisure and the
structure of weekdays and weekends. The latter is a block of time consisting
of a number of consecutive days or weeks, i.e. a relatively long period
of leisure, exempt from institutional work. During such a period of time,
the pressure of institutional work is absent for a much longer period in
comparison with weekends.

Since nature divides and organizes time in terms of such rhythms as day
and night, seasons and years, then, on the basis of these natural rhythms,
society organizes time in its own way (Gurvitch, 1990; Lewis and Weigart,
1990; Mukerjee, 1990; Sorokin and Merton, 1990). Such socially organized
and structured time is called 'social time'. If in traditional society the
governing principle for the organization of time is natural rhythm, then
in modern society the governing principle of time is social rhythm
(Mumford, 1934; Bourdieu, 1977; Zerubavel, 1981; Durkheim, 1995),
typically the rhythm linked to mechanical production as originating from the
Industrial Revolution (Thrift, 1990). Thus, to a large extent, the three layers
of temporal structures are part of heritage left by industrialization and
modernization.

Just as consumption is temporally structured as different layers,
consumption activities are also spatially structured and differentiated into
two different zones – the primary zone and the secondary zone. Of these
two zones, Schutz and Luckmann (1973: 44) write:

> It is of course useful to introduce a distinction between the primary zone of
operation (the province of non-mediated action, and correspondingly the
primary world within reach) and the secondary zone of operation (and the
correspondingly secondary reach), which is built upon the primary zone and
which finds its limits in the prevailing technological conditions of a society.

Such a differentiation of zones of operation indicates that daily activity
and non-daily activity have different zones of operation or different ranges.
The daily range is the zone for daily activity, which is called ‘the primary
zone of operation’, and the non-daily range is the zone for non-daily
activity, which is called ‘the secondary zone of operation’. The same is true
of consumption activity. Daily and weekend consumption activity is located
within the primary zone of operation, namely within the daily range, and
non-daily consumption activity is located differently, usually beyond the
daily range and within the secondary zone of operation.

With regard to the primary zones or ranges of activity, there is a further
distinction between routine zones (or ranges) and alternative zones (or
ranges). For example, a daily zone on weekdays is ‘home plus commuting
and work space’. By contrast, a weekend alternative zone can be the space
outside the home and workplace, but still within the daily range, such as
recreation sites, shopping centres, football stadia and so on, which are
within the compass of people’s daily time. As for the non-daily zone or
range, it is typically exemplified by tourist destinations, which are beyond daily reach (see Table 14.2).

There is a convergence between spatially structured zones and temporally structured periods with regard to consumption activities. Daily consumption is linked to daily range. The day-off consumption is located within the weekend alternative range. Vacation consumption is realized beyond the daily and weekend ranges, namely, within holiday resorts or tourist destinations.

What are the impacts of these temporal–spatial structures upon consumption? One of the consequences is the uneven distribution and budgeting of consumption constraints in time and space. Consumption is always limited by various factors, such as disposable income, availability of goods and services, price, scarcity of time, the pressure and stress of work, and so on. Consumption constraints are the distance or the obstacle between consumer needs and the satisfaction of those needs. In order to satisfy needs, it is necessary to overcome this distance or remove these obstacles. However, it is impossible for consumers to remove all consumption constraints at once, because nobody can be totally exempt from control. Thus, each type of consumption is budgeted to link to constraint in different ways.

In daily consumer activities, consumption is budgeted in a highly functional manner, a way that allocates more constraints to daily consumption. It is necessary to make a distinction between two types of daily consumption. One is long-term budgeted consumption, such as the purchase of a house or a car. Although it is used daily, this type of consumption should be treated as non-daily consumption, since it is non-daily-budgeted consumption. The other is daily-budgeted consumption, such as food or clothing. What is referred to here is not long-term budgeted consumption, but daily-budgeted consumption. This type of daily consumption is constrained materially and temporally to a relatively higher degree. Although daily consumption is also part of the practice of leisure and pleasure, it is more subject to consumption constraints than weekend or vacation consumption, because it is budgeted in close links with consumption constraints and basic functions. Although pleasure is also part of daily consumption, it is, to a larger extent, limited by institutional (responsibilities) and temporal constraints, as well as economic constraints.

**Table 14.2. Zones of activities.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The primary zone</th>
<th>The secondary zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily residential ranges</td>
<td>Non-daily tourist ranges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekday range</td>
<td>Weekend alternative range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily routine range</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Under the condition of ‘survival surplus’, consumers in weekend consumption are less likely to constrain themselves in a way similar to daily consumption. For weekend consumers, weekend time is the respite from the daily tempo and should be liberated temporarily from institutional, temporal and material constraints. Thus, persons are willing to spend in a less economic or functional way or, to put it alternatively, in a somewhat more luxurious way, which is not allowed by a daily-consumption budget. For example, in the budget of weekend consumption, people are willing to spend more money and to allocate more time to eating out in restaurants and enjoying the taste of unusual food in an ambience of sociability and relaxation, an activity which is less realizable in daily consumption due to daily temporal and economic constraints.

In the annual budget of vacation consumption, consumption constraints are mostly assigned to daily consumption in order that a relatively constraint-free vacation can be separated from the daily. Vacation consumption is a world of liberty because vacationers budget boundaries of consumption in which they can spend relatively more freely according to their heart’s desire. They allow themselves to spend in a way that is defined as ‘unrealistic’ or ‘luxurious’. Thus, within the boundaries of a vacation, holiday-makers behave as if they were exempt from those consumption constraints that they impose upon themselves in daily life.

Thus, consumption constraints are distributed differently in three types of consumption budgets. They are concentrated most in daily-consumption budgets, less in weekend-consumption budgets, and still less in vacation-consumption budgets. Although vacation consumption is still subject to consumption constraints, such as the financial and temporal limits of budget, within its boundaries, vacation consumption is exempt from the constraints faced by both daily and weekend consumption.

In relation to the three different temporal–spatial boundaries, there are three different types of consumer roles. The first type is the daily consumer. This is the routine, regular and ordinary role of consumer. This type of consumer role is the most profane and functional. Although consumption can be to a greater or lesser extent hedonistic, the daily consumer can only have more access to the pleasure of goods and less access to the delights of time and space, due to temporal–spatial constraints. What dictate this type of consumer role are daily rhythms and the constraints of daily budgets.

The second type of consumer role is the day-off (or weekend alternative) consumer. This type of consumer role has more time to transcend daily temporal–spatial boundaries and hence to pursue the happiness and pleasure of non-routine or non-daily consumption, such as shopping, eating out, going to the theatre, cinema or dance hall, watching a football match, playing golf, going fishing, and so on. The weekend allows day-off alternative consumers to reverse the role of the daily consumer. If the daily routine consumer is mainly to serve a role relating to daily responsibilities and constraints, then a day-off alternative consumer is able to transcend the
limits of the daily role and become more preoccupied with the pleasure of alternative consumption. However, overall, this type of consumer role is still constrained by work tempo and consumption budget. It is an institutional weekly release (via alternative spaces) from the boredom or stress of the weekday tempo. It is a weekly recycle of relaxation and pleasure in reaction to weekday constraints.

The third type of consumer role is that of vacation consumer. This type of consumer pursues a responsibility-free or constraint-free consumption, a consumption that transcends daily routine and day-off alternative consumption. Vacation consumption is a long-term, budgeted consumption that takes place away from home, free from daily constraints. This type of consumption is more about an orientation. It is about the utopia or fantasy of consumption, an oneiric world where the dream comes true. It can thus be called ‘peak consumption’.

It must be noted that most of Western contemporary people assume all these three types of consumer roles. People assign different consumer roles to different temporal–spatial boundaries. From the first to the second, and finally to the third layer of temporal–spatial structures, consumer roles also continuously upgrade from the first layer to the second layer, and finally to the third layer. This continuity of ascent can be called a ladder of consumer roles (Fig. 14.1).

People move between different layers of temporal–spatial boundaries and accordingly assume their different consumer roles. When they effect the transition to the third layer of temporal structure, then they change their ordinary consumer roles to a higher, peak consumer role.

Tourism as Peak Consumption

Different types of consumer role, including daily routine, day-off alternative and vacation consumer roles, are related to different consumer orientations. Although these types of consumption are all characterized by both rationalism and hedonism, just how these attributes are mixed varies with each type of consumption. The element of rationalism is on the wane with the upgrade
from daily routine to weekend, and finally to vacation consumption. The major principle that underlines the budgeting of vacation consumption is hedonism.

People are more likely to assume peak consumer roles during their vacations. As implied above, two factors help bring about this result. First, throughout the holiday period, people are to a larger extent free from temporal constraints. Secondly, at this time, individuals are more willing to spend in a less self-constraining way, because the sum of money has been allocated in the preceding period of the year for the purpose of obtaining the experience of peak consumption.

Peak consumption is in a sense characterized by surplus consumption. In other words, what persons consume exceeds their level of survival function. The enjoyment of luxury is one such example. However, the most important characteristic of peak consumption is its orientation, a tendency that is linked not to the functions of the satisfaction of elementary needs but to the quest for peak experiences.

For the purpose of obtaining such peak experience, there are two sources on which peak consumers can rely. The first is luxury goods and the second is luxury time (and space). As far as luxury goods are concerned, they are the relatively long-term budget of consumption (for most ‘ordinary’ people) and thus constitute the non-daily budget, even though the consumption of luxury goods takes place daily. As regards luxury time, only holiday-makers or tourists can have full access to it. In this temporal and spatial sense, only tourism assumes the full characteristics of peak consumption. During a holiday period, people become peak consumers not only in the sense that they spend more money than in everyday life, but also in the sense that they are much more luxurious in spending free time, which in turn allows tourists to be able to get away from home and everyday reality (Graburn, 1983; Neumann, 1992; Rojek, 1993). In peak consumption, time itself, i.e. the duration of quality time, becomes the substantial content of consumption (Michael, 1950; Gottlieb, 1982; Ryan, 1997). It needs to be pointed out here, however, that only when time needs to be paid for can it become luxury time, such as holiday time. The idle time of the unemployed is not luxury time because time is only the burden of forced leisure, the very antithesis of luxury time (Roche, 1990).

**Peak Consumption as Utopian Experience**

The peak consumer is a utopian. For most people in modernized or newly industrializing societies, the whole year is divided into two separate temporal territories. One is the daily reality, in which they are rationally self-constrained in consumption, and the other is the utopia of a holiday, in which they engage in the fantasy of freedom to spend and consume. This utopia is appealing only in contrast to daily reality, and daily reality is
tolerable because there is a utopia ahead. Thus, when individuals enter utopia, they upgrade from the roles of daily consumers and day-off consumers to the higher role of peak consumers. They become peak consumers because what they consume are not concrete objects that satisfy their objective needs, but fantasies which resemble haloes surrounding everything they consume. Peak consumers are in pursuit of dreams, dreams that are difficult to realize in daily reality. Thus, the experience of peak consumption necessarily contains elements of fantasy. Holiday-makers splash out in a way as if they could spend *ad libitum*. They live a holiday life in such a manner as if there were no material constraints and daily responsibilities. They consume holidays as if they were in paradise. The utopian experience is an important characteristic of peak consumption.

The separation of the year into a period of production and a period of peak consumption is one solution to the contradiction between material constraint and daily responsibility on the one hand, and freedom, happiness and liberation on the other. For most people, material constraints are always there. Few are totally free from material constraints and consumer limits. For the modern individual, there is no absolute happiness. Life is a project of progress, that is to say, life could be, and should be, constantly improved, better and happier. Happiness, once realized, soon turns into its opposite – boredom. Thus, people pursue ever newer forms of happiness. Happiness is transitional, shifting and dynamic. It lies in expectation and in wishful thinking. Happiness necessarily includes a utopian element. Holiday-making or tourism is therefore a microtechnique for making life better, through creating the utopia of holiday resorts. In order to live a happy life, happiness itself must be socially re-structured and re-cycled as a distinct contrast to the elements of unhappiness, such as the pressure of work in daily life. Happiness is not an issue of pure materialism (goods possessed), but rather a matter of idealism (constantly longing for ideals). According to the micro-technique of a happy life, the elements of happiness should not be evenly distributed according to each day of the year. Rather, they are dispersed in a fluctuating, uplifting and cyclical way within a year. Thus, social time must be organized in such a way that part of it is more linked to daily constraints and another part is more connected to freedom and happiness. Organized in such a fashion, the latter constitutes the ideal that people long for in daily reality. The institution of a holiday is therefore an institution of an accessible and cyclical utopia that makes daily constraints tolerable (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973: 137). This situation does not mean that in quotidian time people do not have any happiness at all. Rather, such happiness always lies in the shadow of daily constraint. If persons can be temporarily free from this constraint, then they would feel much happier. Thus, holiday periods are a social construction of the temporal boundaries in which daily constraints are suspended and people are more engagingly practising happiness and freedom than they are in ordinary time (Gottlieb, 1982).
Even within the holiday period, the experience of peak consumption is structured in such a way that there is a transition stage, a peak stage and a returning stage (Jafari, 1985). Both transition and re-incorporation are more subject to constraints linked to daily reality, such as waiting, queuing, undertaking a tiring journey, and so on. Such consumption labour is the necessary preparation for peak consumption. It is only the existence of peak experiences in the peak stage of the holiday period that turns the travail of consumption into part of a pleasant experience.

Peak Consumption as Transcendence of Consumption Limits

If ordinary consumption (including daily and weekend consumption) is the satisfaction of concrete needs, then the objects of peak consumption are often found in an abstract state. Peak consumption exists as consuming a subjectivity that is characterized by the endless transcendence of present objective requirements. The satisfaction of needs is functional, whereas the transcendence of here-and-now needs is motivated by a generalizing mental hedonism (Campbell, 1987).

At the risk of oversimplicity, in traditional society, people lived an ecological life (a harmonious relationship and exchange with nature via human or animal forces), and their requirements were relatively fixed. By contrast, in modernity, people’s needs are no longer static but in a constant state of flux (Campbell, 1987). This continual change of needs can be either the precondition or the consequence of contemporary technological innovation. However, whether it is technological advance or the changing needs for new products that comes first is still a metaphysical ‘chicken or egg’ issue. Even so, a changing orientation to products and consumption is certainly one of the important factors that interacts with technological advances. For capitalism to occur and succeed, a spirit of consumerism is necessary in order to secure a sufficiently renewable market for the constant emergence of new products brought about by mass production. This spirit is the Romantic ethic that is characterized by the pursuit of imaginative or mental hedonism (Campbell, 1987). To put it another way, one of the most distinctive characteristics of present day consumption is consumption innovation. Contemporary consumption is no longer geared towards concrete objects or needs, but rather appears to be an abstract orientation to constantly new, innovative and changing experiences. It is this continual search for novel and imaginative experiences, what Campbell calls ‘mental hedonism’, that provides the modern capitalist market with cultural support (Campbell, 1987). What is implied here is that a modern consumption orientation entails a constant transcendence of psychological consumption constraints. Thus, the limits of what is not accessible and consumable in
technological or in cultural terms must be forever transcended in order to satisfy the urge for new and changing experiences.

This abstract consumption orientation can be also termed ‘hyperconsumption’. As an orientation, hyperconsumption can exist in all three layers of temporal boundaries, penetrating into both daily and day-off consumption. However, as an institution, hyperconsumption mostly exists within the confines of luxury time. In daily and day-off consumption, a hyperconsumption orientation is limited by temporal constraints. These restrictions truncate people’s consumer experiences because they can only engage in the consumption of goods within a routine context. By contrast, it is tourism or a holiday that allows people to experience change, novelty and difference intensively and broadly. Therefore, it is small wonder that tourism is the most typical example of mental hedonism (Campbell, 1995). Tourism is, in short, an ideal model of hyperconsumption whose best instance is exemplified by the world’s first space tourist, Dennis Tito. He was who blasted off on a $20 million joyride to the International Space Station on Saturday, 28 April, 2001 aboard a Russian rocket, reached his holiday destination on Monday, 30 April, and returned from ‘Paradise’ to earth on Sunday, 6 May, landing on the Kazakh steppe (Yahoo! News, 2001a,b,c).

**Peak Consumption as De-routinization of Consumption**

If daily consumption is routine consumption, then peak consumption is characterized by de-routinization. Routinization is a relative term. The most basic routines are daily routines. Dining out at the weekend is not a routine set against the temporal unit of a day. However, it becomes a routine activity in terms of the larger temporal unit of a month. Similarly, an annual holiday is not a routine in terms of the units of days, weeks or months. Yet, it is a routine with respect to the longer temporal unit of continuous years. De-routinization here is defined in terms of the temporal unit of a year. Tourism is a de-routinization of consumption.

De-routinization is a necessary experience of peak consumption. Peak consumption is unusual consumption. From a psychological perspective, if consumption is conducted routinely, then it is less likely to lead to peak consumption. For consumption to be a peak experience, either the object of consumption or the mode of consumption must be unusual, atypical in the sense that the object and the mode of consumption are new or scarce in daily reality.

Tourism is, in essence, characterized by a break of routine and everyday life. Cohen argues that tourists can be classified into two types – ‘sightseers’ and ‘vacationers’ (Cohen, 1974). For him, ‘sightseers seek novelty, while vacationers merely seek change, whether or not this brings novelty in its train’ (Cohen, 1974: 544–545). Regardless of whether a tourist is a sightseer
or a vacationer, (s)he) seeks strange, non-routine experiences. While the consumption of material goods is relatively slow to change and innovate, tourism is a kind of consumer experience that varies relatively easily and quickly. Of experiences’ relationship to repetition and change, Gabriel and Lang write:

Experiences fade with repetition, hence self-illusory hedonism is always seeking novelty, uniqueness and adventure, while at all times seeking to maintain control over the intensity of stimulation, balancing endurable longing with a kaleidoscopic survey of emotions and delectable morsels of pleasure.

(Gabriel and Lang, 1995: 107)

While innovation, change and variety constitute the essential experience of peak consumption, tourism, as a form of consumption of change, novelty and variety, is the most typical form of peak consumption.

**Peak Consumption as Intensified Consumerism**

If daily consumption is about the economics of life, namely the allocation of scarce, personal disposable income (i.e. maximization of utility), then peak consumption is about the romanticization and enjoyment of life. Peak consumption transcends economic limits and engages in feelings of life, mental hedonism and imaginative enjoyment (Campbell, 1987). Peak consumption is the practice of life underpinned by the values of consumerism and pleasure.

Although both daily and weekend consumption are in a way related to consumerism, the zenith of consumerism is peak consumption. True, any consumption is constrained by economic resources. However, it is also evident that different types of consumption are subject to different degrees of these constraints. Peak consumption is a means of transcending daily limits, a way that is underlined by consumerism. It is the intensified experience of consumerism. One of the essential characteristics of consumerism is pleasure. About this, Gabriel and Lang state:

Pleasure lies at the heart of consumerism. It finds in consumerism a unique champion which promises to liberate it both from its bondage to sin, duty and morality as well as from its ties to faith, spirituality and redemption.

Consumerism proclaims pleasure not merely as the right of every individual but also as every individual’s obligation to him – or herself.

(Gabriel and Lang, 1995: 100)

As an exemplification of consumerism, peak consumption means ‘consuming for pleasure, not consuming for survival or for need’ (Gabriel and Lang, 1995: 100). Peak consumers are hedonists. ‘Their lives are organized around fantasies and daydreams about consuming’ (Abercrombie, 1994: 44). Furthermore, hedonism is not only a right of contemporary consumers, but also an obligation. Thus, they have ‘no right not to be happy’ (Baudrillard,
1988: 49). Contemporary consumers are not destined to remain mere ordinary consumers. They can also assume the role of peak consumer.

**Modernity and Touristic Consumption**

There is a consumption dimension of modernity (Slater, 1997), just as there is a production dimension of modernity. With the advent of modernity, there was a consumer revolution (McKendrick et al., 1982). The rise of industrial capitalism was made possible partly because there was a spirit of consumerism, which paved the way for the continual rise of needs for new and innovative consumer goods (i.e. a constantly increasing market) (Campbell, 1987). Therefore, it is insufficient in the theorization of modernity without considering its dimension of consumption. Tourism can be understood in relation to this consumption dimension.

In traditional society, consumer needs were relatively fixed and highly constrained (cf. Campbell, 1987). This situation was in accordance with an economy of scarcity. By contrast, under the condition of modernity, with the rapid innovation of technology, the force and capability of production are ever increasing. The modern industrial system entails changing needs and widening markets. Thus, a closed system of needs is no longer justifiable. For the purpose of serving a capitalist market, consumer culture has arisen to play a key role in modernity (Campbell, 1987; Slater, 1997). One of the essential characteristics of modern consumption is the continual transcendence of fixed levels and amounts of needs. Informed by consumer culture, modern consumers develop an abstract ability of ‘want to want’ (Campbell, 1983: 282). This wanting and desiring is a process separate from the actual concrete things that might be desired, and is, in fact, a generalized mode of being.

Tourism is an exemplification of this generalizing consuming ability and desire. In traditional society, tourism was regarded as wasteful and was...
therefore negatively sanctioned (Wang, 2000). By contrast, in modernity, tourism is one example of modern abstract consumer orientation, a tendency that is characterized by the constant transcendence of present needs.

Tourism has been popular not merely because there has been improvement in living standards, but also because it is one of best spheres in which individuals can demonstrate their overcoming the limits of daily consumption. If material goods are relatively slow to innovate, then experiences, especially tourist experiences, are easy and quick to change. This situation makes tourism an exemplary domain to explore and satisfy the generalized consuming needs of modern consumers. Relatedly, as touristic consumers, tourists constantly seek change and novelty through travelling ever further afield and via their participation in more and more varied activities.

While the traditional consumer simply consumes what is available, the modern consumer consumes everything in psychological terms. For the latter, there is nothing in the world that cannot, in principle, become the object of consumption. As a prime exemplar of the modern consumer, the tourist not only consumes concrete things (hotels, food, itineraries, services, etc.), but also consumes people, culture, sights and environments. As space technology progresses, the earth as a whole will be visually consumed by the touristic consumer as s(he) takes flight to outer space. The touristic consumer’s constant transcendence of the limits of what is not consumable implies that what has been consumed will soon lose its appeal, because the modern consumer always desires to consume the new and the impossible (Campbell, 1987). This consuming trend can thus explain why there is a life cycle of tourist destinations. The tourist consumer constitutes a contemporary role for modern man, woman and child. The emergence of the tourist is the most appropriate sign of the transformation of contemporary people into modern consumers, especially peak consumers.

Conclusion

With the advent of modernity, as society becomes increasingly differentiated, various domains such as the State, the market economy, culture and private life increasingly constitute structural boundaries in which different roles are assumed. While it may be correct to claim that Western societies are consumer societies and that consumerism dominates people’s everyday consciousness, that is not the same as saying that individuals are consumerists at every waking moment, because consumerism is unevenly distributed in their boundaries of roles and activities. It is certainly hard for consumerism to be actualized within the confines of work, despite the realization that labour is the precondition of consumerism. Even within the limits of consumption, consumerism does not always demonstrate itself in a homogeneous and average manner. It may penetrate into the daily consumption arena, become stronger in weekend consumption, but it can
only be fully carried out within the parameters of peak consumption. Consumerism is an orientation and value that exists in contemporary Western people’s generalizing consumer consciousness. Such an awareness faces various constraints. Thus, in order to practise consumerism, one of the efforts that consumers must make is to remove these limits, and it is within the budgeted boundaries of peak consumption that the restrictions finally are removed in a most thorough manner. Tourism is the best example of peak consumption because people budget their holidays in a way that allocates more constraints to daily consumption and more consumer freedom within the boundaries of a vacation. In other words, the tourist is the most appropriate model in which the contemporary individual’s role of peak consumption is most clearly demonstrated. It is in this sense that the tourist can be regarded as a metaphor of the social world.

References

The Tourist as Peak Consumer


The Cinematic Tourist: Perception and Subjectivity
Bronwyn Morkham and Russell Staiff

Introduction

The relationship with the surrounding physio-cultural environment is an ecological one of dynamic perceptual interaction. This physiological and neurological process is not only fundamental to survival, it is central to cognition. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to this phenomenon within tourism research, despite the strong body of writing that has focused on the ‘tourist experience’ (summarized in Ryan, 1997). This omission may be because an understanding of the relationship between perception and cognition would appear to be something that is much bigger than the tourist context of such interaction. Indeed, at the point where tourism and the individual experience intersect, it is the motivation for travelling that is addressed more often (Ryan, 1997; Wang, 2000).

Are tourists drifters or are they seekers – of pleasure, of the ‘other’, of the spiritual, of wholeness, of authenticity? Are tourists socially alienated and/or are they escapees? Is travel driven by a desire that is constructed and policed by socio-cultural processes? The focus of the commentaries that address these issues has been on the important attempt to explain the meaning and the significance of contemporary travel as a socio-cultural phenomenon. To date, the research has been dominated by a quest to understand trends in tourism by analysing the tourist experience, not at the level of cognitive perception and its organic link to subjectivity, but as an experience that is socially constructed. Consequently, the literature has been overwhelmingly about social patterns, social behaviours, social semiotics, modernity/postmodernity and tourism consumption – replete with references to the

tourist as a metaphor of the social world. The results of this research agenda have been impressive and highly significant (Wang, 2000). Indeed, it is virtually impossible to conceptualize tourism within Western academic discourse outside of this body of work.

Even so, the cognitive aspects of tourist perception, on-site and in real time, have also been mentioned. Whether it is the worlds that people cognitively inhabit (MacCannell, 1976), the behavioural studies of tourist motivation (Mannell and Iso-Ahola, 1987), work on tourist anticipation and motivation (Parrinello, 1993), the perceptions shaped by the tourist environment (Selwyn, 1996) or tourist satisfaction (Ryan, 1997), the processes of reflexivity (Giddens, 1991) or spatial/geographic consciousness (Li, 2000), or the place of the symbolic and of representations in tourism and its affect on self-identity (Desforges, 2000), cognitive perception is always assumed. Yet rarely is it the central subject of inquiry.

How, then, should analysts begin to understand the tourist experience in terms of the subject’s relationships with the physio-cultural environment? One possible place to commence such a speculation is within the domain of the cinematic experience, a choice that is not as ad hoc as it might first seem. In a celebrated essay published before his death, Louis Marin made an important, but fleeting, suggestion that travel is configured into the very heart of (Western) representation – that to read a book, see a film, look at a painting or follow a map is to travel somewhere (Marin, 1993). There are, therefore, many possible starting points in this speculative investigation. By assuming a shared visual culture (Mirzoeff, 1998) for cinema and tourism – both activities, for example, involve spectatorship – it is possible to consider cinema and tourism as inter-related contemporary experiences that share crucial dynamics and processes in the subject’s quest for meaning making. Furthermore, because the theorizing of this relationship within cinema studies has been an ongoing exercise for some time, it seems a logical place to begin (Anderson, 1996).

Navigating Experience

[Film] functions as a programmed surrogate world – programmed in the sense that the filmmaker carefully structures the motion picture to interact directly with the mind of the viewer and surrogate in that the mind interacts with the motion picture utilizing the same perceptual system, the same ‘assumptions’ and cognitive procedures that are employed when interacting with the natural environment.

(Anderson, 1996)

The self and its boundaries are the heart of philosophical speculation on human nature, and the sense of self and its counterpart, the sense of other, are universal phenomena that profoundly influence all our social experiences.

(Stern, 1985)
It is 7 p.m. and 8°C on a freezing Melbourne night. The rain, driven by a howling southwesterly gale, cuts like a blade. Away from these inhuman elements, a small crowd has gathered in the upstairs foyer of that city’s stately Astor Theatre, warmly clothed against the bitter weather outside. Umbrellas drip everywhere and a warm buzz of anticipation pervades the space, along with the aromas of steaming coffee and hot chocolate. Friends locate one another in the growing crush of bodies, and several canny souls start surreptitiously to take up position near the point of entry, all the better to claim a favoured seat when the doors open. As the starting time draws near, people begin to press forward, as if the sheer weight of their collective desire can force the doors open and admit them, at last, to the darkened auditorium within. A casual passer-by (if one exists on this foul night) may wonder what has drawn this group here on such a miserable evening. The answer is easily discovered in the headline banner that proclaims the names of Hollywood’s finest – they are here to see a film.

Film is an utterly compelling beast. Few indeed are the ‘amusements’ that can impel otherwise sensible folk from their safe, warm homes on such a bleak night. Rare indeed are the ‘attractions’ that, having convinced them to brave the elements and risk life and limb, further demand that they pay for the privilege of watching the flickering play of light and shadow on a large white screen, in questionable heating. Yet, thousands do and continue to do so the world over in all types of inclement – and clement – weather, despite the ever rising cost of a cinema ticket. One of the reasons can be found in contemporary cinema’s ability to act as a gateway through which the film aficionado can ‘travel’ to physio-cultural sites in other times, other places and other worlds. In moments such as these, cinematic spectators are transformed into a type of tourist/traveller in their motivations (cf. Wang, 2000).

On another day, at another time, a very different scenario is enacted. The setting is an elegant Victorian terrace house in East Melbourne. This building is the home of a family whose children the first co-author has looked after, at one time of pecuniary need or another, over the last 15 years. Two months ago, the eldest son was married and, as one who has had some involvement in his journey towards this momentous day, there has been an invitation for her to come and view a video of this special event. Many thoughts are running through the mind of the writer on her walk to the front door. As well as a multitude of memories of Aaron over the years, there is an eagerness to see both how he was married as well as where the ceremony took place. Having never been to a Jewish wedding – although having a cursory knowledge of the ritual involved – is one source of this eagerness, but even more intriguing perhaps has been the lack of an opportunity to visit Jerusalem, the place where Aaron was married. This is a city that resonates with deep attraction and equally profound symbolism.

The desire to see this video of Aaron’s marriage thus exists on three levels: the wish to participate vicariously in the significant moment; an
eagerness to see and understand the ancient rituals involved in a Jewish marriage; and a curiosity to ‘see’ this ceremony take place in Jerusalem — a city that does not, as yet, register as a ‘direct experience’. To sit down before the television screen is to be utterly captivated by regimes of anticipation, motivation and expectation as she prepares for the ‘journey’ (cf. Parrinello, 1993). In these moments, the video spectator is both a tourist and a traveller, albeit of the armchair variety, and a cinematically inscribed version of Aaron’s marriage takes the viewer to a ‘destination’.

As these two accounts make clear, the cinematic spectator and the contemporary tourist/traveller share more than the fact of their respective odysseys. Both access vast amounts of information in the course of their travels. Both incorporate particular ways of ‘looking at’ and comprehending these data, both are variously subject to irrevocable subjective change as a consequence of the experiential moments apprehended on their journeys, and both can be considered metaphors of the (post)modern world. In their various ways, cinema studies and tourism studies, as multidisciplinary fields, have each attempted to understand how and why such transformations are enacted (Andrews, 1984; Wang, 2000). Yet neither has been able to describe adequately how these dynamic relationships with ‘otherness’, which lie at the heart of the ongoing enunciation of contemporary subjectivity, are impinged on by journeys of the touristic and cinematic kind. However, the work of noted American cognitive psychologist, Daniel Stern, offers one way of traversing this hitherto abstruse domain, and of understanding the cognitive processes that enable the individual to manoeuvre through, and make sense of, the intense information ‘bombardment’ of such journeying, particularly at the level of the perception–subject interface.

New Places, New Names

The conceptions of cinema and tourism proposed in this chapter locate these activities as sites of information exchange in the service of meaning making. As a foundational activity of human subjectivity, meaning making simultaneously forms part of any extant subjectivity as it is also involved with that entity’s further evolution. Yet as one of many experiential elements subjects can address in their efforts at meaning making, film is especially powerful in the possibilities it offers spectators to establish meanings and make associations from the information obtained (Anderson, 1996). Not only does cinema enable a process of meaning making per se, it also makes it possible for the spectator to activate meaning-making processes that are otherwise culturally negated, or made unavailable to specific aspects of subjective enunciation. The ability for film to transport audio-visually other worlds (other places, other times) into the present is unique.

Cinema achieves this feat by bringing worlds to the spectator that may otherwise remain out of reach. These unattainables can be the ‘off-worlds’ of
science fiction, such as the vision of a bad new future in *Bladerunner* (directed by Ridley Scott, 1982), or the ‘other worlds’ of this planet revealed in the formats of documentary cinema, like the one disclosed in *Joe Leahy’s Neighbours* (directed by Bob Connelly and Robin Anderson, 1998). Examining an indigenous New Guinean’s efforts to buy into his country’s expatriate-dominated coffee economy, the world this film reveals is literally and figuratively ‘a world away’ from the depiction of village life in remote China that Zhang Yimou’s latest feature, *Not One Less* (1999), discloses.

As well as representing other worlds, cinema also allows the spectator to participate vicariously in emotional, intellectual and physical experiences that might not otherwise be undergone. In this regard, the inner worlds of a murderer’s mind brought to light in *The Cell* (directed by Tarsem Singh, 2000) give insights into how a perverse individual evolves from otherwise innocuous beginnings. So too, is the impact of death, self-sacrifice and the endurance of the human spirit rethought in *Mission to Mars* (directed by Brian De Palma, 2000), but in the context of humanity’s exploration of the unknown frontiers of outer space. In availing themselves of such varied sets of experiences, spectators thereby engage in an ongoing and dynamic perceptual interaction with a film that mirrors their perceptual engagements with the physical world outside the cinema. In this way, the viewing and understanding of films is another aspect of the human perception and comprehension that is carried out in day-to-day existence more generally.

While tourism sightseeing involves quite a different environment within which the information exchange transpires, there are also similarities. For example, the degree of manipulation and presentation of landscapes for the tourist has been much debated. If there is a consensus, it acknowledges that the tourist experience is, to a greater or lesser degree, constructed regardless of whether the traveller visits Venice or Bali, a theme park in Las Vegas or walks through a rainforest. In each case, there is an integration (again to various degrees) of attractions, hotel environments, tours (guided, packaged, self-guided) and the development of complex infrastructures to present ‘worlds’ to the tourist.

To participate in the constructed ‘worlds’ of cinema, spectators actively make choices from amongst the many patterns of information available on the screen that represent the diegetic worlds displayed there. Cinematic spectatorship is, therefore, not about being in a semi-hypnotic state in a darkened theatre. It is not just a matter of suspending disbelief. Nor is it a question of being ‘positioned’ as a spectator or ‘sutured’ into a text, and it has nothing to do with dreaming. It is instead the human perceptual system alternating between two separate but related sets of information – that derived from the reality of the world at large, and the commensurate but surrogate reality of the diegetic worlds on the screen.

Analogous to the cinematic experience, the tourist experience is also often regarded as a ‘surrogate reality’ that is in a constant relationship, and dialogue, with the experience of ‘home’ environments and ‘home’
latter's subjective self in relation to this newly acquired information. If it accepted that perception is essentially an information-gathering activity, how do individuals' cognitive capacities deal with this fund of information? What meaning do they make of it? And how do such processes of meaning making shape their subjective sense of who they are?

Making Sense of Informational Opportunities

The alternative model of cinematic and touristic spectatorship outlined here assumes a dynamic, interactive spectator in its explanation of how a sense of self is inflected by the act of going to the movies or journeying to other climes. Whether travelling to the other worlds of *Star Wars* in a cinema, walking through the narrow *siq* that leads to Jordan's pink city of Petra, or exploring the base of Uluru with its traditional custodians, the Anangu people, the spectator-traveller is always involved in a perceptual interaction with an information-saturated environment. The expected end point of this accumulation of experiential data is a greater understanding both of the environment in which those 'data' are perceived by the spectator-traveller, and of the latter's subjective self in relation to this newly acquired information. If it accepted that perception is essentially an information-gathering activity, how do individuals' cognitive capacities deal with this fund of information? What meaning do they make of it? And how do such processes of meaning making shape their subjective sense of who they are?
More particularly, how do the spectatorial regimes inherent in cinema and tourism participate at both an individual and a socio-cultural level in the ongoing enunciation of contemporary subjectivity?

Arguably, cinema in all its various incarnations and tourism in all its forms are two of the most potent forces to which people have access in their desire to make sense of the world they inhabit. Relatedly, at its most basic, meaning making is an inherent human quest that enhances their chances of survival. Making sense of who they are and what they confront around them is, therefore, not only crucial to their sense of purpose and well being. It is also a vital component of human continuity and longevity; it lies at the heart of the ‘processual moments of becoming’ that comprise the human subject (Guattari, 1995). As widely popular experiential regimes, the perceptive processes of cinema going and tourism provide fertile ground for the ongoing process of contemporary subjective enunciation, and do so at both individual and societal levels.

The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter uses the writings of American psychologist, Daniel Stern. Stern’s work is concerned with examining how subjectivity, in its most fundamental sense, comes to be – how individuals develop that sense of self and of other that generally is taken to be the cornerstone of the human subject. Stern’s starting point is the newborn baby and the ways in which an infant comes to terms with the larger world of which s/he is a part. His thesis is that human subjectivity depends on the initial activation of four foundational senses of self in infancy. Once ‘on-line’, these senses of self continue to grow and develop for the duration of the individual’s life, and form the basis of the ongoing evolution of self that is subjectivity. While an extended discussion of each self and its complexities is beyond the scope of this chapter, a brief analysis of spectatorial response to one film will highlight some of the ways in which Stern’s approach informs a more comprehensive understanding of the processes of cinematic spectatorship and tourism experiences.

**Processual Moments of Becoming**

Fundamental to Stern’s theory is his conception of four distinct senses of self. He argues that, as well as forming the bedrock of all initial moves to a nascent subjectivity, these entities also continue to function as the root source of an individual’s subjectivity, a subjectivity that is constantly evolving in response to its experiential awareness of a cognizant world.

These separate senses of the self additionally define accompanying domains of self-experience and social relatedness. The four senses of self are:

- the sense of an emergent self, which forms from birth to 2 months of age;
the sense of core self, which forms between 2 and 6 months of age;
the sense of a subjective self, which forms between 7 and 15 months of age; and
the sense of a verbal self, which forms after the sense of a subjective self has come ‘on-line’.

Each of these various senses of self is the result of the incorporation and consequent reorganization of new behaviours and capacities. These ‘reorganizations’ become in their turn the next organizing subjective perspective on self and other – the next stage-based, sense of self. Emerging in quantum leaps, each sense of self is successive and, once established, continues to coexist simultaneously with its preceding ‘sibling others’.

Each of these individual senses of self is the result of the infant’s experience of the world in which s(he) exists, as well as the ways in which such experiences are encountered. In other words, a sense of self (subjectivity) is the result of both the raw material encountered and the manner in which that material is processed. Naming the spaces where this subjective organizing of experience occurs as the ‘domains of relatedness’, Stern sees each sense of self as the result of the process of organization that takes place in the respective domain of relatedness. As zones of interactivity, the domains of relatedness are thus a sort of nourishing ‘soup’ that sustains and shapes the fledgling subjectivity that is in, to use Guattari’s (1995) term, a ‘processual moment of becoming’. The sense of self that emerges at this point then becomes, in turn, another organizing perspective, the properties of which remain active and available for the rest of the subject’s life. Once this next organizing perspective, this added sense of self, forms, the subjective social world is altered and interpersonal experience can operate in another, different domain (Stern, 1985). These domains are thus spaces where the experience of both self and other is integrated, and interplay between self and other occurs. They are spaces wherein new developmental transformations or creations can both come into being and become assimilated, and can, in their turn, provide the basis for the emergence of the next sense of self.

All domains of relatedness remain active during development and, once formed, each domain remains in place for the remainder of the subject’s life as a distinct form of experiencing social life and self. As the subject continues to live and experience self and other, each domain simply becomes more elaborated. As Stern succinctly explains:

While these domains of relatedness result in qualitative shifts in social experience, they are not phases; rather, they are forms of social experience that remain intact throughout life. Nonetheless, their initial phase of formation constitutes a sensitive period of development. Subjective social experience results from the sum and integration of experience in all domains.

(Stern, 1985)

Stern contends that each self, and its attendant domain of relatedness, comes on-line initially when the maturation of capacities in the infant
allows new organizing subjective perspectives about the self and the other. Although successive phases, he is insistent that the senses of self do not replace one another, but that each remains functionally intact and operational throughout the subject’s life, so that all continue to grow and coexist. If Stern’s senses of self are the organizing perspectives that render the experience of the subjective social world intelligible in particular ways, then their attendant domains of relatedness are where the interpersonal experiences that are informed by these perspectives are perceived.

There is a most important point here. As these four senses of self and their attendant domains of relatedness are active for the entire lifespan, they are always available to interact with each other as they process information gained from the individual’s daily perceptual interaction with the world. The four senses of self are, in other words, simultaneous and cumulative domains of self-experience. Once all are present and functioning, there is a fluidity of movement between them that enables the subjective experience of social interaction to occur in all domains of relatedness at the same time. Once formed, the domains are not lost to adult experience, but remain forever as distinct forms of experiencing social life and self, each becoming increasingly elaborated as the individual continues to perceive and experience informational events. No extraordinary conditions or processes are necessary to allow movement between experiences in different domains or senses of the self.

Stern provides a compelling body of clinical evidence and observational data in support of his claim that the senses of self and their domains of relatedness remain operant and available to individuals for the rest of their lives (Stern, 1985). If cinema and tourism are experientially based informational entities, then the selves and their domains comprise the process whereby the spectator perceptually engages with the diegetic world of the screen-as-information or engages with the socially constructed world of the destination-landscape-as-information. While their constant interaction helps spectators to construe meanings that help them comprehend the perceived film or landscape, at another level these meanings are integrated as part of the continual process of becoming which is each spectator-subject. In other words, these senses of self enable the spectator to intersect with a film or a destination landscape, derive meaning from the cinematic/tourist experience and incorporate this newly accessed ‘information’ into a reiterated sense of self (or subjectivity).

Making Meaning Made Simple...

While there are many ways in which Stern’s senses of self facilitate meaning making, both discretely and together, the ability to enact deferred or delayed imitations, and the spectator’s ability to perceive a psychological relationship between the self and the model performing an original act, are
especially significant. To enact deferred imitations, viewers must have a representation of the original action as performed by the model (something that is itself dependent on good recall or evocative memory) and their own enactment of it. In effect, individuals have two versions of the same reality available to them. These two versions allow them to make comparisons and adjust their version until a good imitation is accomplished.

However, in order to perceive a psychological relationship between the self and the model performing the original act, spectators need to be able to represent themselves as similar to the model, and to do so in such a way that both they and the model occupy the same position relative to the action to be imitated. Such a representation requires a view of the self as an objective entity that, in Stern’s words, can be ‘... seen from the outside and felt subjectively from the inside’ (Stern, 1985: 164).

Within tourism it may be hypothesized that this process is also critical. The observer-traveller is constantly bombarded with an almost endless procession of ‘original acts’, whether it is watching a Balinese family on a beach in Sanur, viewing a street performance at Circular Quay in Sydney, observing a market place in Rome or entering a museum space and relating the museum’s visual environment to the specific objects to be found displayed there for a viewing public. In every case the experiential aspect is ‘measured’ both against and from within the viewers’ existing concepts of ‘who they are’, i.e. their life story. The ‘original’ in Stern’s terminology – the spectator-traveller in another place – is constantly compared with ‘home’, whether it be a material landscape or a place memory or knowledge learnt elsewhere (cf. Horne, 1992). In these cases, it is a looking from the outside and a feeling from the inside.

The way in which these subjective aspects come together is illustrated by just one response to the opening scenes of the film *The Cell*[^2]. Over the course of this sequence, a beautiful young woman on a jet-black horse gradually comes into focus, riding at full gallop through a Sahara-like desertscape. Dressed in a sumptuous gown that billows behind her, the beauty of the horse – richly attired in silver bridle and trappings – matches her own exotic splendour. The possibility of a direct experience of this magnitude is clearly beyond the capabilities of most film viewers, and this particular combination of beauty and setting is the potential preserve of an even more limited few.

Yet individuals can experience these moments because of their referencing of personally derived prototypes, the ability to enact deferred imitations and to perceive a psychological relationship between themselves and the models involved in this spectatorial event. If these models are taken to be ‘woman riding horse’ and ‘desert landscapes’, the prototypic memory of people’s own experiences of deserts initially gives them entry into the diegesis via previous experiences like that of the Sahara’s talcum-fine sand, strong light and hot dry atmospheres. Intertwined with childhood memories, for example, of their horse-riding experiences, they can ‘feel’ the hot wind of...
The Sirocco and the ‘movement’ of the horse, and ‘feel’ exulted in the ease with which the animal flies across the landscape with its rider24. These prototypic depictions usher the viewers into the *mise-en-scène* and allow them to ‘taste’ its veracity25.

From this point, it is but a short transition to a state in which individuals seem ‘transparently transposed’ into the *mise-en-scène*. To accomplish this situation, they do exactly what Stern describes: they hold two versions of the event – the woman riding the horse and their memory of riding a horse – make comparisons and adjustments until ‘their’ version becomes a good imitation of the diegetically apperceived event; and thus achieve a requisite sense of similarity between the self as spectator and the woman riding the horse, such that both occupy the same position (as rider) relative to the action being imitated (the riding of the horse). At all times in these evocative moments, they are entirely able to view themselves as an objective entity – a rider on a horse and, thus, ‘seen from the outside’ – but they can also experience what this meant subjectively ‘from the inside’. As riders of the horse, they thus ‘feel’ the movement of its ‘body’; its laboured ‘breathing’ as it ‘gallops’, all the while aware of the sheer pleasure their perception of this ‘event’ imbues in them.

The tourist experience, it is suggested, parts company with the film experience in detail but not in substance. A case in point is Wat Doi Suthep, outside Chiang Mai in Thailand. The climb up the Naga staircase is a major physical effort but one rewarded by the arrival at the temple enclosure. After removing one’s shoes, the entry into the sacred complex, with its striking gold-plated central *chedi*, is deeply affecting and memorable. Although the referents will always differ for each individual, how does the spectator-subject process this experience? For the second co-author, a Western tourist, several ‘mental and actional schemas’ are activated: monasteries, ritual, monks and nuns, devotion, sacred spaces, religious imagery and religious sculpture. As a traveller with a deep background and academic interest in 14th-century Italian culture, but with only a minuscule knowledge of Buddhism and Thai culture, it is his memory of trips to Italy, of experiences of Catholicism, and of academic work in the art and culture of Italian churches and monasteries that come to the fore. This prototypic knowledge gives him an entrée into what is, essentially, an alien world and, once ‘admitted’, he can, like the viewer of the horse-rider in *The Cell*, sense the veracity of what is being experienced. Comparison and adjustment are the crucial dynamics when faced with what borders on the incomprehensible, yet which, at the same time, produces the intense pleasure of being surrounded by such a rich real-time, real-space experience26.

Stern’s use of the words ‘similar to’ and not ‘identifies with’ is of particular importance here. What might initially seem a trifling distinction is none the less significant in light of the currency maintained by theories of identification in contemporary film studies. Compare, for example, Metz’s idea that film offers the spectator images of wholeness and completion and
that, when watching a film, the spectator is presented with images of a world that exists elsewhere (Metz, 1982)27. This insight prompts Metz to define cinema as being of ‘the imaginary’ and to argue that it employs the processes of voyeurism, fetishism and identification to create a state of wholeness for the spectator. Metz thus argues that cinema achieves its compelling quality because it momentarily helps spectators forget their otherwise omnipresent feeling of lack or incompleteness. This recuperative function is also found in the tourism literature, where tourism is considered within an analytical trajectory that moves from the alienated/fragmented to the whole/authentic (e.g. MacCannell, 1976).

In one sense, Metz is partly correct – the spectator is presented with images of a world that exist somewhere else. And it is indeed a creation of its maker’s ‘imaginary’, as it does not exist in real time28. What Metz fails to understand, however, is that images of wholeness and completion are not what the spectator seeks as counter-weight to an omnipresent state of incompleteness. Rather, viewers bring those self same capacities used in any instance of information gathering and assessment to bear on the data the film proffers for their delectation. And, amongst others, they do so via their intersubjective facilities for deferred imitation and for instating a sense of similarity to a model or event. Within tourism, this process is even more the case. The ‘somewhere else’ world of the tourist imaginary becomes a material reality in the real time of the tourist experience. The problematic arising when wholeness is contrasted with alienation, or the authentic is pitted against the inauthentic, becomes an all-together different discussion if tourism is considered as a data interpretation extension of their intersubjective and inter-relational capacities.

If identification is described as ‘the experience of being able to put oneself so deeply into a character – feel oneself to be so like the character – that one can feel the same emotions and experience the same events as the character is supposed to be feeling and experiencing’, then Stern’s notion of the perception of a psychological relationship between self and model as part of the capacity for deferred imitation explains what has been described in film theoretical terms elsewhere as a sadistic–voyeuristic gaze/identification (Ellis, 1982). Stern’s conception is all the more significant, however, because it does not require any merger or submergence of self-with-other in the service of plenitude regained. And it does so for the simple reason that these intersubjective capacities always operate at a distance from the model, even while in a relationship of similarity to it. The spectator-subject seeks an understanding but never a merger, for in any merger lies death (of the extant and unique subject).

Thus when viewing a film, or being sightseeing tourists, spectator-subjects work within the ability to represent themselves as an objective entity that can be ‘seen from the outside’ – in a relationship of similarity to diegetic characters/events and to tourist landscapes – and ‘felt from the inside’, so that they and the characters diegetically represented or the tourist
landscapes being experienced both occupy the same position relative to the
events taking place. A necessary precondition to the arrival of the verbal self,
this capacity to view the self as an objective category as well as a subjective
experience is clearly the prerogative of both cinematic and touristic
spectatorship and is a major imperative to both as well.

Objective Views and Symbolic Plays

Making the self the object of reflection in concert with the use of language
and symbolic actions all enable the individual to negotiate shared meanings
with another about personal knowledge. Being able to objectify the self and
‘coordinate mental and actional schemas’ allow spectator-subjects to think
or ‘imagine about’ their interpersonal lives (Stern, 1985). Stern argues that
the net result of these capacities is that individuals possess the ability to tran-
send their immediate experiences. They now have, he says ‘... the psychic
mechanisms and operations to share their interpersonal world knowledge
and experience, as well as to work on it in imagination or reality’ (Stern,
1985). These mechanisms enable the spectator-subject to ‘... entertain and maintain a formed wish of how reality ought to be, contrary to fact.’ Stern
continues:

Furthermore, this wish can rely on memories and can exist in mental
representation buffered in large part from the momentary press of psycho-
physiological needs. It can carry on an existence like structure... It reaches
far beyond the real or potential distortions in perception due to immaturity or
to the influence of ‘need state’ or affect seen at earlier levels of relatedness.
Interpersonal interaction can now involve past memories, present realities, and
expectations of the future based solely on the past. (Stern, 1985, emphasis added)

As well as the enormous potential this process embodies, interpersonal
activities can now be transacted verbally, or at least can be reported to the
self and to others. The extant knowledge of interpersonal transactions that
involve objectifiable selves and others – including transactions that are real,
wished for or remembered – are shareable verbally. When this transaction
takes place, ‘... mutually shared meanings become possible and a quantum
leap in relatedness occurs’ (Stern, 1985).29

The ability to ‘maintain a formed wish of how reality ought to be,
contrary to fact’ is of obvious and enormous significance here. Almost
without exception, successful film spectatorship is about the ‘reality’ of
entering other ‘worlds’ and spaces through the interactive portal that the
cinematic experience offers to each spectator-subject. The ability Stern
ascribes to the always-developing subject to think about and maintain a
formed wish of how reality ought to be, contrary to fact, lies at the heart of
the experience that viewers anticipate encountering when they enter the
cinema. Although there are times when films can portray realities that
closely approximate the real-time situations they attempt to represent, film can never escape its contextualized composition. Whether composed of the purely imaginative contrivances of its creators (the Alien series) or the filtered reflections of docu-fiction (Sex: the Annabel Chong Story directed by Gough Lewis, 1999), cinema essentially offers its viewers other ideas of how realities might ‘be’, despite – or contrary to – the realities they confront outside the cinema. The ability to maintain this ‘formed wish contrary to fact’ is also the facility that allows the spectator-subject to ‘enter’ or experience these diegetically realized worlds, worlds that can only ever bear a transparent resemblance to the real-time worlds they are derived from, depend on or refer to. Inherently dynamic and impermanent, this ‘sliding scale of actuality’ depends on the already relative inconsistency of real-time realities. One person’s reality is, after all, another’s fantasy.

Rather than being about inside (the cinema)/outside (the cinema), the process in tourism spectatorship is one of simultaneity. The expected reality and the existential reality are in a state of constant exchange. The expected reality is the one that is evoked by a host of possible stimuli, such as the tourist brochure or the lifestyle television programme, or even constructed by the tour itself (with the theme park and contrived heritage sites at one end of the spectrum and a nature walk or visiting a place ‘off-the-beaten-track’ at the other and, in between these extremes, all planned/constructed tourist experiences), and so forth. The contrary fact is the bad weather that spoils the fantasy of the brochure; the angst of not finding a pharmacy open for some medical needs (or not being able to communicate with the chemist) while travelling in Venice; being bitten by insects while walking in a national park; experiencing the ‘real world’ of Bali outside the walls of Nusa Dua’s resorts. Like the cinematic experience, there is always a gap between the lived experience of the tourist and the contextualized composition of that same tourist experience. Like cinema, this gap activates the meaning-making process of the tourist experience that, in turn, activates contemporary subjective enunciation. The tourist dream, therefore, retains its potency no matter how ‘the reality’ destroys that experience (Ryan, 1997). The difference between the two states – the expected and the existential (a dimension of the self/other constant) – is the means by which spectators can explore other possibilities about themselves.

Conclusion

A foundational assumption of this chapter is that both film viewers and tourist-travellers are involved in a fundamental quest to make sense of the world they find around them. One is the analogue of the other, and each in turn is emblematic of the surrounding world. Whether as part of a basic need to survive, or as a more esoteric quest to understand/define the ever-changing face of who – and why – they ‘are’, the insertion of spectator-subjects into
the interactive ‘otherness’ of disparate cultures, times or places, real-time or not, large or small, is a constant in any evolving subjectivity. The sites of information exchange encountered in the course of filmic or touristic spectatorship allow available meanings to be both perceived and incorporated subjectively via the enunciatory processes Stern’s work has described. Thus the tourist-traveller standing at the apex of the Naga staircase in Wat Doi Suthep and the cinematic spectator traversing the worlds of *Alien* or *Annabel Chong* both avail themselves of the same mechanisms to understand the experientially rich moments they encounter.

Viewed in this light, the contemporary tourist-traveller is never simply a voyeur engaged in the acquisition of momentarily important information, or an unknown and inanimate statistic. Like cinematically referenced spectatorial companions, tourist-travellers instead engage with interactive regimes of anticipation, desire and expectation that make them both observer and observed; regulator and regulated within the spectatorial arena; affect and affected in any landscape with which they engage (cf. Wang, 2000). While the immediate sensation of any tourist experience lies in the way that vistas, flavours, sounds and smells are made available to the spectator-subject, its underlying potency comes from the expansion of enunciatory possibilities – possibilities that enable the ongoing expansion of the self. This approach stands in contrast to theories of desire/experience that have ‘lack’ as their focus. As a constantly enacted sequence of interpersonal events actioned variously through travel, (cultural) spaces and places, it is fitting that the final word should come from Daniel Stern:

> The universe was created only once, way out there, while interpersonal worlds are created, in here, everyday in each [individual’s] mind... We instinctively process our experiences in such a way that they appear to belong to some kind of unique subjective organization that we commonly call the sense of self. How we experience ourselves in relation to others is the basic organizing perspective for all interpersonal events.

(Stern, 1985)

**Notes**

1. The term ‘tourist gaze’ has been avoided purposely. The collapse of the term ‘gaze’ with the term for the ocular act of ‘looking’ or sightseeing in recent tourism research (so that they become almost interchangeable) is highly problematical. The failure of tourism researchers to go back to Foucault (ostensibly, Urry’s starting point) and to understand that Foucault’s idea of the gaze is about the subjectivities of those *who are gazed upon* (thus the notion of the disciplinary gaze of surveillance) means that Urry has, in fact, produced a very different notion of ‘the gaze’ to that hypothesized by Foucault. For a strong critique of this collapse and its implications, see Winn (1999). For a critique of ocularism in Western thinking, see Jay (1993).

2. In this discussion the expressions ‘experience’ and ‘spectatorship’ are employed interchangeably. This convergence is to underscore the visual nature of both the
tourist experience and the cinematic experience and the role of visual perception in accessing the information ‘presented’ by both experiences. The term ‘spectatorship’ is used in the following senses: as an ‘act of seeing’ that has an epistemic dimension (i.e. meaning making by observation); ‘seeing’ that is more than just looking and involves the other senses (cf. Rojek and Urry, 1997); ‘vision linked to subjectivity’ (cf. Mirzoeff, 1998); and ‘seeing orchestrated by an (invisible) architectonics’ (Mirzoeff, 1998). This definition immediately raises significant issues related to the cultural inscription of seeing, power relationships, intelligibility, legibility, identity, gender and so forth. However, these issues properly belong to studies of vision and visuality (e.g. Foster, 1988; Staiff, 1995), the gaze (e.g. Urry, 1990; Jay, 1993; Mirzoeff, 1998) and sightseeing (e.g. MacCannell, 1976; Taylor, 1994). While use of the terms ‘experience’ and ‘spectatorship’ points towards these studies in a familial sense, the significant issues are beyond the quite specific scope of the analysis presented here.  
3Meaning making’ in this context is understood in the widest possible sense of cognition. It therefore includes everything from learning for survival to education (formal and informal), epistemological frameworks and formations of the subjective self.  
4Indeed, demand is now so great in Australia that the movie chains have responded by building more movie theatres per head of population than in any other country in the world. In 1981, there were some 842 screens across the country. By 1998, however, that number had nearly doubled to a huge 1580. Figures quoted by Hoyts Cinemas chief operating officer, Roger Eaton, interviewed in ‘Hooray for Lollywood’, The Age, Saturday Extra/Features: 6, 29/5/1999.  
5A fictitious name.  
6‘Information’ here, and throughout this chapter, refers to all stimuli – sensory as well as ‘data’ from systems of representation.  
7Jay’s (1993) magisterial study of 20th-century vision in French discourse explores many of the problematics that ‘plague’ attempts to explain occularism, perception, visuality and subjectivity in contemporary analysis.  
8This a priori assumption about the making of meaning being foundational within the tourist experience aligns this study with those that explore meaning making from the position of socially and culturally constructed knowledge about the world. See, for example, MacCannell (1976); Urry (1990, 1995); Selwyn, (1996); Rojek and Urry (1997).  
9It has not been considered necessary to include a full filmography in this paper. Instead, a shorthand reference is used – the title, the director and the year of release.  
10Thus the ongoing debate about pseudo-events, authenticity, simulation, place consumption, commodification and so forth (Boorstin, 1964; MacCannell, 1976; Eco, 1986; Urry, 1990; Horne, 1992; Wang, 2000).  
11The technical term ‘diegetic reality’ refers to the ‘reality’ that the viewer ‘enters’ during the cinematic experience. The actuality of the situation is as follows: a viewer sits in a darkened room and watches celluloid images passing over a light source that are then projected on to a white two-dimensional screen. But the viewer ‘transcends’ this reality and enters, to varying degrees, another – diegetic – reality, the ‘world’ of the film.  
12Whether as a hegemonic, ‘masculine’, Oedipal spectator who receives an illusory power and coherence from its cinematic subjugation, or as a spectator-subject whose voyeuristic-sadistic gaze is the chief organizing principle for mainstream cinema, certain film theories privilege a passive spectator. The theoretical position outlined in this chapter thus stands at odds with recent film theoretical orthodoxy,
which draws heavily on Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to define its tenets. The passive viewer such theories describe uses film to try to recapture the plenitude that disappeared with the infant subject’s separation from the merged state of the mother–child dyad. See Andrews (1984) for a more extensive discussion of these influential film theories and their ramifications.

13Sense of self refers to a sense of who persons are as individuals, but also a sense of who they are as members of a larger socio-cultural collective.

14For further explanation of perception as an ecologically based information-gathering activity, see the work of James Gibson (1966, 1979).

15Written just before his death in 1992, Félix Guattari describes in this final work the need for what he calls a ‘new ethico-aesthetic paradigm’, a paradigm concerned with a re-figuring or re-thinking of the notion of the subject that Guattari believes to be essential in the particular, cultural, fin de millénaire moment.

16Stern’s writings should not be confused with the early work of George Mead. In Mead’s schema, language is crucial/central in the development of subjectivity (while for Stern it is highly problematical and the ‘verbal sense’ is only one aspect of the operation of subjectivity). Stern does not suffer the Cartesian split between ‘mind’ and ‘body’ (endemic in Mead’s work), and he both postulates and empirically illustrates the integration between physiological/perceptual perceptions and the individual’s cognitive response to them. Mead argues for a unified/holistic sense of ‘self’ while Stern (in alignment with post-structural theory) describes four senses of ‘self’ (i.e. multiplicity) and various states of intersubjectivity between them. See Mead (1934). On embodiment, see Parrinello (2001).

17Paradoxically, to analyse Stern’s work it is necessary to employ the exigencies of what he calls the ‘verbal self’, the fourth and final in Stern’s schema. Interacting with the first three selves and their attendant domains of relatedness, the arrival of the verbal self completes the various intersubjective states needed for subjective enunciation to be complete.

18Stern indicates a deliberate preference for the term domain of relatedness and not phase or stage. In his view, phases or stages imply a hierarchical status that might be accurate ontogenetically, but may not be appropriate in the sphere of social life as subjectively experienced. In this regard, see Stern (1985: 32, n. 13).

19Emphasis added. Stern also includes several schematic depictions of the developmental situation he describes. They are reproduced in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, pp. 32–33.

20In this regard, Stern cites the work of Hoffman (1977, 1978); Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979); Zahn-Waxler et al. (1979); Kagan (1981); Kaye (1982); and Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow (1982).

21Due to constraints of space, only two aspects of Stern’s verbal self are examined here. A more extensive treatment would examine the interactive application of all four selves.

22Stern makes the point that the infant’s ability to recognize maternal attunements during intersubjective relatedness is not the same thing as having two versions of the same reality available for comparison and adjustment. ‘In attunements,’ he says, ‘the infant senses whether two expressions of an internal state are equivalent or not but does not need to make any behavioural adjustments on the basis of these perceptions.’ A further point of difference is that, because the registration of attunement is almost immediate, only short-term memory is needed, not the long-term memory required for evocation or recall. See Stern (1985: 164).
Beautifully realized, this richly textured film deals with a psychologist’s efforts to physically enter the mindscape of a serial killer in an effort to discover where he has placed his latest victim, before her pre-programmed death takes place.

Interestingly, the slow motion that the director uses at different points in this sequence has the effect of ‘slowing’ time. This technique allows the moment in question to be savoured to the fullest, while simultaneously providing sufficient time to locate the personal prototypes that make ‘entry’ into this domain possible.

Spectator-subjects will obviously bring their own particular and unique set of prior experiential moments to bear in the perception of any one experiential moment.

This situation resonates with the decoding of the tourist experience as outlined within semiotic analysis. However, in semiotic analysis, the material experience is turned into a ‘text’ to be deciphered. Stern’s approach to experience is more holistic. The verbal is but one coordinate in what is an inter-relational process. Compare with, for example, MacCannell (1976), Eco (1986) and Culler (1988).

A film theorist of significant influence, in developing his concepts, Metz drew heavily on Lacan’s view that the child understands the previous union with his/her mother to have taken place in a situation of plenitude or wholeness wherein the child was everything and lacked nothing. Incorporating three stages – the mirror phase (acquiring a sense of self); the fort da game (the accession to language); and the Oedipus complex (the child’s submission to the laws of society) – the child’s developmental progression was seen to incorporate an essential state of separation from mother. This situation is perceived by the child as one of ‘lack’. Within a Lacanian paradigm, the subject seeks the impossible restoration of plenitude and merger evermore. ‘The child is born into the experience of lack, what Lacan terms the manque à être (‘the want to be’); and the subject’s subsequent history consists of a series of attempts to figure and overcome this lack, a project doomed to fail.’ For further explanation, see Lapsley and Westlake (1988: 67ff).

‘Maker’ here refers to the panoply of people who contrive to bring the film about, and includes the director, producers, actors, technicians and so on.

Stern also comments that, while this description implies that either concepts come first and words are attached, or that experiences established earlier get translated into words, contemporaneous thinking is of the opinion that felt-experience and words as an expression of felt-experience co-emerge. Although this issue is crucial to notions of language development, he maintains that his argument is not dependent on it. See Stern (1985: 168, note 2).

Compare with Sternberg’s (1997) notion of the ‘iconography of the tourist experience’.

Articulated so well in Horne’s (1992) study of the ‘intelligent’ tourist.

References


The Cybertourist

Bruce Prideaux

Cyber-boundaries can now be crossed, and with the adoption of more advanced virtual technology it will no doubt become more commonplace.

(Timothy, 2001: 175)

Introduction

In the future, which in a sense is being unravelled on the drawing boards of today, many of the accepted norms of the past and present will fall away, creating new social, economic and cultural structures that will radically alter current concepts of travel. History repeatedly has demonstrated the validity of this observation through the rise and fall of empires from Samaria to the USSR, social and cultural upheaval, political revolution (the French Revolution for example) and economic transformation, commencing from the New Stone Age and progressing through to the contemporary post-industrial era. To forecast accurately the structures and organization of travel in the future is a task that remains beyond the realms of present technology and, in all probability, is an undertaking that will never be possible. Just as air transportation, the subject of scientific speculation 100 years ago, is the norm for travel at the beginning of the 21st century, today’s predictions on forthcoming interplanetary space travel may turn out to be a mere historical footnote in the tourism text books of the 22nd century.

Of the desire to forecast the future, Silver (1998: 509) has observed that ‘the success rate of futurology is probably on a par with that of astrology.’ Yet the passion for investing in the stock exchange or gambling at casinos

demonstrates the willingness of people to speculate on the unknown. Following this line of thought, this chapter attempts to peer into the prospects for tourism from the perspective of the cyberworld. Here, cyber-tourism is defined as an electronically simulated travel experience that is substituted for a physical travel experience. Refusal to undertake this type of intellectual exercise leaves people exposed to the uncertainty of the years ahead with a reduced ability to respond to possible directions of change. While pondering tomorrow will invariably raise more questions than supply answers today, it is still an exercise that is worth embarking upon, even if it yields only a small number of insights into the trends that may affect human-kind, either as individuals or collectively.

The deluge of new technologies, combined with the emergence of new groups of travellers from developing countries, may well usher in a revolution in the way that travel will be organized in the future. If the iconic experiences so often prized by tourists are denied on grounds of overcrowding, damage through overuse, the Greenhouse Effect or through the price mechanism, there are reasons to suppose that they will seek other avenues to satisfy their curiosity and the urge that entices them to leave their own environment and visit new places. In the past, the so-called ‘armchair traveller’ found pleasure in a pseudo-travel experience derived from the printed word, where the journey was a product of the mental images evoked by the creativity of the author’s narrative. Subsequent technology has added to this medium the movie, television and, more recently, interactive computer games incorporating an element of simulation. In the proximate future, there is a very real possibility that new forms of computer games will incorporate an elementary form of artificial intelligence (AI). Later developments, such as full-blown AI and nanobot-enhanced, computer–human interfaces may create new forms of pseudo-travel experiences that will be the forthcoming versions of the experiences that one’s ancestors sought from the accounts of early explorers.

Cybertourism presents a view of tomorrow that may be vastly different from today. According to Williams and Shaw (2000: 239), cybertourism is likely to challenge the meaning of place and, to an extent, the meaning of tourism itself. There are many opportunities for the tourism industry to play a part in this moulding exercise, particularly where the consequences of contemporary actions reduce the scope for enjoying the tourism pursuits that currently are regarded as the norm – relatively unrestrained access to the earth’s wild regions, its oceans and beaches, and its special places – both built and natural. The level of future access to these locations will rest on an acceptance of the need for implementing sustainable practices by government and industry. Where access is denied, new cybertourism experiences may be able to bridge the gap between the desirable and the possible. Cybertourism, if used as a substitute for the authentic, may, in conjunction with sustainable practices, preserve destinations for the future. Commenting on the need to ensure long-term sustainability, Hall (2000) has identified
sustainability as a key element in human welfare in the future, stating that it is probably the most important planning and policy issue of the present era in terms of its impact on tourism. There are also ethical considerations relating to the degree to which technology should be allowed to intrude into the domain of the human consciousness as cybertourism becomes increasingly used as a substitute for physical tourism.

**Aim of the Chapter**

This chapter looks forward to tomorrow in order to look back to today and identify issues that should not, or cannot, wait for tomorrow’s solutions. By anticipating the future, it seeks to outline some ideas and explore the possibilities that cybertourism presents. To achieve this aim, a number of promising technologies are discussed. To frame projected developments suitably in the technology that underpins cybertourism, a new tourism model is suggested as an evolutionary metaphor for gauging tourism trends on a spectrum that originates far back in the past, extends to the present and is extrapolated into the future. The end product of this overview should provide a sense of how future technologies, particularly those that constitute the building blocks of tourism, may shape tomorrow’s tourism industry and the tourists that it will serve. The success of this exercise must remain for the judgement of those who follow. As a consequence, this chapter is perforce largely speculative, there being no other alternative to informed conjecture. In the course of this chapter, new technologies and their potential impacts on tourism and tourists will be discussed and these outcomes will be incorporated into the proposed model.

The future is just that: a different world, not yet made, but currently in the process of being created. This ‘brave new world’ will have its own dynamics and directions where today is tomorrow’s yesterday and where the things that are valued, the places that are visited and the people who are revered will be the subject of interpretative displays, weighty academic discourse and historical theses. Yet the keys of tomorrow are held in the present, even though people usually fail to see this reality without the benefit of hindsight. The following account examines just one small part of this future and is far from comprehensive. By forcing individuals to think of matters ahead, they might just be able to play a constructive role in shaping their destiny and exercise some degree of control over the technologies that will be introduced, rather than passively accepting change and suffering possible adverse consequences. With these thoughts in mind, it is necessary to consider the future of tourism, which undoubtedly will be based in part on the outcomes of great struggles ahead. Such contestation will take place between groups pressuring governments to continue the present exploitation of the earth’s special places, leaving it to the future for others to reshape and fix, or to proceed with caution, building a future based on principles of
sustainability and of respect for the essence of humanity that separates it from other life forms, to create a future as pleasant as if not better than today.

**Previous Research**

Relatively few tourism researchers have speculated on the remote future of the tourism industry. However, attention to the proximate future has received relatively more attention, particularly from forecasters interested in the impact of the Greenhouse Effect (Agnew and Viner, 2000; Lohmann, 2001) and the sustainability of tourism. Of the future of tourism, Inayatullah (1995) has observed, ‘We should expect the fantastic and be ready to create it.’ Hall (2000) has developed a political, economic, social and technological (PEST) framework of the influences that he estimates will exert some influence on the shape of tourism in the years up to 2020. In more specific areas, Weaver (2000) has questioned the sustainability of tourism and Buhalis (2000) has explored the changing shape of tourism in the information technology (IT) age. Cetron (2001) has highlighted economic considerations, concerns over the environment and social issues as major factors that will influence tourism in the future, while identifying edutainment as a major area for technological advances. Hall’s framework predicts that virtual tourism will be used as a promotional device to sell destinations. Other researchers look past marketing applications and beyond the next two decades to speculate on specific areas of tourism, including space tourism (Smith, 2000).

**Forces Shaping Tourism in the Future**

Before contemplating the possibilities of cybertourism, there is a need to consider the likely directions of tourism and the forces that will be responsible for shaping its future. Three emerging issues appear to be central:

1. Tourism will continue to grow, fed by three primary sources:
   - new cohorts of travellers from the newly developed economies of Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and, in time, from sub-Saharan Africa;
   - a trend towards longer annual holidays that will extend to additional countries; and
   - increased life expectancy that will offer people more travel opportunities.

2. A growing number of travellers threaten to overwhelm many of the sites that visitors currently find popular. How many more people can climb the steps of Blarney Castle without the queue being so long that many become disheartened and leave for some less renowned, less crowded attraction? Will more replicas like the Lascaux Cave in France become necessary or even commonplace?
3. Escapism into the cyberworld, already possible with an ever-expanding range of computer games and simulations, may provide a cheaper alternative to the act of travel itself and to the crowding that is already evident at some tourist sites.

The magnitude of these forces will be determined by economic growth, the environment, technology and the state of international relations.

Beyond these industry issues lies a fourth matter of considerable significance to the academic community: are current typologies and paradigms sufficiently flexible to cope with the changes that are likely to occur as these influences begin to be felt in the future, and do they adequately describe the changes that have influenced tourism in the past?

Gazing on Possible Future Trends

Efforts to predict the future have long intrigued humanity, although the rate of success of current future-gazers is probably no better than that derived from the ancient oracle of Delphi. Yet the yearning for insight into the future remains strong and, in tourism research, attempts at future-gazing, under the guise of forecasting, remains an important element of today’s tourism industry, since it is widely employed by that industry, governments and individuals. Unfortunately, the success rate of such forecasting is not high beyond the immediate future, primarily because of the unpredictable nature of many of the variables on which it is based (Prideaux and Laws, 2000). For example, forecasters responsible for developing a 10-year plan of tourism growth based on trends current in 1935 would have failed to predict the Second World War. As a result, their projections would have been vastly different from the actual outcomes. Yet forecasts by science and its prophets, which include fiction writers and film producers, do provide some clues of what to expect. It is clear that the tourism industry of the future will face many challenges, including those predicted by current thinkers (Maddox, 1998; Silver, 1998) and unknowns that even futurologists (Coates et al., 1997; Cocks, 1999; Hobsbawn, 1999) and authors of science fiction have failed to identify.

While future-gazing in the tourism industry has been limited mainly to forecasting, a few researchers (e.g. Faulkner and Russell, 2000; Hall, 2000; Prideaux, 2000b; Prideaux and Laws, 2000; Cetron, 2001) have attempted to identify trends that exhibit some potential to influence the future development of tourism. Prideaux and Laws (2000), for instance, suggest that in the near future the following forces are likely to exercise a negative effect on tourism:

- the impact of AIDS – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and potentially in the Indian subcontinent and the Russian Federation;
development of new supranational political blocks where nations join together in regional political and economic unions such as the European Union (EU);

- terrorism employed to achieve political or religious objectives;
- unexpected natural disasters;
- unanticipated wars; and
- militant religious fundamentalism.

Beyond the proximate future, Prideaux (2000b) has speculated that a spectrum of possible factors may disrupt tourism including:

- the direction that is taken by capitalism following the demise of socialism;
- technological innovation, particularly as it impacts on leisure and transport;
- demographic change, in terms of ageing populations in developed economies, as well as growing populations in many developing countries;
- a continuing search for political identity by ethnic and religious groups causing further fragmentation in a number of nations;
- overuse and abuse of natural resources, particularly of farming lands, water, marine resources and non-renewable energy;
- environmentalism, especially if global warming continues;
- public health scares such as pandemic diseases; and
- warfare, which could be triggered by many of the preceding factors or as new power blocks emerge to challenge the existing international order.

To these factors should be added the emerging clash between Westernism (roughly defined as the projection of the West’s contemporary and dominant social, economic and cultural structures through globalization) and Islam, with the events of 11 September 2001 being seen as an opening skirmish. The apparently widely supported rejection of Westernism’s aggressively secular libertarianism by Islam’s world view of a theocratic state centred on the teachings of the Koran may shape international relations, and tourism, for some time.

Taken in combination or individually, these factors will influence the direction of tourism in the future, possibly causing the decline of some forms of tourism and of some destinations, while bringing about growth in new types of tourism and new destinations.

In addition to the major issues that will influence the future shape of tourism, there are a number of factors that will influence the structure of tourism. These factors include new technologies, particularly in transport (Seekings, 2001), computers (Kaku, 2000), information technology, the challenge of adapting to and being adapted by cybertourism, and the unknown challenges posed by the Greenhouse Effect (Agnew and Viner,
2000) later in the century. Global warming will pose a major challenge if the current pessimistic forecasts of rising ocean levels actually take place (Lohmann, 2001). Indeed, this single factor alone will dramatically alter the entire structure of the tourism industry. Assuming that some magnitude of change is caused by the Greenhouse Effect, one may speculate that there will be significant shifts in human population, either voluntary or forced, as rising sea levels inundate parts of the earth’s great cities and coastal areas. The need to relocate populations and rebuild settlements presumably will create a heavy financial burden, funded by taxes, leaving individuals less discretionary income to pursue physical travel. If fewer people travel, and a part of the current travel infrastructure, including tourism attractions, is lost to rising seawater, tourism may again become the preserve of the wealthy and force the masses into a form of home-based cybertravel.

The combination of forces that may influence, and ultimately shape, the structure of tourism previously outlined will profoundly affect the future direction of the tourism industry. Given that the ability of individuals to engage in the pursuit of tourism activities is a product of increasing affluence, additional leisure time, plus the availability of desirable places to visit, future events or forces that influence prosperity and/or the availability of the tourism sites will also shape the future of tourism. In a favourable scenario, where problems such as the Greenhouse Effect are overcome and tourism’s special places are managed effectively to produce centuries-long sustainability, tourism can expect to become a dominant industry in the world economy with the ability to influence governments. Alternatively, if the world’s destinations continue to be exploited and allowed slowly to degrade, or if war or other factors reduce prosperity, the structure of tourism may be forced to give way, at least in the short term, to other needs. Either scenario will support the growth of cybertourism.

In an affluent world, the pressure of increasing tourism may encourage tourists to alternate between real and cyber experiences. For some, the possibilities of becoming voyeurs in a personalized and private cyberworld may be strong, and fantasies only dreamed about in the past and the present will become possible in the future. For others, the chance to experience the otherwise unexperienceable may be the reason for undertaking individualized and personalized cybertourism journeys. However, as affluence increases, there will be added pressure on tourism resources and, even with careful harnessing combined with enforcement of long-term sustainability practices, many physical areas will experience increased stress. In such a world, the growing number of physical tourists may force some travellers into the cyberworld as crowding and the need for preservation either drive up the price of the world’s great attractions or cap the number of arrivals. In either sense, the trend towards individual cybertravel will be accentuated.

In the alternative scenario, harsh political and/or economic realities may force a retreat of the tourist to more confined areas, and the taste for real-time travel may be restricted or substituted by cybertourism
experiences. In this situation, the physical world may become less accessible as borders once again become physical barriers obliging tourists to turn to cybertourism as a means of participating in the touristic experience.

**Defining Cybertourism**

Cybertourism can be described as an electronically simulated travel experience that is a substitute for a physical tourism experience. In its current state of development, whereas only a small part of the potential for this new form of tourism has been commercialized, it can be expected that new and unexpected applications will emerge in the future.

Although their view of the cyberworld is more near term than long term, a number of researchers, including Williams and Hobson (1995), Cheong (1995) and Sung et al. (2000), have explored the conceptual elements of cybertourism. Williams and Hobson (1995: 424), for instance, have debated the possible impact of virtual reality on the tourism industry and identified three key elements of a virtual-reality experience that distinguish it from computer and arcade games:

- Visualization of the components using technology such as stereoscopic vision.
- Immersion into the experience.
- Interactivity involved in the experience.

While these elements will continue to define cybertourism, many of the advances in technology required to support it were not on the horizon at the time their paper was written. As a consequence, developments based on emerging technologies (described later) are more likely to impact on the longer-term future structure of tourism than the near view identified by Williams and Hobson (1995), Cheong (1995), Seong et al. (2000) and Sung et al. (2000). Cybertourism’s full potential will only become apparent when a range of novel technologies (some already undergoing initial feasibility testing, others existing only as untested concepts) are brought together as a single package. Among these technologies are new types of computers, advanced wireless communications, nanobots, advanced atmospheric and space transport vehicles and developments in animation. When a convergence of technologies occurs at some point in the future, cybertourism will have the potential to take the tourist experience from the physical realm defined by specific parameters of space, time and place into a cyberworld that is essentially boundless.

The term ‘cybertourism’ contains at least two views of what is possible – proximate and remote. One near-future prospect is based on the virtual-reality environment that fuses video production and display media into a multimedia network that supplies an indirect tourist experience on demand. According to Sung et al. (2000), this form of cybertourism will provide users
with an opportunity to experience the world in an economical but indirect way. Applications include the Internet and large screens in special-purpose rooms. Both applications require the participant to use headwear fitted with glasses to produce a 3D effect (Seong et al., 2000). A key component of this system is the fusing of the Internet with cameras and encoding devices to produce stereographic vision. One advantage of this type of tourism is the opportunity to reduce environmental damage. Limitations include the requirement for users to wear LCD shuttle goggles to produce the stereographic effect of the system, a lack of interactivity and absence of other senses including taste, touch and smell.

To test the degree of acceptance that such a virtual-reality cybertourism approach may achieve with the youth market, a small survey was conducted with 31 University of Queensland tourism students in 2001. Respondents were already skilled in computer applications in a learning environment that incorporated a high degree of CTWeb and e-learning. While the subjects reacted favourably to the idea of virtual reality as an information tool and for marketing, there was almost unanimous rejection of this form of cybertourism as a substitute for the real-life experiences of travel. Comments indicating a negative reaction to cybertourism based on this model included:

- ‘What you can’t do – buy souvenirs, get holiday photos, talk to other travellers.’
- ‘Where is the spontaneity of experience?’
- ‘How can I relax? I would miss the feeling of excitement and happiness.’
- ‘The fantasy of the reality will be lost.’
- ‘The element of surprise is gone.’

Positive responses to this form of tourism included:

- ‘No more jet lag.’
- ‘As people get older they can go to difficult places through virtual reality.’
- ‘It is a surrogate for travel that might help the disabled.’
- ‘It will allow the preview of destinations and may enhance consumer satisfaction.’

There was little inclination among respondents for adopting virtual tourism as a substitute for the actual experience.

Developments of these near-future forms of virtual reality are being driven by the demand for military applications and for simulator training by a wide variety of industries including those of aviation, mining and shipping. Limitations of current and developing technologies utilizing this approach are the relatively poor quality of animation and graphics in the simpler applications and the need to wear LCD shutter goggles in the more advanced applications. Screens continue to provide the basic element of the viewing experience. While virtual tours based on these technologies have
some appeal, the exercise may prove to be no more than an additional viewing aid that stands alongside of, rather than replacing, print and existing electronic imaging systems using some form of viewing screen.

In the more distant future, emerging technologies based on tele-immersion promise an entirely different participant experience, one that has similarities to the adoption of the video player as a substitute for the cinema. Based on research undertaken by the National Tele-Immersion Initiative (NTII) (a project funded by a consortium of UNC Chapel Hill, the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and a non-profit organization called Advanced Network and Services based in New York), tele-immersion utilizes prototype Internet2 applications to create a 3D image that has depth and is able to recreate a life-size remote environment (Ananthaswamy, 2000). In its current experimental stage, users are required to wear head sensors and glasses, as images are projected on to screens. The volume of data necessarily requires supercomputers to perform the calculations needed to portray the environments in 3D. Future developments of the technology may enable the headgear to be eliminated and convert the tele-immersion room into a screen by coating all surfaces, including walls and objects, with light-sensitive material. Computers can then turn camera-generated images into 3D projections that shine pre-warped images into the room, thereby giving it the impression of being filled. In this way, a participant will be able to sense depth and movement as well as dimensional aspects, giving the experience a highly realistic feel that today is only crudely possible with IMAX and 3D cinemas. According to Ananthaswamy (2000), McDonald’s has suggested that tele-immersion booths fitted at its restaurants would allow people in remote locations to have dinner with their families.

From a tourism perspective, the utilization of tele-immersion offers immense scope for visiting places hardly dreamed of by present cohorts of tourists. The remote and exotic places of the world will all become accessible, as indeed will the vast variety of sites that highlight any imagined theme such as heritage, nature, culture and sport. An eco-tourist, for example, would be able to explore the depths of the Amazon jungle on one day, followed by the forests of Asia on the next. There are also obvious possibilities for future versions of sex tourism and, given the rapid growth in Internet sex sites in recent years (Timothy and Groves, 2001), it is entirely possible that virtual-reality sex tourism will be at the forefront of demand for these new technologies.

Interestingly, a form of tele-immersion was first suggested in the Star Trek television and movie series, where crew members of the Starship Enterprise could interact with projected images in the Holodeck, a futuristic 3D world where real people interact with synthetic computer-generated characters in a context not bound by time or space. Perhaps the ultimate development of tele-immersion will be another example of science fiction becoming reality. Later applications may include the development of
animation technologies that utilize new-generation nanotube technology to create new fantasy worlds.

While creating an illusion of place, the major limitation to this technology is the passivity of the participant. The ability to interact with the simulation does not contain a physical element, and experiences will need to be scripted and probably commercialized. Consequently, there will be a reduction in scope for the individual to have unique experiences that are characteristic of the physical act of travelling, where the tourist can gaze on the same landscape as fellow voyagers, but come away with a collection of unique and individualized experiences.

As a technology, tele-immersion appears to lie at the apex of machines that can stimulate and enrich the human visual and aural environment. Interactivity is essentially external, entering the consciousness via sight and sound. The next step forward will require an internalization of interactivity where the participant either physically interacts within a virtual landscape or mentally interacts in a manner that mimics a physical experience. Only when this level of interactivity is achieved will the voyeur of the future be able to experience a set of substitute experiences that realistically simulates the physical world of present travellers.

Beyond applications that are currently being tested in prototype, new applications, now considered to be in the realm of pure science fiction, may include computers that can be connected to and controlled directly by the human brain. Technology of this nature will require new forms of computer architecture and the development of nanobot applications (for a detailed discussion on nanobot technology, see Foresight Organization at http://nanodot.org/ and the special issue of Scientific American September 2001 devoted to Nanobots)\. In a recent article examining the possibility of interfacing the human brain with computers, Gibson (2000) describes a future world where nanomolecular computing, based on bioengineering, will open up new virtual-reality possibilities. In Gibson’s scenario, nano computers are fused into the structure of the brain allowing wireless communication with external computers. Nanobots\footnote{Gibson, 2000} are an emerging technology, and current thinking (Gibson, 2000) is that, within three decades, it will be feasible to manufacture self-replicating nanobots that are the size of human blood cells or even smaller. The need for new military and space applications, long a sponsor of groundbreaking science, may be the driving force behind these developments. According to Gibson (2000: 113), ‘I very much doubt that our grandchildren will understand the distinction between that which is a computer and that which isn’t.’

While there is no uniform view within the scientific community on the feasibility or even possibility of nanobot technology of this capability, the eventual viability of the technology should be considered from a tourism perspective. According to Kurzweil (2000), nanobot technology should be available for brain scanning by 2030. In this scenario, nanobots could pass through every capillary and scan neural details at close quarters. Using
High-speed wireless connections, they will communicate with each other and external computers to form a brain-scan database. After the algorithms of the scanned region are understood, they can be refined before being implanted in synthetic neural equivalents able to expand human thinking and experiences. Should nanobot technology develop along these lines, it may be possible to provide fully immersive, totally convincing virtual reality. By being placed close to interneuronal connections of the sense organs (eyes, ears, skin), nanobots will be able to suppress inputs coming from the real senses and substitute signals that will create a virtual environment. If nanobot technology produces outcomes of this order, accessing a web site may mean entering a virtual-reality environment. Compared with current technology, nanobot-based virtual reality will not require external equipment to create the reality-like experiences of people, places and time. These experiences will already be in the human brain but in a form that makes them appear physical, with the participant enjoying a full variety of simulated, although apparently real, experiences in a limitless number of times and places.

Nanobots, or their equivalents, will only reach their full potential if parallel advances are made in computing technology. Although computing power continues to grow at a rapid rate, following Moore’s Law that states that computer capability doubles every 12–18 months, today’s silicon chips will not be able to supply the computing power required for virtual reality of the nature described. New computing architectures will be needed to provide the capacity necessary and are the subject of several promising areas of research (Whitesides and Love, 2001).

Quantum physics, now over a century old, is a perplexing field of study, which Silver (1998: 357) describes as a theory that is ‘not explicable in commonsense terms’. Perhaps the observation (see Silver, 1998) made by Neils Bohr (one of the founders of quantum theory) that ‘if people are not confused by quantum mechanics, they really do not understand it’ continues to be true. However, quantum physics appears to hold the key to a completely new computer architecture that will revolutionize computing and the application of computers (The Economist, 2000). Current generations of computers rely on silicon chips producing measurable fields of binary combinations of zeros and ones. If this architecture can be replaced by an array of in-between spin values, the magnitude of the power of computers will be enhanced considerably. This scenario is what appears possible with new quantum physics applications based on carbon nanotubes. When fed into one end of a nanotube, electrons pass down the tube retaining a constant magnetic spin. Because the transmitted electrons spin in this fashion, nanotubes may form the platform for future computer architecture, with an array of in-between spin values replacing the current silicon binary numbers.

Other potential candidates to replace silicon may include:
- an optical computer which will employ lasers to transmit light through an optical switch based on photons;
- a DNA computer which will use the double-stranded DNA molecule as a biological computer tape, where solutions are carried in the sequence of bases on these strands (Lieber, 2001); or
- a molecular/dot computer where silicon transistors will be replaced by molecules or electrons, respectively, which would then act as tiny logic gates and switches (Kaku, 2000).

Standing just in front of this possible cyber threshold, it appears that future cyber experiences, of which tourism is just one, will offer participants almost limitless opportunities for entertainment, education and the receipt of marketing information. However, within the application of this technology, there lies a range of potential dangers that must be seriously contemplated before these technologies are adopted. Most apparent are the ethical considerations for uninvited intrusions by corporations, governments and others. The control of the individual by state and private organizations has been a recurrent theme of film directors and science fiction writers, and is once more a timely reminder that today’s science fiction may become tomorrow’s science fact. It is therefore imperative that implications of this nature need to be carefully thought out, preferably before considerations of profit are put before human welfare and long-term sustainability.

Should tourism follow any of the possible courses outlined, profound changes will occur in both the structure of the industry and the experiences in which tourists participate. Current theories of tourism will not be suitable as vehicles to interpret these changes and will require a new model that includes the past, the present and the future.

The Need for a New Metaphor?

Increasingly, scholars are incorporating a number of sociological metaphors, including postmodernism and Fordism, into their interpretation of the touristic experience (Ioannides and Debbage, 1997). According to Walle (1998: 25), postmodernism is a cross-disciplinary movement that raises questions about mass society, its meaning and the benefits of technology. Squier (1995: 119), cited in Pendergast (1999), has suggested that the dominant feature of postmodernism is its ‘... challenge to the master narratives of Western metaphysics and philosophy, first with their bases in binary opposites: mind/body; male/female; self/other; first world/third world; human/non-human.’ From a tourism perspective, Urry (1990) has argued that tourism has become a postmodern phenomenon in response to the development of parallel culture. Other scholars (Poon, 1989; Mullins, 1991; Page, 1995) have discerned a Fordist to post-Fordist transition in the structure of the tourism industry as it moves from mass production to
consumption dominated by the service sector. Based on a more economocentric view of the forces of change, Fordism views the world in metaphorical terms of the means and ownership of production. Poon (1989) relatedly has suggested an alternative view based on new and old tourism.

However, it is clear that the forces of change described by these scholars are relatively recent in origin and ignore the early history of tourism. Modernist and Fordist metaphors are not the products of tourism research and, for this reason, have largely overlooked tourism, even though in recent years some analysts have made valiant attempts to incorporate elements of tourism into Fordism and modernism (see Feiffer, 1985; Harvey, 1989; Urry, 1990, 1995). Perhaps the notion that, in the past, tourism was often considered a trivial pursuit, not worthy of serious study (Davidson and Spearritt, 2001) is the primary cause for the neglect of this aspect of tourism until quite recently.

A problem that arises from adapting 20th-century industrial production to the psychological and social theories that can interpret it is that tourism had its origins in the distant past when many of the forces determining such production were not yet present (see Ioannides and Debbage (1997) for a fuller discussion). Taken from another perspective, many of the issues that affect production in the current era and the parallel great debates on theories of society will be entries about previous eras of economic organization in future history books, while tourism itself will in all probability continue to prosper as it has already done for centuries. Fordism and postmodernism have considerable appeal as platforms for explaining contemporary tourism issues, but their long-term utility is doubtful because of the rapidity of change in production frameworks and the structure of society over the longer term. In an alternative thesis proposed by Rojek (1993), the development of the concept of ‘holiday’ is seen as an evolutionary process based on efforts to maintain preferred social arrangements. Ryan (1997) questions this approach, asking if the process is more apparent than real, and, secondly, if real, whether there are inconsistencies in it.

While reliance on the metaphors of Fordism and post-Fordism, modernism and postmodernism (particularly Urry, 1990) to describe the touristic experience in the latter part of the 20th century can provide a useful interpretative framework, this observation does not extend to periods before that time or to the cyberworld described in this chapter. In the future, innovative technologies will create new opportunities and new metaphors for touristic experiences, many of which were not apparent at the opening of the 21st century. The emergence of cybertourism parallels the present, where new technologies, including commercial passenger jets and computers, allied with major cultural and social changes and rapid economic expansion, have underpinned the changes that have facilitated the shift from modernism to postmodernism. Neither Urry’s (1990) definition of postmodernism based on de-differentiation nor any other similar contemporary metaphor is likely to be sufficient to describe the possible range of changes
that are to occur in the future. Consequently, it is argued that an alternative metaphor is needed that can both accommodate these changes as well as sit alongside current understandings.

What is needed is a metaphor that can explain both changes in the structure of the tourism industry and the goals of the tourist over a much longer time frame than is implicit in existing frameworks based on modernism and Fordism. Such a metaphor should also be able to incorporate previous metaphors in its interpretation of the changes that have occurred during the period that these explanations had currency. There is an obvious connection between the introduction of new technology and the expansion of the physical presence of tourism to most corners of the globe as well as expansion in the number of participants. In the past, transport technology was a strong candidate as a key indicator of tourism development in so far as it provided the means for travel (Prideaux, 2000a; Seekings, 2001). In the future, technologies that will define and shape the tourism industry are likely to be those associated with the introduction of cybertourism, new hyper-sonic aircraft and space travel. In the sense used here, transport and cybertourism technologies are viewed as the outcome of a series of advances in science and economic organization.

Interpretations of the past invariably influence perceptions of the present and the route that society has taken to arrive at the here and now. However, history is a reconstruction of the past often filtered through invisible biases, themselves the unseen consequences of family events, personal belief systems and the dominant cultural structures of contemporary life. To select technology as a point of reference for the evolution of tourism to date is to choose an obvious tourism variable. Some will surely disagree, but focusing on the means of transport from origin to destination is an effective benchmark for classifying the development of tourism to the present, as transport is one of the products of advances in the scientific and economic structure of society. From the time of the Sumerians to the development of the steam engine as a means of propulsion in the 19th century, basic road and sea transport technology changed little. In a period of less than 100 years after the harnessing of steam for railways, new transport technologies revolutionized travel by sea; cars were developed and air travel was introduced on a commercial basis. This 100-year period was fundamental to developing the contemporary tourism system where travel became cheap, safe, fast, long haul and comfortable for the first time in history. Paralleling the development of new technologies were the liberating forces of mass production, which, in a relatively short time, freed the vast majority of the working class from the drudgery of rural squalor and urban slums and endowed them with new opportunities for leisure and travel.

Transport can also be singled out as a major factor for interpreting tourism’s history, because it is only through the introduction of new transport technologies that much of the travail that bedevilled early travel was
reduced, to the extent that more recent descriptions of travel do not incorporate references to all the adversity that was associated with such pain. In the late 20th century, use of the term ‘travel’ indicates a higher sense of safety and comfort than implied by travail in earlier times. Transport thus furnishes a useful benchmark for identifying and classifying major tourism eras, at least until the present. Neither Fordism nor modernism, or any other popular metaphor, is able to encompass a view of tourism that includes such a wide sweep of history. Therefore, there is a need to consider an alternative interpretation of tourism based on the past, together with the impact that new forms of social and economic organization have had on society, and coupled with the changes to society and the economy brought about by the introduction of new technologies.

This chapter speculates on how new cybertourism opportunities may alter the patterns of travel and even the types of experiences available to future tourists. New technologies, including hypersonic jets, may reduce travel times, but other considerations, including time and money, will force at least some potential tourists to engage in cybertourism built on simulations. To describe these changes a new metaphor – the Tourism Evolution Model – is proposed. It identifies three eras: contemporary to describe the present, pre-contemporary to describe the past, and post-contemporary to describe the future.

**Pre-contemporary**

This period commenced before written records were kept and concluded with Thomas Cook’s 1841 adaptation of rail for passenger transport. At least from the time of the development of the wheel and paved roads by the Sumerians and the introduction of sailing boats on the River Nile in about 2700 BC (Casson, 1974), transport technology changed little. In Sumerian times, as at the opening of the 19th century, animals and animal-drawn wagons were the predominant land transport technology, and wooden sailing boats were the only means of sea travel. Steam, first used as the locomotive power for railways and soon after for ships, became the dynamo for rapid increase in speed, safety and carrying capacity on land and water, causing a revolution in travel. There were, of course, many changes in the composition of the groups of travellers during this period, but the act of travel remained straight-jacketed by the dominant transport technologies until the introduction of steam engines in the 19th century.

**Contemporary**

The contemporary era of tourism commenced with the introduction of new transport technologies that emanated from the scientific fervour spawned by
the Industrial Revolution. Based on these technologies, a growing accumulation of wealth and rapid social changes, travel became increasingly popular and available to an ever-widening circle of people until the ultimate expression of travel for all emerged in the form of mass tourism. This era is likely to continue to dominate until cybertourism offers an alternative form of travel that is within the self-consciousness of the individual and not an external physical act. The present era of long-haul travel by jet, mass tourism and the domination of most terrestrial areas by car are likely to be described in the future as the pinnacle of the contemporary era.

It is possible to discern a number of stages in the evolution of transport and tourism during this period. Steam was the predominant technology in the first stage running from 1841 to the 1920s, when a growing trend towards ownership of cars resulted in the relinquishing of rail’s primary position on land to the greater mobility of the private car. The auto’s dominance was brief and, within several decades, land and sea travel was again revolutionized by affordable commercial air services. These technological advances created the infrastructure for the development of mass tourism in the latter part of the century.

Post-contemporary

In the coming post-contemporary era, the tourist gaze will enable participants to be removed from the physical constraints of structures that currently define the boundary between the authentic and the contrived to move into a cyberworld where voyeurs will become participants able to write their own scripts for the touristic experience they enjoy. However, the process of converting what can be described as today’s science fiction into science fact is at least several decades away and will depend on new technologies similar to those previously discussed.

For the tourism industry, the eventual emergence of cybertourism will offer many new opportunities as well as posing several real threats. Marketers will use this technology as a lure, and destination operators will be able to promote cyber experiences as a supplement to the existing spectrum of physical experiences. But the control of the experience and the degree to which individuals are prepared to allow intrusions within their body and even conscious sense of self to establish the necessary human–machine links to operate cybertourism will determine the limits of the cyber experience.

Discussion

The process of change from the physical to the electronic experience has already begun, but the former remains the defining barrier to the degree of
interactivity that is possible. The change from the physical to the cyber is a development that will occur in phases, none of which needs to be sequential. W. Carter (2001, personal communication, The University of Queensland, Gatton College), for example, sees the evolution as one involving a move from supplementation to complementarity to substitution. The widespread adoption of computer gaming able to provide pre-packaged ‘authentic’ experiences, allied with the need to limit the physical presence of tourists in some sensitive localities, may hasten the speed at which the process occurs. A logical outcome will also be the ability to mix the past with the present and the future. Where now the contemporary voyeur looks upon an exhibit of life from the past in a passive sense, the post-contemporary voyeur will become an interactive participant transcending the physical for the cyberworld in a pseudo-active experience that is a substitute for the passive.

Group experiences will be difficult, though not impossible, to produce, and will affect the ability of participants to control their individuality. From another perspective, the ability to individualize a person’s travel preferences according to time, the parameters of the gaze and the mix of activities point to the development of new possibilities for unique travel experiences. There also exists the potential for creating a new personalized tourism dimension where there may be some preference for collecting electronic experiences rather than real travel hours. Trends of this nature are evident in the usage profiles of Internet users. The degree to which people participate in tourism as individuals (versus in a group or in real situations) may hinge on their future ability to travel in real, as opposed to virtual, space. If one accepts the position that humans are essentially social beings who enjoy the company of their fellows, it is more likely that most people will continue to enjoy the physical nature of travel. However, outside influences of the nature previously discussed may intervene to preclude at least some of the real opportunities for future tourists. The concept of individuality and the ability to change the human consciousness from external sources is an area that still requires lengthy debate. These factors might be the product of war, political uncertainty, the need to preserve sensitive sites or the low cost of cyber-tourism experiences. In the recent past, desirable tourism destinations, such as Dubrovnik and Kashmir, have been isolated from the tourism industry by war, while sensitive sites, such as the Lascaux Cave, are sealed because of the risk of environmental damage.

The ideas underlying the classification of tourism according to market outcomes and technology lie at one end of a spectrum that spans a wide range of views on the structure of the tourism experience. At one end of the continuum, Ryan (1990: 14), cited in Ryan (1997), notes, ‘tourism is, in essence, not a market, nor an industry, not a system, but the ideas or ideologies of tourists and the behaviour of people in touristic roles.’ At the other end, scholars employ an organicist metaphor of tourism. For example, Mill and Morrison (1985) and Leiper (1990) view tourism as a system, with
the market providing a fundamental basis for organization, with clearly identified goals.

This chapter, by contrast, takes the view that tourism is a market where travellers draw on the accumulated wealth of society in order to generate the disposable income that is available to fund personal travel, and where a part of the wealth generated by society is available for investment in commercial and public enterprises that provide the supply of touristic goods and services. From the operation of the market springs the creativity of science that supplies the technology to activate developments in transport and cyber industries as well as creating the demand for these products and services.

**Conclusion**

While there are likely to be numerous opportunities for cyber technologies to provide a substitute for physical tourism experiences, for marketing and even preserving the earth’s unique places and landscapes, there are also lurking perils for the individual and the industry. There is a very real danger that eventually there will emerge a world where there are no clear distinctions between the human brain and computers. There are other risks in combining nanobots and new advanced computers in order to lay the foundations for cybertourism, particularly in issues including a possible loss of individual identity and the ownership of experiences. As a consequence, it is imperative to consider whether or not cybertourism will create potentially hazardous situations for human welfare. These are ethical questions that only appear as vague possibilities at present but, given the recent history of rapid technological advance, it is entirely possible that the future is literally just around the corner.

The coming cyber age points to the need for a new metaphor that seeks to understand the tourist in a changing social world – a world that has evolved and will continue to evolve. The proposed Tourism Evolution Model furnishes such a framework using advances in technology as the benchmark for suggesting a simple yet definitive explanation for the great shifts in the structure of tourism. The model recognizes that technological benchmarks are only the outward manifestations of the social and economic forces that continually shape and reshape society and culture. Contemporary theories are not denied by the framework, since they are useful for understanding the conditions in society that create the scientific appetite for change. However, the proposed model goes beyond these theories to provide a tourism-centric explanation for the changes that have occurred and will take place in the structure and operation of the tourism industry. As it stands, the model is rather naked and in need of fuller description, including the identification of microperiods during each major era. In a future discourse, it is desirable that the contemporary period will be described in greater detail, particularly in terms of the technological changes.
that caused the shift from pre-contemporary to contemporary. This task is left to a future occasion.

In the meantime, it can be seen that cybertourism offers many potential opportunities for marketing, sampling and comparison by customers, travel to difficult places, travel by tourists with disabilities and perhaps exotic adventure when the technology is developed. While marketing is likely to be a key use for cybertourism, it is possible that the leader in this area will be the sex tourist. Although the advantages of cybertourism are attractive, its dark side is an issue that cannot be avoided, and should be the matter of a full and long discussion prior to its introduction at some point in the future. The fanfares for the technological achievement that will surely accompany the leap into a forthcoming nanobot-powered, virtual reality may well become the funeral march for humanity’s ability to exist as unique reasoning individuals. The future is bleak unless the gloss of the voyeur’s gaze is tempered with the reality of the consequences of assigning control of the mind to an external technology and its controllers.

Notes

1Although ‘model’ and ‘metaphor’ are often considered as distinct terms in everyday parlance, here they are treated interchangeably. After all, a model is only a paradigmatic representation of reality based on similitude.

2Little did they know of the events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, DC.

3In 2000, US President Bill Clinton established the multiagency National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) to be supported by US$422 million in the federal fiscal year ending 30 September 2001 (Stix, 2001).

4There is a lack of unanimity on a definition of nanotechnology, which can be described as an amalgam of individual atoms and molecules harnessed for some specific function. According to Mahail C. Roco (quoted in Stix (2001: 28)), the emerging field of nanotechnology ‘deals with materials and systems having these key properties: they have at least one dimension of about one to 100 nanometers, they are designed through processes that exhibit fundamental control over the physical and chemical attributes of molecular-scale structures, and they can be combined to form larger structures.’

5Surprisingly, some other metaphors, including those of structuralism and post-structuralism (see Weiner, 1993), and more recent approaches, comprising post-humanism and post-humanism body frameworks (see Davis, 1997), have failed to gain similar acceptance.

6Current metaphors are limited in their ability to describe past experiences of travel, commencing with the unrecorded accounts of those who travelled far and wide to settle the most distant parts of the globe, and extending to the commentaries of Herodotus written in the 5th century BC.
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